



CAMBRIDGE CLASSICAL STUDIES

Absolute Constructions in Early Indo-European

ANTONIA RUPPEL

CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE

more information - www.cambridge.org/9780521767620

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

Absolute Constructions in Early Indo-European

In the past, discussions about absolute constructions (ACs) have been limited by an imprecise understanding of what ACs are. By examining the nature and function of ACs and related constructions in Greek, Latin and Sanskrit, this new study arrives at a clear and simple definition of ACs. Focusing on the earliest attested material in each language, it highlights how AC usage differs between languages and offers explanations for these differences. Identifying the common core shared by all ACs, it suggests a starting point and way by which they developed into Greek, Latin and Sanskrit. Further historical study reveals how ACs have been conceived of by grammarians, philologists and even Christian missionaries over the last two thousand years and how enduring misconceptions still affect our discussion of them today. All Sanskrit material is annotated in detail, making it accessible for classicists in particular and allowing a better understanding of ACs in Greek and Latin.

ANTONIA RUPPEL is the Townsend Senior Lecturer in the Greek, Latin and Sanskrit Languages at Cornell University.

CAMBRIDGE CLASSICAL STUDIES

General editors

R. L. HUNTER, R. G. OSBORNE, M. MILLETT,
D. N. SEDLEY, G. C. HORROCKS, S. P. OAKLEY,
W. M. BEARD

ABSOLUTE CONSTRUCTIONS IN EARLY
INDO-EUROPEAN

ANTONIA RUPPEL



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521767620

© Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge 2013

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2013

Printed and Bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Ruppel, Antonia.

Absolute constructions in early Indo-European / Antonia Ruppel.

pages ; cm. – (Cambridge classical studies)

ISBN 978-0-521-76762-0 (hardback)

1. Indo-European languages – Absolute constructions.

2. Grammar, Comparative and general – Absolute constructions.

I. Title. II. Series: Cambridge classical studies.

P671.R86 2013

415 – dc23 2012019059

ISBN 978-0-521-76762-0 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to
in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such
websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>page viii</i>
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	<i>x</i>
<i>Note on translations</i>	<i>xiv</i>
I The AC so far	I
1.1 Why do we need another study of absolute constructions?	1
1.2 Prior research on ACs	4
1.2.a The history of the term ‘absolute’	4
1.2.b The definition of ACs	7
1.2.b.i No definition	7
1.2.b.ii Description instead of definition	8
1.2.b.iii Sentence appositions	11
1.2.b.iv Unusual case usage	12
1.2.b.v Dominant participles	13
1.2.b.vi Summary	14
1.2.c How did ACs arise?	15
1.2.c.i No view expressed	16
1.2.c.ii Grammatical vs. semantic case usage	17
1.2.c.iii OV to VO: Lehmann’s explanation	22
1.2.c.iv Transformation	23
1.2.c.v A promising approach	25
1.2.d Links between ACs and other constructions	27
1.2.e Summary	28
1.3 The scope of this study	28
1.4 Summary of findings	30
2 Early Greek	33
2.1 Introduction	33
2.2 The Genitive Absolute in Homer: an overview	36
2.2.a General	36
2.2.b Ambiguities	38
2.2.c The nature of the absolute participle	41
2.2.d Semantics	42
2.3 Homeric questions	44
2.3.a ‘Lateness’: a preamble	45

CONTENTS

2.3.b Further components: signs of development?	46
2.3.c Transitivity	50
2.3.d Genitive participles instead of an expected conjunct participle	57
2.3.e Summary	64
2.4 Future research? The Homeric GA in comparison with other means of grammatical subordination	65
2.5 The GA in Hesiod	68
2.6 The GA in the seventh and sixth centuries BC	73
2.7 Absolute participles and related phenomena	76
2.8 Conclusions	79
3 Early Latin	82
3.1 Introduction	82
3.2 The Latin Ablative Absolute: an overview	83
3.2.a The formal make-up of the AA	83
3.2.b The AA in Early Latin: formal make-up and semantic types	86
3.2.c Classical Latin	88
3.3 Delineating the AA semantically: absolute and other ablatives	89
3.4 Delineating the AA syntactically: obligatory and dominant nominal qualifiers across Latin	97
3.4.a The <i>ab urbe condita</i> construction (AUC)	97
3.4.b The gerundive	102
3.4.c Summary	108
3.5 'Nominal' ACs in Latin	108
3.5.a Adjectival AAs	109
3.5.b Comparative matters	115
3.5.c Substantival AAs	117
3.5.d *sens	121
3.6 ACs in Italic	122
3.7 Conclusions	123
4 The Sanskrit locative absolute and its syntactic surroundings	127
4.1 Introduction	127
4.2 Sanskrit literature: a brief sketch	128
4.3 Some elements of Sanskrit grammar	130
4.3.a Nominal expressions and case syntax	130
4.3.b The Sanskrit locative absolute	137
4.4 Supposedly absolute locatives in the <i>Rigveda</i>	139
4.4.a Time	139
4.4.b Time, space and probably both	143

CONTENTS

4.4.c	Space	145
4.4.d	Excursus: a particularly tricky case	148
4.5	Actual Rigvedic LAs: expressions of natural time	153
4.6	LAs in context	156
4.7	The Sanskrit perspective	159
4.8	The origins of the Western perspective	165
4.9	Conclusions	168
5	Proto-Indo-European roots of ACs	172
5.1	Introduction	172
5.2	Recapitulation: what makes ACs absolute?	173
5.2.a	What does not make them absolute	173
5.2.b	What does make them absolute: the obligatory qualifier	176
5.3	Obligatory and apparently obligatory qualifiers: a cross-linguistic look	176
5.3.a	The AUC	177
5.3.b	Various case usages	185
5.3.c	Conclusions	190
5.4	The elements of the AC	192
5.4.a	Participles	192
5.4.b	Case	200
5.5	Proto-Indo-European	206
5.5.a	ACs in PIE	207
5.5.b	AUCs and ‘nominal’ ACs	214
5.6	From PIE into the daughter languages	216
5.6.a	Sanskrit	216
5.6.b	Latin	217
5.6.c	Greek	219
5.7	Absolute or not: an excursus	222
5.8	Conclusions	224
<i>Appendix 1 Literature on ACs</i>		230
<i>Appendix 2 ACs, potential ACs and constructions similar to ACs</i>		233
<i>Bibliography</i>		236
<i>Index of cited passages</i>		251
<i>General index</i>		254

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The existence of this book, which is based on the thesis for which I was awarded a PhD by the University of Cambridge in 2008, was made possible by the copious support I received from friends, teachers, colleagues and funding bodies.

For my PhD, I received a fees-only grant from what was then the AHRB; a scholarship from the Gates Cambridge Trust kept me comfortably fed, clothed and housed. I am especially grateful to the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes, which kept me in their *ideelle Förderung*. Throughout my graduate studies, Newnham College provided a physical and intellectual home, the basis of numerous friendships, and gardens to lose myself in whenever the uncertainties of a multi-year project that might never lead to anything were becoming too much. (The cats roaming those gardens also provided great emotional support; I hope they are still well.)

Sincere thanks go to Torsten Meißner, not just for being a truly inspiring teacher, but also for saying two things that have greatly influenced my academic career: ‘Sanskrit is *always* useful’ (1998; had I not started learning Sanskrit when I did, I would not have been able to take up my current job teaching, among other languages, Sanskrit) and ‘Then why don’t you write your PhD on absolute constructions?’ (2001, the effects of which need no further explanation). I am enormously indebted to James Clackson, the Supervisor Better Than Which None Can Be Imagined, who saw my thesis through to its completion even after I had moved to the US. Draft chapters e-mailed to Cambridge in the evening were often returned with detailed comments by the following day; his suggested timeline for completion, which ends with the line ‘August – have completed thesis, open champagne’ still hangs on the wall above my desk. Geoffrey Horrocks oversaw the early stages of my thesis work, was always available for questions and

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

offered extremely helpful comments on how to rework the PhD into this book. Many thanks also to Rupert Thompson and David Langslow, my thesis examiners, who at my viva offered me not only very detailed and constructive feedback, but also some rather nice white wine. It is due to Pietro Pucci's influence and kindness that I was able to get a study in Cornell's main research library, a quiet haven, free from nearby a-cappella groups, that allowed me to concentrate fully on my work whenever I needed to. Eloïse Cucui kindly shared her and her father's knowledge of traditional shepherding and sheep keeping. Andrew Ketley, Nicholas Denyer, Penny Needham, Emma Beddoe and Daphne Gerling came to my rescue when I was at a loss for idiomatic English phrasing. Wayles Browne, Coulter George, Toon van Hal, Stephanie Jamison, David Mankin, Alan Nussbaum, Stephen Oakley and Michael Weiss all kindly shared their expertise with me at various stages of this study.

Among the many who helped me with their advice, friendship and good cheer, I wish to thank especially Annetta Alexandridis, Gizem Arslan, Jack Austin, Anne Blackburn, Allison Boex, Charles Brittain, Irene Depetris Chauvin, Martin Dinter, Kate Horning, Helen Imhoff, Joshua Katz, Erik Kenyon, Hayden Pelliccia, Caroline Ross, Chad and Rossitza Schroeder, Anke Timmermann and Noriko Yasumura.

My greatest debt is to my parents, Elisabeth and Heinrich Ruppel, who have never stopped believing in me and without whose unconditional love and support I would not be the person I am today. I dedicate this book to them.

ABBREVIATIONS

See Bibliography for abbreviations of periodicals and reference works.

A. A.	Aeschylus, <i>Agamemnon</i>
AB	<i>Aitareya Brāhmaṇa</i>
BG	<i>Bhagavad Gītā</i>
Caes. Gal.	Caesar, <i>De Bello Gallico</i>
Cato Agr.	Cato the Elder, <i>De Agri Cultura</i>
Cic.	Cicero
Amic.	<i>De Amicitia</i>
Att.	<i>Epistulae ad Atticum</i>
Brut.	<i>Brutus</i>
Fam.	<i>Epistulae ad Familiares</i>
Fin.	<i>De Finibus</i>
Inv.	<i>De Inventione</i>
Leg.	<i>De Legibus</i>
Off.	<i>De Officiis</i>
Orat.	<i>Orator</i>
Part.	<i>Partitiones Oratoriae</i>
Phil.	<i>Philippicae</i>
Pis.	<i>In Pisonem</i>
Quinct.	<i>Pro Quinctio</i>
Sen.	<i>De Senectute</i>
Ver.	<i>In Verrem</i>
Gel.	Aulus Gellius, <i>Noctes Atticae</i>
Hdt.	Herodotus, <i>Histories</i>
Hes.	Hesiod
Op.	<i>Works and Days</i>
Sc.	<i>Shield of Hercules</i>
Th.	<i>Theogony</i>
Hit.	<i>Hitopadeśa</i>

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Hor.	Horace
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epodes</i>
<i>Sat.</i>	<i>Satires</i>
<i>Il.</i>	<i>Iliad</i>
<i>JB</i>	<i>Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa</i>
<i>Kā.</i>	<i>Kālidāsa</i>
<i>Abhi.</i>	<i>Abhijñānaśākuntala</i>
<i>Ku.</i>	<i>Kumārasaṃbhava</i>
<i>Kath.</i>	<i>Kathāsaritsāgara</i>
<i>KB</i>	<i>Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa</i>
<i>Nep. Alcib.</i>	<i>Nepos, Alcibiades</i>
<i>Od.</i>	<i>Odyssey</i>
<i>Ov.</i>	<i>Ovid</i>
<i>Fast.</i>	<i>Fasti</i>
<i>Met.</i>	<i>Metamorphoses</i>
<i>Pac.</i>	<i>Pacuvius</i>
<i>Pi.</i>	<i>Pindar</i>
<i>O.</i>	<i>Olympians</i>
<i>P.</i>	<i>Pythians</i>
<i>Pl.</i>	<i>Plautus</i>
<i>Am.</i>	<i>Amphitryo</i>
<i>Aul.</i>	<i>Aulularia</i>
<i>Bac.</i>	<i>Bacchides</i>
<i>Capt.</i>	<i>Captivi</i>
<i>Cas.</i>	<i>Casina</i>
<i>Cist.</i>	<i>Cistellaria</i>
<i>Cur.</i>	<i>Curculio</i>
<i>Epid.</i>	<i>Epidicus</i>
<i>Men.</i>	<i>Menaechmi</i>
<i>Mil.</i>	<i>Miles Gloriosus</i>
<i>Mos.</i>	<i>Mostellaria</i>
<i>Per.</i>	<i>Persae</i>
<i>Poen.</i>	<i>Poenulus</i>
<i>Ps.</i>	<i>Pseudolus</i>
<i>Rud.</i>	<i>Rudens</i>
<i>St.</i>	<i>Stichus</i>
<i>Trin.</i>	<i>Trinummus</i>
<i>Truc.</i>	<i>Truculentus</i>

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Plin. <i>Nat.</i>	Pliny the Elder, <i>Naturalis Historia</i>
Plt.	Plato
<i>Ap.</i>	<i>Apology</i>
<i>Lg.</i>	<i>Laws</i>
<i>Tim.</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>
<i>Rām.</i>	<i>Rāmāyaṇa</i>
<i>RV</i>	<i>Rigveda</i>
<i>ŚB</i>	<i>Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa</i>
Sen.	Seneca the Elder
<i>Con.</i>	<i>Controversiae</i>
<i>Suas.</i>	<i>Suasoriae</i>
Tac. <i>Ann.</i>	Tacitus, <i>Annals</i>
<i>TB</i>	<i>Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa</i>
Ter.	Terence
<i>Ad.</i>	<i>Adelphoe</i>
<i>An.</i>	<i>Andria</i>
<i>Eu.</i>	<i>Eunuch</i>
<i>Hau.</i>	<i>Heauton Timorumenos</i>
<i>Hec.</i>	<i>Hecyra</i>
<i>Ph.</i>	<i>Phormio</i>
Th.	Thucydides
<i>TS</i>	<i>Taittirīya Saṃhita</i>
X.	Xenophon
<i>An.</i>	<i>Anabasis</i>
<i>Hell.</i>	<i>Hellenica</i>
<i>Lac.</i>	<i>Republica Lacedaemoniorum</i>

AA	Ablative Absolute
Abl	ablative
AC	absolute construction
Acc	accusative
Act	active
Adv	adverb
AUC	<i>ab urbe condita</i> construction
Dat	dative
Du	dual
Fem	feminine
Fut	future

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GA	Genitive Absolute
Gen	genitive
IE	Indo-European
Impf	imperfect
Impv	imperative
Indecl	indeclinable
Instr	instrumental
LA	Locative Absolute
Loc	locative
Masc	masculine
Nom	nominative
Ntr	neuter
Opt	optative
Pass	passive
Perf	perfect
PIE	Proto-Indo-European
Pl	plural
Pres	present
Ptc	participle
Ptcl	particle
Sg	singular
Subj	subjunctive
Voc	vocative

NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS

The translations of Latin and Greek texts in this book are generally taken from or based on the Loeb editions; where possible, Sanskrit texts and translations are taken from or based on the Clay Sanskrit Library. Notable exceptions: translations of Homer are taken from or based on the translations by Robert Fagles (1990 and 1996); translations of the *Rigveda* are based on those of Griffith (1896). Wherever necessary, I have adapted translations to be more literal.

THE AC SO FAR

1.1 Why do we need another study of absolute constructions?

Most Western philologists first encounter absolute constructions (ACs) when they learn Latin.¹ At some point after the introduction of the conjunct participle, an apparently related participle construction is mentioned: a conjunct participle always agrees with its head. Yet if the head of the participle is not included in the main clause, both the participle and its head will stand in the ablative. They are to be translated as a finite subordinate clause, with the head noun as subject and the participle as verb.

his confectis rebus conventibusque peractis in citiorem Galliam revertitur.

‘When these matters were settled and the assizes conducted, he returned to Hither Gaul.’ (Caes. *Gal.* 5.2.1)

Often, teachers of Greek who know that their students have already studied Latin will preface their explanation of the genitive absolute (GA) with the words that it is ‘just like’ the ablative absolute (AA) in Latin, but standing in a different case.

ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ κήρυκος λέγεται Κύρον ἐπειρέσθαι τοὺς παρεόν-
τας...

‘When the herald had proclaimed this, Cyrus is said to have asked those who were present...’ (Hdt. 1.153)

The classes in which most of us are introduced to Latin and Greek (and thus to ACs) aim at allowing us to translate texts written in these old languages into the modern language that we speak ourselves. In many cases, there is only a small difference between understanding what a language is saying and understanding how

¹ See Sluiter 2000 on how the Latin ablative absolute has been taught throughout the centuries.

to translate this into our own language. At least if one's mother tongue is a member of the Indo-European family, there will be great overlap between the categories in its grammar and those in the grammar of Latin or Greek. Looking at finite verb forms, for example, we can say that there is a straightforward functional correspondence between the personal ending *-o* in forms such as Latin *audio* and the personal pronoun *I* in forms such as English *I listen*: each marks a verb as a first person singular. Yet in ACs, there is no such one-to-one correspondence: their most idiomatic translation into e.g. English – often: finite subordinate clauses – is far removed from how they actually function.

Scholarly research on ACs has been conducted for about 200 years.² Yet too much of it appears to have been influenced by how Western academics first encounter ACs. Cicero and Caesar are usually read long before Plautus and Terence. Thus, our view of a 'typical' Latin AA actually focuses on a form of the construction in the Classical language that has likely been influenced by literary Greek. Statements on 'the nature of ACs' tend to falsely generalise across time periods and languages. Secondly, ACs are usually looked at in isolation (perhaps an unconscious effect of how the meaning of the word 'absolute' is perceived). Grammatically very similar phenomena such as the *ab urbe condita* construction (AUC), for example, are rarely discussed in studies of ACs,³ and there is no systematic discussion of the two kinds of construction side by side. This has the effect that many scholars working on ACs never state what their definition of 'absolute' is, or in other words: what they see as the defining feature that makes absolute constructions absolute and that delineates them from other expressions. Instead of definitions, we find descriptions, many of which refer to how ACs are to be translated. Other descriptions are insufficient because they could equally well be applied to various other

² The oldest treatise I am aware of is Eduard Wentzel's 1828 dissertation *De genetivis et dativis linguae Graecae, quos absolutos vocant*. He in turn mentions others which I have not been able to identify.

³ The exceptions here are Pinkster 1990: 132 (who mentions the AA in a discussion of the AUC, or rather of the 'dominant participle construction', a category that includes AA and AUC), Menge 2000: 717–18 and Ziegler 2002, who also refers to Pinkster. Bauer, who discusses AUCs at 2000: 236–48, briefly mentions them in her discussion of ACs at 2000: 277.

adverbial expressions. The definitions that we do find (such as Keydana 1997: 9–26)⁴ may be seen as relying too heavily on the strongly verbal features of ACs that we find mainly in one language, namely Greek, which happens to have the furthest developed ACs from its earliest literary attestations on.⁵ All these factors – a missing precise definition, insufficient attention to the differences between ACs in the single languages, lack of consideration of the environment of ACs – have furthermore impeded speculation about the diachronic question of how these constructions came to be.

It is the aim of this present study to arrive at a definition of ACs that applies across the Indo-European languages in which these constructions occur and that, in spite of the number of borderline cases in all languages involved, allows us to say clearly whether a specific expression is absolute or not. On the basis of this definition and the constructions it applies to, an attempt at reconstructing the Proto-Indo-European (PIE) origin of ACs will be made. This reconstruction will involve two steps: identifying first the source in the mother language from which ACs originally came to be, and then the ways by which they subsequently developed into the single daughter languages. When structurally similar linguistic phenomena occur in related languages, comparative philologists ascribe this to a shared origin in the language from which the languages in question developed. For ACs, a straightforward reconstruction to PIE is not possible as the cases in which they are attested (most notably the genitive in Greek, the ablative in Latin and the locative in Sanskrit) cannot be led back to one case in PIE. Most past studies have thus not offered a reconstruction of the exact PIE source of ACs. This study will attempt to do just that.

⁴ ‘Descriptive thing function’, ‘formally speaking, a participial nominalising operation’ (‘[D]escriptive Dingfunktion’, ‘formal eine partizipiale Nominalisierungsoperation’, 1997: 21).

⁵ Cf. Keydana’s justification of his approach: ‘The following description is based on the intuitively perceptible link between ACs and independent finite sentences. There apparently is a direct connection between ACs and sentences as the former contain more or less the same constituents as the latter.’ (‘Die folgende Beschreibung geht von dem intuitiv wahrnehmbaren Zusammenhang zwischen ABS und unabhängigen finiten Sätzen aus. ABS stehen offenbar in einem direkten Zusammenhang mit Sätzen, denn sie enthalten in mehr oder minder großem Umfang dieselben Konstituenten wie diese’, 1997: 9).

After an overview of the prior research on this subject (Chapter 1), one chapter each will outline the grammatical situation of ACs in the three old Indo-European languages in which they are attested without doubt and in numbers that allow any meaningful study: Greek, Latin and Sanskrit (Chapters 2–4). Chapter 5 will then attempt to combine the information and discussions presented in the previous three chapters and offer the reconstruction outlined above.

1.2 Prior research on ACs

The corpus of work on ACs is extensive,⁶ and several authors have prefaced their work with an overview of research past.⁷ Rather than repeat what they have done, I shall focus only on those elements which seem key to further advancing our understanding of ACs. Specifically, these are (a) our understanding of the meaning of the term ‘absolute’, (b) the definition of what makes ACs absolute, (c) theories on the points from which and means by which ACs developed and finally (d) the syntactic environment of ACs. Whenever a particular treatise merits it, I shall discuss it on its own in greater detail.

1.2.a The history of the term ‘absolute’

The definition of ACs and our understanding of the term ‘absolute’ are two different matters, and yet the former often seems affected by the latter.⁸ A look at the history of this technical term thus seems merited.

To my knowledge, past discussions of ACs have not paid attention to the first uses of *absolute* as a grammatical *terminus technicus*. Yet this early history is rather interesting. In late antiquity, the term ἀπολελυμένος was used by Dionysius Thrax (e.g. at 44.6) and Apollonius Dyscolus (e.g. at *Syntax* 97.20). Its Latin translation *absolutus* is found in Priscian (e.g. at 2.062: ‘Absolutum est quod per se intellegitur et non eget alterius

⁶ See Appendix 1 for a list of prior discussions in reference works, monographs and articles.

⁷ See most recently e.g. Holland 1986, Keydana 1997 or Maiocco 2005.

⁸ This is discussed e.g. at Keydana 1997: 1–8 or Sluiter 2000 *passim*.

coniunctione.’)⁹ It is used to denote e.g. intransitive as opposed to transitive verbs, cases such as nominative and vocative, or primary, i.e. non-derived adjectives (such as ἀγαθός). It thus is a rather general term meaning ‘not linked’ or ‘not requiring a link’ (for understanding) in very general syntactic and etymological terms.

The next attestations of the term *absolutus* that we find are discussed by Keydana (1997), Sluiter (2000) and Maiocco (2005). By the High Middle Ages, the term *absolutus* had been applied to the constructions that are still called *absolute* today. The earliest work in which this term is attested in the modern meaning is Alberic of Montecassino’s eleventh-century *De dictamine*.¹⁰ Contrary to what Maiocco says, we do not actually know whether this term was chosen ‘with reference to [the construction’s] syntactic looseness’ (2005: 8), or with any other aspect of unconnectedness in mind.¹¹ For Alberic, whose *De dictamine* is a manual on good written style, the main condition for using an AA is a difference in subjects between the matrix clause and the participle.¹²

In other words: the term *absolutus* was not originally employed in the way in which we use it now, and we do not know for certain why it came to be used in this way later. As Keydana (1997: 6) points out, Alberic’s words show that the name ‘*ablativus absolutus*’ must already have been a fixed technical term in his times. We thus know neither who first used *absolutus* in the modern sense, nor his motivations for doing so. Yet authors such as Hirt (1937: 92) seem to imply that we know what ‘absolute’ means: ‘A noun stands linked to a participle without there being the possibility of construing it as dependent on a verb, *thus apparently absolute* [italics mine]’.¹³ As Serbat (1979: 341) rightly points out, there seems

⁹ A detailed list of attestations can be found at García Ramón and Gutiérrez Galindo 2001 s.v. ‘*absolut-*’. For editions of Dionysius Thrax and Apollonius Dyscolus, see Uhlig 1883 and Schneider and Uhlig 1873–1910, respectively.

¹⁰ Sluiter 2000: 394–5.

¹¹ After all, these expressions are no more ‘syntactically loose’ than other adverbial expressions of time.

¹² ‘*Ablativus absolutus presentis [sic] participii fiet, cum eiusdem temporis sed diversarum personarum vel numerorum verba sine retransitione ponuntur: ego lego tu canis: me legente tu canis, vel te canente ego lego*’; text as quoted by Scaglione 1970: 136–7.

¹³ ‘Es steht ein Nomen mit einem Partizipium verbunden, ohne daß dieses von einem Verbum abhängig ware, scheinbar also absolut.’

to be a body of opinion that he refers to as a ‘grammatical vulgate’, which includes elements such as ‘absolute’ in the meaning of ‘not attaching itself grammatically to the rest of the phrase’.¹⁴ On this and similar received beliefs he comments that ‘there is basically not a single term which cannot be attacked with legitimate suspicion. We here find unquestioned old dogmatic doctrines concerning ancient problems that are still unsolved.’¹⁵

Chapters 2–4 of this book will demonstrate why the term ‘absolute’ is misleading: taken in its literal and general meaning of *unconnected*, *loosened* or *loose*, or also as ‘not attaching itself grammatically to the rest of the phrase’, ACs are no more *absolute* than many other adverbial expressions of time or, with certain limitations, space (such as ‘on Sundays, we go to the beach’ or ‘on a sinking ship, there are no atheists’). As the term is so memorable and has become so generally employed, it would be foolish to suggest altering it to something more correctly descriptive.¹⁶ Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that we must not let it mislead us into making any assumptions about the grammatical nature of these ‘absolute’ constructions. It may seem excessive to discuss this issue at such length here, yet in the past, the term has led quite a number of scholars to attempts at identifying some way by which these constructions ‘loosened’ themselves out of some grammatical bond. We now know that we do not know the meaning of *absolute*, and thus should not allow ourselves to be influenced by what we may *assume* it might mean. Nor, having admitted our ignorance, should we feel that we do not need to define the object of our study.

¹⁴ “‘Absolu” est compris comme “ne se rattachant pas grammaticalement au reste de la phrase”.’

¹⁵ ‘Il n’y a pour ainsi dire aucun terme qui ne puisse être frappé de suspicion légitime. On y décèle de vieux postulats dogmatiques, non remis de question, de très anciens problèmes toujours en suspens.’ This *vulgate grammaticale* also includes the following: ‘1) une sorte d’unitarisme simplificateur: on met sur le même plan *partibus factis* et *Cicerone consule*; pour ce dernier il suffirait de sous-entendre un scolastique *ente*; 2) le qualificatif essentiel: “absolu” est compris comme “ne se rattachant pas grammaticalement au reste de la phrase”; 3) l’ablatif absolu est *toujours* défini comme l’équivalent d’une subordonnée circonstancielle, et, en premier lieu, d’une subordonnée de temps; 4) l’ablatif absolu ne doit pas s’employer lorsque son sujet est repris par un terme quelconque de la proposition régissante.’

¹⁶ On this point, cf. also Costello 1982: 242–3.

1.2.b The definition of ACs

1.2.b.i No definition

The majority of scholars writing on ACs do not provide any definition or description of how they employ the term *absolute*.¹⁷ This may seem understandable – after all, most Classical philologists are likely to have a good idea of what ACs are. Yet whenever either examples or a description (rather than a definition) are provided, it becomes clear that different scholars have different criteria for what qualifies as an AC, and a number give examples that cannot be considered absolute in any meaningful use of the word. Coleman (1989: 353), for example, gives no definition but lists as examples ‘*urbe capta, sole oriente*, and perhaps *Romulo rege*’, making the reader wonder why he questions the absolute nature of the nominal AA *Romulo rege*. This question certainly is justified, but it would nevertheless be helpful to be told explicitly which criterion Coleman uses to differentiate between absolute and non-absolute expressions. In relation to the Sanskrit locative absolute (LA), one finds non-absolute examples being used to introduce the construction particularly frequently; see Brugmann (1903: 609–10)¹⁸ and, all using the same (and, as we will see in Section 4.4, non-absolute) Sanskrit example, Delbrück (1888: 387), Lehmann (1974: 211) and Frauzel (1998:

¹⁷ Draeger 1881 (instead, he offers a detailed discussion of large numbers of examples), Bennett 1910 and 1914, de Saussure 1881 (he provides an excellent description of the Sanskrit GA, giving numerous examples over several pages, but does not offer a definition as such; rather he seems to take for granted that we know what we mean when we speak of an AC), Wackernagel 1926: 292–4, Kunst 1923 (on p. 29, he only describes the AC as a ‘loosely attached participle construction’ (‘locker angegliederte Partizipialkonstruktion’)), Flinck-Linkomies 1929, Mugler 1936, Tarelli 1938, Wifstrand 1956, Thesleff 1958 (to be fair, he reacts to Kunst 1923, and may have felt it odd to define the common object of their research at that rather late stage), Holland 1986, Krisch 1988, Rosén 1988, Coleman 1989, Vasilaros 1993 and Menge 1999.

¹⁸ He lists *sám asmin jáyamāne āsata* (together he_{Loc.Sg} being-born_{Loc.Sg} sit_{3rd.PL.Impf}) (RV 10.95.7), which he translates as ‘als er geboren wurde, saßen sie dabei’ (‘as he was born, they were sitting nearby’). In almost all its usages, the verb *ās* ‘to sit’ requires a locative complement indicating where someone is sitting, and the notion of sitting *at* or *near* something is fully included in the scope of the Sanskrit locative. Hence we can translate this line simply as ‘they sat together next to/near him as he was being born’, seeing *asmin jáyamāne* (he_{Loc.Sg} being-born_{Loc.Sg}) as a regular spatial locative. See Section 4.4 on this state of affairs.

105).¹⁹ Again, this indicates that there is a gap in our understanding and that many are unaware of this gap.

1.2.b.ii *Description instead of definition*

Most other works on ACs offer a description that focuses on usually one, sometimes several noticeable features of these constructions. For the purposes of the works that fall into this category, this approach is usually sufficient. Grammars and reference works aim to explain how to recognise and translate ACs into our modern languages. Many articles are interested only in the ACs in one particular language (and as we shall see, the Greek GA in particular is a relatively clear-cut phenomenon that, for the most part, is easy to define, while the situation in Latin and Sanskrit is much less straightforward). Yet for our present goal – to arrive at a definition of ACs that works across languages and that allows us to understand borderline or unusual cases – more detailed work on the single languages, especially their oldest attested stages, and a more careful comparison of material between languages is required. Yet first we need to look at the different features suggested so far.

A large group of works on ACs explains what these constructions are by naming first their constituents in the original languages (usually a participle and a (pro)noun) and then their equivalent in the author's native language. A typical description can be found in Delbrück (1888: 386): 'The basis of a so-called absolute participle constructions is given by an ordinary locative or genitive [*Delbrück here discusses Sanskrit, which has a locative and later also a genitive absolute*, A.R.] to which a participle is added. Through the implicit perception of these two words as a kind of temporal or modal subordinate clause, the case loosens itself from what it is governed by, and such constructions can also be used where the case could not stand on its own.'²⁰ This description refers to Sanskrit, yet similar accounts are found relating to Latin or

¹⁹ The example they use is *prayatī adhvaré* (forthgoing_{Loc.Sg} ritual_{Loc.Sg}) 'during the ongoing ritual, while the ritual took place'.

²⁰ 'Die Grundlage einer sog. absoluten Participial-Construction bildet ein gewöhnlicher Localis oder Genitiv, dem ein Partic. zugefügt ist. Indem diese beiden Wörter innerlich als eine Art von temporalem oder modalem Nebensatz empfunden werden, löst sich der Casus von seinem regierenden Theile los, und es können solche Constructionen auch da gebraucht werden, wo der Casus allein nicht stehen könnte.'

Greek.²¹ To quote a more recent example, Keydana (1997: 6) speaks of the ‘intuitively perceived link between ACs and independent finite clauses’.²²

What is the nature of this link, and who is it supposed to be felt by? If used in an argument concerning the development of ACs, the link must presumably be perceived by the speakers of the original language. If used towards a synchronic definition of ACs, it apparently appeals to the speakers of the language in which the treatise, grammar etc. is written. We can only guess how the speakers of Latin, Greek and Sanskrit themselves perceived ACs.²³ It is a fact that ACs are nominal phrases, not verbal clauses. Even instances of actual parallels between an AC and an equivalent finite clause do not give us any conclusive evidence. Compare, for example, *Il.* 1.88–9 and 18.442–3:

οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο
σοὶ κοίλῃς παρὰ νηυσὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει

‘while I am alive and see the light on earth, no one will lay his heavy hands on you by the hollow ships’

(*Il.* 1.88–9; similarly at *Od.* 16.438–9)

ὄφρα δέ μοι ζῶει καὶ ὄρᾳ φάος ἡελίοιο,
ἄχνηται

‘and long as I have him with me, still alive, looking into the sunlight, he is racked with anguish’

(*Il.* 18.442–3)

The GA ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ . . . δερκομένοιο could be described as the absolute equivalent (or rephrasing?) of the recurring finite phrase ὄφρα δέ μοι ζῶει καὶ ὄρᾳ.²⁴ Yet even this does not automatically imply that ἐμεῦ ζῶντος was perceived as any more ‘verbal’ than the possible English translation ‘in my lifetime’ (a more verbal

²¹ See Classen 1867: 184, Bombe 1877: 27, Spieker 1885: 311 (note his very detailed account), Delbrück 1897: 494, Weihenmajer 1891: 2, GrGr II.307, Horn 1918: 13, Oertel 1926: 7, 101, Berent 1973: 147, Lehmann 1974: 210, Costello 1982: 242, 249, Cooper 1998: 156 and in great detail 2002: 2015–16, Frauzel 1998: 105, Bauer 2000: 261 and Menge 2000: 718.

²² ‘Die folgende Beschreibung geht von dem intuitiv wahrnehmbaren Zusammenhang zwischen ABS und unabhängigen finiten Sätzen aus. ABS stehen offenbar in einem direkten Zusammenhang mit Sätzen, denn sie enthalten in mehr oder minder großem Umfang dieselben Konstituenten wie diese.’

²³ See Section 4.7 on the perspective of Sanskrit grammarians.

²⁴ Also at *Il.* 18.61–2; similarly at *Il.* 24.558, *Od.* 4.50, 4.833, 10.498, 14.44, 20.207.

alternative to which would be ‘while I am alive’). It is true that the parallel GA (ἐμεῦ) ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο is more ‘verbal’ in that there is a prepositional complement of the participle; it nevertheless remains a nominal expression. Modern readers may perceive it as more akin to a verbal clause because we cannot render this exact expression into an idiomatic nominal expression (*‘in my beholding (of) the earth’ *vel sim.*) in English. Yet again, this says more about English than about Greek. Also, if we do want to make reference to English to gain a better understanding of what this expression may have ‘felt like’ for a speaker of Greek, we may point out expressions such as ‘in my travels across the sea’. There, we do have a dependent prepositional phrase, and we do have an idiomatic way of phrasing this expression as a verbal clause (‘while I was travelling across the sea’). Yet that does not change that this expression in itself is a nominal phrase, not a verbal subordinate clause. There are various ways of referring to time. Finite verbs are only one of them, and ACs do not make use of finite verbs.

‘Explaining’ ACs to a modern reader by depicting them as equivalent or linked to verbal clauses is problematic. It is a good approach in a grammar or textbook that has the purely practical aim of allowing us to understand the meaning of a text. Yet knowing what an AC is equivalent to in e.g. English does not necessarily help us understand the original construction. To take an example from two modern and closely related languages, the German preposition *bei* (+ dat.) ‘close to, near, at’ can be used together with an adjective and a noun to mean ‘when that noun has the quality of that adjective’.²⁵ *Bei schönem Wetter* (lit. ‘at/in nice weather’), for example, is best translated into English as a temporal clause: *Bei schönem Wetter bin ich viel draußen* corresponds to English *When the weather is nice I am outside a lot*. Yet this idiomatic correspondence of a nominal phrase and a verbal clause means neither that the German phrase actually is a verbal clause, nor that the English clause somehow is a nominal phrase.

In relation to Latin, the nominal character of ACs has been pointed out before: Serbat (1979: 353) stresses very rightly that

²⁵ This kind of expression, as we shall see, actually is rather close to how ACs function.

especially the pre-Classical AA does not represent a verbal clause, but involves ‘inserting a subordinate “nominal” phrase into the middle of another phrase’.²⁶ Also in reference to Latin, K-S II.1.771–2 note that the AA is ‘not actually a sentence, but only a part of a sentence’.²⁷ It is correct that the most frequent types of Early Latin AAs (such as *me/te/ro absente/praesente* ‘in my/your/the master’s presence/absence’ or nominal AAs such as *me invito* ‘with me unwilling, against my will’ or *me vivo* ‘while I am alive, in my lifetime’)²⁸ have a very nominal ‘feel’ about them. Yet we need to ask to what extent this is because they have nominal expressions as their idiomatic equivalents in English. And more importantly, while it is true that these are nominal in character, we must admit that we have no sound criterion by which to classify even Greek GAs such as ἐμὲ ζῶντος as more ‘verbal’ than Early Latin *me vivo* (which does not seem to be different in meaning/use from the later *me vivente*).

A discussion at such great length may have appeared superfluous. Yet the perceived link between ACs and verbal clauses usually introduced to us, when we first encounter ACs, in order to facilitate their translation has led a surprising number of scholars to an incorrect understanding of these constructions. This, in turn, has caused misguided theories on the genesis of ACs (more on that in Section 1.2.c). In brief, we must not allow ourselves to be misled by our modern renderings of ancient ACs, but must look at them within the syntactic context of their own language.

1.2.b.iii Sentence appositions

Some authors concentrate on (or also mention) the fact that ACs stand ‘as attributes to a whole clause’ or ‘syntactically independent’ from their matrix clause.²⁹ Others focus on the necessity that the subject of the AC be absent from the matrix clause.³⁰ All of

²⁶ ‘[L]’insertion de la phrase dite “nominale” en position subordonnée au sein d’une autre phrase’.

²⁷ ‘[E]igentlich kein Satz, sondern nur ein Satzteil’.

²⁸ See Chapter 3.5 on ‘Nominal’ ACs.

²⁹ Among them we find Bombe 1877: 1, Oertel 1926: 6–7, Hirt 1937: 92, GrGr II.307, Ramat 1989: 262 and Bauer 2000: 261.

³⁰ Cf. K-G II.2.78 and in more detail, K-S II.1.771: ‘Participles used in lieu of adverbial clauses describe adverbial relationships, such as time, reason, means, way in which etc.

these points are correct, yet they equally apply to non-absolute adverbial expressions of space or time (cf. Greek genitives of time, such as τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτός ‘in the following night’, e.g. at Th. 2.33, or also English expressions such as ‘In cities, pollution is a big problem’). In effect, saying that ACs are ‘clause attributes’ is like saying that a cat has four legs and is furry: the description points to important and noticeable features of the anatomy of this species; yet it does not allow us to tell a cat apart from, for example, a dog. What we need, so to speak, is to identify the meow of ACs.

1.2.b.iv Unusual case usage

Keydana (1997: 24) and, following him, Ziegler (2002: 83–5) see case usage that goes beyond the regular semantic bounds of the case employed as a defining feature of ACs. For Keydana, absolute case usage has ‘no denotative, but purely expressive function,³¹ i.e. it solely marks adverbialisation’.³² This is not correct. In Early Latin, where the AA already is clearly absolute, it still is very much in line with the semantics of other uses of the ablative (especially the comitative-instrumental,³³ but also the purely temporal,³⁴ see Section 3.3). The semantic difference between the Greek GA and the temporal genitive (such as τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτός mentioned above) is gradual rather than clear-cut: in Homer almost exclusively, but also frequently in later literature, the GA has a mostly temporal

Two kinds are to be distinguished: . . . b) When the subordinate clause has a subject that does not appear in the main clause, the subject nominative is changed into an ablative and a participle, also in the ablative, is added to it.’ (‘Die Partizipien in Vertretung von Adverbialsätzen bezeichnen adverbiale Verhältnisse, als: Zeit, Grund, Mittel, Art und Weise usw. Dabei sind zwei Fälle zu unterscheiden: . . . b) Wenn der Nebensatz ein besonderes Subjekt hat, welches im Hauptsatz überhaupt nicht vorkommt, so wird der Subjektsnominativ in den Ablativ verwandelt und diesem das Partizip gleichfalls im Ablative beigelegt.’)

³¹ Following Reichenbach’s 1947: 319 definition of *expressive*, a technical term used in symbolic logic: ‘We shall say that a term is expressive when it is not used as a denotative term.’

³² ‘[K]eine denotative, sondern rein expressive Funktion, d. h. sie kennzeichnen ausschließlich die Adverbialisierung’ (Keydana 1997: 24).

³³ Cf. an ablative of attendant circumstance such as *qua spe aut quo consilio huc imus?* ‘With/in what hope and with what intention are we coming here?’ (Ter. Eu. 1025) vs. an absolute *Me suasore atque impulsore id factum audacter dicito*. ‘Say boldly that this was done **with/through me as adviser and instigator**’ (Pl. Mos. 916).

³⁴ Cf. e.g. temporal *adventu patris* ‘at my father’s arrival’ (Pl. Mos. 381) vs. absolute *piro flore* ‘at the bloom of the pear-tree, when the pear-tree is in bloom’ (Cato Agr. 131).

meaning. Any other modal (usually causal or concessive) nuances are secondary (see Section 2.2.d). In Sanskrit, the semantic link between ‘regular’ and absolute locative expressions is extremely strong, causing the confusion between absolute and non-absolute mentioned above (see also Section 4.4). Yet even in those locative expressions in Sanskrit that can correctly be called absolute (see Section 4.5), the regular locative semantics (denoting space where or time when) are still very much present. As we shall see, it is not the case usage that is peculiar, but the actual words that are employed in these adverbial case usages.

For Ziegler (2002), who writes specifically on Sanskrit, ACs require a modal (i.e. usually causal or concessive) rather than a temporal meaning to be absolute. Apart from the problem that we are again dealing with the question of translation and supposed equivalence of ACs with different kinds of finite subordinate clauses, there also are no ACs in Sanskrit or elsewhere that do not have at least some temporal semantics. Any circumstantial participle, whether absolute or conjunct, contains in it information about aspect or (relative) time. Any further causal, concessive or conditional nuances are effected by the context of the clause which the participle stands in. For example, even ὥς ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἐχάρησαν ἔϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ | μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος (*Il.* 19.74–5) the most strongly causal GA in Homer, has a temporal dimension and could thus be rendered both as ‘so he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans rejoiced *since* the greathearted son of Peleus had sworn off his wrath’ and as ‘... *when* he had sworn off his wrath’. (See Chapter 2.3.c for further discussion on this.³⁵) If we adopt Ziegler’s semantic criterion, there are no ACs.

1.2.b.v Dominant participles

Ziegler and Keydana agree on one further criterion: the participle in an AC, although not the head of the construction, is semantically

³⁵ An example of an early Sanskrit LA that is strongly modal, but nevertheless temporal, can be found e.g. at RV 1.17.8 *indrāvaruṇa nū nū vām siṣāsantiṣu dhīṣū ā | asmābhyam śārma yachatam* (Indra-and-Varuna_{Voc.Du} now now you_{Voc.Du} wishing-to-obtain_{Loc.PI} prayer_{Loc.PI} hither us_{Du.PI} protection_{Acc.Sg} extend_{2nd.Du.Impv}) ‘Indra and Varuna! **Because/when** [our] poems now seek to win you, grant us your protection!’.

so important that it may not be omitted. Keydana calls this feature of ACs their *Verbalzentriertheit* ('verbal-centeredness') and explains it through a series of semantic transformations (1997: 17–22). Ziegler points us to the discussion in Pinkster (1988: 201) and, following him, refers to such participles as 'dominant'.³⁶ Pinkster demonstrates that there are participles, absolute ones among them, whose omission makes the remainder of an expression nonsensical. Omitting the participle from *dictator occisus . . . pulcherrimum facinus videbatur* 'the murder of the dictator (lit. the murdered dictator) seemed the most beautiful deed' leaves us with *dictator . . . pulcherrimum facinus videbatur* 'the dictator seemed like the most beautiful deed', which does not make sense. The same applies to any AC: taking the participle away from e.g. *piro florente* 'at the bloom of the pear-tree, when the pear-tree is in bloom' (Cato Agr. 131) leaves us with a nonsensical 'during the pear-tree'. To my mind, Ziegler is on the right track in adopting Pinkster's idea, but she does not make anything further of it. In the remainder of this present study, I shall attempt to demonstrate why the 'dominance' of participles (or rather one specific sub-category of this phenomenon, which I shall call 'obligatory') is the crucial factor in the definition of ACs. (See Sections 2.7, 3.4, 4.5 and 5.2.b for details.)

1.2.b.vi Summary

To sum up: at least in most cases, there is no way of demonstrating that an AC is to be seen as a finite-clause equivalent. The status of an AC as a sentence attribute is shared by other adverbial expressions. The semantics of the absolute case are not significantly (if at all) different from other usages of the case in question. Focus on 'dominant' participles appears to be the right way ahead, but the theory will need some modifications and more detailed study.

³⁶ The idea of the dominant participle is also taken over by Menge 2000: 718: 'Wie in der Konstruktion des dominanten Partizips ist auch im Ablativus absolutus das Partizip notwendig, damit ein grammatisch korrekter Satz zustande kommt. Im Unterschied zum dominanten Partizip ist der Ablativus absolutus immer von der Rede losgelöst (absolutus), d.h. der ablativus absolutus ist immer eine freie Angabe.'

1.2.c *How did ACs arise?*

Having gone over the main views concerning our principal synchronic question – what are ACs? – it now remains to see which theories have so far been offered to answer the diachronic question of how ACs came to be, that is, from what source they first arose and how they then developed. One of the main questions in this reconstruction is whether ACs are inherited from PIE, the reconstructed proto-language that Latin, Greek and Sanskrit (among others) developed from, or whether they are the result of parallel, independent development within the single languages. When there are systematically parallel elements in several related languages, comparative philologists reconstruct these elements back to the parent language. (Under most conditions, for something to have developed once is much more likely than for it to have developed several times independently in more or less identical form.) To take a very simple example: the similarity between the words for ‘apple’ across Germanic languages (English *apple*, Dutch *appel*, Norwegian *eple*, Danish *æble*, German *Apfel*, and so on) is a result of the fact that all these languages inherited this word from the same source, a putative language simply referred to as Proto-Germanic. Carefully studying each individual language and then comparing our findings, we are able to identify systematic correspondences between both identical and differing elements among languages. Thus, for example, the *-pf-* instead of a *p-*sound in the German word is expected: in this specific environment, this is what inherited *p*’s change into in High German.

The same reasoning applies to correspondences on other levels of language. The arguments concerning the word for *apple* were phonetic, i.e. relating to sounds. For ACs, comparison of syntactic elements – or more specifically: of cases – is needed. In Greek, the original ablative case has merged with the genitive (hence e.g. Greek ἐκ takes the genitive, while Latin *ex* takes the ablative), and thus the fact that Latin has an *ablative* absolute while Greek has a *genitive* absolute does not keep us from reconstructing an AC back to PIE, the common ancestor of Latin and Greek. Yet already when we take Sanskrit into the equation, there is a problem: the Sanskrit locative does correspond to the ablative in Latin, but not

to the genitive in Greek: instead, it corresponds to the Greek dative. Thus, if we want to reconstruct an AC for PIE, we are unable to say which case such a construction would have stood in. There is no one case in PIE that we can reconstruct the Latin ablative, the Greek genitive and the Sanskrit locative back to.³⁷

Being unable to offer a straightforward reconstruction of a proto-AC for PIE, two options remain: one, we may postulate independent genesis and development of ACs in each individual language that contains these constructions. This is an inelegant and unlikely reconstruction: it would be very difficult to find a linguistic motivation for multiple repetitions of a process at the end of which there is an admittedly unusual construction whose existence is difficult to explain even once. Alternatively, we do reconstruct ACs back to PIE, or at least some element or developmental stage of ACs. The question then is how much exactly we can reconstruct to the common ancestor language, how much to the individual languages, and how to explain the developments that result in the differences between the attested constructions (here specifically: the variations in choice of absolute case). This study will take the second approach and attempt to answer the questions just outlined. Yet first, let us look at what prior studies have done.

1.2.c.i *No view expressed*

A number of works on ACs do not express any views on how or when they assume these constructions came to be.³⁸ In discussions of synchronic matters, diachronic theories are not required. Yet in some cases, authors who do not say how they assume ACs came to be nevertheless offer detailed reconstructions of the PIE state of affairs.³⁹

³⁷ There are other Indo-European languages that contain ACs, but adding them into the discussion does not change the basic problem here.

³⁸ These include Draeger 1881, de Saussure 1881, Horn 1918, Serbat 1979, Krisch 1988, Rosén 1988, Ramat 1989, Frauzel 1998, Menge 1999, Bauer 2000 and Cooper 2002.

³⁹ Rosén 1988 says neither how he understands the term ‘absolute’ nor how he thinks ACs came to be, yet he reconstructs a threefold system of ACs for PIE (an impersonal and subjectless accusative absolute, a dative absolute that was ‘gemeinpersönlich’ (i.e. referring to ‘anyone who’) and a personal GA) that seems to simply project the state he sees in Classical Greek back to the proto-language. Frauzel’s interesting 1998 article on impersonal absolutes (mostly *Witterungsimpersonalia* such as Gk. ὕοντος, Skt. *varṣati* (rain_{Loc.Sg.Pres.Act.Ptc}) ‘while it rains’, but also Latin expressions such as

1.2.c.ii Grammatical vs. semantic case usage

The theories which we do find concerning the origins of ACs can be split up into two groups according to which point of origin they identify: Particularly in research up to the second half of the twentieth century, grammatical case usage is favoured, i.e. cases governed by nouns, verbs or prepositions.⁴⁰ There are several nuances of this theory. Whereas some (K-G, *GrGr* II or Delbrück 1888) see regularly governed cases as the source of ACs, others are more vague and talk about expressions that *modify* one element (Bennett 1914) or talk about a *link* (Bombe 1877 uses the term *vinculum*, Classen 1867 and *LGr* talk about a *Verband*) or about a *relation* (Lehmann 1974). These differences in words used are mostly due to the ancient language written about (even where the statements are meant to discuss ACs in general). The main point is that the head noun of the AC is meant to once have been in a grammatically regular relation with one element in its matrix clause, whether that is a noun, verb or pronoun. In their detailed discussion of this theory, K-G II.2.79 quote the example of *Il.* 8.118:

τοῦ δ' ἰθὺς μεμαῶτος ἀκόντισε Τυδεὸς υἱός

‘at him as he charged ahead, the son of Tydeus hurled his spear’

As they argue, the relationship between such a genitive and the verb by which it is governed would loosen because of the participle added to the genitive, and together they would be perceived as ‘a kind of subordinate clause (temporal or similar)’. This perception would have been strong enough to outweigh the link originally felt between genitive and governing verb. Finally, this ‘shift in syntactic structure’ (*Verschiebung der syntaktischen Gliederung*) would have led to the employment of such a combination of an oblique-case noun with an agreeing participle even where there was

pugnato ‘after the fight, after it has been fought’) draws our attention to how widespread these constructions actually are. Yet although he offers no views on the exact origins of these constructions, he is able to reconstruct their status as ‘a stylistic device of Indo-European poetic language’ (Franzel 1998: 123).

⁴⁰ Among the supporters of this theory we find Classen 1867: 187, Bombe 1877: 26, Delbrück 1888: 386, Brugmann 1903: 609 (see below), K-G II.2.79 (very detailed), Bennett 1914: 367, Oertel 1926: 147, *LGr* II.445–50, Mugler 1936: 39, *GrGr* II.397, Chantraine 1953: 323–4 and Lehmann 1974: 210 (Section 1.2.c.iii below).

no possible link between this expression and any other element of the clause, thus resulting in an AC.⁴¹

This approach was criticised as early as Spieker (1885: 312) and seen as ‘insufficient’ as early as Hirt (1937: 92).⁴² The criticism was taken up by Thesleff (1958: 194–5). Spieker basically argues that adverbial case usages are a more likely source for ACs simply because they do not require the extra step of a loosening of syntactic bounds. He also points out that the grammatical relation between (in the case of Greek) a genitive and that governing it would have been ‘distinctly felt’,⁴³ which I think is a stronger argument than the purely probabilistic explanation.

What should make of such a weakening of grammatical ties (and therefore a syntactic reanalysis) unlikely? To answer this question we must be careful to distinguish whether we are talking about the original genesis of ACs, or about their further development. When we read or hear a sentence, we expect it to be grammatical, and try to make it make sense.⁴⁴ If Greek did not have ACs yet, would a speaker parse e.g. τοῦ κινυμένου in

⁴¹ ‘Die Entstehung des *Genitivus absolutus* ist auf eine ähnliche Verschiebung der syntaktischen Gliederung zurückzuführen wie die Entstehung des *Accusativus cum infinitivo*... In Sätzen wie Θ 118 τοῦ δ’ ἰθὺς μεμῶτος ἀκόντισε Τυδεΐος υἱός... schliesst sich der Genetiv als Genetiv des Ziels... an das regierende Verbum an (auf diesen schoss er, als er vorwärts stürmte;...); aber zugleich bildet er das Subjekt eines durch das Partizip vertretenen Nebensatzes (er schoss, als dieser vorwärts stürmte;...). Je mehr das Gefühl hierfür im Sprachbewußtsein wirksam wurde, desto mehr lockerte sich der grammatische Zusammenhang zwischen dem Genetive und dem Verbum, und man wandte nun den Genetiv mit dem Partizip auch da an, wo eine Abhängigkeit von dem übergeordneten Satze nicht mehr vorhanden ist, also nach Verben, mit denen ein Genetiv nicht verbunden werden kann. Die so überaus mannigfaltige Verwendung des Genetivs... macht es erklärlich, dass gerade dieser Kasus zum absoluten Kasus wurde.’ This view is also followed by Smyth 1956: 461.

⁴² ‘Allmählich habe sich der grammatische Zusammenhang zwischen dem Genitiv und dem Verbum gelockert, und man wandte nun den Genitiv mit dem Partizip auch da an, wo eine Abhängigkeit von dem Verb nicht mehr vorhanden war; es sei also ein ähnlicher Vorgang gewesen, wie beim Akk. c. Inf. Diese Erklärung genügt m. E. hier ebensowenig wie dort.’

⁴³ ‘That the dependent pure genitive is not the one to which we must refer this use [the GA] is made likely by the following fact: being an adnominal case, it was always felt as accompanying and depending upon another noun; this relation was distinctly felt, and it is far less probable that uncertainty as to the exact construction of such a genitive gradually gave rise to the absolute use than that this is due to some use not dependent on any noun in the sentence.’

⁴⁴ More linguistically put, we expect that the writer or our interlocutor follow the maxims of Grice’s Cooperative Principle (see Grice 1975), and thus avoid obscurity of expression or ambiguity.

τοῦ καὶ κινυμένοιο Διὸς κατὰ χαλκοβατὲς δῶ
 ἔμπης ἔς γαῖάν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἵκετ' ἄϋτμή

'of this shaken in the bronze-floored halls of Zeus the scent would drift
 from heaven down to earth' (Il. 14.173–4)

as adnominal to ἄϋτμή, or as independent from it and thus as grammatically unprecedented and wrong? Admittedly, ἄϋτμή comes very late in the sentence. But in any language in which e.g. the verb may come last, a speaker parses a sentence assuming that there will be a verb holding the various nominal elements together. If, in a language with variable word order, we encounter an element such as an oblique-case expression whose function is initially unclear, we scan the entire sentence for a possible head. Once we have heard or seen the verb or any other possible head, we recognise its complements for what they are.

Once ACs exist, it seems very possible that sentences such as Il. 14.173–4 would have been interpreted by some as containing an AC. In analogy with such now ambiguous constructions, the steps outlined by K-G II.2.79 are likely to have happened. Yet before there are constructions in analogy with which such a syntactic reanalysis could have taken place, this theory cannot be sufficiently motivated. It thus seems that we must look elsewhere for the source of the very first ACs.

If grammatical case usage is ruled out, the remaining alternative is semantic case usage. A case is called semantic (or also peripheral) when it is not typically used as a required complement of a verb.⁴⁵ The most straightforward example of a grammatical case is the accusative, of a semantic case, the locative. Semantic cases *can* denote elements dependent on verbs (as in English 'she put the book *on the table*, he cut the cake *with a knife*, they went away *from the house*'). Using such expressions as the basis of our theories would again require an explanation of how the link between the head and what it governs is weakened. ACs stand in apposition to whole clauses. What we are thus looking for are adverbial expressions that do the same. This brings us directly to expressions of time, and in some cases, space: in e.g. 'they bring in the harvest on

⁴⁵ Cf. Blake 2001: 33.

that day’, ‘everyone praised the gods at the sacrifice’ or ‘they sacrificed at/next to the fire’ it is the entire action, and thus the entire clause, that is qualified/described by the adverbial expression. The view that ACs, being adverbial expressions, derive from adverbial expressions in some way now seems generally accepted.⁴⁶

Yet having identified a likely source of ACs, the next step again is to understand how ACs would have developed from that source. How do we bridge the gap between e.g. a Greek temporal genitive such as τούτης τῆς ἡμέρας ‘on that day’ and a GA such as ἐμεῦ ζῶντος ‘while I am alive, in my lifetime’? The factor that has been brought forward is the supposed ‘verbal force’ of the participle: once a participle is added to a noun in an adverbial expression of time, the two supposedly develop a clause-like force, and develop accordingly.⁴⁷ I agree that this force must have played a decisive role in the development of GAs *within* Greek. The participle system in Classical Greek, whose members are regularly paradigmatic and verb-like in their syntactic behaviour,⁴⁸ allowed the GA to become what sometimes does look like a full equivalent to a verbal subordinate clause. Compare the following Attic prose example:

Εὐρυσθέως μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀποθανόντος, Ἀτρέως δὲ μητρὸς ἀδελφοῦ ὄντος αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπιτρέψαντος Εὐρυσθέως, ὅτ’ ἐστράτευε, Μυκήνας τε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον Ἀτρεΐ (τυγχάνειν δὲ αὐτὸν φεύγοντα τὸν πατέρα διὰ τὸν Χρυσίππου θάνατον), καὶ ὡς οὐκέτι ἀνεχώρησεν Εὐρυσθεύς, βουλομένων καὶ τῶν Μυκηναίων φόβῳ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν . . . τῶν Μυκηναίων τε καὶ ὅσων Εὐρυσθεύς ἤρχε τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀτρεά παραλαβεῖν.

‘When Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids, Atreus being his mother’s brother, and when Eurystheus, when he set out on

⁴⁶ Adverbials such as the ones just mentioned are explicitly discussed as the source of ACs by, among others, Spieker 1885: 312 and following him Hirt 1937: 94–5, Thesleff 1958: 194–5, Coleman 1985: 359 and Cooper 1998: 157.

⁴⁷ Cf. e.g. Müller-Lancé 1994: 368: ‘Die Entstehung [der Absolutkonstruktion] hängt sicherlich mit der Existenz von Participia Coniuncta zusammen, die mehr und mehr verbale Kraft entwickelten, bis sie schließlich eigene, von der ÜP unabhängige Subjekte an sich binden konnten.’ (‘The origin [of ACs] is certainly related to the existence of conjunct participles, which developed more and more of a verbal force until they finally were able to bind to themselves their own subjects independent from their matrix clause.’), or also K-G II.2.79 n. 31.

⁴⁸ See Chapter 2 (e.g. Section 2.2.a) for more detailed discussions of this.

his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government to Atreus (who had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus), and when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, when/because the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by fear of the Heraclids, wanted [this], . . . assumed the sceptre of Mycenae and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus'. (Th. 1.9)

This passage displays GAs whose participles behave very much like finite verbal forms and that go far beyond the formal minimum: they include an agent expression, an adverbial expression of space, a dependent genitive and even a dependent finite clause. They are on a par with other finite clauses (καὶ ὥς οὐκέτι . . .) and appear even though, in one case, the head noun (Εὐρυσθεύς) occurs in the matrix clause. Looking exclusively at such prose GAs (or also AAs in some Classical Latin prose), one would indeed assume that the verbal properties of participles played a role in the development of GAs, participial equivalents of finite subordinate clauses.

Yet this does not allow us to generalise across languages: looking at Early Latin, we find constructions that are unambiguously absolute, but that neither are equivalents of finite subordinate clauses (e.g. *me praesente*, perhaps closest to English 'in my presence') nor contain participles that are strongly 'verbal' in their properties (such as *silente*, *praesente*, *insciente*; see Section 3.5 for a detailed discussion of these). This indicates that what we find in Greek, a regular and productive system of participles that share most of the semantic and syntactic properties of finite verb forms, is an innovation, not something that can straightforwardly be reconstructed back to PIE.

Furthermore, looking at the so-called nominal ACs of Latin (which do not include a participle but an adjective or a second noun, as in *me vivo* 'with me alive, in my lifetime' or *me puero* 'when I was a boy, in my childhood') we see that no verbal force is required to result in a construction in which the attribute to the head is dominant and which, for all intents and purposes, functions in the same way as the regular Greek GA ἐμεῦ ζῶντος 'while I am alive, in my lifetime'. Finally, looking at the oldest Sanskrit texts, we shall see that the early LA still underlies a number of limitations which need to be taken into account for any reconstruction to PIE (cf. Section 4.5).

All in all, the situation in Greek is not a very good basis from which to project back to PIE. Especially the ‘verbal force’ of the participle is an inner-Greek development. Yet as we shall see in Section 5.5, there is indeed a factor that causes a quasi-verbal force to be present within the attribute in an AC, yet this is the effect, not the cause of the development of ACs.

1.2.c.iii *OV to VO: Lehmann’s explanation*

A different motivation for the development of ACs from governed case expressions is offered by Lehmann in his 1972 paper ‘Contemporary linguistics and Indo-European studies’ and his 1974 *Proto-Indo-European Syntax*. As the paper title suggests, he is attempting a new approach to old topics. He suggests that ACs, which for him are ‘absolute’ in the sense that they are used ‘without reference to a finite verb’ (1974: 211), developed at a time when the word order in Indo-European languages changed from OV (the object of the verb precedes the verb) to VO (the verb precedes its object). He suggests that, during this change, there may have been uncertainty whether a given participial expression ‘might be related either to a preceding or to a following finite verb’, and that thus somehow the perception arose that these expressions were not dependent on any verb.

In 1972, Lehmann stated that ‘if as in Classical Sanskrit, Greek, or Latin there is no fixed order for object and verb, there can also be no fixed order for embedded constructions. . . . [A]bsolute constructions can be expected in languages of ambivalent word order’ (1972: 989). To my mind, he himself here shows why his 1974 argument does not work: even in languages that have a variable word order (a characteristic, I assume, of any language undergoing a change in standard word order) speakers will be able to parse sentences and tell where their boundaries are rather easily. Whether a complement of a verb stands before or after that verb does not matter – in parsing any given sentence, a listener will look for a verb that requires such a complement, and will take the two together. It seems odd to postulate that speakers of such languages should not be able to identify clausal or even sentence boundaries. Furthermore, the problems inherent in Lehmann’s approach can simply be avoided if we accept the approach suggested in this

study and postulate adverbial origins of ACs: if we do so, we do not need any theories on how ACs would loosen their syntactic ties to the main verb of their matrix clause.⁴⁹

1.2.c.iv Transformation

The latest trend in solving the problem of the origin and rise of ACs takes us into the area of Transformational Syntax. Several authors, among them Berent (1973: 147), Lehmann (1974), Costello (1982: 249), Holland (1986) and Keydana (1997), have noted the similarity of ACs and finite (subordinate) clauses and have postulated that ACs are nominal transformations of verbal clauses.

The most detailed discussion of the transformational approach can be found in Keydana (1997: 9–25). After disputing the possibility of a syntactic transformation from a finite sentence into a nominal phrase as discussed by Chomsky in his ‘Remarks on nominalization’ (1970: 9–12), he then suggests a *semantic* transformation (1970: 12). Although the main topic – transformation – thus seems to remain the same, Keydana’s approach is rather far removed from Chomsky’s.

In a discussion relying on the formalisations of symbolic logic,⁵⁰ he demonstrates that ACs represent *event functions* that appear in the shape of *thing functions*: although from a formal/syntactic point of view, they are ‘nominally centred’ (i.e. a (pro)noun stands as their formal head), semantically speaking they are ‘verbally centred’: an AC such as ἀποιοχόμενιο ἀνακτος⁵¹ ‘while the master was absent, in the master’s absence’ does not refer to the *master* (who happens to be absent), but to the *absence* of the master. Thus, the verbal element (the participle) appears to function as the ‘actual’ or ‘semantic’ head of this phrase, and we get a *verbally centred* (‘verbalzentrierte’) expression referring to an event (here: an absence). Hence he calls ACs ‘formally speaking, a participial nominalising operation’.⁵²

⁴⁹ Lehmann’s theory has previously been discussed in most detail by Costello 1982: 238–42 and Bauer 2000: 284–5, who both reject it, for different reasons.

⁵⁰ Following Reichenbach 1947.

⁵¹ δὴ τότε κείτ’ ἀπόθεστος ἀποιοχόμενιο ἀνακτος | ἐν πολλῇ κόπρῳ ‘but now **with his master gone**, he lay there, cast away, on piles of dung’ (Od. 17.296–7).

⁵² ‘[F]ormal eine partizipiale Nominalisierungsoperation’ (Keydana 1997: 21).

Keydana employs several replacement tests to prove his theory: in regular expressions of nominal head and participial attribute (such as ‘playing children’ in e.g. ‘playing children need space’) the participle can be replaced with an adjective (‘young children need space’) or a relative clause (‘children that play need space’). In ACs (such as the ἀποιοχομένοιο ἀνὰκτος above), he correctly states, we cannot do that.⁵³ This demonstrates the exceptional importance of the attribute. Pinkster (1990: 117) and Menge (2000: 718) have called this phenomenon ‘a dominant participle’ (see Section 1.b.v above). Keydana instead refers to the construction as a whole as *verbally centred*.

All of this forms his ‘Definition of the AC’ section. Yet at the beginning of the section immediately following (‘Genesis and Age of the AC’),⁵⁴ he says that he has ‘already laid out his thoughts on the origin of the AC in the preceding section’.⁵⁵ I therefore assume we are meant to consider the concept of the ‘semantic transformation’ as his theory of how ACs arose.

Keydana’s description of the AC – as a construction that is nominally centred in shape, yet verbally centred as far as its semantics are concerned – is appealing from a synchronic point of view: it aptly describes the paradox of ACs. Whether we believe in the transformational process that is supposedly underlying this paradox is another question. Yet more important is the following: Keydana never states whether he wants his views concerning ‘semantic transformation’ to apply on a synchronic or on a diachronic perspective, even though this is an issue of fundamental importance.

Once again it needs to be pointed out that, with the exception of Greek, the earliest attested ACs do not have any strongly verbal features: Early Latin *me invito* ‘against my will’ or Vedic *sūrye*

⁵³ He actually uses a different example (*victores victis hostibus legiones reveniunt domum, | duello exstincto maximo atque internecatis hostibus*. ‘Our legions come back victorious, **our enemies defeated**, **a great contest concluded** and **our enemies massacred**.’ Pl. *Am.* 188–9), which however is problematic: the ablatives could well be read as regular ablatives of source governed by *revenire* (cf. e.g. Menge 2000: 465–7), in which case the participles *can* be replaced with an adjective or a relative clause).

⁵⁴ ‘Entstehung und Alter der ABS’ (Keydana 1997: 27).

⁵⁵ ‘Meine Auffassung von der Entstehung der ABS habe ich bereits im vorangehenden Abschnitt dargelegt’ (Keydana 1997: 27).

udyatí (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at sunrise’ seem equivalent more to noun phrases than to verbal clauses. As the more detailed studies of the following three chapters will show, the ‘verbal’ or ‘clausal’ element in ACS is brought about in a different, much simpler fashion. Discussions such as Keydana’s make an extremely valuable contribution to our synchronic understanding of at least some ACS. I agree with his description of the paradox of ACS, and think it is indeed possible that speakers of languages containing ACS of the kind we find in e.g. Greek historiography would have rephrased (or ‘transformed’) verbal clauses into such (nominal) ACS once ACS already existed in the language. Yet our evidence indicates that such considerations cannot be applied to the original genesis of the first ACS.

1.2.c.v *A promising approach*

Steps in the right direction towards answering the diachronic question – how can we motivate the development of languages towards being able to form and employ their first ACS? – can be found in a much older publication, Flinck-Linkomies (1929). His argument refers solely to Latin, but his meticulous approach pays great attention to detail and can be applied equally well to other languages. Hence his thoughts seem best discussed here, rather than postponed to the chapter focusing on Latin.

Flinck-Linkomies’ monograph is a detailed study of the AAs in Terence and Plautus. As their point of origin he sees the comitative uses of the ablative case or, as he puts it, a *casus sociativus* that first of all denotes a person physically present and thus accompanying/partaking in a situation,⁵⁶ and then also what could generally be called ‘accompanying circumstances’.⁵⁷ From expressions denoting actual bystanders of an action (*me adiutrice*, *quibus iudicibus*, *me suasore ac impulsore*, and then also participial *me praesente*, *me lubente*), he argues, Latin moves to expressions such as *me absente* or *me invito*. These cannot denote presence at or participation in an action, but being the exact opposite

⁵⁶ ‘Persona iis est significata, quae socia est in aliqua actione’ (Flinck-Linkomies 1929: 75).

⁵⁷ ‘Res, quae cum subiecto et praedicato enuntiati sunt adiunctae’ (Flinck-Linkomies 1929: 75).

of *me praesentellubente*, they are likely to be expressed using the same grammatical/syntactic means: ‘Nos quidem discrimen illud, quod est inter “*me lubente*” et “*me invito*”, ex associationis legibus explicamus, quibus animorum humanorum motus reguntur. His enim efficitur, ut contraria facile in mente hominum ad opposita se associant, eamque ob rem ea quoque quae significatione inter se sunt opposita, ad easdem rationes syntacticas possunt accedere’ (1929: 52–3). This, and a general weakening of case semantics (necessitating reinforcement or disambiguation by means of prepositions), he then sees as the way by which the construction we are looking at left its original sociative sphere and could become absolute. As he furthermore points out, the constructions denoting a presence or partaking appear together with main verbs that denote action (i.e. something at or in which one can physically participate), whereas in AAs of opposite semantics this is not the case.⁵⁸ That absence of lexical limitations he sees as a further step towards fully absolute AAs.

For Flinck-Linkomies, the absolute usage is reached when the ablative expression does not have the sociative semantics defined above any more.⁵⁹ Thus he also is of the opinion that there is no proper AA in Terence, as we can still find this sociative force in the large majority of cases: ‘probabiliter conicimus ne [Terentii] quidem temporibus vivam fuisse hanc elocutionem, verum nascentem, nondum natam’ (1929: 90).

I agree with the steps Flinck-Linkomies proposes, yet to my mind, his criteria for absoluteness are incorrect: an ablative can be absolute and still have comitative semantics; instead, I propose, absoluteness is reached when an expression, comitative or not, refers to a situation or an accompanying circumstance when its head noun does not.⁶⁰ In spite of this, Flinck-Linkomies’ approach is exemplary in that he takes a close look at the available material

⁵⁸ ‘Nam ‘agendi’ aut ‘faciendi’ verba, quae tum usitatissima sunt, cum ‘*praesente*’ in hoc ablative ponitur, iam cum ‘*absente*’ non coniungitur, sed varia sunt et quaecumque verba’ (Flinck-Linkomies 1929: 59).

⁵⁹ Thus he disagrees fundamentally with people such as Methner 1914–15: 33–61, who delineates absolute from other ablatives by the criterion of whether they stand in apposition to one word (whether a noun or a verb) or to the whole sentence, respectively.

⁶⁰ And thus, we do find AAs in Terence, such as *pudet* | *dicere hac praesente verbum turpe* ‘I am ashamed to say so vile a word in her presence’ (Hau. 1041–2).

and, on this basis, comes up with a step-by-step theory about the rise of the AA. He also does not make the mistake that is so frequent in other studies, namely to make statements about ‘ACs’ based on the material in just one language. Particularly in [Chapters 4 and 5](#), we shall see how evidence from similar expressions in Sanskrit can help us elucidate the situation that we and Flinck-Linkomies are faced with in Latin.

1.2.d *Links between ACs and other constructions*

As mentioned before, the ‘dominant’ qualifier that cannot be omitted and that, as we shall see, is a fundamental characteristic of the AC, is shared also by the AUC. Although the two constructions have been mentioned in connection to one another,⁶¹ there have not been any detailed comparisons of the two, nor any systematic studies identifying similar features elsewhere in the relevant languages.

The most detailed discussions of the AUC in Latin and Greek are Bolkestein (1980) for Latin and Jones (1939) for Greek. Bolkestein’s discussion follows the framework of Functional Grammar as outlined by Dik (1978). She, too, operates on the assumption that AUCs are the result of a development that turns a predication into a nominal phrase.⁶² In the discussions of the AUC in Section 5.5, we shall see why postulating such a change or transformation is not necessary – and likely wrong – not only in the context of the AUC’s first origins, but also in purely synchronic contexts in Latin, where the relative lack of abstract nouns makes it difficult to postulate e.g. *‘from the foundation of the city’ (**a conditione urbis?*) as somehow ‘underlying’ *ab urbe condita*.⁶³ The discussions of AUCs at Sections 2.7, 3.4a and 5.5b will also show that there is an element in AUCs – namely varying degrees of ‘dominance’ – that cannot be explained by this view.

⁶¹ Cf. n. 3 above.

⁶² ‘[We assume] the existence of a change of category-rule (provisionally called ‘participialization’) which changes the embedded predication into an NP (its Subject becoming Head): as a consequence the Head of the NP will receive the case form required by the governing predicate for nominal fillers of the argument-position involved’ (Bolkestein 1980: 90).

⁶³ *conditio* ‘a making, creating’, specifically, is not used until Church Latin. There is no other abstract noun linked with the verb *condo* in use.

1.2.e Summary

Many studies of ACs do not offer a proper account of what defines these constructions, i.e. what makes them ‘absolute’. Explanations based on reference to the idiomatic equivalents of ACs in modern languages do not explain the workings of the actual ACs. Various other criteria that have been offered only describe single features of ACs, rather than delineating them from similar but non-absolute expressions. In what follows, I shall argue that the ‘dominant’ attribute is the key feature of ACs, and demonstrate that refinement of this idea, possible when related constructions such as AUCs are adduced for a systematic comparison, can offer a simple definition of ACs. This definition will also be shown to help answer the questions of how ACs first came to be.

1.3 The scope of this study

This work aims at correcting the errors and filling the gaps which I see in the research on ACs up to this point. I thus intend to look one by one at the three old Indo-European languages in which a sufficiently large corpus of relevant material can be found: Greek (Chapter 2), Latin (Chapter 3) and Vedic/Sanskrit (Chapter 4). I shall ask the question of what ‘absolute’ can mean separately for each language. Throughout, I shall show how misinterpretations of the material arose when scholars looked at these constructions from e.g. a modern English or German point of view, thus for instance seeing an AC as equivalent to a finite subordinate clause simply because, in their language, this happened to be the best way of rendering this construction. I am basing my statements on corpora of ACs from the oldest spheres of each language. My collection of Greek GAs from Homer, Hesiod and fragmentary seventh- and sixth-century literature was assembled by searching for genitive participle endings on the online *TLG*.⁶⁴ I compared my Homeric collection with those in Vasilaros (1993) and Keydana (1997). My

⁶⁴ The *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, to be found at www.tlg.uci.edu.

collection of Early Latin AAs is based on those found in Bennett (1914) and Keydana (1997). I gathered my Rigvedic material by going through Lubotsky's *R̥gvedic Word Concordance* (1997) and looking for participles in the locative, while my examples from Vedic prose are taken from Oertel (1926). My examples from later Sanskrit literature were either taken from single texts (i.e. not the result of a comprehensive search) or, where so noted, taken from a variety of grammars.

Chapter 2 will focus on what an AC *can* do: given its strongly verbal participle system, Greek does not only have unambiguous ACs, but these have also developed rather far. I shall look at the functions they fulfil and the constructions they are related to. In an attempt to identify signs of change in ACs, I shall also take into account other pre-Classical material (Hesiod, and fragmentary authors from the seventh and sixth centuries BC).

Chapters 3 and 4, on the other hand, will focus more on questioning our conceptions of ACs. I shall demonstrate that, within the system of Latin grammar, there are a number of constructions that show a considerable overlap with the AA. Thus, while we can determine rather well where the border lies between absolute and that which only just is not absolute, the constructions to be identified as absolute are well linked in with their grammatical environment. In my discussion of Sanskrit – interesting also for those whose main focus lies on the Classical languages, as we can there actually see certain developments which we can only assume or reconstruct for the pre-history of Latin and Greek – I shall show that, if we have a clear understanding of what we mean by 'absolute', we can see easily that many expressions standardly labelled as 'locative absolutes' are not absolute at all. Yet here again, the constructions in question are so close to actual LAs that one might ask whether, just within Sanskrit, it makes sense to insist on somehow drawing a line between them. While Greek ACs are interesting because of how far developed they are, Latin and Sanskrit ACs are most useful for reconstructing the PIE state of affairs: the case system of Sanskrit and the participle system of Latin are still closer to their PIE counterparts. Hence there are various aspects in which their ACs retain potentially old features.

Chapter 5, finally, will put together the information gathered in the preceding chapters. I shall collate ACs from all three languages and shall compare what it is that makes them ‘absolute’. I shall then reconstruct how this feature could have come about, and shall attempt to establish what form it may have taken in PIE. For this purpose, I shall offer a reconstruction of aspects of two relevant areas of PIE syntax, namely case and participle usage. Rather than assigning the overall genesis of ACs to either PIE or the daughter languages, I shall show which specific developments are likely to have taken place in PIE, and which must have happened later. Finally, I shall offer possible paths of development from PIE to the material that we find attested in the daughter languages.

Generally speaking, this study thus aims to answer open questions relating to ACs and, where that is not possible, to at least identify the areas for further research on whose clarification an answer depends. More specifically, it aims to demonstrate that we can define ACs as temporal expressions with non-temporal heads, and that all their characteristic qualities follow from this definition. Using the oldest attestations of ACs in the oldest languages in which they are unambiguously attested, it then shows from what source and how ACs first came to be, and, taking into account later information from each language, how these constructions developed.

1.4 Summary of findings

Absolute constructions are temporal expressions with non-temporal heads. Normally, nominal expressions of time involve nouns that have some temporal dimension to their semantics, as in *at dawn*, *on Monday*, *during the lecture*. ACs on the other hand have as their heads nouns which do not denote events but things (whether animate or not): *ἐμὲν* ζῶντος ‘in my lifetime, while I am alive’, *urbe deleta* ‘with the city destroyed, after the destruction of the city’, *Romulo rege* ‘with Romulus as king, when Romulus was king’, *śūrye udyatī* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the rising sun, at sunrise’. Although the semantics especially of ACs in the Classical stages of each language may receive a strong

causal or concessive nuance,⁶⁵ ACs still basically denote a point or period in time. Because the head nouns do not have any temporal semantics, they cannot fulfil this function on their own and need to be ‘put into time’, so to speak, by the accompanying attribute (usually a participle, in Latin also an adjective or another noun). The semantic necessity of these attributes for the expression as a whole to make sense is what creates their ‘dominance’: they are necessary in the same way as a predicate is required in a verbal clause (the non-nominal counterpart of temporal expressions).

So much for the synchronic dimension. The diachronic question to ask now is how this state of affairs came to be: how did these languages develop the possibility of using simple attributes in such a semantically unusual way? Looking at the oldest attested stages of Greek, Latin and Sanskrit, we find expressions denoting *natural* time in all of them, i.e. expressions that do not talk about random events, but points or periods in time traditionally used to measure the passage of time, such as sunrise, night or day, the seasons and their onset etc. This makes it likely that ACs first arose from non-absolute expressions of natural time (‘in spring’, ‘at dawn’, ‘at night’ etc.). There furthermore is evidence that the first development towards absoluteness was the extension of such expressions from nouns that actually have a temporal dimension to nouns such as *moon* or *sun* that do not have a temporal dimension in themselves, but are frequently used to refer to time or measure its passing. In the oldest Sanskrit texts, for example, the only truly absolute construction that we find refers to sunrise: *sūrye udyatī* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the rising sun, at sunrise’ (RV 8.27.19) and *sūr(y)e údite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} risen_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the risen sun, just after sunrise’ (e.g. at RV 8.13.13). Even such a semantically small extension results in fully absolute expressions, at least if we employ the definition of ACs as temporal expressions with non-temporal heads.

⁶⁵ See e.g. τετράπους τε τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἐκ ταύτης ἐφύετο καὶ πολύπους τῆς προφάσεως, θεοῦ βάσεις ὑποτιθέντος πλείους τοῖς μᾶλλον ἀφροσιν, ὡς μᾶλλον ἐπὶ γῆν ἔλκοιντο. ‘On this account also their race was made four-footed and many-footed, **since God set** more supports under the more foolish ones, so that they might be dragged down still more to the earth’ (Plt. *Tim.* 92a).

Having used specific absolute and non-absolute expressions to identify a starting-point for ACs, a further look at other early material permits specific speculations concerning the next steps by which ACs would have developed (formally minimal steps such as negations or the use of other formally parallel but semantically opposed expressions, and ultimately the move from expressions of natural time to expressions referring to time in general). Given that it lends itself to expressions of *time at which* most easily and given that the cases in which ACs are attested I believe the locative to have been the original case of ACs in PIE. I thus conclude the final chapter with suggestions how the Latin AA (which is largely comitative-instrumental in its semantics) and the Greek GA (not being a descendant of the PIE locative) may have developed.

EARLY GREEK

2.1 Introduction

Among the languages focused on in this study, Greek has the AC that is developed furthest. From the earliest literary texts onwards, the Genitive Absolute (GA) appears as a productive and varied phenomenon. At least some cases of this particular AC can rightly be called clausal equivalents.

It is unclear whether the GA is attested in Mycenaean Greek or not. It is absent from the Linear B tablets, yet may well have existed in Mycenaean times: given the shorthand nature of most Mycenaean texts, there is usually no use for the kind of background information provided by a subordinate construction, be it participial or finite.¹ Hence, the question of whether the GA is *attested* in Mycenaean Greek has relatively little bearing on our study of the construction overall. I shall thus not look into the potentially relevant material in detail, as it presents too many uncertainties and possible interpretations.²

The GA is attested from the earliest literary texts onwards. We find it in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, in Hesiod and in the various more or less fragmentary authors that exist in the gap between Early and Classical Greek. While there is a small number of syntactic limitations on GA use in Homer (e.g. on the possibility of the absolute participle to govern an object, see Section 2.3.c), these

¹ See Panagl 1999 for an overview, and Bartoněk 2003: 439, 445 for a list of publications on Mycenaean syntax.

² Probably the most interesting expression attested is *me-tu-wo(-)ne-wo* (PY Fr 1202), which has tentatively been translated as ‘at the festival of the New Wine’ (see e.g. Vilborg 1960: 33, Palmer 1963: 241). If it does indeed consist of two words, and if it is indeed intended to be an expression of time (and is not abbreviated in some way, with these genitives thus being adnominal), it is absolute: the head noun ‘wine’ does not have a temporal dimension to its semantics, hence the attribute ‘new’ is required to furnish a temporal expression ‘at the new wine; at the new-wine [occasion/festival]’.

seem to have disappeared by the time of Classical prose, where the construction has become fully productive as a means of expressing subordinate information.³ This productivity of the GA is likely to have the following two causes. On the one hand, Greek participles themselves are formally productive and share many of the syntactic properties of finite verbs, and can thus be employed in many of the constructions in which a finite verb may be used (see Section 2.2.a). On the other, with the genitive, Greek uses for its AC a case that is predominantly employed in grammatical, i.e. governed usage. The one other adverbial use of the Greek genitive – the temporal genitive – is in itself relatively infrequent and unproductive. ACs are adverbial expressions. Thus, the potential for overlap between absolute and other uses of this case and hence for ambiguity is comparatively small (see esp. Section 2.2.b). This makes the GA a rather distinct phenomenon, with few apparent ties to any other case usage it may once have been linked to; therefore it develops without being restrained by those. Once a GA can convey a substantial amount of information and thus has become more similar to a full clause rather than just a nominal phrase, developments such as the formal extension of GAs to include direct objects or other complements are not impeded any more.

This chapter will focus on GAs in early Greek – specifically Homer, but also Hesiod and other (fragmentary) early authors. Later GAs are only quantitatively, not qualitatively, distinct from early GAs. For those interested solely in Greek, this study should thus be as relevant as one of later GAs, yet for those with comparative interests, early GAs and their limitations should prove more interesting.

As we shall see in the following three chapters, its great productivity makes the GA quite different from the Early Latin AA and the Vedic/Sanskrit LA in several ways. This, in turn, influences which aspects of the GA are particularly interesting to look at. While [Chapters 3](#) and [4](#) (on Latin and Sanskrit, respectively) will have a strong focus on the relations between the AA and adjacent areas of grammar, the current chapter looks at various points of

³ For an overview of ACs in Plato as well as a number of post-Classical prose authors and papyri, see Maiocco 2005.

usage concerning exclusively the GA, and especially the Homeric GA (Section 2.3). Thus, it will investigate the formal make-up of GAs that go beyond the minimal constituents of participle and (pro)noun and discuss whether this tells us anything about the formal origins and development of the construction (Section 2.3.b+c). It will examine the supposedly ‘ungrammatical’ GAs in Homer, i.e. instances of genitive participles instead of expected conjunct ones, and will demonstrate that these are quite unlike later Greek GAs which are indeed used, instead of conjunct participles, for emphasis (Section 2.3.d). This discussion will show once more that constructions are called ‘absolute’ after insufficient reflection, which in turn implies that not enough thought is spent on defining the phenomenon at the outset.

Yet given that even some of the earliest GAs are finite-clause equivalents (in that there are finite clauses of identical content; see Section 2.2.a and also Section 1.2.b.ii), one should indeed ask what niche Homeric GAs occupy: can we identify any factors (syntactic, stylistic, discourse-related) that determine the choice of an AC over a finite clause? Is there something they are used for exclusively, or are they only ever just an alternative to finite (or other) subordination? The review of a text corpus large enough to answer this question properly lies beyond the scope of this study. Yet Section 2.4 will present some preliminary findings based on an analysis of parts of the *Iliad*, and will suggest questions to be asked in the course of further research.

This concludes the examination of the Homeric GA itself. Although, overall, this study focuses on the earliest attested stages of the AC in each language looked at, we need to go a step further in the case of the GA. There are indications in Homer that the GA might be on its way out in the seventh century BC: The GA in the *Odyssey* becomes rarer and both formally and semantically more uniform, a trend which seems to be continued in Hesiod. Thesleff (1958 *passim*) sees this as an indication that the GA is an old construction on its way out of the language. He claims it would have actually died out had it not been (artificially) revived in the fifth century (1958: 205). Classical Greek literature, he argues, greatly profited from this rather brief and compact means of subordination, and thus took it up again, made it more frequent, varied and

simply more productive. To determine the accuracy of this claim, the evidence we have from Hesiod (Section 2.5), and also the various minor pre-Classical authors whose work survives in fragments (Section 2.6), is examined. Particularly in the post-Hesiodic evidence, the GA appears to be productive and not infrequent, which demonstrates that there is no gap, nor a Classical ‘revival’ of the construction.

Finally, the Homeric GA will be put in context by comparison not only with other, finite means of subordination and of later GAs, but also with the *ab urbe condita* construction (AUC). AC and AUC are similar in their use of a head and agreeing participial modifier where the modifier is of such great semantic importance that elsewhere it would be expressed as the head (compare the GA ἀπτοιχομένοιο ἄνακτος (*Od.* 17.296) lit. *‘at the absent master’, as opposed to idiomatic English ‘in the master’s absence’ or ‘while the master was absent’ and the AUC μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας (*Th.* 6.33) lit. *‘after Syracuse founded’ instead of ‘after the foundation of Syracuse’). This discussion (Section 2.7), in conjunction with more details on AUCs in Sections 3.4.a and 5.3.a, will show that the characteristics even of the Greek GA, the most distinct and well-defined of all old Indo-European ACs, are more in line with their grammatical environment than is usually noted. From this fact we can then draw further inferences concerning the prehistoric development of such expressions.

2.2 The Genitive Absolute in Homer: an overview

2.2.a General

The GA is fully absolute in Homer. Compare e.g.

ὁ δ' ὄφρα μὲν εἰλίποδας βοῦς
βόσκ' ἐν Περκώτῃ δῆϊων ἀπὸ νόσφιν ἐόντων
‘He used to graze his shambling herds in Percote, long ago **when the
enemy’s forces stood far off**’
(*Il.* 15.547–8)

This genitive expression is unambiguously absolute: there is no other possible interpretation for it, no matter which definition of

absoluteness we employ. It already goes beyond the formal minimum of an AC ((pro)noun and qualifier) by including the adverb νόσφιν.

There are thirty-six unambiguous GAs in the *Iliad* and thirteen in the *Odyssey*.⁴ The great majority of Homeric GAs consist of at least (pro)noun and participle. At *Il.* 11.458,⁵ the GA does not have a head noun, which however is present in the preceding sentence. *Od.* 4.646 and 14.527 also have no nominal head. In both cases, the possible head is present in a different case in the same clause (see Section 2.3.d).

Although nominal in shape, some Homeric GAs serve as clausal equivalents. This can be seen not only from their semantic contents, but also from the fact that they include particles like μέν and δέ, which correlate them with other (finite) subordinate clauses, or also γε and (οὐκ)έτι:

ἐπεὶ ἄρ σέ γε θυμὸς
ὀτρύνει ἐπὶ νῆας ἐμείο μέν οὐκ ἔθελούσης.
ἀλλ' εὖχεο σύ γ' ἔπειτα κελαινέφει Κρονίωνι

'since your heart urges you to the ships, **even though I do not want it;**
but you at least pray to cloud-wrapped Zeus' (*Il.* 24. 288–90)⁶

Perhaps the most clause-like of all Homeric GAs are *Il.* 1.88–9 and *Od.* 16.438–9:

οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζώντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο
σοὶ κοίλης παρὰ νηυσὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει

'no one, not **while I live and see the light on earth**, shall lay his heavy
hands on you by the hollow ships'

ὅς κεν Τηλεμάχῳ σῶν υἱεὶ χεῖρας ἐποίσει
ζώνοντός γ' ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο

'... who will lift a hand against Telemachus, your son, while I am alive
and see the light on earth'

⁴ See Appendix 2 for a list of Homeric GAs, including the most ambiguous/nearly absolute cases. The various sources of possible ambiguity are discussed in Section 2.2.b below.

⁵ αἶμα δέ οἱ σπασθέντος ἀνέσσυτο, κῆδε δὲ θυμόν 'and when [the spear] was drawn out, the blood gushed forth and distressed his spirit'.

⁶ Another 'verbal' element in this example is the use of ἔθελούσης rather than the more adjectival ἀέκοντος (e.g. at *Il.* 1.301).

Of these, there actually is a finite counterpart:

ὄφρα δέ μοι ζῶει καὶ ὄρᾳ φάος Ἥελίοιο
ἄχνυται

‘and as long as I have him with me, still alive, and he is looking into the
sunlight, he grieves’ (e.g. *Il.* 18.61–2)⁷

The productivity of the GA even early on in Greek is likely due to the productivity of the Greek participle system. Greek participles are regular and predictable both in their formation and their semantics. A participle exists for each tense stem and voice formally distinguished in the finite verb. They are regularly formed, with each participle consisting of the relevant verbal stem and participial suffix. The meaning of each of these forms stands in a clear relation to the corresponding finite part of the verbal paradigm. Syntactically, they behave like verbs in that they can govern basically the same complements as their finite counterparts (thus e.g. governing direct objects in the accusative rather than taking the genitival attributes that one might expect from a nominal formation or including agent expressions).⁸ When we look at Latin, we shall see that such ‘verbal’ participles are not necessary for the genesis of ACs, yet it is clear that they contribute to the versatility of the construction once it already exists.

2.2.b Ambiguities

The main source of ambiguous constructions is found in potentially adnominal expressions. Compare the following examples (the possible head(s) of each genitive is/are underlined>:

⁷ ὄφρα δέ μοι ζῶει καὶ ὄρᾳ φάος Ἥελίοιο is found twice in the *Iliad* (18.61 = 18.442) and once, as ἡ που ἔτι ζῶει καὶ ὄρᾳ φάος ἡελίοιο; ‘Is he still alive? does he see the light of day?’, in the *Odyssey* (4.833).

⁸ Cf. e.g. ψηφίσασθε τὸν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν ‘vote for the war, not fearing/not afraid of its immediate horror’ (Th. 1.124). Examples of the latter are rare in Homer, but cf. αἱ δ’ ἅμα πᾶσαι | θύσθλα χαμαὶ κατέχευαν ὑπ’ ἀνδροφόνοιο Λυκούργου | θεινόμεναι βουπλήγι ‘and they all let fall to the ground their wands, smitten with an ox-goad by man-slaying Lycurgus’ (*Il.* 6.133–5). For a later example, see ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναγκαζόμενος ‘you answer, forced by them’ (Plt. *Ap.* 27c). Many thanks to Coulter George for pointing me to these.

τοῦ δ' ἦν ἔλκομένοιο κονίσσαλος, ἄμφι δὲ χαῖται
κυάνεαι πτίτναντο, κάρη δ' ἅπαν ἐν κονίησι
κέϊτο πάρος χαρίεν

‘[and from Hector] **as he was dragged** the dust rose up, and on either side
his dark hair flowed outspread, and all in the dust lay the head that was
once so handsome’ (Il. 22.401–3)

τοῦ ἔλκομένοιο is dependent on κάρη (‘the head of him being dragged’; note the link between the three clauses established by the repeated δέ), yet as κάρη only appears much later in the sentence, it seems possible that a speaker of Greek would have parsed the genitive expression as absolute, at least until its grammatical (and literal) head appeared. τοῦ ἔλκομένοιο might also be seen as dependent on κονίσσαλος (‘dust [arose] from him who was being dragged’). Finally, it seems possible that τοῦ ἔλκομένοιο was originally felt as adnominal, but later, once ACs had become a more frequent feature of the language, as absolute.⁹

ἢ καταλείψουσιν πόλιν ἄκρην τοῦδε πεσόντος,
ἦε μένειν μεμάσσι καὶ Ἑκτορος οὐκέτ' ἔοντος

‘Will they abandon the city heights **with this man fallen**? Or brace for a
last, dying stand **though Hector is no more**?’ (Il. 22.383–4)

Here, too, it is unclear whether a link would have been perceived between πόλιν ἄκρην and τοῦδε πεσόντος: the city being referred to, Troy, is the home city of the dead man referred to, Hector. Still one cannot prove that Il. 22.383 is thus to be understood as ‘whether they will leave the high city of this [man] now that he has fallen/died’.¹⁰ Od. 9.550–1 presents us with a similar ambiguity:

⁹ The fact that we here have τοῦ instead of a possibly expected αὐτοῦ (the only kind of pronoun present in unambiguous Homeric GAs) might be seen as an additional indication that this is not an AC. Yet given that the later definite article still has pronominal force in Homer, the absence of a ‘proper’ pronoun in this passage does not allow any certain inferences on the status of this construction.

¹⁰ Or should we see τοῦδε πεσόντος as adnominal and Ἑκτορος οὐκέτ' ἔοντος as absolute, in spite of their syntactic parallelism in this sentence? It seems difficult to find criteria on which to make this decision (see also Section 5.7 on this question).

ἄρνειόν δ' ἔμοι οἴῳ ἐϋκνήμιδες ἑταῖροι
μήλων δαιομένων δόσαν ἔξοχα

‘the ram that, **of the sheep being distributed/as the sheep were being distributed**, my well-greaved comrades gave to me alone, as a special honour’¹¹

The ram mentioned here is the one that carried Odysseus out of the Cyclops’ cave (while each of his comrades was carried by several ewes). Usually, there is just one ram accompanying a flock of sheep.¹² Would an audience in Homeric times thus have perceived μήλων δαιομένων as a kind of partitive genitive (best rendered into English as ‘the ram of/belonging to the sheep that were being distributed’), or would it not have seen such a link and thus considered the genitive construction as absolute?¹³

Ambiguous constructions such as the above – where it is unclear whether a genitive expression is dependent on (usually) a noun or (far more rarely) a verb¹⁴ or preposition¹⁵ – are relatively numerous in the Homeric epics. Looking at them helps us see why the idea of ACs developing through the loosening of syntactic ties

¹¹ Autenrieth 1902 s.v. ἔξοχος, *Lfgre* s.v. ἔξοχος 2.b and LSJ s.v. ἔξοχος 2.a agree in seeing ἔξοχα as standing on its own (‘gave to me as a high honour’). It is not impossible that an adnominal link between ἔξοχα and μήλων δαιομένων was perceived (‘distinguished among the sheep’), yet I do not think that this translation has any greater merits. Fagles translates ‘But the splendid ram – as we meted out the flocks my friends-in-arms made him my prize of honour.’

¹² Rams do not produce milk and as such are not profitable. One ram is enough to impregnate a herd of ewes, and several rams kept together would attack one another. (See e.g. Wooster 2005 on this.)

¹³ Admittedly, there is mention of several male animals at *Od.* 9.238–9. Yet it never is made clear just how many animals the Cyclops had (and whether there thus were several flocks, each with ‘their’ ram). But at any rate, the group of sheep used to help Odysseus and his comrades escape consisted of ewes accompanied by one ram.

¹⁴ Cf. καὶ κεν τοῦτ' ἐθέλωμι Διὸς γε διδόντος ἀρέσθαι ‘I’d be happy to take this [crown] if Zeus presents it/from Zeus presenting it’ (*Od.* 1.390). This is the only example where there is an ambiguity between a GA and an ablative genitive governed by a verb.

¹⁵ E.g. τετρήχει δ' ἀγορή, ὑπὸ δὲ στεναχίζετο γαῖα | λαῶν ἰζόντων, ὁμαδος δ' ἦν ‘The meeting grounds shook. The earth groaned and rumbled underneath, as soldiers took positions (or: under the soldiers taking position?) – the whole place in uproar’ (*Il.* 2.95–6), similarly ὑπὸ δὲ Τρῶες κεκάδοντο | ἀνδρὸς ἀκοντίσαντος ‘and the Trojans gave ground, scattering back, panicking before the man as he cast his spear’ (*Il.* 4.497–8 = 15.573–4).

(see Section 1.2.c.iii) is difficult to support: at a time when there are no ACs yet, an interpretation of these genitive expressions as anything other than adnominal would have been ungrammatical. The same holds in the case of expressions dependent on verbs that govern genitive objects, such as the example of τοῦ δ' ἰθὺς μεμῶτος ἀκόντισε Τυδέος υἱός 'at him as he charged ahead, the son of Tydeus hurled his spear' (*Il.* 8.118) that K-G II.2.79 offer. When, on the other hand, the GA is established, interpretations of a genitive construction as either absolute (i.e. adverbial/adsentential) or as e.g. adnominal both are grammatically possible. Once the seeds of the GA have been sown, it seems very possible that constructions such as those discussed above would also have been syntactically reanalysed and understood as absolute. Yet in times before there was a GA, to my mind an expression such as *Od.* 9.550–1 above would have been interpreted as adnominal, rather than as ungoverned and thus grammatically wrong.¹⁶ It thus seems that the original source of the GA needs to be sought elsewhere.

2.2.c The nature of the absolute participle

Participles from all tenses with the exception of the future are found in Homeric GAs; see the table below.¹⁷ The present active and medio-passive participles occur with the greatest frequency. There is also a distinct number of aorist active and middle participles, and finally, a few aorist passive and perfect active participles. These latter two only appear in the *Iliad*.

¹⁶ This would especially have been the case with adnominal constructions: nouns can almost always stand on their own, while verbs frequently require complementation. ἀκοντίζω, for example, often is used together with expressions denoting who is being shot at (mostly in the genitive) which makes it likely that the genitive expression at *Il.* 8.118 would continue being understood as dependent on the verb even after the GA had come into existence.

¹⁷ To my knowledge, the absence of future participles from the GA does not change for at least several centuries. In Homer, this absence is likely explained by the fact that use of future participles is limited almost exclusively to express purpose after verbs of going; see Monro 1891: 211 also for a handful of other uses.

	<i>Iliad</i>	<i>Odyssey</i>
Present	17	10
Aorist	14	3
of which aorist passive	4 ¹⁸	
Perfect	4 ¹⁹	
ἄέκων	1	

Yet the decrease in participle variety does not automatically allow any inference that the GA as a whole is becoming more limited in its use. Almost all perfect active GAs in the *Iliad* involve τεθνηῶτος. The lack of this participle in GAs in the *Odyssey* could very well be a lexical/topical rather than a grammatical matter: there simply are not that many prominent people dying in the *Odyssey*. The fact that we get fewer GAs involving aorist active and middle participles in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad* also does not say much: when we compare these figures to the total number of GAs in each of the two epics, the relative frequency of these aorist GAs becomes almost identical. There is the fact that the aorist passive participle is absent from the GAs in the *Odyssey*. However, as it does not occur more than four times in the *Iliad* either, it is not certain whether one can infer any greater grammatical changes from this later absence. The only clear ‘recession’ that can be identified is the decrease in overall GA frequency in the *Odyssey*.

2.2.d Semantics

A GA can theoretically express the same nuances as any (non-future) conjunct participle: temporal, or modal (causal, conditional or concessive). While the participle itself only provides temporal information, the context in which it is used may then add weaker or stronger modal nuances. Homeric GAs are used in such a way

¹⁸ E.g. τῷ ῥα περίδεισαν μένεα πνέοντες Ἀχαιοὶ | μή πῶς μιν πολέμοιο μετακλινθέντος ἔλοιεν ‘Achaeans breathing fury feared for [Machaon] now: what if the tide turned and Trojans killed the healer?’ (*Il.* 11.508–9).

¹⁹ E.g. ὃς κέλει πολέμοιο συνεσταότος καὶ αὐτῆς | νῆας εὐσσελμούς ἄλαδ’ ἐλκέμεν ‘when war and battle-cry are engaged to clash you tell us to haul our oar-swept vessels out to sea?’ (*Il.* 14.96–7).

that their meaning is either purely temporal, or temporal-modal, but almost never very strongly modal. Cf. e.g.

purely temporal:

οὐ γὰρ οἶω
τούτου γε ζώντος ἀνύσσεσθαι τάδε ἔργα
‘**while he lives**, I swear we’ll never bring our venture off’
(*Od.* 16.372–3)

temporal-conditional:

καί κεν ἐλαφρότερος πόλεμος Τρώεσσι γένοιτο
σεῖο καταφθιμένοιο
‘how much lighter the war would be for the Trojans then . . . **with you
being dead/if you were dead**’
(*Il.* 22.287–8)

temporal-concessive/adversative:

τί νυ βείομαι αἰνὰ παθοῦσα
σεῦ ἀποτεθνηῶτος;
Why shall I live in my terrible suffering, **now you are dead/even though
you are dead?**’
(*Il.* 22.431–2)²⁰

temporal-causal:

ῥηῖτεροι γὰρ μάλλον Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὴ ἔσεσθε
κείνου τεθνηῶτος ἐναιρέμεν
‘easier game you will be for the Argive troops to slaughter, **now he is
dead/because he is dead**’
(*Il.* 24.243–4)

Yet let us take a look at *Il.* 19.74–5:

ὥς ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἐχάρησαν ἑυκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος.
‘So he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans rejoiced **since the great-
hearted son of Peleus had sworn off his wrath.**’

Here, the causal semantics are particularly strong – there is a temporal relationship between the two clauses (first Achilles speaks,

²⁰ This example also shows how much the exact semantics of a GA depend on its context: are we to understand a ‘(how shall I live), suffering terribly because you are dead’ or a ‘how/why shall I live, suffering terribly, even though you are dead’?

then the Achaeans rejoice), but it is the causal relationship (*because* he has renounced his wrath, they are rejoicing) that seems important here. If, as will be argued below (Section 2.3.c), this passage is a rather late element within the Homeric text as we know it, we may be justified in seeing this development towards more clearly modal semantics also as late, which, in turn, may be seen as an indication that the original sphere of application of GAs was to denote purely temporal facts.

While present-tense absolute participles in Homer display mostly temporal semantics with an even spread of other adverbial nuances, many aorist participles display causal nuances. Cf. e.g.

τὸ δ' ὑπέρπτατο χάλκεον ἔγχος,
καρφαλέον δέ οἱ ἄσπις ἐπιθρέξαντος ἄϋσεν
ἔγχος

‘under it low he hunched and the brazen spear flew past with a grating
screech **as/because the shaft grazed it**’ (Il. 13.408–10)

This seems understandable given that the basic function of aorist participles is the expression of simple aspect.²¹ They are thus semantically better suited than present participles to refer to actions that are complete rather than still ongoing. One can only know that an action is complete when it is actually over, i.e. in the past, and thus at least partly anterior to the still ongoing action of a main verb. Anteriority, finally, lends itself to expressing a cause: if two events are depicted as related and one is temporally prior to the other, it also is likely that this prior event will be the cause of the latter.²²

2.3 Homeric questions

There is extensive literature on the Homeric GA. As early as Classen (1867), we find excellent analyses of the Homeric material.

²¹ See e.g. K-G II.1.185.

²² See also τῶν δ' ἄρα δεισάντων ἐκ χειρῶν ἔπτατο τεύχεα, | πάντα δ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ πίπτε, θῆς ὅπα φωνησάσης ‘Then in their terror the arms flew from their hands and fell one and all to the ground, **as/because the goddess uttered her voice**’ (Od. 24.534–5).

The most recent detailed studies can be found in Vasilaros (1993) and Keydana (1997). Nevertheless, there still are several interesting questions left open. These can be answered by close analyses of single GAs. Even though the GA as a whole is well developed and thus much further removed from possible PIE sources than the Early Latin AA and the LA in Vedic Sanskrit, comparisons between different groups of GAs (e.g. *Iliad* vs. *Odyssey* or Homer vs. Hesiod) can reveal layers within GA development and thus hints at earlier stages of the construction. Having identified such layers, it is then easier for us to compare the Greek material to that in Latin and Sanskrit. This section will thus consist of several more or less independent studies which nevertheless all have the same ultimate goal: to find indications of possible roots of the GA, and eventually of ACs overall.

2.3.a ‘Lateness’: a preamble

In what follows, apparent innovations in the use of GAs will be referred to as ‘late additions’ to the text. Some may see this approach as problematic, hence a word of explanation. Most discussions²³ of ‘early’ or ‘late’ elements and ‘later additions’ concern the question of whether we can identify early and late layers in the Homeric *Kunstsprache*, i.e. employ single features to make any inferences regarding the relative age of a given passage. Parry (1980: 421–36)²⁴ has shown that this approach implies a fundamental inability to understand the workings of an oral tradition. As he demonstrates, the various dialectal forms of the same word or ending, the various epithets or variations of formulae (the choice of which is basically governed by the specific metrical needs within a line) may stem from different periods or dialects, but they form a synchronic collection of elements which a skilful poet needs to command in its entirety to compose, fill or end a hexameter line as elegantly as possible. In brief, the language available to ‘Homer’ reflects numerous diachronic developments

²³ Cf. e.g. Wilamowitz 1916, criticised by Adam Parry 1980: xviii in the introduction to his edition of his father’s works.

²⁴ This is a reprint of Parry’s 1923 MA thesis, which until then had remained unpublished. The ideas laid out in that thesis are then taken up again later and expanded upon.

that are all present on one synchronic plane. Thus, an ‘archaic’ element does not necessarily indicate that we are dealing with an old passage. In the context of the Homeric *Kunstsprache*, there was a collective memory for elements not in current/everyday use, and thus, any poet may have chosen any archaic element e.g. for its metrical convenience.

Yet the appearance of an *innovative* element rules out old age, and any arguments in this chapter that concern putative layers and developments will focus solely on such innovations. One of these is the use of a GA in places where the use of a conjunct participle is possible (i.e. where the head of the participle construction is a part of the matrix clause). Such a use of the GA usually is found only in later Greek, and there apparently serves to create stronger emphasis: a GA is more independent and thus more clause-like than a governed nominal phrase would be.²⁵ Other such elements include transitivity and general extension of GAs beyond the formal minimum of (pro)noun and participle (a phenomenon which becomes more frequent in the *Odyssey*). Distribution is also interesting here: in both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, GAs are by far more frequent in direct speech than they are in narrative.²⁶ If we follow e.g. Janko (1994: 12–13) in assuming that direct speech is linguistically more innovative than narrative, we might see this distribution of ACs as another indication of the construction’s increasing popularity during the period of or directly preceding the monumental composition. Given all of this, it seems possible that some GAs would have been added to the text as we know it at a late stage in its development and may thus reflect recent changes in GA usage.

2.3.b Further components: signs of development?

Formally minimal GAs consist of only (pro)noun and participle. As described above, there furthermore are GAs that are modified by means of a particle (οὐ, δέ etc.) and GAs that are extended

²⁵ See Schwyzler 1942.

²⁶ Various long passages of the *Odyssey* are, of course, narrated by a character rather than the anonymous poet; in this context ‘direct speech’ is used not to mean the narrative passages of such direct speech, but rather solely direct speech as reported by those characters.

e.g. through prepositional expressions, adverbs etc. We find the following distribution:

	<i>Iliad</i>	<i>Odyssey</i>
Minimal	25	3
Modified	5	4
Extended	6	6

The majority of GAs in the *Iliad* are formally minimal; cf. e.g. ἡελίου ἀνιόντος ‘when the sun rises, at the rising of the sun’ (*Il.* 8.538), πολλῶν ἐλκόντων ‘with many (hands) tugging’ (*Il.* 17.393), ἐμεῦ ἀπομηνίσαντος ‘as I raged on’ (*Il.* 9.426), κεδασθείσης ὑσμίνης ‘when the fight is scattered’ (*Il.* 15.328), ἑταίρου τεθνηῶτος ‘with (my) companion dead, although my companion is dead’ (*Il.* 19.210). GAs modified by particles such as γε, μέν, δέ, οὐ(κ) or (οὐκ)έτι include e.g. ἐμεῖο μὲν οὐκ ἐθελούσης ‘although I do not want it’ (*Il.* 24.289) or Ἑκτορος οὐκέτ’ ἐόντος ‘with Hector being no more/even though Hector is no more’ (*Il.* 22.384).

There are also a number of GAs in the *Iliad* which are structurally more complex. These ‘extended’ GAs become more common in the *Odyssey*; cf. e.g. ἐμεῖο μετ’ Αἰθιόπεςσιν ἐόντος ‘while I was among the Ethiopians’ (*Od.* 5.287), κακῶς πάσχοντος ἐμεῖο ‘with me suffering badly’ (*Od.* 16.275), σέθεν ἐνθάδ’ ἐόντος ‘while you are here’ (*Od.* 20.232), μῆλων σφαζομένων οἶνοιό τε πινομένοιο | καὶ σίτου ‘while sheep are being slaughtered, and wine and bread consumed’ (*Od.* 20.312–13).

The formally extended GAs in the *Iliad* are the following: *Il.* 1.88–9:

οὐ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο
σοὶ κοίλης παρὰ νηυσὶ βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει

‘no one, not **while I live and see the light on earth**, shall lay his heavy hands on you by the hollow ships’

Il. 14.96–101:

ὃς κέλεαι πολέμοιο συνεσταότος καὶ αὐτῆς
νῆας ἔϋσσέλμους ἄλαδ’ ἐλκέμεν, ὅφρ’ ἔτι μάλλον

Τρωσὶ μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται ἐπικρατέουσιν περ ἔμπτῃς
 ἡμῖν δ' αἰπὺς δλεθρος ἐπιρρέπη. οὐ γὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ
 σχήσουσιν πόλεμον νηῶν δ'λαδ' ἔλκομένων,
 ἀλλ' ἀποπαπτανέουσιν, ἐρώησουσι δὲ χάρμης.

'With the forces poised to clash you tell us to haul our oar-swept vessels out to sea? Just so one more glory can crown these Trojans – god help us, they have beaten us already – and the scales of headlong death can drag us down. Achaean troops will never hold the line, I tell you, **not while the long ships are being hauled to sea**. They'll look left and right – where can they run? – and fling their lust for battle to the winds.'

Il. 15.547–8:

ὃ δ' ὄφρα μὲν εἰλίποδας βοῦς
 βόσκ' ἐν Περκώτῃ δηϊῶν ἀπὸ νόσφιν ἐόντων

'He used to graze his shambling herds in Percote, long ago **when the enemy's forces stood far off**'.

Il. 19.74–5:

ὥς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἐχάρησαν ἑυκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
 μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος.

'So he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans rejoiced **since the great-hearted son of Peleus had sworn off his wrath**.'

Il. 23.520–1:

ὃ δέ τ' ἄγχι μάλα τρέχει, οὐδέ τι πολλή
 χῶρη μεσσηγὺς πολέος πεδίοιο θέοντος

'(the very tip of the tail brushing his running-rim), and the wheel spins closer, hardly a gap between **as he sweeps the open plain**'

Interestingly, almost all of these passages provide indications that they may be late additions to the text. Constructions very similar to both *Il.* 1.88–9 and 15.548 are found in the *Odyssey* (ζῶοντός γ' ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο (16.439), ἐμεῦ ἀπὸ νόσφιν ἐόντος (18.268)²⁷). This alone does not prove anything (they could just

²⁷ We do have to ask whether we can consider this particular genitive construction as properly absolute. The whole sentence reads μεμνήσθαι πατρός καὶ μητέρος ἐν μεγάροισιν | ὥς νῦν, ἢ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐμεῦ ἀπὸ νόσφιν ἐόντος 'watch over my father and mother in the palace, just as now, or perhaps a little more, when I am far from home' (this is Odysseus speaking to Penelope). It seems possible that a link between the genitive expression and either πατρός καὶ μητέρος or also μεγάροισιν was perceived. If we believe that

as well have been taken over from the older *Iliad* into the younger *Odyssey*). Yet given that such ‘extended’ GAs are far more frequent in the *Odyssey*, and most of the other extended GAs in the *Iliad* seem to be late phenomena (as I hope will become clear in the course of the following paragraphs), these two are perhaps more likely to be at home in the *Odyssey*.²⁸ Alternatively, one could also argue that both are independently drawn from the same ‘later’ phrase that is also the source of the *Odyssey*. Either way, we may here be able to see an innovation (i.e. the formal extension) as it is occurring.

Il. 14.96 and 14.100 stand in a passage that is discussed by Janko (1994: 161) for its ‘innovative phrasing’. He draws attention to the following points: ‘... πολέμοιο συνεσταότος καὶ αὐτῆς reverses and separates ἄ. κ. π. (37), which in turn declines the formula αὐτὴ τε πτόλεμός τε (etc., 4x epos); συνίσταμαι next means ‘join battle’ in Hdt. ... αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος normally at verse-end (24x, including acc.) ... ἐπιρρέπη is a metaphor from weighing (balls of wool?); ... Common later, the metaphor next occurs in Alcman frag. 41.’ In brief: just as the syntax of the passage is innovative overall, so is the fact of the formal extension of these two GAs.

On *Il.* 19.74–5 see Section 2.3.c below for a detailed discussion. The GA is clearly marked out as late by its almost purely causal semantics, its transitivity, and even by its existence (instead of the dative that one would expect χαίρω to govern²⁹).

This leaves us with *Il.* 23.521, which contains a slightly unusual GA (the next time we find a GA in which an adjective qualifies the head noun is at Hes. *Op.* 502), which however does not give us any further clues as to its age.

To sum up, the *Iliad* does contain formally extended GAs. Yet nearly all of these show indications of being late additions into the text.

this particular genitive construction was taken over into the *Iliad* as a GA, it must have been already perceived as a GA also at *Od.* 18.268.

²⁸ As noted in n. 7 above, the finite phrase ὄρα δέ μοι ζώει καὶ ὄρα φάος Ἡελίοιο is found twice in the *Iliad* (16.61 = 18.442) and once, as ἡ που ἐπὶ ζώει καὶ ὄρα φάος Ἡελίοιο ‘Is he still alive? does he see the light of day?’, in the *Odyssey* (4.833).

²⁹ LSJ s.v. χαίρω 1.

2.3.c *Transitivity*

I would here like to argue that the development towards transitivity in GAs is a phenomenon that only appears late in the process of creation of the Homeric works, or is post-Homeric. Keydana (1997: 201–2) provides a list of apparently transitive GAs, quoting the following passages.

With an accusative object:

ὥς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν ἔυκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος.

'So he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans rejoiced **since the great-hearted son of Peleus had sworn off his wrath.**' (*Il.* 19.74–5)

μάλα πού σφισι θυμὸς
αἶψιν ἔυφροσύνησιν ἰαίνεται εἵνεκα σεῖο,
λευσσόντων τοιόνδε θάλος χορὸν εἰσοιχνεῦσαν

'how often their hearts must warm with joy **to see you striding into the dance**' (*Od.* 6.155–7)

ὥς ἔφαθ', ἡμῖν δ' αὖτε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ,
δαισάντων φθόγγον τε βαρὺν αὐτόν τε πέλωρον

'so he spoke, and the hearts inside us shook, **as we feared his rumbling voice and monstrous hulk**' (*Od.* 9.256–7)

τῶν δ' ἄρα δαισάντων ἐκ χειρῶν ἔπτατο τεύχεα,
πάντα δ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ πῖπτε, θεᾶς ὄπα φωνησάσης

'weapons slipped from their hands and strewed the ground, **as the goddess uttered her voice**' (*Od.* 24.534–5)

With a genitive object:

πολλὸς δ' ἱμερόεντα χορὸν περίσταθ' ὄμιλος
τερπόμενοι· δοιῶ δὲ κυβιστητῆρε κατ' αὐτοῦς
μολπῆς ἐξάρχοντος ἐδίνευον κατὰ μέσσους.

'A breathless crowd stood round them struck with joy and through them a pair of tumblers dashed and sprang, whirling in leaping headsprings, as he (a singer) **led the dance.**' (*Il.* 18.604–6, compare *Od.* 4.18–19)

With an accusative object to be supplied:

ἔλπετο γὰρ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀποστρέψοντας ἑταίρους
ἐκ Τρώων ἰέναι πάλιν Ἑκτορος ὀτρύναντος.

‘for in his heart he hoped that they were friends coming from the Trojans
to turn him back, and **that Hector was calling off [the mission]**’

(*Il.* 10.355–6)

αὐτὰρ ὁ θυμὸν ᾄσθε καὶ ἥρυγεν, ὥς ὅτε ταῦρος
ἥρυγεν ἐλκόμενος Ἑλικώνιον ἀμφὶ ἀνακτα
κούρων ἐλκόντων

‘and he gasped his life away, bellowing like some bull that chokes and
grunts **when the young boys drag [him]** round the lord of Helice’s
shrine’

(*Il.* 20.403–5)

καὶ κεν τοῦτ’ ἐθέλοιμι Διὸς γε διδόντος ἀρέσθαι.

‘I’d be happy to take this [crown] **if Zeus presents [it].**’

(*Od.* 1.390)

This list appears to be sufficiently long to prove that the Homeric GA can indeed be transitive. Yet when we look at each example on its own we arrive at a different picture: these constructions are either not absolute, or not transitive, or again demonstrably late.

Let us start at the beginning of Keydana’s list, *Il.* 19.74–5. χαίρω normally takes the dative to express a thing *rejoiced at*,³⁰ i.e. here Achilles renouncing his wrath. Although the subject of the participial clause, Achilles, could thus be regularly included in the matrix clause, it is not. Instead of a complement of the main verb of the matrix clause we find a GA. (And it should be noted that metrical considerations cannot have been an issue here: the expected dative would have the right shape to fit into this line, giving μῆνιν ἀπειπόντι μεγαθύμῳ Πηλεΐωνι.)³¹

³⁰ See LSJ s.v. for references.

³¹ This is possible at least with a little metrical licence: as Chantraine (1948: 104) points out, ‘it happens that a short syllable where a long ought to be counts as a long in a metrical line. This is observed especially at the caesura, or in front of a punctuation [i.e. in places where later on a break in speech would be marked by punctuation, A.R.]’ (‘Il arrive qu’une syllabe brève au temps fort compte pour une longue dans la métrique. Le fait s’observe en particulier à la césure, ou devant une punctuation.’) His example for the third foot is *Od.* 1.326. Admittedly, this is a minority phenomenon. Yet one might

This construction is similar to sentences containing a GA instead of an expected conjunct participle such as θῶμα δὲ ποιευμένων τῶν κατασκόπων περὶ τῶν ἐτέων ἐπὶ κρήνην σφε ἡγήσασθαι ‘**when the spies showed surprise concerning [the number] of years, he led them, it is said, to a spring**’ (Hdt. 3.23) discussed by Schwyzler (1942, esp. 102).³² In both, the phrasing as a GA gives the participial expression greater prominence and semantic weight. This phenomenon is rare in Homer (for two possible further instances, see Section 2.3.d below), but more frequent in later authors.³³ One might wonder whether this line is not a rather late addition into the text of this passage, and indeed there are signs in favour of this – admittedly bold – theory.

We here see one of only two Homeric instances (and the only one in the *Iliad*) of an elided ἀπειπ- as opposed to the original ἀποπειπ- (*ἀποφειπ-). It is true that ἀποπειπ- itself only appears in Homer six times – five times in the *Iliad*, once in the *Odyssey*. And furthermore, we could argue that these different forms are metrical variants whose choice depends completely on what the poet needs in a particular line. Yet given their distribution (the older almost only in the *Iliad*, the newer appearing only twice overall),³⁴ the presence of the newer form in this passage may indeed be due to a lateness of the whole passage. A second linguistic indication of possible late age is that, as was mentioned above, *Il.* 19.74–5 is one of the very few Homeric GAs that have fairly clear modal (here: causal) semantics. As we saw above, the large majority have temporal semantics with a certain amount of modality inferable from the context.

This particular passage is also interesting from a literary point of view. It describes the official end of that which in the first line of the *Iliad* was programmatically set out as the topic of the piece: Achilles’ μῆνις. At *Iliad* 1.1, the μῆνις was explicitly asked about. Here, at *Il.* 19.74–5, the red thread of this storyline is explicitly ended. It is at least possible that an explicit marker of this fact was

as well allow it in a passage which, as it stands, is not slightly unusual from a metrical point of view, but unprecedented from a syntactic one.

³² See also K-G II.2.101 for more examples.

³³ At Hdt. 3.23, it may have been employed because of the length of the participle clause.

³⁴ Here and at *Od.* 1.91.

added at a stage when the monumental composition had acquired a certain familiarity, its structure was known, and a bard felt the need of explicitly flagging this moment crucial to this structure. This passage also represents the last verbal/explicit reference to Achilles' μήνις.³⁵ (Note that in spite of all these syntactic innovations, the rules of the Homeric *Kunstsprache* have not been violated: μήνις appears in the poetically conventional position, first in the line.)

To continue with Keydana's list, *Od.* 6.157 (λευσσόντων) and *Od.* 9.257 (δεισάντων) may be transitive, but do not represent GAs. As I shall show below (Section 2.3.d), the use of a genitive after a noun denoting a body part represents such a frequently found combination in Homeric and also later Greek literature that it might well have been employed in spite of the presence of a preceding noun which refers to the same entity (him to whom that body part belongs), but stands in a different case. In other words: in spite of σφισι and ῥμῖν in the above examples we can and ought to see λευσσόντων and δεισάντων as depending on θυμός and ἦτορ respectively. The constructions are not absolute.

Od. 24.535 undoubtedly contains a GA, which furthermore is transitive. Yet consider the following sentence, which appears in the *Iliad* twice (2.182, 10.512):

ὥς φάθ', ὃ δὲ ξυνέηκε θεᾶς ὄπα φωνησάσης

'So said she, and he recognised **the goddess uttering her voice**/the voice of the goddess speaking'

Here the identical phrase, θεᾶς ὄπα φωνησάσης 'the goddess uttering her voice', is dependent on ξυνήμι, which in the meaning of 'perceiving, hearing' in Homer is either constructed with the accusative of a thing (usually ὄπα, ἔπος) or the genitive of the source/person from which something is heard.³⁶ If we assume the latter for *Il.* 2.182/10.512 (which is what e.g. Autenrieth (1902) s.v. ξυνήμι does), ὄπα would have to be governed by φωνησάσης, and θεᾶς φωνησάσης in turn be dependent on ξυνέηκε, thus giving 'he

³⁵ It will be interesting to see to what extent we might be able to find similar phenomena in the other 'structural' mentions of the μήνις.

³⁶ See e.g. *Il.* 2.63 for the latter, and cf. Autenrieth 1902 s.v. συνήμι.

perceived the goddess uttering her voice'. Whether or not we agree with this interpretation of a transitive φωνέω at *Il.* 2.182/10.512, it clearly is the only possible analysis at *Od.* 24.535.³⁷ Yet given that φωνέω is not transitive anywhere else in Homer, I believe we ought to see it as intransitive wherever possible, including at *Il.* 2.182/10.512, where one should thus read 'he perceived the voice of the goddess as she spoke'. This would make those two genitive expressions unambiguously adnominal, rather than absolute.

Furthermore, it seems that the following happened: at some point, the φωνησάσης at *Il.* 2.182 was analysed as governing ὅπα, rather than being dependent on it. Subsequently, the phrase as a whole (θεῶς ὅπα φωνησάσης) was wrongly interpreted as a GA, was split off and reused, with the same wrong (or at least unusual) transitive interpretation of φωνέω, at *Od.* 24.535.³⁸ These events must have taken place at a fairly late stage within the textual history of the epics.³⁹ We know that φωνέω develops towards transitivity later (from Pindar onwards, φωνέω is attested governing statements in direct speech (φώνησε δ' 'εὔδεις βασιλεῦ', *Pi. O.* 13.67), and from Herodotus onwards also single words ('βέκος φ.' 'to utter the word "bekos"', *Hdt.* 2.2)), and if this development was taking place sufficiently early at least in the spoken language, it would explain the confusion in the interpretation of *Il.* 2.182 that likely led to the GA at *Od.* 24.535. In other words, *Od.* 24.535 does contain a transitive GA, but again one that is likely to represent a late addition to the text.⁴⁰

³⁷ See e.g. LSJ, which notes 'c. acc. cogn., ὅπα φωνησάσης, having made her voice sound, *Od.* 24.535'.

³⁸ See also Erbse 1972: 228–9 on this very line. He lists other examples of such syntactic reinterpretations but argues that these need not be later than the time of the monumental composition: rather, the poet 'here seems to have seen a possibility of giving to a known formulaic expression a new and more effective meaning' ('[er] scheint hier eine Möglichkeit gesehen zu haben, einer bekannten formelhaften Junktur einen neuen, wirkungsvolleren Sinn zu geben').

³⁹ Note here the controversy concerning the question whether the last book of the *Odyssey*, and certainly its first part, were added on to the text at a later stage. See Russo *et al.* 1992: 353–5 for a bibliography, and Clarke 1999: 225–9 and *passim* for a discussion of 24.1–205.

⁴⁰ Moreover it is an addition that is slightly repetitive (Athena's speaking had been mentioned in the preceding line) and could be cut out without any problems, giving ὥς φάτ' Ἀθηναίη, τοὺς δὲ χλωρόν δέος εἶλεν | τῶν δ' ἄρα δεισάντων ἐκ χειρῶν ἔπτατο τεύχεα | πρὸς δὲ πόλιν τρωπῶντο λιλαϊόμενοι βιότοιο. 'Thus Athena spoke; but them pale terror seized, and they turned to run towards the city, fearing for their lives.'

There are several cases of repeated phrases in Homer where some instances are absolute, others clearly not absolute, and yet others ambiguous. At *Od.* 17.296, there is a clear GA in δὴ τότε κείτ' ἀπόθεστος ἀποικομένοιο ἄνακτος | ἐν πολλῇ κόπρῳ 'but now, **in his master's absence**, he [Odysseus' dog] lay there, cast away, on piles of dung', yet at *Od.* 14.7–8, the participle phrase ἀποικομένοιο ἄνακτος is rather clearly adnominal (ἦν ῥα συβώτης | αὐτὸς δείμαθ' ὕεσσιν ἀποικομένοιο ἄνακτος 'which the swineherd had made himself for the pigs of his master, who was gone'), and there are two more instances that are ambiguous (around 400 lines later at *Od.* 14.449–50, potentially 'the swineherd of the absent master', and at *Od.* 12.393–5, potentially 'the bow of the absent master'). A similar issue arises in GAs involving the word 'year'. Some are absolute: ἐνθα δέ μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἄρνειοῖς ἰλάονται | κοῦροι Ἀθηναίων περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν 'where sons of Athens worship him with bulls and goats **as the years wheel around in season**' (*Il.* 2.550–1) or περιπλομένου δ' ἐνιαυτοῦ | τέξεαι ὄγλαὰ τέκνα 'and **when a year has run its course**, you will give birth to glorious children' (*Od.* 11.248–9). In all other cases in Homer, there is the possibility that the genitive expression is adnominal: ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ἔτος ἦλθε περιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν | τῷ οἱ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι | εἰς Ἰθάκην (*Od.* 1.16–8) could literally be talking about 'the year of/among the revolving years in/for which the gods had allotted that he return home to Ithaca' just as ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ μῆνές τε καὶ ἡμέραι ἐξετελεῦντο | ὅψ περιτελλομένου ἔτεος καὶ ἐπήλυθον ὥραι (*Od.* 11.294–5 and 14.293–4) could literally refer to 'the months and days of the year coming around'.⁴¹

The most interesting question to ask here is whether these phrases influenced one another. Was their appearance as a GA

⁴¹ This view fits in well with the theory that the temporal genitive in Greek may have had adnominal origins (see Section 5.4.b). Also, given that omitting the qualifier in genitive expressions employing 'year' as a head noun still leaves us with an expression that makes sense as an expression of *time at which*, none of these genitive expressions are GAs in the strict sense. Nevertheless I am counting them as GAs because their qualifier is of such importance to the noun phrase as a whole that without it, the expression is missing the point, and they are thus so close to actual GAs in the stricter sense as to be more or less undistinguishable from them. See Sections 4.4.a and 4.6 on a very similar situation in Sanskrit.

in one place any indication of how they would have been read in another, i.e. would potential adnominal ties have been perceived less (or intended less by the poet) if the same phrase appeared as an AC elsewhere? Can we perhaps – as I suggested concerning $\theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \delta\pi\alpha \varphi\omega\nu\eta\sigma\acute{\alpha}\sigma\eta\varsigma$ above – identify more cases where a participial expression was erroneously identified as absolute as early as Homeric times and then reinserted in the monumental composition in an unambiguously absolute way? One way of attempting to answer this question would be a study of works in Homericising language – the Homeric Hymns or the works of Apollonius Rhodius – and comparison of e.g. the relative numbers of clear ACs and ambiguous, potentially adnominal constructions.

In the next example on the list, $\xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ at *Il.* 18.606 represents a *varia lectio* given by Athenaeus (180c–d).⁴² Yet all Homeric MSS, and all papyri of the *Iliad* read the nominative $\xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ (‘they whirled up and down *as leaders of the dance*’), thus seeing the plural participle as agreeing with the dual $\kappa\upsilon\beta\iota\sigma\tau\eta\tau\eta\rho\epsilon$. In his discussion of this passage, Vasilaros (1993: 70–2) concludes that $\xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ *might* have originally stood in the Homeric text,⁴³ yet the reading of the MSS and the papyri themselves seems to be generally accepted.⁴⁴ As Monro notes (1891: 162), the use of a dual noun or pronoun with a plural predicate is a regular occurrence in Homer.

To my mind, the genitive participle can furthermore only work if we also accept Athenaeus’ claim that this passage originally contained an additional line ($\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha} \delta\acute{\epsilon} \sigma\phi\iota\nu \acute{\epsilon}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\pi\epsilon\tau\omicron \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\omicron\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma | \varphi\omicron\rho\mu\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\nu$) after $\tau\epsilon\rho\pi\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota$.⁴⁵ otherwise the ellipsis of an $\acute{\alpha}\omicron\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$

⁴² See Vasilaros 1993: 71 for an exact description of this reading’s origins.

⁴³ The main reason for assuming this lies in the fact that two verses in Apollonius Rhodius’ *Argonautica* (1.513 and 4.908) contain GAs with unexpressed subjects (as this one here would be, if we read $\xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$) which both also belong to the sphere of music and stand in the same position in the line as $\xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. If we wanted these to have a fairly concrete Homeric precedent, $\xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ would provide us with just that.

⁴⁴ I am not sure why Keydana *loc. cit.* prefers to read $\xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. West 2000 follows the MSS, as do Monro and Allen 1920, Heubeck/West/Hainsworth 1990 and Edwards 1991.

⁴⁵ Thus giving $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma \delta’ \acute{\iota}\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\epsilon\nu\tau\alpha \chi\omicron\rho\omicron\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu \pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\theta’ \delta\mu\iota\lambda\omicron\varsigma | \tau\epsilon\rho\pi\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota \mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha} \delta\acute{\epsilon} \sigma\phi\iota\nu \acute{\epsilon}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\pi\epsilon\tau\omicron \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\omicron\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma | \varphi\omicron\rho\mu\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\nu, \delta\omicron\iota\acute{\omega} \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\upsilon\beta\iota\sigma\tau\eta\tau\eta\rho\epsilon \kappa\alpha\tau’ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma | \mu\omicron\lambda\pi\eta\varsigma \xi\zeta\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\omicron\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha} \mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ‘A breathless crowd stood round them struck with joy and among them a divine minstrel was singing to the lyre, and through them a pair

as the subject of the GA (*ἄοιδοῦ ἑξάρχοντος) would seriously impede comprehension of this passage.

As it seems much simpler overall, I shall take this passage out of the list and will follow the MSS and papyri in reading δοῖω δὲ κυβιστητῆρε μολπῆς ἑξάρχοντες ‘two tumblers/dancers leading on the dance’.

Finally, there are the three examples that employ transitive verbs (*Il.* 10.355–6, *Il.* 20.403–5 and *Od.* 1.390). In none of these, the direct object is actually expressed. While such an omission in itself is nothing unusual,⁴⁶ the omission in all of these three cases has the effect that we are left with only two instances of actual/explicit transitivity in Homeric GAs (*Il.* 19.74–5, *Od.* 24.534–5), which furthermore seem likely to represent a rather late layer within the composition of the epics as we know them. Intransitivity, I shall argue, is a reflection of the original shape of ACs (and thus GAs), which will be returned to in [Chapter 5](#).

To sum up: it is not the case that there is no transitivity in Homeric GAs anywhere. Yet there is a reluctance to use transitive GAs, and those two GAs which undoubtedly are transitive (*Il.* 19.74–5, *Od.* 24.534–5) represent innovations. In spite of the well-developed nature of the Homeric GA, we can thus observe signs of several stages of that development.

2.3.d *Genitive participles instead of an expected conjunct participle*

GAs regularly appear only where a conjunct participle cannot because the subject of the absolute expression is not contained in the matrix clause. Nevertheless there are twelve Homeric instances of genitive participles standing beside a pronoun in the dative or accusative (see below), i.e. in places where one would expect an agreeing dative or accusative participle, respectively. This phenomenon has been discussed by Classen (1867: 174–6), who regards these constructions as ‘the last stage [of the GA] before

of tumblers dashed and sprang, whirling in leaping headsprings, as he **led the dance**’ (*Il.* 18.604–6, compare *Od.* 4.17–19). See West 2000 *ad loc.* for a note on the history and provenance of this line.

⁴⁶ See e.g. Matthews 1981: 123–36 on omitted/implied complements.

it becomes independent'⁴⁷ and by Vasilaros (1993: 76–84), who quotes the opinion of K-G II.2.110 that the construction is used 'to stress this phrase more strongly and contrast it to the other words [in the sentence]'.⁴⁸ Vasilaros himself lists these passages in his category of 'Probable GAs'. (Note that Classen sees these expressions as the last stage in the development of the GA, whereas Vasilaros' explanation entails that they would have been used after the GA was already familiar. It is interesting to see that the same evidence is taken as the basis for diametrically different interpretations.)

The list of the actual instances of this phenomenon below is based on those found in Classen and Vasilaros. (The preceding pronoun is put in *italics*. The noun which, I shall argue, functions as the head of the genitive expression, is underlined.)

Genitive participle instead of an expected accusative:

- (1) τὸν βάλε μέσσον ἄκοντι ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς
νῶτα παραΐσσοντος

'*He* swift-footed godlike Achilles hit square with his spear, the back of
him running' (Il. 20.413–14)

- (2) ἦ σε βίη ἄεκοντος ἀπηύρα νῆα μέλαιναν;

'Was it by force and **against your will** that he took the black ship away
from you?' (Od. 4.646)

- (3) ἄλλ' ἔμπης τάδε μὲν καὶ τέτλαμεν εἰσορόωντες
μήλων σφαζομένων οἶνοί τε πινομένοιο
καὶ σίτου·

'but none the less we still endure to see these deeds, **while sheep are
slaughtered, and wine and bread consumed**' (Od. 20.311–13)

Genitive participle for expected dative:

- (4) λάκε δέ σφι περὶ χροῖ χαλκὸς ἀτειρῆς
νυσσομένων ξίφεσίν τε καὶ ἔγχεσιν ἀμφιγύοισι

'and about their bodies rang the tough bronze **as they thrust at one
another** with swords and two-edged spears' (Il. 14.25–6)

⁴⁷ '[D]as letzte Stadium vor seinem Durchbruch zur Selbständigkeit.'

⁴⁸ '[Um] das Satzglied mit größerem Nachdrucke hervorzuheben und den übrigen Worten entgegenzustellen.'

- (5) Γλαῦκος δ' ἔγνω ἥσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ γήθησέν τε
 ὅττι οἱ ὦκ' ἤκουσε μέγας θεὸς εὐξαμένοιο
 'and Glaucus sensed it all and glowed with joy that the mighty god had
 heard **him praying** so quickly' (Il. 16.530–7)
- (6) ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται
 οἰχομένοιο σέθεν δολιχὴν ὁδὸν ἀργαλήην τε
 '(and he can tell you) – if you so wish [τοι] – all that's occurred within
 your palace, good and bad, **while you've been gone** your long and
 painful way' (Od. 4.392–3)
- (7) μάλα ποὺ σφισι θυμὸς
 αἰὲν ἔυφροσύνησιν ἱαίνεται εἵνεκα σεῖο,
 λευσσόντων τοιόνδε θάλος χορὸν εἰσοιχνεῦσαν
 'how often their hearts must warm with joy **to see** you striding into the
 dance' (Od. 6.155–7)
- (8) ὥς ἔφαθ', ἡμῖν δ' αὖτε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ,
 δεισάντων φθόγγον τε βαρὺν αὐτόν τε πέλωρον
 'so he spoke, and the hearts inside us shook, **as we feared** his rumbling
 voice and monstrous hulk' (Od. 9.256–7)
- (9) τῷ κέ οἱ ἐγκέφαλός γε διὰ σπέος ἄλλυδις ἄλλη
 θεινομένου ραίοιτο πρὸς οὔδει
 'then would his brain flood across my cave, some here, some there, **once
 he had been smashed against the ground** (i.e. the brain of him)'
 (Od. 9.458–9)
- (10) χαῖρε δ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
 ὅττι ῥά οἱ βιότου περικήδετο νόσφιν ἐόντος
 'and Odysseus was glad that he [Eumaeus] took such care of his
 [Odysseus'] goods **while he was afar**' (Od. 14.526–7)
- (11) πολλά οἱ ἀμφὶ κάρη σφέλα ἀνδρῶν ἐκ παλαμάτων
 πλευραὶ ἀποτρίψουσι δόμον κάτα βαλλομένοιο.
 'salvos of footstools flung at his head by all the lords will crack his ribs **as
 he runs the line of fire** through the house' (Od. 17.231–2)
- (12) δέπας δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χεῖρὸς
 βλημένου, αὐτίκα δ' αὐλὸς ἀνὰ ῥίνας παχὺς ἦλθεν
 αἷματος ἀνδρομέοιο
 'and the cup dropped from his hand **as he was hit**, and the man's life-blood
 came spurting out his nostrils – thick red jets' (Od. 22.17–19)⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Note that ῥίνας can also be seen as head of βλημένου.

Two comments on this list. To my mind, (3) should not be included as a case of ‘genitives following other cases’, because the τῶδε does not refer to the same things as the genitives in the two following lines. Rather it is anaphoric⁵⁰ and sums up the preceding lines, the evils in Odysseus’ house that Telemachus has been speaking about.⁵¹ Furthermore, in his discussion of this phenomenon, Classen does not include (6). This example is different from the others in that we here have a complete GA (pronoun and participle) instead of just a participle (as whose ‘head’ we might want to see the preceding dative or accusative pronoun), and in that the τοι seems to function as a particle (translatable as something like ‘let me tell you’) rather than a dative pronoun proper (even though the particle developed from an original ethic dative). This example could also be accounted for by means of some of the explanations offered below, yet the interpretation just offered appears best overall. Thus this example will be omitted from further considerations.

Of the eleven remaining passages, nine involve a genitive participle that follows upon a dative pronoun, and two upon an accusative. The members of the former group can be explained in several ways. In the majority of examples, we can find a common lexical feature: the noun that the pronoun and participle in question are dependent on denotes a part of the body (1 νῶτα, 4 χρώς, 7 θυμός, 8 ἦτορ, 9 ἐγκέφαλος, 11 πλευραί, 12 χεῖρ). Let us look at example (4), *Il.* 14.25–6, to understand why this may be important.

⁵⁰ At least in the textual sense, referring to things mentioned earlier. These τῶδε nevertheless are things still present to and surrounding Telemachus as he speaks 311–13, thus giving us a usage of this pronoun that is relatively frequent in Homer.

⁵¹ If we were to say that it is used cataphorically (as it actually is just a few lines further down, *Od.* 20.317–19), then the opinion of K-G II.2.1110 (see above) would apply: the genitive is employed for greater emphasis of the action described. As we shall see from the discussion of the remaining passages, however, this view would make the present pair of lines rather unique in their status of ‘GA used ungrammatically for pragmatic purposes’ (a function it is unambiguously attested in only later). This is not impossible: after all, the structure of this GA is arguably more complex than that of almost all others in Homer, and we could thus be dealing with another late/post-Homeric addition. To me it appears simpler to assume the presence of an anaphoric pronoun.

λάκε δέ σφι περὶ χροῖ χαλκὸς ἀτειρῆς
 νυσσομένων ξίφεσιν τε καὶ ἔγχεσιν ἀμφιγύοισι

‘and about their bodies rang the tough bronze **as they thrust at one another** with swords and two-edged spears’

The first line in itself is syntactically coherent (‘to them, the bronze rang around (their) flesh/body’). Only in the next line, when ‘they’ are further described as ‘pierced (by swords etc.)’ does an incongruence arise: ‘they’ are first given in the dative, then the genitive. But is this really an incongruence? I argue that there is a genitive rather than the dative one might expect not in order to particularly emphasise that which is expressed by the participle (which is what, I suppose, K-G and Vasilaros would assume), but because an adnominal genitive simply is more closely linked to the noun it stands with.⁵² As Cooper (2002: 2017) puts it, ‘[i]n these places, the dative is a dative of interest, and close to a dative of possession. The genitive participle is possessive, so the shift from dative to genitive is very easy since both case forms have a similar function. . . . Both dative and genitive are construed with the same substantive and so hooked into the sentence.’

A similar explanation can be applied to example (1), which involves an accusative pronoun: this might be considered as a kind of σχῆμα καθ’ ὅλον καὶ μέρος: ‘with his spear Achilles hit him, (namely) his back/the back of him running’. Here we have the same kind of apparent incongruence as in the passages involving a dative pronoun: again, *Il.* 20.413 is syntactically complete. It is only in the next line, when additional information is given (in this case, what exactly Achilles hit), that a different interpretation of the sentence syntax (in this case, what exactly the object(s) of βάλε is/are) becomes necessary. Another factor comes into play here: constructions involving a noun that denotes a body part or part of armour, followed by a genitive pronoun that in turn is accompanied by a participle, are frequent (textual searches for such head nouns show that there are over forty of these constructions in Homer; cf. e.g. τοῖο δ’ ἅπ’ ὀφθαλμῶν χύτο δάκρυα χωομένοιο ‘tears flowed

⁵² While a dative (of interest, or possessive) would be more closely attached to the verbal notion.

from the eyes of him crying', *Il.* 23.385). I therefore think that we have to see the examples under discussion here in the light of this apparently very pervasive pattern.⁵³ The apparent incongruence in choice of case has nothing to do with GAs, but is a feature of the syntax of oral poetry.

While this accounts for most members of our list, it does not explain passages (2) or (5), which do not involve a noun of the kind just described (denoting a part of the body, of armour etc.). These two passages are furthermore interesting in that the genitive participle stands in the same line as the (pro)noun that they should/could agree with. Yet there are two possible explanations. Consider the following pattern: In the nine instances involving dative pronouns, all but one of these pronouns are enclitic (οἱ, τοι, σφι, σφισι), and the one that is accented (ἡμῖν in (8)) does not have an enclitic counterpart. As first argued by Wackernagel (1928: 77–8), whom Vasilaros (1993: 80) also refers to, it is quite likely that these enclitic pronouns (or at least some of them) originally were used for both genitive and dative. This would mean that almost all of the supposed 'dative' pronouns could actually be genitives, in which case we would here be dealing with normal attributive genitives (e.g. (4), *Il.* 14.26: 'the hard bronze rang around the flesh of them being pierced by swords etc.'). Such an interpretation is particularly likely in (5), where the 'dative' οἱ is governed by ἀκούω. Again as pointed out by Wackernagel (1928: 77–8), phrases such as κλῦθί μοι *vel sim.* (where the μοι would be easier to explain if it was an original genitive) are not infrequent in the Homeric epics, and such μοι's should not be turned into μεν by the editor of a text. If this interpretation is correct, we are here dealing with a phenomenon of comparative interest: the state that Wackernagel assumes for enclitic pronouns in pre-historic Greek is actually attested in Sanskrit, where these are identical for genitive and dative in all numbers.

Alternatively, one can also argue the following: with one exception (no. (10)), all instances of οἱ and τοι in this list are followed by

⁵³ Cf. also expressions such as 'the strength (μένος) of X' or 'the head (κάρα) of X' to mean simply the person X, which remain in use into at least the fifth century BC.

a word with an initial vowel, and might thus represent οἱ/τοῖ, the elided forms of an original genitive οἴο/τοῖο. But even though this is formally and also palaeographically possible,⁵⁴ I do not consider it very likely – at least not across the board. In the positions within the clause in which we find the pronouns in question, a dative often makes far more sense than a genitive; cf. e.g. δέπας δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χεῖρός (*Od.* 22.18). Here, the dative cannot be easily translated as such into English, yet within Greek it represents a regular way of expressing *to whom* an action is happening (cf. German ‘*ihm* fiel der Becher aus der Hand’). Once again, it is mainly in example (5) that a genitive fits better than a dative. Here we might hence argue for an underlying οἴο.

We thus have the possibility of explaining the present passages either as the result of oral poetic syntax, or, generally speaking, as the result of a wrong surface interpretation of pronouns (which appear to be dative, but really are genitive). With the exception of (6), I favour the former interpretation, which allows us to see our dative pronouns simply as dative pronouns that also make sense in the positions in which they are standing.

This leaves us with two examples, (2) and (10),⁵⁵ which are linked by the fact that they are the only passages in which the incongruent elements stand within the same line. Overall it seems that they can only be explained by the model of K-G (choice of the genitive for greater emphasis on the participle’s content) and thus are to be seen as (‘incorrect’) GAs.⁵⁶

In sum, there are various possible explanations for the syntax of these passages that do not require any reference to the GA. With the exception of passages (2) and (10), we are not dealing with the much later type of GA that is used for emphasis. This shows that such GAs are a rarer phenomenon in Homer than

⁵⁴ It is not until rather late that manuscripts mark in signs such as diacritics or apostrophes.

⁵⁵ Note that both are found in the *Odyssey*.

⁵⁶ No. (2) (ἦ σε βίη ἄεκοντος ἀπηύρα νῆα μέλαιναν, *Od.* 4.646) is interesting in that ἀπαιράω ‘to take away from, rob’ can express in both a genitive and an accusative the person from whom something is taken away (see e.g. at τῇν ῥα βίη ἄεκοντος ἀπηύρων ‘they took her away from him against his will’, *Il.* 1.430). At *Od.* 4.646 an accusative is used when a genitive would be (at least grammatically speaking) possible, making the use of the genitive participle even more marked).

discussions of this topic to date suggest. It is indeed possible that later on, as the adaptable and more intuitive syntax we find in Homer was replaced by a syntax that is more rigid and follows systematic rules more strictly, the passages were seen as GAs. As ‘Homeric examples’, they may even have led to increased usage of such ‘emphatic’ GAs, or even of one-word GAs. What remains unclear is the extent to which the phenomenon first noted by Wackernagel (unresolved formal identity of genitive and dative enclitics throughout PIE) plays a role here: most of the dative pronouns under discussion could actually be just dative pronouns – but of course it is noticeable that these apparently incongruent constructions so often involve particularly a dative.

2.3.e *Summary*

As I argued in the preceding chapter, too often statements are made about ‘ACs’, even when these statements are based mostly on material from one language; and even statements made about just one language may not be accurate. Sometimes, a study of each individual element of an apparent group will show that this group (e.g. of transitive GAs in Homer) does not really exist. Sometimes, a comparison with similar expressions will show that a group of apparently absolute genitives are not absolute at all, let alone ‘incorrect’ GAs used for emphasis. Quite the opposite: the expressions discussed in Section 2.3.d display elegant ways of linking the various elements within a clause, not of singling any one element out. We are blinded by the label ‘absolute’ too easily. ACs are something unusual, and so philologists seem to take great pleasure in spotting them. Also, although the corpus of relevant material is rather small, detailed comparison of the individual constructions may enable us to identify developments in ACs: features such as formal extensions, including transitivity, and semantics that are not just mostly temporal seem to occur together in passages that show indications of being ‘late’. If this is correct, we can in turn assume that early ACs would probably have been formally minimal and temporal in their semantics, information we can then use for reconstructing the PIE source of these constructions.

2.4 Future research? The Homeric GA in comparison with other means of grammatical subordination

As Monro says, the GA in Homer ‘expresses the time or circumstance in which the action of the verb takes place’ (1891: 212–13). Such background information can be given in a variety of ways. At one end of the spectrum, there are nominal expressions such as ‘one fine day’, ‘that evening’, ‘in our new apartment’, or, even more basic, purely relative adverbial expressions such as ‘there’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘later’, ‘nevertheless’. On the other hand, there are finite subordinate clauses, which, given the ability of verbs to express detailed information in complements and adjuncts, are the more likely to be chosen the more information needs to be conveyed (compare ‘after he had fed the cat her favourite kind of yoghurt on a silver spoon’ with a simple ‘later’). A third possibility exists in the form of participial constructions.⁵⁷ Especially in languages such as Greek, whose participle system is comprehensive (there is a participle for every voice of every tense stem) and whose participles can to a large extent take the same complements and adjuncts as finite verbs,⁵⁸ there is great potential overlap between finite and participial subordination. The basic difference between them is that participial clauses are marked for the fact, but not the manner of the subordination, whereas the conjunction or pronoun that introduces a finite subordinate clause indicates also the manner of the subordination, clearly marking what the semantic relationship between main and subordinate clause is.

As we saw above (Section 2.2.a), the notion that ACs can be seen as finite-clause equivalents does apply to at least some GAs. Although a comprehensive inquiry into the factors governing the choice between finite and participial (and especially absolute) subordination is beyond the scope of this monograph,⁵⁹ a study of at least a small textual corpus gives some interesting insights, which might furthermore serve as a basis for future study. The statements in this section about all finite clauses except relative clauses are

⁵⁷ Cf. Berent 1973 for a more detailed comparison.

⁵⁸ But see n. 8 above on agent expressions with passive verbs.

⁵⁹ See Buijs 2005 for a similar study in the Greek of Xenophon.

based on a study of *Iliad* Books 13–17 (about 3700 lines of text), and those concerning relative clauses, which are numerous, on *Iliad* 13 (837 lines) alone. Statements concerning participles are based on a search of *Iliad* 13 and 14 (1359 lines, containing a total of 361 participles).

To briefly sum up what we know of the Homeric GA: it is fairly short; particularly in the *Iliad*, it typically is formally minimal. A transitive GA is unusual. The GA has predominantly temporal semantics; strongly causal, concessive or conditional semantics are rare. If the absence of Homeric GAs that employ future participles indicates that such constructions did not exist in those times, the GA could also not appear in lieu of a purpose clause. Although productive, the Homeric GA still is a comparatively rare phenomenon.⁶⁰ GAs are employed in both narrative and direct speech; a number of them are used in similes. In both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, GAs are more frequent in direct speech than in narrative.⁶¹ There does not seem to be any predilection of the GA for agitated or calm speech.

Of the non-absolute participles looked at, the majority provide information on the subject of the sentence and thus stand in the nominative. The majority of conjunct participles have predominantly temporal semantics or are equivalent to relative clauses. Participles standing together with *καί* or *περ* are the standard way of expressing concessive meaning, and apart from those, only few are found that receive any significant modal (be it causal,

⁶⁰ Overall, the relative frequency between non-absolute participles and GAs in Homer is roughly 100 : 1. In Book 1 of Herodotus, who also uses more participles overall, the ratio is only about 10 : 1. In Sophocles' *Antigone*, we find a ratio of about 40 : 1, and in Book I of Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* we still find a ratio of about 25 : 1. (These statements are based on textual searches of a third of each of the texts named.)

⁶¹ *Iliad*: twenty in 7203 lines of direct speech, which equals a GA every 360 lines; nineteen in 8249 lines of narrative, which equals a GA every 430 lines. Thus the frequency is 25 per cent higher in direct speech. For the *Odyssey*, clear figures are more difficult to generate as there are many passages which are strictly speaking direct speech (it is someone other than the anonymous poet/bard speaking, and hence modern editors put such stretches of text between inverted commas), but which contain long stretches of narrative. Yet about 75 per cent of GAs in the *Odyssey* stand in 'proper' direct speech (i.e. dialogue, or generally anything other than long monologue), the remaining 25 per cent in narrative or what one might call 'direct narrative'. Thus one can say that here, too, the GA is more frequent in direct speech.

concessive or conditional) semantics by their context.⁶² This overall distribution of usages indicates that the absolute participle, as looked at above, is semantically in line with other participles.

We could thus expect, at least from a semantic perspective, a certain overlap between finite temporal clauses and GAs, or finite and relative clauses and participial subordination in general. Yet often, it seems, finite subordination is used for rather specific syntactic or pragmatic reasons: Sometimes, the subject of a temporal clause is not contained in its matrix clause, thus making use of a conjunct participle impossible, and the temporal clause is too expansive to be phrased as a GA (which in Homer usually still is formally close to minimal). Sometimes, there is a set of parallel expressions that function better when both halves are phrased in the same (finite) way.⁶³ Sometimes, the weight of a finite (and thus slightly longer) expression is needed.⁶⁴ Going through the finite temporal clauses in the textual sample defined above and taking into account both the formal and semantic limitations on the GA and the pragmatic reasons for choosing a finite clause, one has the impression that there are only a handful of subordinate clauses that could actually be expressed as GAs.⁶⁵ Any inferences from this on the role and

⁶² To give examples of what I would consider a ‘strongly’ concessive participle, compare *Il.* 13.571–2, ὡς ὅτε βούς τόν τ’ οὔρεσι βουκόλοι ἄνδρες | ἰλλάσιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα βίη δῆσαντες ἄγουσιν ‘like some wild bull in the hills that herdsmen shackle, and drag with them by force **although it is unwilling**’. Yet note that this example shows very well how the semantics of a participle are determined by the context: depending on how we want to read the sentence, the participle is concessive (‘they dragged him although he was unwilling’) or causal (‘they dragged him, by force because he was unwilling’).

⁶³ Cf. e.g. δς τ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν ποιήσῃ ἀθύρματα νηπιέησιν | ἄψ αὐτίς συνέχευε ποσὶν καὶ χερσὶν ἀθύρων ‘(with the same ease some boy at the seashore knocks sand castles down,) he no sooner builds his playthings up, child’s play, than he wrecks them all with his hands and kicking feet’ (*Il.* 15.363–4).

⁶⁴ At *Il.* 16.168–98, for instance, we find a long description of Achilles preparing his men for battle. When he is done, we find a short summary: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντας ἄμ’ ἡγεμόνευσιν Ἀχιλλεύς | στήσεν εὖ κρίνας, κρατερὸν δ’ ἐπὶ μῦθον ἔτελλε ‘But as soon as Achilles mustered all battalions, positioned in battle-order led by captains, he imposed this stern command on all his troops’ (*Il.* 16.198–9). Although the replacement of the finite clause by a participle would be grammatically possible, the absence of the αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ would attenuate a statement which, textually speaking, is rather important.

⁶⁵ When I say this, I do not take into account metrical considerations, i.e. I shall say that a replacement is theoretically possible even if I cannot find a way of metrically inserting a participial clause into the place which contains the relative clause. I assume that, if ‘Homer’ had wanted to use a relative clause in a sentence not formulaically fixed by the

function of the GA (does it have its own niche that it fills, is it only ever an optional alternative way of phrasing something, what are the factors leading to the choice of a GA?) can only be answered properly after a more thorough study of, ideally, the entire Homeric corpus. Yet hopefully, this brief outlook has pointed the way to the questions one may want to ask when conducting such a study.

2.5 The GA in Hesiod

The Homeric epics provide us with only a rather small sample of GAs. Given that the works of Hesiod and Homer are of a similar age (some even speculate whether Hesiod represents an older stage of Greek than Homer),⁶⁶ the GAs we find in Hesiod represent a useful supplement to the study of Homeric material presented above.

In about 2600 lines I count a total of eighteen GAs:⁶⁷ three in the *Theogony* (1022 lines), eleven in the *Works and Days* (828 lines), four in the *Shield of Heracles* (480 lines), none in the *Catalogue of Women* (about 280 lines) and one, possibly two, more in the surviving fragments. Overall, the GA thus is about three times as frequent in Hesiod as in Homer (on average one in about 140 lines as opposed to one in about 420 lines). In the *Works and Days* (on average one in 75 lines), it even is six times as frequent as in Homer.

The GA in Hesiod is semantically quite narrow, its main sphere of application being expressions used for denoting natural units of time (months, years, summers etc.) or for the structuring of natural time (dawn, setting of stars, first appearances of autumnal rain or a certain wind etc.). These are only rarely needed in the *Theogony*, but all the more so in the agricultural core part of the

poetic tradition, he would have been able to do so with a certain amount of rephrasing. I cannot prove this, but it seems better to assume this than to say that the choice between alternatives would have *mainly* been influenced by the limitations of the metre (e.g. the fact that οἱ provides a possibly very useful heavy syllable to start a foot or line with, e.g. τόφρα δὲ τοὺς ὀπιθεν γαιήχους ὥρσεν Ἀχαιοὺς | οἱ παρὰ νηυσὶ θοῆσιν ἀνέψυχον φίλον ἦτορ ‘and meanwhile the Enfolder of Earth roused the Argives, who were in the rear beside the swift ships and were refreshing themselves’, *Il.* 13.83–4).

⁶⁶ See West 1966: 46–7.

⁶⁷ See Appendix 2 for a list.

Works and Days (all the GAs of which are in this core part); hence the uneven distribution of this construction. In the *Shield of Heracles* we have three GAs completely unlike the ones found in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, and one (slightly formulaic) time expression.⁶⁸

There is an even spread between present and aorist participles. Most are active or middle, but of both present and aorist we find one passive participle. The GAs from the *Theogony* and the *Shield of Heracles* are predominantly aorist – again with one (present tense) exception each. Given the small overall numbers of GAs in Hesiod, it does not seem that one could infer anything from this distribution.

We find the same kinds of syntactically ambiguous constructions in Hesiod as in Homer: adnominal genitive constructions with a rather weak link to their head noun (mainly, sound or light emanating from someone or something; but also body parts). Cf. e.g.

τοῖος γάρ κε μέγας ὑπὸ δοῦπτος ὁρώρει
τῆς μὲν ἐρειπομένης, τοῦ δ' ὑψόθεν ἐξεριπόντος
τόσσος δοῦπτος ἐγεντο θεῶν ἐριδι ξυνιόντων

‘for such a mighty crash would have arisen **if Earth were/from Earth being being hurled to ruin**, and **Heaven from on high** were hurling her down, so great a crash was there **while the gods were/of/from the gods meeting together in strife**’
(Hes. *Th.* 703–5)

ποσσι δ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι μέγας πελεμίζετ' Ὀλύμπτος
ὀρνυμένοιο ἀνακτος

‘Great Olympus reeled beneath the immortal feet **of the king as he arose**’
(Hes. *Th.* 842–3)

There is one particularly ambiguous example:

μηδέ ποτ' οἶνοχόην τιθέμεν κρητῆρος ὑπερθεν
πινόντων· ὅλοή γάρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ μοῖρα τέτυκται

‘never put the ladle upon the mixing-bowl **of [people] who drink/when [people] drink**, for bad luck is attached to that’
(Hes. *Op.* 744–5)

⁶⁸ See below for details.

Several scholars (West 1978: 340 among them) have argued that we are dealing with a GA with unexpressed subject. I am not so certain about this: an understanding of this as ‘the mixing-bowl of (people who are) drinking/the mixing-bowl of drinkers’ seems at least possible. Also, given that the unambiguous GAs in the *Works and Days* otherwise denote ‘natural’ markers of time by which to measure the progress of the agricultural year, πινόντων would here be taking a rather unique position not just formally, but also semantically. The syntactic link between πινόντων and its possible head, οἶνοχόην, may be weak, and it is possible that this construction was seen as absolute in retrospect. Still we cannot say for certain that a link was not originally intended or perceived.

While semantically rather limited in its scope (as I indicated above, the majority of instances denote the passage or markers of natural time), the GA in Hesiod shows innovations in its syntactic/formal make-up: next to minimal constructions such as

ψυχρή γάρ τ' ἤώς πέλεται Βορέας πεσόντος

‘for dawn is cold **once Boreas has arrived**’

(Hes. *Op.* 547)

we also find several slightly more complex constructions.

GAs whose participle is further qualified by an adjective or adverb:

τὸν δὲ μέτ' ὀρθρογόη Πανδιονίς ὦρτο χελιδὼν

ἐς φάος ἀνθρώποις ἔαρος νέον ἵσταμένοιο

‘After him the shrilly wailing daughter of Pandion, the swallow, appears
to men **when spring is just beginning**’ (Hes. *Op.* 568–9)

δείκνυε δὲ δμῶεσσι θέρευσ ἔτι μέσσου ἔντος·

‘οὐκ αἰεὶ θέρος ἐσσεῖται, ποιεῖσθε καλίας.’

‘**While it is yet the middle of the summer** command your slaves: “It will
not always be summer, build barns.”’ (Hes. *Op.* 502–3)

GAs in which such a further qualification either seems to point the way towards transitivity, or which are actually transitive:

ἦμος δὴ λήγει μένος ὀξέος ἡελίοιο

καύματος ἰδαλίου, μετοππωρινὸν ὀμβρήσαντος

Ζηνὸς ἐρίσθενέος, μετὰ δὲ τρέπεται βρότεος χρώς
πολλὸν ἐλαφρότερος

‘when the piercing power and the sultry heat of the sun abate and **almighty Zeus sends the autumn rains** (lit. ‘rains autumnally’), and men’s flesh comes to feel far easier’ (Hes. *Op.* 414–17)⁶⁹

ἄλλοτε μὲν θ’ ὕει ποτὶ ἕσπερον, ἄλλοτ’ ἄησι,
πυκνὰ Θρηκίου Βορέω νέφεα κλονέοντος

‘sometimes it turns to rain towards evening, and sometimes to wind **when Thracian Boreas huddles the thick clouds**’ (Hes. *Op.* 552–3)

There are two main things to note. First, although the GA in Hesiod is topically and thus also semantically rather limited (the topic being ‘markers of natural time’, its semantics are almost always purely temporal), it formally is at least as well developed as the GA of the *Odyssey*. Thus, although we may want to argue that the GA in Hesiod is *semantically* close to the likely starting-point of the GA overall (i.e. the temporal genitive), this does not allow us to argue that the construction in Hesiod represents an earlier stage of the Greek language than Homer.

Secondly, one might wonder whether the GA in Hesiod and that in the *Odyssey* represent the same or a similar stage of the Greek language: in relation to the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* also has formally innovated. Yet as will be discussed in Section 2.6 below, it shows a topically limited preponderance for instances of the ‘presence/absence’ formula⁷⁰ (five out of the total 14), and of natural time expressions (four out of 14). These limitations in the *Odyssey* are difficult to explain. The topical/semantic limitations in Hesiod simply reflect the thematic limitations of the text, particularly the agricultural core passage of the *Works and Days*, the part of Hesiod’s works in which GAs are by far the most frequent. One might, as Thesleff (1958 *passim*) does, want to ascribe this phenomenon to a supposed decline in GA usage. Yet this, as we shall see in Section 2.6, is unlikely to be correct: the apparent ‘trend’ can be seen to reverse itself in the remaining authors of the seventh and sixth centuries.

⁶⁹ Note the parallel of the GA with two finite clauses.

⁷⁰ Thesleff 1958: 196.

One interesting note can be made regarding the *Shield of Heracles*: here, we find GAs which do not denote expressions of ‘natural time’. There is τρις μὲν ἐμῷ ὑπὸ δουρὶ τυπείς ἡρέισατο γαίῃ | οὐταμένον σάκεος, τὸ δὲ τέτρατον ἤλασα μηρόν ‘thrice he was struck by my spear and dashed to earth, **and his shield was pierced**; but the fourth time I struck his thigh’ (362–3), ἄρματα δ’ εὐποίητα καὶ ἄντυγες ἀμφαράβιζον | ἵππων ἱεμένων ‘the well-made chariot and its rails rattled around [them] **as the horses plunged**’ (64–5) and ὁστέα δέ σφι περὶ ῥινοῖο σαπείσης | Σειρίου ἄζαλέοιο κελαινῇ πύθεται αἶη ‘but their bones, **when the skin is rotted about them**, crumble away on the dark earth under parching Sirius’ (152–3).⁷¹

As Barron and Easterling (1985: 95) say, ‘the *Shield of Heracles* . . . is undoubtedly spurious and probably belongs in the sixth century’. In the whole of Hesiod apart from the *Scutum*, there is just one GA that does not denote an expression of natural time, and it is possible that the expression in question is not a GA at all (see discussion of Hes. *Op.* 744–5 above). As we shall see in the next section, the GAs as found in the (often fragmentary) remainder of early Greek are equally not subject to any topical restrictions. One might thus argue that the break in GA usage between the main body of Hesiod’s work and the *Shield of Heracles* is another sign that it is post-Hesiodic.

Summing up, thus, Hesiod employs the GA for markers of natural time, denoting e.g. the rhythm of the seasons. If this semantic limitation represents an original phenomenon we may speculate that Hesiod did not extend it because this was not necessary for the subject matters he writes about. The Homeric epics, on the other hand, provide numerous opportunities for temporal expressions outside the realm of natural time. Comparing these two situations, we can say that Hesiod displays rather little semantic, but considerable formal innovation. Hence his use of the GA cannot support the

⁷¹ περί cannot govern ῥινοῖο σαπείσης as ‘bones crumbling around skin’ would not make sense. Hence it must mean something like ‘round about’ or, if that is possible, govern σφι (σφι περί ‘around them (i.e. the bodies)’). Notice the unusual genitive usage in Σειρίου ἄζαλέοιο ‘at/under parching Sirius’, which, for all intents and purposes, appears to be a nominal(!) GA. Given that this passage is unusual overall, I shall not take it into further consideration – at least until I have found more similar material.

speculation that his language is more archaic than that of Homer, and that Hesiod's works thus predate the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Also, the atypical nature of GAs in the *Shield of Heracles* supports the view that this text is from a different author and/or period.

2.6 The GA in the seventh and sixth centuries BC

It has been pointed out⁷² that a number of GAs in the *Iliad* and particularly the *Odyssey* can be grouped into various 'formulae' or 'types', namely, as Thesleff (1958: 196) calls them, 'will and call', 'presence/absence' and 'life/death'.⁷³ He sees these as a sign that the GA in Homer is an 'old' construction that is beginning to fossilise and that would have died out, had it not been for an artificial revival in the Greek literary genres of the fifth century, where such a concise way of expressing a subordinate statement would certainly have been useful. This line of reasoning is questionable: on the basis of the same material, one could also argue that these apparent limitations are a result of the GA simply not having loosened itself from certain original semantic restrictions yet.

Thus we should ask: did such a demise and artificial revival of the GA really occur? The obvious way of approaching this question is to look at the authors active between the two periods in question (i.e. Homer on the one hand, fifth-century authors on the other). As we have just seen, the material we find in Hesiod is not very helpful in this respect: although we do not find any of Thesleff's 'formulae', there definitely are great topical limitations on the Hesiodic GA.

Among the other texts traditionally assigned to the seventh and sixth centuries BC, some cannot be securely dated. This includes the works of Aesop or the sayings attributed to the 'Seven Sages'.⁷⁴ Other works – mainly of philosophers – do not survive in their

⁷² E.g. Thesleff 1958 *passim*.

⁷³ Cf. e.g. Ἑκτορος ὀτρύναντος 'with Hector spurring on' (*Il.* 10.356), ἐμεῦ ἄέκοντος 'with me unwilling' (*Il.* 19.273), λαῶν ἀπτεόντων 'with the peoples absent' (*Il.* 8.521–2), ἐμεῦ ζῶντος 'with me living/alive' (*Il.* 1.88–9). To what extent the label of 'will and call' is random will not be discussed here.

⁷⁴ See Mullach 1860: 217–35.

original form, but only as paraphrases. This nevertheless leaves us with (more or less) fragmentary authors such as Archilochus, Callinus, Tyrtaeus, Mimnermus, Theognis,⁷⁵ Solon, Semonides, Alcman, Hipponax, Stesichorus, Sappho, Alcaeus, Ibycus and Anacreon.

GAs can be found in the following authors (names in brackets indicate that there are no clear examples, but only ambiguous constructions):⁷⁶ Callinus, (Tyrtaeus), Theognis, Solon, Semonides, Alcman, Hipponax, Stesichorus, Sappho, (Alcaeus). There are about thirty GAs or constructions which are at least likely to be interpreted as GAs. They employ present, aorist and perfect participles. The large majority of them are formally minimal, consisting of just the noun and participle (in two cases there is no noun, but a pronoun; in four cases the noun is accompanied by a definite article). Those that extend beyond the minimal formal requirements for a GA include small qualifiers such as ἔτι, τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ and γάρ. There also is one instance that includes a prepositional expression (ἀληθείης ἐς μέσον ἐρχομένης ‘when the truth has come out into the open’, Solon frg. 10 l.2). In all but one instance, all members of the GA stand directly next to each other.⁷⁷

Most seventh- and sixth-century GAs have purely temporal semantics; as e.g.

ἀλλά τις ἰθὺς ἵτω
ἐγχοσ ἀνασχόμενος καὶ ὑπ’ ἀσπίδος ἄλκιμον ἦτορ
ἔλσας, τὸ πρῶτον μειγνυμένου πολέμου.

‘But one person shall go straight ahead, holding up his sword and holding his heart in check underneath his shield, **when war first has started** (lit. ‘mingled’).’
(Callinus frg. I 9–11)

We do also find other semantic nuances, yet these are rather weak. Cf. e.g. κεκηνότος γὰρ ἀνδρὸς, οἱ δὲ γείτονες | χαίρουσ’ ὀρῶντες

⁷⁵ I am aware, however, that much is attributed to him that is also attributed to other authors, such as Solon, Mimnermus or Tyrtaeus, and that parts of ‘his’ work might have been added later on. I have taken this into account where relevant.

⁷⁶ Ambiguities were created almost entirely by uncertain dependence of a genitive construction on a noun. Cf. e.g. τρεσάντων δ’ ἀνδρῶν πᾶσ’ ἀπόλλωλ’ ἀρετὴ ‘of fleeing men/when men flee, all virtue is destroyed’ (Tyrtaeus frg. 11 l.14).

⁷⁷ The exception is found at Theognis frg. incert. l.1222: Πολλὰ φέρειν εἴωθε λόγος θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν | παίσματα τῆς γνώμης, Κύρνε, ταρασσομένης. ‘Many footfalls is speech used to bring to mortal men **when their judgement, Cyrenus, is confounded**’.

καὶ τόν, ὡς ἁμαρτάνει ‘for **if/when a man gapes**, the neighbours rejoice seeing how he, too, errs’ (Semonides frg. 7.110).⁷⁸

As in Homer, we find genitive expressions which can be perceived either as absolute or as (sometimes loosely) adnominal: most frequently this happens after nouns denoting feelings of some kind (πόθος ‘longing, desire’ (of/for), χάρις ‘gratitude’ (of/for)), but sometimes also after other nouns (e.g. ἀἶσχος καὶ κακός[τα]τ’ ὠλομέν[αν] | πόλλαν ‘the shame and badness of many things lost’, Alcaeus frg. 117b.30–1).⁷⁹

A very interesting passage can be found at Solon frg. 33 1.2 (West):

ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος οὐκ ἐδέξατο

‘for he did not receive any good things **when god gave [them]/from god giving [them]**’

This has a parallel at *Od.* 1.390:⁸⁰

καί κεν τοῦτ’ ἐθέλοιμι Διὸς γε διδόντος ἄρ᾽ ἐσθαι

‘I’d be happy to take this [crown] **if Zeus presents it.**’

In the Homeric passage, it is unclear whether we have to consider the genitival expression as a GA (‘receive when Zeus gives’) or as an ablative genitive (‘receive from Zeus when he gives’). Yet in this fragment, the οὐκ in a way makes the absolute interpretation less likely: ‘he did not receive when Zeus gave’ implies that there was a certain point at which Zeus(/a god) gave out ἐσθλὰ, but that on that occasion the speaker did not receive any, whereas an ablative ‘I did not receive from a giving god/Zeus’ implies much more generally that the god did not do any giving of ἐσθλὰ. Once again it is interesting to see how dependent the interpretation of such genitive expressions (as either absolute or adnominal) is on their exact semantic/lexical surroundings.

⁷⁸ Note how the δέ makes an adnominal interpretation of the genitive expression impossible.

⁷⁹ I am referring to the edition by Lobel and Page 1955. This reading, of course, is only a conjecture. Edmonds 1963: 448 has [αἶσχος καὶ κακός[τα]τ’ ὠλομέν[ω φέρην] | πόλλαν π[ρὸς ἄστων].

⁸⁰ Cf. also e.g. *Pi. O.* 3.39 or *P.* 5.3, both employing the verb δίδωμι.

In proportion to the number of words, the frequency of the GA in Homer and these ‘smaller’ seventh- and sixth-century authors does not vary greatly.⁸¹ The apparent semantic limitations we observed in the early seventh century (*Odyssey*, Hesiod) do not apply any more. The GA often is minimal in shape, but can be extended to a certain degree when necessary. It is always used in rather plain ways (e.g. in that its constituents typically stand directly adjacent to one another), but usually also with a certain simple elegance. In short: it has nothing formulaic or fossilised about it.

As collections such as that of Maiocco (2005) and examples such as Th. 1.9 (see Section 1.2.c.ii) show, the GA in fifth-century and later prose sheds the few limitations identified in relation to earlier GAs. We find formal extensions (such as frequent direct objects, multiple subjects or prepositional phrases) and GAs that fit the ‘clause equivalent’ criterion (see Section 1.2.b.ii) in that they contain the same amount of information a finite clause might and are placed in syntactic parallel to finite clauses (linked by *καί* or *μέν . . . δέ*). ACs in verse become more frequent (see n. 60 above), but otherwise stay far more similar to their Homeric counterparts than prose ACs do. A study of the factors governing the choice of GA (or participial subordination in general) over finite subordination in both fifth-century prose and verse might prove very interesting and potentially more revealing than a study of the (rather straightforward) formal changes within the GA.

2.7 Absolute participles and related phenomena

Across the languages in which they occur, the structure of ACs is unusual in the following way: in a combination of head (pro)noun and agreeing qualifier (participle, adjective, noun), the syntactically less important element (the qualifier) is semantically more

⁸¹ Twenty to thirty GAs in a total of 48,000 words in fragments, as opposed to thirty-nine in 115,000 (*Iliad*), thirteen in 88,000 (*Odyssey*) and eighteen in 16,000 (Hesiod, excluding the fragments). This gives us various different frequencies, yet the point is that there is no clear increase or decline visible. All word counts are those given by the TLG.

important than its head.⁸² Thus, in a sentence such as δὴ τότε κεῖτ' ἀπόθεστος ἀποικομένοιο ἄνακτος | ἐν πολλῇ κόπρῳ 'but now, **in his master's absence**, he [Odysseus' dog] lay there, cast away, on piles of dung' (*Od.* 17.296–7), it is the absence of the master, not the master himself, that has put the dog into such an unfortunate situation. For this same reason, when ACs are translated into non-absolute expressions in languages that do not productively use ACs, what originally was the qualifier is turned into the new head of the expression. ἀποικομένοιο ἄνακτος cannot be translated literally as *‘at/during the absent master’, but only either as a nominal ‘in the absence of his master’ or a verbal ‘while his master was absent’. In either of these, the former participial qualifier is now the head of the construction, either in the form of a noun with a temporal dimension to its semantics (‘absence’) serving as the head of a nominal expression of time, or a finite verb, which by definition is marked for time – whether as tense or as aspect – as the head of its clause.

Yet while this feature is crucial in ACs, it also appears elsewhere. In Greek, the same peculiarity as in the GA is found in the *ab urbe condita* construction (AUC). This will be discussed more properly in Section 3.4.a, after all relevant Latin and Greek material has been introduced. Yet it will be helpful to take a brief look at it now.

The AUC in Latin is found both after prepositions (cf. e.g. *ante solem exorientem* ‘before the rising of the sun, before sunrise’, Pl. *Bac.* 424, or *queri de Milone per vim expulso* ‘to complain about Milo’s violent expulsion’, Cic. *Att.* 9.14) and in non-prepositional case usages (as in *cum occisus dictator Caesar aliis pessimum, aliis pulcherrimum facinus videretur* ‘because the murder of the dictator Caesar (or: the fact that the dictator Caesar had been killed) seemed to some the worst, to others the most beautiful deed’, Tac. *Ann.* 1.8). In Greek,⁸³ it equally is found both after prepositions (μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας ‘after the foundation of Syracuse’, Th. 6.33) and elsewhere (ἐλύπει αὐτὸν ἡ χώρα πορθουμένη ‘the plundering of the country/the fact that the country

⁸² This is the mismatch that is also addressed by Keydana’s concept of ‘Verbalzentriertheit’; see Section 1.1.c.iv.

⁸³ For a list of examples and some discussion, see Jones 1939.

had been plundered saddened him', *X. An.* 7.7). AUCs are found mostly in prose.⁸⁴ Yet there are a number of them occurring in verse as early as Homer, where we find expressions such as ἅμα δ' ἡελίῳ καταδύντι 'at sunset (lit.: together with the setting sun)',⁸⁵ ἅμα δ' ῥοῖ φαινομένηφι 'at dawn (lit.: together with appearing dawn)',⁸⁶ or also ἐς ἥλιον καταδύντα 'until sunset (lit.: up to the setting sun)'.⁸⁷ We also find similar expressions dependent on nouns (e.g. Σαρπήδοντι δ' ἄχος γένετο Γλαύκου ἀπιόντος 'in (lit. 'to') Sarpedon arose pain over Glaucus' leaving', *Il.* 12.392) or verbs (τοῦ δὲ Πάρις μάλα θυμὸν ἀποκταμένοιο χολώθη 'in his heart, Paris was greatly angered by slain him [Harpalion]', i.e. 'by the fact that he had been slain', *Il.* 13.660).⁸⁸

In addition to these constructions (and similar to the last example above, *Il.* 13.660), such semantically very important qualifiers are also found in participial phrases grammaticalised as verbal complements. These *accusativi cum participio* (ACPs) are found in a variety of semantic fields, most notably after *verba sentiendi*, *verba declarandi* and *verba affectuum* (i.e. verbs expressing emotion, such as rejoicing or being angry about something).⁸⁹ Compare instances such as οἱ Ἕλληνες οὐκ ᾔδεσαν Κῦρον τεθνηκότα 'the Greeks did not know that Cyrus was dead' (*X. An.* 1.10) or ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα 'he heard that Cyrus was in Cilicia' (*X. An.* 1.4), or also a *nominativus cum participio*, ἀγγέλεται ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τετελευτηκώς, νικῶν δὲ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ 'it is announced that Peisander is dead, but has won the seafight' (*X. Hell.* 4.3.13).

Two things are important here. On the one hand, as mentioned above, obligatory nominal qualifiers – participles or also adjectives that are semantically so important that their omission would either render the remainder of the phrase nonsensical, or fundamentally

⁸⁴ *GrGr* II.404.

⁸⁵ πᾶν δ' ἥμαρ φερόμην, ἅμα δ' ἡελίῳ καταδύντι | κάππεσον ἐν Λήμνῳ 'the whole day long I was borne headlong, but at sunset (lit.: together with the setting sun) I fell in Lemnos' (*Il.* 1.592–3).

⁸⁶ ἅμα δ' ῥοῖ φαινομένηφι is found in Homer twelve times (*Il.* 9.618, 9.682, 11.685, 24.600, *Od.* 4.407, 6.31, 7.222, 12.24, 14.266, 15.396, 16.270, 17.435).

⁸⁷ ἐς ἥλιον καταδύντα is also found in Homer twelve times (*Il.* 1.601, 19.162, 24.713, *Od.* 3.138, 9.161, 9.556, 10.183, 10.476, 12.29, 17.570, 17.582, 19.424).

⁸⁸ LSJ s.v. χολόομαι with a genitive to denote 'to be angry for or because of a person or thing'.

⁸⁹ See K-G II.2.47–50 for a detailed list.

change its meaning – exist not just in the GA.⁹⁰ On the other hand, note that among these obligatory qualifiers, some are more obligatory than others. Comparing e.g. μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας with ἔλύπει αὐτὸν ἡ χώρα πορθομένη, we see that both οἰκισθείσας and πορθομένη are semantically so important that e.g. English would not express them as qualifiers, but as the heads of each expression: the foundation of Syracuse, the plundering of the country. Yet while an expression such as *μετὰ Συρακούσας ‘after Syracuse’ cannot make sense in any context as ‘Syracuse’ is not a noun whose semantics have a temporal dimension and can thus not be used as a temporal expression,⁹¹ *ἔλύπει αὐτὸν ἡ χώρα ‘the country saddened him’ has a different meaning, but the noun phrase ἡ χώρα, used as the subject, is still fully grammatical. This difference will be crucial in helping us understand the true nature of ACs, and also their genesis. After a more detailed discussion at Section 3.4.a, I shall return to the topic once more at Section 5.3.a.

2.8 Conclusions

The Greek GA is a well-developed and productive construction from earliest literary Greek onwards. As we shall see in the next chapters, it also is further developed than the ACs in the oldest attested texts in Latin and Vedic Sanskrit. Nevertheless, it benefits from being studied not only on its own, but in various contexts: earlier attestations compared with later ones, GAs with other means of grammatical subordination, participles in GAs with similarly employed participles elsewhere. Studies of the GA in isolation have generally been the norm so far, presumably having been motivated by the idea that ACs are ‘absolute’ and ‘thus’ somehow to be looked at independently. This chapter has aimed to show which new insights can still be gained by contextualising such constructions.

⁹⁰ I do not claim that there is a historical link between these; I am simply noting the synchronic parallels.

⁹¹ Unless we think of either poetic or elliptic means of expression in which ‘after Syracuse’ could mean ‘after a certain event pertaining to Syracuse’; compare ‘ever since the Twin Towers’.

Comparisons of GAs from different points in the pre-Classical history of Greek demonstrate that the GA is fully developed from its first attestations on. Formal minimality ((pro)noun + participle) is frequent, but not the only possibility. Transitivity is rare, and GA semantics are mostly temporal. In many ways, the GA is very much in line with its grammatical surroundings.

The GA remains infrequent but otherwise productive in later pre-Classical Greek. In Classical times, its frequency increases, as do numbers of transitive or generally extended GAs.⁹² Participles (absolute and otherwise) are more frequently used in environments that give them a clearer modal meaning. Yet all these changes are quantitative rather than qualitative: What is there is mostly there from the start.

GAs used for emphasis in places where conjunct participles would also work are indeed found in Homer. Yet this phenomenon is much rarer than people such as Classen (1867) or Vasilaros (1993) in their treatises on Homeric participles argue. As we saw in Section 2.3.d, most supposed instances of this phenomenon are not such ‘incorrect’ or ‘emphatic’ GAs, but rather examples of a slightly anacoluthic pattern that effects stronger cohesion between the words in each clause. Rather than agreeing with its actual head, a participle will link up with and make itself dependent on a different head that stands textually closer to it. This head most often is a body part, and expressions of the kind ‘the head of him nodding, the cheeks of her crying’ are generally frequent not just in Homer but also in later Greek. Once again we see that looking at ACs in isolation reveals only a part of the picture, and does not even make it possible to see that part very clearly.

Comparing GA usage between *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, we find that the formal enlargements which represent the main change in the GA up to the Classical period have already begun in Homeric times. Observing the progression of this trend also lets us infer that the formally minimal GAs mostly found in the *Iliad* are likely to represent the original shape of the GA. Comparing Homeric GA usage with that in later authors demonstrates that there is no

⁹² In e.g. Plato we often find GAs of the type ταῦτα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ‘after he had said/when he asked this’.

CONCLUSIONS

real dip in numbers at any point. The absolute numbers of GAs in the *Odyssey* are considerably smaller than in the *Iliad*, but then the *Odyssey* is also more than one quarter shorter than the *Iliad*. In other words: yes, there is a dip, but not one compelling us to infer greater trends from it.

I hope that I have shown how important it is to look at the relevant evidence in detail, and without preconceptions: it is very easy to see a particular construction as absolute when there is actually just some surface similarity to real ACs. (As we shall see particularly in [Chapter 4](#) on Sanskrit, such errors are only too frequent.) The look at participle usages similar to what we find in the GA has remained rather brief. The material we find in Greek can be understood and evaluated much better once we have looked at more (and more telling) evidence in Latin.

EARLY LATIN

3.1 Introduction

As we saw in the previous chapter, the Greek GA fully fits the standard conceptions of what an AC is and does: it functions as a nominal ‘equivalent’ of subordinate clauses in that it is able to express more or less the same kind and amount of information as a full clause. (As we shall see in Section 3.2.c, the AA in Classical Latin prose shows some similar features.) Furthermore, while there are some ambiguous constructions in whose case we cannot be sure whether we are dealing with adnominal or absolute genitives, the absolute genitive on the whole is quite distinct from other usages of this case. The GA thus is a clearly definable construction. Partly, this has to do with the fact that there is just one non-absolute adverbial usage of the genitive in Greek, the temporal genitive, which moreover is not very frequent.

In Latin, the situation is quite different. The case used for the main AC, the ablative, also is the main case for adverbial expressions in general. The Latin ablative, being the result of syncretism between the PIE ablative, instrumental and locative cases, can denote various semantic roles: ‘space from’ and ‘space where’, means or instrument, agent and accompanier (whether an entity or a circumstance).¹ Most of these semantic nuances are also present in AAs, thus creating significant overlap between absolute and non-absolute adverbial expressions.

After a formal overview of AAs in Early and Classical Latin in Section 3.2, Section 3.3 will demonstrate that it is not possible to establish semantic criteria by which to delineate or define the AA. Section 3.4 will then attempt an alternative approach and focus instead on a syntactic criterion, the presence of an obligatory

¹ K-S II.1.346–412; Bennett 1914: 279–390.

qualifier, to delineate AAs. Others (Bolkestein 1980, Pinkster 1990 and Menge 2000) have called this use of participles ‘dominant’. This study will demonstrate that they are conflating two related but different phenomena under this label, and will argue for a new contrastive use of ‘dominant’ and ‘obligatory’.

We shall see that this syntactic criterion – the presence of an obligatory nominal qualifier (such as a participle) – is the only one that allows us to differentiate systematically between absolute and non-absolute expressions in Latin. Yet both obligatory and dominant qualifiers also appear elsewhere, namely in the so-called *ab urbe condita* construction and certain gerundive constructions. These give us additional opportunities for studying dominant and obligatory usage, and thus for understanding them (and ACs as a whole) better. Their discussion concludes Section 3.4.

Section 3.5 will then look at so-called *nominal* AAs. These do not involve a participle but combine the head noun or pronoun with an adjective (such as *me vivo* ‘with me alive, in my lifetime’) or with another noun (*me puero* ‘when I was a boy, in my childhood’). The main question concerning these is how they came to be – if they are an archaism inherited from PIE, why do they not exist in other old IE languages that contain ACs? And if they are an innovation, how could and did they develop? It will be argued that the two different kinds of nominal AA (substantival and adjectival) are actually separate phenomena, and independent origins will be suggested for each. Section 3.6, finally, will briefly look at the evidence from other Italic languages. As that is not very extensive, and as what exists is likely influenced by Latin, we shall see that this material unfortunately does not tell us very much.

3.2 The Latin Ablative Absolute: an overview

3.2.a The formal make-up of the AA

The Early Latin AA² appears principally in the same forms as the AA in Classical Latin and beyond. The following

² The following statements are based on the collections of early AAs in Bennett 1914 and Keydana 1997. Keydana’s collection unites those of *LGr* II, K-S, Lindsay 1907, Bennett 1914 and Allardice 1929, leaving out several attested constructions (mostly involving two nouns or pronoun and noun, see Section 3.5 below) which he does not consider

includes both Early and Classical examples of each formal type.³

(i) *A noun or pronoun combined with a present active participle*

*profecto in aedis meas **me absente** neminem
volo intro mitti.*

‘In short, I don’t want anybody to be let into my house **in my absence.**’
(Pl. *Aul.* 98–9)

piro florente dapem pro bubus facito.

‘Make the offering for the oxen **when the pear tree is in bloom.**’
(Cato *Agr.* 131)

*id [oppidum] . . . **paucis dependentibus** expugnare non potuit.*

‘He was not able to take it [the town] by storm, **even though there were
few men to defend it.**’
(Caes. *Gal.* 2.12.2)

(ii) *A noun or pronoun combined with a perfect passive participle*

*pallam ad phrygionem fert **confecto prandio**
vinoque expoto, parasito excluso foras.*

‘He is taking the cloak to the embroiderer’s, **now that the lunch is finished
off and the wine drunk out, and the hanger-on locked out.**’
(Pl. *Men.* 469–70)

*nunc **exacta aetate** hoc fructi pro labore ab eis fero,
odium.*

‘And now at the end of my time the reward I get from them for my labours
is hatred.’
(Ter. *Ad.* 870–1)

*his **confectis rebus conventibusque peractis** in citiorem Galliam
revertitur.*

‘**When these matters were settled and the assizes conducted,** he
returned to Hither Gaul.’
(Caes. *Gal.* 5.2.1)

absolute. I have supplied at least some of these latter by reference to Bennett’s rather comprehensive 1914 collection. The corpus under consideration therefore includes the comedies (including fragments) of Plautus and Terence, what remains of the works of Cato, Ennius, Afranius, Pacuvius, Caecilius, Naevius, Asellio, Coelius, the *Lex reg. Numa*, Titinius and Turpilius. (I thus mostly follow Bennett’s definition of Early Latin.) Both Keydana and Bennett include a small number of AAs taken from the *CIL* (1²), yet neither states on what basis this selection was made. Many thanks to James Clackson for a list of inscriptional examples taken from Degrassi 1972.

³ The Classical examples are taken from Menge 2000: 718–24 and K-S II.1.774–80.

(iii) *A noun or pronoun combined with a future active participle*

procedit foras non nisi migraturo examine

‘he **only** issues abroad **when the swarm is about to migrate**’

(Plin. *Nat.* 11.54)

(iv) *A noun or pronoun combined with an adjective*

non sino, neque equidem illum me vivo corrumpi sinam.

‘No, I won’t, and I won’t let him be corrupted **while I’m alive**.’

(Pl. *Bac.* 419)⁴

equidem has te invito iam ambas rapiam.

‘I am going to drag them both off now **against your will**.’

(Pl. *Rud.* 796)

ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit, loco pro castris ad aciem instruendam natura oportuno atque idoneo, quod is collis ubi castra posita erant paululum ex planitie editus

‘when he perceived that our men were not inferior, **because the ground before the camp was naturally suitable and appropriate for forming a line of battle**, [and] because the hill where the camp had been pitched was standing up a little from the plain’ (Caes. *Gal.* 2.8.3)⁵

(v) *A noun or pronoun combined with another noun*

nam me puero venter erat solarium.

‘**For when I was a boy**, my stomach was a sundial.’

(Pl. *frag.* 24, quoted at *Gel.* 3.3.5)

C. Licinio praetore remiges scribti cives Romani[s] sub portisculum, sub flagrum conscribti venire passim.

‘**When C. Licinius was praetor**, conscript Roman citizens continuously came under the under the rowing-hammer and the whip.’ (Cato *frag.* 145 (Cugusi))

quod autem affirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est

‘a solemn promise given, as **before God as one’s witness**, is to be sacredly kept’ (Cic. *Off.* 3.104)

⁴ Note that this is not a supposedly ‘wrong’ use of the AA in which the head of the AC also appears elsewhere in the matrix clause: the matrix verb of *me vivo* is *corrumpi*, not *sino*, and thus there is no identity of subjects. Cf. K-S II.1.788 n. 2 on these constructions.

⁵ Note that the AA is parallel with a finite causal clause.

exstitit iam senibus illis quos paulo ante diximus Isocrates.

‘In the old age of those whom I just mentioned, Isocrates came forward.’ (Cic. *Brut.* 32)

(vi) Sometimes, a perfect passive participle stands on its own⁶

*nam illi[c] haud licebat nisi praefinito loqui
quae illi placerent.*

‘There I wasn’t allowed to say anything except what would please him,
and that was strictly defined.’ (Ter. *Hec.* 94)

*haec tibi dictabam post fanum putre Vacunae,
excepto quod non simul esses cetera laetus.*

‘These lines I am dictating to you behind Vacuna’s crumbling shrine, happy
on all counts **save** that you are not with me.’ (Hor. *Ep.* 1.10.50)

Variants (iii) and (iv) are commonly referred to as ‘nominal’. The future active participle is not used in the AA in Early Latin and only appears from Livy and Tacitus on.⁷

3.2.b The AA in Early Latin: formal make-up and semantic types

Most early AAs consist of only the elements listed so far. Yet there are also various extended forms: we find multiple subjects or modifiers (*re placida atque otiosa* ‘with things calm and quiet’, Pl. *Truc.* 75), subjects qualified by adjectives (*remissa humana vita* ‘human life having been let go’ (i.e. after death), Ennius *Thyestes* 36 (Vahlen) = 299 (Jocelyn)), numerals (*decumo mense exacto* ‘when the tenth month had passed’, Pl. *Cist.* 163), or sometimes a genitive attribute (*decurso aetatis spatio* ‘when this period of time had gone by’, Pl. *St.* 81). Sometimes adverbials qualify the construction as a whole (*iam amoto metu* ‘with fear already removed’, Ter. *An.* 180). There also is one Early Latin example of an AA in

⁶ K-S II.1.778 classify this usage as ‘adverbial’ rather than as absolute; cf. also the *OLD*, which separately lists expressions such as *praefinito*, *optato* ‘according to (my) wish’, *auspicato* ‘under a good omen, auspiciously’ as adverbs. Only in Classical times (rarely) and then more frequently in Silver Latin authors such as Tacitus do these expressions come to govern subordinate clauses. But cf. Frauzel 1998 on this type of construction across IE languages.

⁷ Wölfflin 1904: 275. Cf. K-S II.1.761 (who read *operibus mansuris* rather than *mansuri* at Sen. *Suas.* 6.24 and thus count this among their examples of ACs).

which the absolute participle governs a subordinate clause: *orante ut ne id faceret Thaide* ‘with Thais asking that he not do this’ (Ter. *Hec.* 830).

Overall, however, these extended types are relatively rare; most of the attested cases are listed in this section. The vast majority of early AAs, found in Plautus and Terence, are formally minimal, consisting of a pronoun or (more rarely) a noun qualified by a participle or adjective. In about half of the cases, the qualifier is *praesens*, *absens*, *invitus* or *vivus*.⁸

Other Early Latin authors show semantically different kinds of AA, which are also formally minimal. We mostly find expressions of natural time in Cato: *piro florente* ‘when the pear-tree is in bloom’ (*Agr.* 131), *intermestri lunaque dimidiata* ‘at new moon and at half-moon’ (*Agr.* 37), *luna silenti* ‘at new moon’ (*Agr.* 50), *vindemia facta* ‘when the wine-harvest is done’ (*Agr.* 26). There are a variety of expressions in Ennius (e.g. *incerta re atque inorata* ‘with the matter uncertain and not pleaded’, *Ach.* VIII (Vahlen)/*Ach.* VI (Jocelyn)) and other fragmentary authors (e.g. *custodiis discessis* ‘after the guards had left’, Coelius 32).

A noteworthy exception to the near-formulaic use of the AA in Early Latin comedy comes from Plautus. In six passages,⁹ he heaps one AA of military contents upon another, as for example at *Per.* 753–6:

*hostibus victis, civibus salvis, re placida, pacibus perfectis,
bello extincto, re bene gesta, integro exercitu et praesidiis . . .
eas vobis habeo grates atque ago.*

‘Now that our enemies are defeated and our citizens safe, our state calm, peace assured, and the war brought to a triumphant end, with our army and garrisons intact, . . . I do thank you.’

Lavency remarks that this type of AA may be a parody of historiographic style,¹⁰ yet it is unclear which historical texts (that would

⁸ See Section 3.5 for more on these.

⁹ *Per.* 753–6, *Truc.* 75, *Am.* 188–9 (*victis hostibus legiones reveniunt domum, duello extincto maximo atque internecatis hostibus*. ‘The enemy’s been conquered and our legions return home as conquerors, now that a mighty war’s been brought to an end and the enemy’s been exterminated’), 654–6, *Bac.* 1070–1, *Poen.* 524–5.

¹⁰ Plautus ‘fait ainsi un joli pastiche de style des historiens’ (Lavency 2005: 587).

have to predate Plautus) he is referring to. Rather, as has been pointed out by Adams (2005: 74–5) and Oakley (2005: 375), this use of the AA likely imitates the style of military reports (e.g. to the senate), or of prayers of thanksgiving for military achievements.¹¹ The appearance of this kind of AA in Plautus is limited to exactly those situations, and one may speculate that it was similarly limited in its use in the spoken language.

If we can see the AAs used in Plautus and Terence as representative of the everyday spoken language of their time, it seems that the AA was not very productive there, and likely did not go much beyond the almost formulaic *me absente/praesente/vivofinvito* type. Other types of AA attested early on probably stem from more restricted forms of spoken language: in Cato's *De Agri Cultura*, we predominantly find AAs denoting points in 'natural' time (the seasons and that which marks them, as in *piro florente* 'when the pear-tree is in bloom'). Maybe these would have been commonly used in weather lore. The AAs that we find in cases where Plautus imitates military speech (the *hostibus victis* type) may represent a feature of actual military reports, which one would expect valued them as a concise means of summing up relevant actions and events.

3.2.c Classical Latin

The further development of the AA is discussed extensively in Müller-Lancé's *Absolute Konstruktionen vom Altlatein zum Neufranzösischen* (1994)¹² and will therefore not be treated in detail here. Simply put, we find the AA developing to become more similar to the Greek GA in terms of semantic productivity and formal variation.¹³ (It would be interesting to investigate further the extent to which we can identify any more specific

¹¹ '[A]t least since the late third century successive ablatives absolute seem to have been regular for summarizing a magistrate's achievements.' See both sources for parallels from other authors. Many thanks to Stephen Oakley for pointing this out to me.

¹² For a brief summary, see Coleman 1989; for case studies in individual authors, see Laughton 1964: 100–15 and Steele 1902 and 1904. Lease 1928 and 1931 also mostly focus on Classical constructions.

¹³ As Adams 2005: 75 points out, 'In Caesar the ablative absolute is about ten times as frequent (proportionately) as it is in Cicero, and that reflects a tradition.'

links between Classical AAs and Greek GAs, such as a similarity between types of AA and GA in the same literary genre. Yet this lies outside the scope of this present study.) AAs are used to refer to any kind of action (in military/historical prose, they regularly serve to sum up any actions that have led up to what is being described in the main clause), and, as is pointed out e.g. by Coleman (1989: 362), '[s]ubordinate clauses are attached to . . . the nominal or the participial constituent', or may even replace the head noun of the AA.¹⁴

3.3 Delineating the AA semantically: absolute and other ablatives

So far, we have looked at the Early Latin AA in isolation, and seen the various shapes it can take. For all intents and purposes, it appears to be a true parallel of the Greek GA. Yet if we look at it in the context of other ablatives in adverbial usages, we shall observe that, at least semantically speaking, the construction is nowhere near as well-defined a phenomenon as its Greek counterpart. Instead, there are numerous usages of the ablative that come very close to what we would call 'absolute'.

Going back to the situation in Greek for a moment, we remember that the GA has defining characteristics in both semantics and syntax. As far as semantics are concerned, whenever an expression in the genitive is used adverbially to denote 'time at which', but does not employ a noun that denotes time (such as 'night', 'dawn' etc.), this expression is unambiguously absolute. In terms of syntax, the GA is characterised by the presence of its obligatory participle. Furthermore, the syntactic characteristics of the GA are an automatic consequence of the construction's semantics: whenever we

¹⁴ His examples include *hoc facto duabus legionibus quas proxime conscripserat in castris relictis* 'this done, and having left in camp the two legions he had last enrolled' (Caes. *Gal.* 2.8.5), *instructo exercitu magis ut loci natura . . . quam ut rei militaris ratio . . . postulabat* 'the crew was drawn up rather as the character of the ground . . . required than according to regular tactical formation' (Caes. *Gal.* 2.22.1) and *sin vita ante acta ignorabitur hoc loco praeterito et cur praetereatur demonstrato* 'but if his past life is unknown, it will be fitting to pass over this topic and after showing why it is passed over, . . .' (Cic. *Inv.* 2.34). See also K-S II.1.778 on formally more complex examples.

have a bipartite expression (such as ‘absent master’) that is used to denote a *time at which*, the qualifier (‘absent’) becomes obligatory, since without it, the head noun (‘master’) does not have the necessary semantics to denote such a *time at which*.¹⁵ One may thus argue that the semantic criteria are the more basic for recognising or defining GAs, while the construction’s syntactic peculiarities are only a necessary by-product of its semantic features.

In Latin, the situation is different. Due to the fact that the Latin ablative is an amalgamation of the PIE ablative, instrumental and locative cases, the semantic range of this Latin absolute case is much larger. Ablatives are regularly used as adverbial modifiers: in a large variety of nuances, they may denote a point (either in space or time) from or at which, something by means of which, someone through whom or something/someone in the company of which the action of the verb occurs.¹⁶ Nevertheless, let us try and apply the same semantic standards to the AA as to the GA and argue the following: in Greek, an absolute genitive can quite simply be defined as a temporal genitive that does not employ a head noun which denotes time. Accordingly we should say that in Latin, an ablative is absolute when it appears in one of the semantic roles of the ablative but employs a noun which on its own cannot be used to denote this role. For example, in a Catonian sentence such as

prata primo vere stercoreto luna silenti

‘manure meadows at the opening of spring, **at new moon**’
(Cato Agr. 50)

luna silenti denotes a point in time, and does so although the head noun *luna* does not have any temporal semantics. As in the Greek GA, the presence of the qualifier (here: *silenti*) hence is necessary for this expression to make sense.

In this particular example, and indeed in all other AAs denoting points in natural time, the Latin AA and the Greek GA appear

¹⁵ The passage I am here referring to is *Od.* 17. 296–7: δὴ τότε κείτ’ ἀπόθεστος ἀποιομένοιο ἀνακτος | ἐν πολλῇ κόπρῳ ‘but now **with his master gone** he lay there, castaway, on piles of dung’.

¹⁶ K-S II.1.346–412; Bennett 1914: 279–390.

properly parallel: they are expressions which refer to something other than that which their head noun denotes, a fact which makes the attribute to the head noun obligatory. Yet the majority of Early Latin AAs are of the type *me praesente*, *me absente*, *me invito*, *me vivo* etc., which denotes accompanying circumstances rather than a straightforward expression of *time at which* (such as was denoted by e.g. *luna silenti*).¹⁷ Many AAs from Classical Latin, too, do not denote a straightforward ‘time at which’, but rather an accompanying circumstance.¹⁸ This function is fulfilled also by the so-called ablative of attendant circumstance, which Bennett (1914: 301) describes as particularly close to (and sometimes difficult to distinguish from) the ablative of manner, and which he defines as ‘express[ing] some circumstance accessory to the main act indicated by the verb of the sentence’. Compare, for instance, the following:

invocat deos immortales ut sibi auxilium ferant

manibus puris, capite operto

‘she invoked the immortal gods to bring her help **with clean hands and covered head.**’

(Pl. *Am.* 1093–4)

An interesting view of this passage may be found in Bennett, who classifies *manibus puris* as an ablative of attendant circumstance (1914: 303) and *capite operto* as an ablative absolute (1914: 368). Semantically speaking, what is the difference between these two? *manibus puris* could theoretically be seen as an instrumental ablative: ‘she invokes the gods with her hands’ – and these hands, we are told, are clean. In this case, *puris* would be a regular qualifier. *capite operto*, on the other hand, cannot be interpreted as an instrumental ablative (*‘she invokes the gods with her head’ or ‘her covered head’ does not make sense). *capite operto* cannot be interpreted in any way that would make *operto* non-obligatory. Yet if (as Bennett suggests and as seems to better fit the sentence context) we

¹⁷ In other words, it is likely that *me praesente* etc. derives from the comitative/instrumental function of the ablative. This point is also touched on again in Section 3.5.c; cf. also Section 1.2.c.v.

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. *quod idem contigit adolescentibus adversante et repugnante natura*. ‘The same fate befalls the young, though Nature in their case struggles and rebels’ (Cic. *Sen.* 71).

interpret *manibus puris* as an ablative of attendant circumstance, *puris* becomes just as obligatory as *operto*: her hands are clean, her head is covered, and in this state she prays to the gods. Just like ‘head’, ‘hands’ on its own cannot be sensibly understood as an ‘attendant circumstance’. ‘Clean hands’ and a ‘covered head’, on the other hand, can be. Yet if we see *manibus puris* as an ablative of attendant circumstance, the syntax of both expressions, *manibus puris* and *capite operto*, is exactly identical: both attributes have to be seen as obligatory. Yet are these two expressions ablatives of attendant circumstance or AAs?

One could argue that an ‘ablative of attendant circumstance’ does not exist as an independent category, but rather that it and the AA should be counted as one and the same phenomenon. Alternatively, one could argue there is no separate AA, and that constructions such as *luna silenti* or *me praesente* are ablatives of attendant circumstance. As we have just seen, the two constructions overlap, and indeed, Bennett’s (1914: 301–5) list of ablatives of attendant circumstance includes *luna silenti* and some other expressions (such as *compositis mendaciis*, Pl. Am. 366, see below for a discussion) that could equally well be defined as absolute.

Yet while there is no clear semantic difference between the two constructions, there is a syntactic one: there are ablatives of attendant circumstance whose qualifiers are not obligatory.¹⁹ The expressions in question either have no qualifier at all: cf. *nemo funera fletu faxit* ‘no one conducted funerals **with crying**’ (Ennius Epigr. I 3–4 (Vahlen)) or *ludos faciam clamore in via* ‘I shall play games in the street **with shouting**’ (Pl. Truc. 759). Alternatively, they do have a qualifier, but its omission does not fundamentally affect the meaning or function of the expression: cf. *illud aiunt magno gemitu fieri* ‘this they say happened **with great groaning**’ (Pl. Ps. 786), *micant nitore tecta sublimi aurea* ‘the golden roofs gleam **with sublime brilliance**’ (Trag. Inc. 242), or *frater, et tu, quem ego multis miseriis, laboribus quaesivi* ‘brother, and you, whom I have searched for **with many cares and troubles**’ (Pl.

¹⁹ All of the following examples are taken from Bennett 1914: 301–5.

Men. 1133). In all of these, the qualifier (*magno*, *sublimi* and *multis*) could be omitted without causing semantic or syntactic problems.

Thus one might argue that the AA (or at least the *me praesente* type) is distinct from the ablative of attendant circumstance in that the latter does not include an obligatory qualifier. (Which, in the context of our overall discussion, means acknowledging there is no semantic, but only a syntactic difference between AAs and this other type of ablative.) Yet this view is complicated by the existence of the ‘ablative of quality’, a collocational variant of the ablative of attendant circumstance: depending on the exact nature of an expression, an ablative can denote either an external attendant circumstance or, if it refers to a circumstance directly relating to or part of a person or thing, a quality. In examples such as *cano capite atque alba barba*, *miserum me* ‘[I was fooled twice . . .], wretched me, despite my grey head and white beard’ (Pl. *Bac.* 1101–2) or *quadrupes aspectu truci* ‘a quadruped of terrible appearance’ (Pac. 2),²⁰ one could argue that the attributes in question (*cano*, *alba*, *truci*) cannot be omitted without making the expressions they stand in nonsensical: *‘a quadruped with/of an appearance’ does not mean anything.

If one wanted to keep these three ablative usages distinct, one might classify (a) the AA as adverbial and containing an obligatory qualifier, (b) the ablative of attendant circumstance as adverbial without an obligatory qualifier, and (c) the ablative of quality as adnominal and containing an obligatory qualifier. Yet what such a categorisation mostly emphasises is the semantic proximity of all three usages.

The argument just outlined had its focus on the *me praesente* type of AA that, while so frequent in Early Latin, is in the minority among AAs in Classical Latin. Yet if we look at the ‘military’ kind of AA (which also is frequent in later prose), as e.g. *hostibus victis, civibus salvis, re placida, pacibus perfectis, | bello extincto, re bene gesta, integro exercitu et praesidiis . . . eas vobis habeo grates atque ago* (Pl. *Per.* 753–6, see above), we shall also find it difficult

²⁰ See Bennett 1914: 319–25 for further examples.

to define a clear difference between it and the other ablative uses described above. One might argue that, unlike those other ablatives, this ‘military’ type of AA describes background actions rather than background states. Yet even this is not quite true: *bello extincto* etc. do not strictly speaking refer to an action, but describe a state by reference to the action that brought it about – a typical function of the perfect tense. Here, too, it thus is difficult to draw a semantic boundary between ablatives of attendant circumstance and an AA.

That the overlap discussed above was noticed by speakers of Latin is evident in the following passage:²¹

*ne tu istic hodie malo tuo compositis mendaciis
advenisti, audaciai columnen, consutis dolis. –
immo equidem tunicis consutis huc advenio, non dolis. –
at mentiris etiam: certo pedibus, non tunicis venis.*

‘You there, you really will pay for coming here **with your premeditated lies**, your peak of audacity, and **with your patched up tricks**.’ – ‘No, I’m coming here **with a patched up tunic, not with patched up tricks**.’ – ‘You’re lying, you’re certainly coming **with your feet, not with a tunic**.’
(Pl. *Am.* 366–9)

This whole exchange basically hinges on the question whether the ablative expressions are ablatives of attendant circumstance/AAs (ll. 366–7), comitative ablatives (l. 368) or instrumentals (l. 369). These lines show once again that the difference between ablatives of attendant circumstance and AAs is negligible. No clear criteria present themselves by which one might categorise *compositis mendaciis* and *consutis dolis* as one or the other. They also illustrate the ambiguity perceived between an ablative of attendant circumstance (which presumably is a reflex of the comitative instrumental)²² and an instrumental ablative. It thus seems that the possibility of interplay between the various uses of the Latin ablative was apparent to native speakers of Latin.

²¹ Among the commentaries on the *Amphitryo* that I am aware of, Sedgwick 1960, Cutt 1970, Oniga 1991 and Mahoney 2004 do not discuss these ablatives. Christenson 2000 *ad loc.* comments that there is ‘more humour derived from literal interpretation of the figurative’.

²² It is listed as such e.g. by Bennett 1914: 301–5, or K-S II.1.395–6.

The discussion of the ablative of attendant circumstance in K-S also is interesting for our discussion. They split up this usage into two finer categories, namely ablative expressions denoting the ‘internal or external circumstances accompanying an action (*ablativus modi*)’²³ and those denoting ‘indirect circumstances (‘*Nebenumstände*’) accompanying an action’.²⁴ As they demonstrate, these employ the preposition *cum* when they consist of just one word (e.g. *face rem hanc cum cura geras* ‘see to it that you carry this out with care’, Pl. *Per.* 198), but usually appear without it when the expression includes an attribute; cf. *haec summa cura et diligentia recognita sunt* ‘the whole thing was then examined with scrupulous care’ (Cic. *Ver.* 2.2.190). (Exceptions to either of these rules occur; cf. *silentio praeteriri* ‘to be passed over in silence’ (Cic. *Part.* 82) or *servatus est summa cum diligentia* ‘[his duty] was most carefully discharged by him/discharged with the greatest diligence’ (Cic. *Quinct.* 19).) At II.I.412, K-S furthermore list a number of lexical items/fields in combination with which *cum* is regularly missing. One of these is ‘body parts’, which they exemplify by means of expressions such as *nudo corpore* ‘with naked body’, *nudo capite* ‘with naked/uncovered head’, *promisso capilla* ‘with the hair let down’, *hilari vultu* ‘with a cheerful expression’ etc. (all examples without references). Yet at II.I.771, the first example provided to illustrate the AA is *Troiade exhibant capitibus opertis* ‘they departed from Troy with uncovered heads/with their heads uncovered’ (Naevius *carm.* fr. 4 (Baehrens)). Why is this not put into the same category as e.g. *capite nudo*? (If we use the syntactic criterion of the presence of an obligatory qualifier, both of these should be seen as absolute.)

Furthermore, at K-S II.I.410, the discussion of ablatives of attendant circumstance that include an attribute and thus do not have a *cum* (such as *quanto studio dignitatem tuam defenderim* ‘how zealously/with how much zeal I have defended your position’, Cic. *Fam.* 12.7.1) closes with a few examples that K-S introduce by saying that ‘absolute ablatives are *probably* to be assumed in the following’ [italics mine].²⁵ These include passages such as *quid*

²³ ‘[Die] eine Handlung begleitenden inneren oder äußeren Umstände’, K-S II.I.408–9.

²⁴ K-S II.I.410–11. Examples in this section are taken from these four pages.

²⁵ ‘Absolute Ablative sind *wohl* anzunehmen an Stellen wie . . .’ [italics mine].

hoc populo obtineri potest? ‘what can be secured from the Roman people such as it is as present/with the Roman people being such?’ (Cic. *Leg.* 3.37) or *ea sunt tolerabilia hac iuventute* ‘they are tolerable, young people being what they are nowadays’ (Cic. *Att.* 10.11.3). It is interesting to see that K-S do not commit to an interpretation (as either absolute or not) here. Semantically, it seems, all of these expressions denote the same idea: accompanying circumstances. Yet the difference between them lies in the varying degrees of importance of the qualifier (*quanto*, *hoc*, *hac*): in the case of *quanto studio*, *quanto* can easily be omitted without greatly changing the meaning of the sentence. In *hoc populo*, on the other hand, the situation is different: it is the point that only with a people *such as this*, the question *quid obtineri potest?* applies. This would not be the case with just any people. In *hac iuventute*, finally, the importance of the attribute lies somewhere in between the first two examples: *iuventus* on its own already has certain connotations that explain its role in this sentence. Thus, both ‘these things are easy to bear in/with youth, when one is young’ and ‘when youth is this/such’ make sense. Still, there seems to be a slightly greater difference between these two expressions than between *studio* and *quanto studio* in the first example.

So in a sense, the difference between these expressions is semantic after all, as it lies in the semantic importance of each qualifier. Yet these semantic differences have syntactic effects: given that *populo* cannot on its own denote a background circumstance (but *iuventus* can), its attribute has become necessary: *with a people being of this kind, with such a people*. The obligatory nature of the attribute is, in effect, a syntactic phenomenon. And so, once again, the only clear distinction that we can draw between these various expressions is *not* semantic in nature.

What should we make of all this? On a semantic basis, we cannot draw distinctions between ablatives of attendant circumstance, ablatives of quality and AAs. We have seen that we can make a syntactic distinction between the three: if we define all ablatives of attendant circumstance with obligatory qualifiers as absolute (which in itself is a categorisation made on syntactic, not semantic grounds), we could argue that AAs

have obligatory qualifiers, while ablatives of attendant circumstance do not; and while ablatives of quality also include qualifiers that appear obligatory, they are distinct from AAs in that they are adnominal while AAs are adverbial. Yet these distinctions are of a rather fine nature. This may indicate that it is more helpful for our understanding of these ablative usages to pay attention to their similarities, to the semantic continuum, rather than to the differences between them.

Nevertheless, the obligatory qualifier is present in all the constructions that one might want to define as ‘absolute’. Hence we should look at this phenomenon more closely.

3.4 Delineating the AA syntactically: obligatory and dominant nominal qualifiers across Latin

Now that we have looked at semantic features characteristic of the AA, let us look at that which defines it syntactically: the obligatory qualifier.²⁶ We shall see that, while this feature is indeed present across AAs, it (and something very similar) are also found elsewhere in Latin, specifically (a) in the *ab urbe condita* construction and (b) two gerundive usages. Looking at these in detail will help us understand what exactly it is that makes a qualifier ‘obligatory’.

3.4.a *The ab urbe condita construction (AUC)*

As we saw in Section 2.7, AUC is the name for a number of nominal expressions.²⁷ In these, the qualifier to the head is of greater importance to the meaning of the overall expression than the actual head. And so, a language which does not have a productive equivalent construction would translate these qualifiers as the heads of their expressions: *ab urbe condita*, for example, literally translates

²⁶ Cf. also Bauer 2000: 236–48 on the constructions discussed here.

²⁷ For further work on the AUC in Latin, compare Heick 1936, Bolkestein 1980 and also Pinkster 1990. In the grammars, Riemann and Ernout 1927 discuss the AUC at 523–5, K-S at II.1.766–70.

as ‘from the founded city’, but in idiomatic English would have to be translated as ‘from/since the foundation of the city’. Bolkestein (1980) and Pinkster (1990: 117) call the qualifiers to the head noun of an AUC ‘dominant’. I shall argue here that a continuum of several degrees of semantic importance may be observed in these qualifiers, and that this continuum will help us understand the syntactic peculiarity of ACs better.

In many ways, the AUC and the AA complement one another. The AA appears in only one form: prepositionless ablatives taking adverbial functions. The AUC, on the other hand, appears in various grammatical case functions and, when introduced by a preposition, takes adverbial roles. Compare the following examples:

Subject:

cum occisus dictator Caesar aliis pessimum, aliis pulcherrimum facinus videretur

‘because **the murder of the dictator Caesar** (lit.: killed dictator Caesar, dictator Caesar killed) seemed to some the worst, to others the most beautiful deed’ (Tac. *Ann.* 1.8)

angebant virum Sicilia Sardiniaque amissae

‘**the loss of Sicily and Sardinia** (lit.: Sicily and Sardinia lost) pained this man’ (Livy 21.1.5)

Genitive Attribute:

sibi bene gestae, mihi conservatae rei publicae dat testimonium

‘acknowledging **himself as a good servant** of the state but **me as its saviour** (lit.: of himself as having served it well, of me as having saved it)’ (Cic. *Att.* 2.1.6)

Direct object:

auctorem senatus exstinctum laete atque insolenter tulit

‘[he displayed his hatred...] by insolent delight at **the death of the adviser of the senate** (lit.: the killed adviser of the senate)’ (Cic. *Phil.* 9.7)

Prepositions:

ante solem exorientem

‘before the rising sun’, i.e. ‘before sunrise’ (Pl. *Bac.* 424)

ab urbe condita

‘from the foundation of the city’

queri de Milone per vim expulso

‘(that) he complained about the fact that Milo was violently exiled’ (Cic. Att. 9.14.2)

Usually, the AUC employs a past passive participle. The present active participle is rarer, but does occur (see for example *Bac.* 424 above).²⁸ Particularly in Tacitus we also find nouns and adjectives (instead of participles) used as qualifiers:

sed superbire miles quod filius legati orator publicae causae satis ostenderet necessitate expressa quae per modestiam non obtinuissent

‘the troops, however, were elated, as the sight of **their commander’s son pleading the common cause** (lit.: the commander’s son [as] the pleader of the common cause) showed plainly enough that force had extracted what would never have been yielded to orderly methods’ (Tac. *Ann.* 1.19)

augebat metum gnarus Romanae seditionis hostis

‘**the [fact that the] enemy were aware of Roman mutiny** added to their fear’ (Tac. *Ann.* 1.36)

We can see from these examples that the construction is fundamentally the same as the AUC in Greek. It usually is discussed in relation to Latin as it is much more frequent here. In its use after prepositions, the AUC is attested from Early Latin onwards; see for example *erili filio hanc fabricam dabo super auro amicaque eius inventa Bacchide* ‘I’ll present this trick **about the gold** to master’s son **and about his girlfriend Bacchis having been found**’ (Pl. *Bac.* 367).²⁹ There is at least one instance of an AUC in the nominative in Early Latin: [ea] *perdita perdidit me* ‘[its] loss has ruined me’ (Pl. *Cist.* 144). We also find AUCs attested in inscriptions; cf. *ab colonia deducta anno XC* ‘in the 15th year after the establishment of the colony’ (*CIL* 1².577.1). The constructions after *opus est* (e.g. *celeriter mihi homine conventost opus* ‘I must **meet with**

²⁸ K-S II.1.769.

²⁹ One may even argue that we have a double mismatch (or abbreviation) here: strictly speaking, *fabricam dare super amica inventa* is not ‘tell him about the discovery of his girlfriend’ but rather ‘tell him about the discovery of the existence of his girlfriend, i.e. the discovery of the fact that he has a girlfriend’.

this man presently', Pl. *Cur.* 302) and after *usus est* (e.g. *quam subito argento mi usus invento siet* 'how suddenly there is need for me for **a silver one to be found**', Pl. *Ps.* 50) are more or less limited to pre-Classical usage, but during that time are relatively frequent.³⁰

In Classical Latin, the AUC increases in frequency and variety.³¹ It is found after more prepositions (still mostly following those that express temporal notions, such as *alab*, *ante*, *ex*, *inter*, *post*, but also for example *praeter* and *propter*) and in all five cases (though dative and ablative are rare;³² yet cf. *quibus [legibus] latis gloriabatur* 'in the proposals of which he exalted' (Cic. *Phil.* 1.24) and the usages after *opus* and *usus est* above). It is in historiography (Livy and Tacitus) that the AUC is at its peak. Not only does its use become more frequent, but it is also found following a wider range of prepositions (in addition to those listed above, we find *ad*, *post*, *pro*, *secundum*, *sub* and *super*). This development seems understandable: in the rather condensed style of both of these authors, short nominal expressions are useful for the straightforward subordination of various kinds of information that would otherwise require a verbal clause.

As in Greek, the great semantic importance of the participle is a key feature of the Latin AUC. Yet in between regularly used participles and clearly obligatory ones, we find a number of expressions that cannot easily be assigned to either category. Take for example:

qui *ob eam [amicitiam] summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit*

'who gained renown **because of a friendship preserved through greatest loyalty, constancy, and sense of justice**' (Cic. *Amic.* 25)

It is difficult to find criteria by which to decide whether a participle (or here: a participial phrase, *summa fide constantia iustitiaque servatam*) is obligatory or not. When *summa fide . . . servatam* is omitted, the remaining sentence still makes sense. Yet one might argue that the point of the sentence – the fact that the friendship was

³⁰ Cf. also Draeger 1881: 779–81 on these usages.

³¹ K-S II.1.768. ³² K-S II.1.767.

preserved through supreme loyalty – has been lost. Thus, although the remaining statement (‘to acquire fame through friendship’) still makes sense, its meaning has been significantly altered.

The situation is similar in *ut . . . iniusti oneris impositi tua culpa sit, mea recepti* ‘so that . . . your fault is to have imposed an unjust burden, mine is to have accepted it’ (Cic. *Orat.* 1.35). If we omitted *impositi* and *recepti*, the point that this sentence is making has disappeared, yet we would still be left with a sensible sentiment (two people affected by an unjust burden).

One might want to attempt defining a point beyond which the omission of the qualifier (be it a participle or a different nominal form) alters the meaning of a phrase too grossly for this phrase to still be considered the same as the original in its basic meaning. Beyond that point, one might then find the obligatory qualifier, i.e. the characteristic feature of the construction this inquiry focuses on, the AA. Yet the definition of any such point will seem rather arbitrary. Whether or not a participle is perceived as ‘necessary’ sometimes depends on factors of Latin idiom, but usually on minute semantic factors and the reader’s (or listener’s) personal intuitions which, at least in the case of modern scholars and other non-natives, are shaped by their individual language background, which of the texts that happen to have survived to us they have read, etc.

Yet, to my mind, it is not necessary to define any such point beyond which a sentence is too mangled or its meaning changed too much. Instead, I argue, the cut-off point we are looking for is quite straightforward. It lies between the qualifiers whose omission changes the sentence they stand in (to a lesser or greater degree) and those qualifiers whose omission makes the nominal phrase they stand in nonsensical in itself. Looking across examples of AUCs and comparing them to ACs, we shall see that the latter is the case only where an expression has a temporal dimension, but its head noun does not. This temporal dimension may be included in a straightforward expression of time such as *luna silenti* or *ante solem exorientem*: while both ‘sun’ and ‘moon’ are objects that are typically used to measure time and its natural units (days, months etc.), they in themselves remain objects, and thus do not have a

temporal dimension to their meaning: it does not make sense to say *‘during the moon’ or *‘during the sun’. The same applies to expressions denoting attendant circumstance (*me praesente* etc.): here again, the expression as a whole has a temporal component to its meaning even though the syntactic head of the expression (*me*) does not (and thus *‘during me’ does not make sense). This is especially interesting as it clearly reveals the basic nature of this type of AA as a temporal expression, even though its exact semantic nuances often are different from those of expressions of natural time.

In non-temporal AUCs, on the other hand, the omission of the qualifier to the head may make the clause they stand in as a whole odd or even nonsensical, as the meaning/content of the newly shortened nominal phrase has ceased to fit the content of its matrix clause. In clauses such as *cum occisus dictator Caesar aliis pessimum, aliis pulcherrimum facinus videretur* ‘because **the murder of the dictator Caesar** (or: the fact that the dictator Caesar had been killed) seemed to some the worst, to others the most beautiful deed’ (Tac. *Ann.* 1.8), the omission of *occisus* would lead to the statement that a person (Caesar) was thought of as an action (*facinus*). This collocation does not make sense. Yet considered on its own, the use of the phrase *dictator Caesar* as a subject is fully acceptable and grammatical.

Given the essential nature of the nominal qualifier in temporal expressions, I suggest we employ the term ‘obligatory’ for those, and use the term ‘dominant’, suggested by Bolkestein (1980) and Pinkster (1990: 117), for the kind of qualifier whose omission may make its matrix clause odd or nonsensical, but not the actual nominal phrase that it stands in. In Section 5.3, we shall see that the difference between temporal expressions (whether ACs or AUCs) and other constructions containing a semantically dominant qualifier is identical across IE languages.

3.4.b *The gerundive*

In two of its usages, the gerundive appears together with a dominant qualifier. Although, to my mind, there are no instances of obligatory qualifiers here, these usages will be discussed to

elucidate some of the various ways in which dominance may arise, and to provide some further contrast with the obligatory qualifiers of ACs.

In certain cases, a dominant gerundive may be used instead of a gerund.³³ In its predicative use, the gerundive can be employed personally and impersonally:³⁴ an example of the personal use may be seen in *consolandus hic mihist* ‘I have to console him (lit.: to me he is (one) to be consoled)’ (Pl. *Bac.* 625). Impersonal examples include *mi advenienti hac noctu agitandumst vigilias* ‘When I arrived that night, I had to keep watch (lit.: to/by me arriving, it was necessary to keep watch)’ (Pl. *Trin.* 869). The impersonal construction is mostly limited to Early Latin, while the personal construction is found from Early Latin and then in the majority of cases in the Classical language.³⁵

When used in the oblique cases, a personal use of the gerundive may appear, under certain circumstances,³⁶ in place of a gerund that has another noun dependent on it. For example, instead of an expression such as *nunc tibi potestas adipiscendist gloriam* ‘now you have the **power of acquiring glory**’ (Pl. *St.* 281) we may get a personal expression such as *ei colendae virgines praesint* ‘virgins should have charge **of serving her** [i.e. Vesta] (lit.: of her who has to be served)’ (Cic. *Leg.* 2.29). That the two constructions were perceived as semantically equivalent at least in Classical Latin is demonstrated by the following passage from Caesar where they appear in parallel: [*Germanis*] *neque consilii habendi neque arma*

³³ Let me point out explicitly that I am not concerned with the question of the historical precedence of either gerundive or gerund. As Whatmough (1952) points out, ‘It is repugnant to contemplate uncounted hours and tireless industry devoted to yet another attempt to find a conclusive answer to a defeating if not insoluble problem.’ (Many thanks to James Clackson for pointing me to this marvellous review.) When I mention for instance that in Early Latin one particular gerund construction is more frequent than one particular gerundive construction, I am not making any statement about gerundives and gerunds in general. By the time Latin is attested, both forms are in use. If I talk of the development of one gerundival usage, I am not talking about the development of the gerundive as a whole. If one is more frequent at an early stage, that does not automatically say anything about the anteriority of its genesis.

³⁴ The examples used here are taken from K-S II.1.727–36, Rubenbauer and Hofmann 1995: 202–7 and *LGr* II.593–600.

³⁵ K-S II.1.734.

³⁶ Again, the impersonal use is more frequent in earlier texts; cf. Rubenbauer and Hofmann 1995: 204 on stylistic considerations affecting the choice between the two.

capiendi spatium datum [est] ‘no time was given [to the Germans] to think, or to take up arms’ (Caes. *Gal.* 4.14.2). It is in this oblique use of the personal construction that a dominant gerundive is found. Compare *ei colendae* or *consilii habendi* above, or also examples such as

virtus constat ex hominibus tuendis

‘virtue . . . centres in **protecting people** (lit.: *people which are to be protected)’ (Cic. *Off.* 1.157)

cui nimis videtur senatus conservanda patria fuisse crudelis

‘to . . . the man . . . who thinks the senate to have been too cruel **in the preservation of the fatherland** (lit.: *in their fatherland which had to be saved)’ (Cic. *Pis.* 17)

Ciceronian virtue does not consist of people, which are here said to have to be protected; it consists of the act of protecting, namely protecting one’s fellow people. The collocation of just *virtus, constare* and *homines* does not make sense; the presence of *tueri* is necessary for the intended meaning. (Yet note that *virtus constat ex hominibus* ‘virtue consists of people’ is a syntactically well-formed sentence.) And while it is not nonsensical to say ‘he was cruel in his country’, this clearly is not the intended meaning of Cic. *Pis.* 17.

The examples above are among the more clear-cut instances of dominant qualifiers. Now compare the following:

multa sunt dicta ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis

‘many things have been said by the ancients **concerning the disdain and despising of human affairs**’³⁷ (Cic. *Fin.* 5.73)

ad bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus

‘the temper of the Gaul is eager and ready **to undertake a campaign**’ (Caes. *Gal.* 3.19.6)

Are the qualifiers in either of these sentences dominant? The answer to this question depends entirely on what we think would change the sense of a given expression too much, and on what

³⁷ Meaning to say that material goods are to be looked down on, and that only things such as knowledge were to be valued. I did not use the Loeb translation in this case as it was rather far removed from the Latin text.

‘makes sense’, i.e. on which lexical or expressional collocations we wish to allow. It is possible to state that the ancients have said many things about human affairs – affairs they see as contemptible. This is because the verb *dicere* can be freely collocated with anything that may be said or spoken about. Similarly, the Gaulish mind might be seen as *promptus ad bella*, ‘keen on wars’, and here specifically ‘keen on wars which are necessary to be undertaken’. Yet in spite of this, one might argue, talking about one’s ‘contempt of human affairs’ and ‘keen on undertaking wars’ is something rather different. In that case, the qualifiers would need to be seen as dominant.

To call a qualifier ‘dominant’ means acknowledging that its omission will either fundamentally alter or even make nonsensical what is left of its matrix clause. It seems fair to say that the gerundival qualifier in Cicero’s *virtus... constat ex hominibus tuendis* is dominant. Yet we should note that the gerundives in many other examples of the construction given in this chapter³⁸ can only truly be considered ‘dominant’ from the point of view of a language that does not productively employ a formally equivalent construction. In English, for example, one would not say that there were ‘virgins in charge of her [who was] to be served’ (*ei colendae*, Cic. *Leg.* 2.29), but that they were ‘in charge of serving her’; nor that the Gaulish mind would be ‘quick at wars which were to be undertaken’ (*ad bella suscipienda*, Caes. *Gal.* 3.19.6), but that it was quick at initiating wars. Yet ‘virgins in charge of her’ would make sense and be grammatical in Latin, as would a ‘mind that is ready for wars’. In this case, it is the translation as it is rephrased to fit English idiom that evokes the impression of a particularly ‘dominant’ gerundive in the Latin.

This is not meant to say that ‘dominant’ qualifiers are a figment of the English-speaking imagination. Nevertheless, one should ask in every individual case why a certain qualifier might be considered ‘dominant’. Sometimes this may simply be due to the fact that English would express the given concept in a different way, sometimes it may be due to the fact that the omission of the qualifier

³⁸ Which I chose as containing the ‘most dominant’ of qualifiers among lists of examples in Latin grammars, especially K-S II.1.727–36.

makes a sentence nonsensical in any language. What we should note here is the steady continuum that extends basically from regular to properly ‘dominant’ qualifiers.

More ways for dominance to arise can be found in some gerundives used after direct objects to express purpose. A textbook example such as *tibi librum legendum do* demonstrates the link between the semantics of necessity, as expressed by a gerundive, and that of purpose: ‘I give you a book which is to be read’ is in effect the same as ‘I give you a book to read/so that you read it.’ Throughout the history of Latin, these constructions are found following a number of transitive verbs.³⁹ In some, the gerundive may be considered dominant. Compare the following:

diviti homini id aurum servandum dedit

‘he gave **the gold** to a rich man **to guard**’

(Pl. *Bac.* 338)

hunc Fabricius reducendum curavit ad Pyrrhum

‘Fabricius saw to it **that this fellow was taken back** to Pyrrhus’

(Cic. *Off.* 3.86)

[qui] *Epaminondam pecunia corruppendum susceperat*

‘[who] had undertaken to **bribe Epaminondas**’

(Nep. *Alcib.* 15.4)

In these cases, the degree of dominance of a given qualifier is dependent less on semantic factors (such as whether one can meaningfully equate ‘virtue’ and ‘people’, see Cic. *Off.* 1.157, p. 104 above) than on syntactic ones: the syntactic properties of each of the verbs found in this construction determine or at least indicate how any given construction should be understood.

dare, the main verb in the first example, governs nominal direct objects rather than complement clauses.⁴⁰ This means that the natural way of understanding this sentence is to read *aurum* as the direct object, and the gerundive as a regular qualifier to it. At *Off.* 3.86 on the other hand, the syntax of *curare* lends itself to a different analysis of the gerundive construction: *curare* in the meaning of ‘see to it that’ can stand with an accusative plus gerundive or perfect participle, and alternatively with an *ut* or

³⁹ K-S II.1.731.

⁴⁰ See *OLD* s.v. for a list of the various usages of *dare*.

ne clause, or an infinitive.⁴¹ Given that the alternatives to the gerundive construction thus all include a verbal predicate (whether in the form of a finite verb or an infinitive), one might ask whether the gerundive, a verbal adjective, would also be perceived more as a predicate than as a mere attribute. If it were perceived as a kind of predicate, its presence would be required not just semantically but also syntactically. In that case, one should argue that the gerundive is obligatory rather than just dominant: the syntactic parallels to the gerundive construction after *curare* are all verbal clauses, and the gerundive is thus parallel to the verbal heads of those other clauses. Verbal clauses are all expressions of time, in the sense that their head, the verb, is marked for tense, the grammatical manifestation of time. A verbal clause without its verbal predicate would thus be a temporal expression without anything to give its semantics a temporal dimension; this is parallel to an AC without the (participial) qualifier. Differently put, *perfugam* may function as a verbal expression of time (i.e. a clause) just as little as e.g. *sole* on its own could function as a nominal expression of time.

The above interpretation seems preferable to reading *Off.* 3.86 as involving *curare* with an accusative object, a usage in which the verb denotes ‘to look after (someone), take care (of them)’. *curare* usually has positive connotations,⁴² and a supposed meaning of ‘he looked after the fugitive, who was to be returned’ seems odd: the subject of the sentence would be more concerned for the well-being of others than for that of the fugitive. Thus, the syntactic properties and semantic connotations of *curare* together effect a reading of this sentence in which the gerundive *perducendam* in the Latin plays a role as (semantically and syntactically) important as that of the predicate in the English ‘he made sure *that the fugitive was returned*’.

The verb at Nep. 15.4, *suscipere*, may take both nominal and sentential complements, and both would work equally well here. It is thus difficult to see whether the gerundive would have been perceived attributively (in a way similar to ‘Diomedon took on himself Epaminondas who was to be bribed with money’), or rather predicatively (a weighting which would in English best be

⁴¹ See OLD s.v. *curo*.

⁴² See OLD s.v. *curo* 1–3.

rendered as ‘D. took the bribing of E. on himself, took it on himself that E. be bribed’). In such ambiguous cases there is nothing to firmly support either analysis. Our own intuitions, and detailed study of parallel passages in Nepos, must lead us to decide how ‘natural’ either interpretation is. The use of the gerundive as a verbal complement thus shows us another way in which an apparent adnominal attribute may gain high semantic, and perhaps even syntactic, importance. It demonstrates what sorts of factors need to be considered when we ask whether a specific qualifier is ‘dominant’ or ‘obligatory’.

3.4.c Summary

In the AUC and in some usages of the Latin gerundive, we find nominal qualifiers that are very similar to the qualifiers of the head in ACs. Among AUCs, we find qualifiers used in the same way as in ACs; in some gerundive uses, we may even find another source of obligatory qualifiers. Several factors make these usages interesting to us. By comparing the various borderline cases, we can determine what kinds of factors can make a particular qualifier dominant. We can also identify the difference between dominant and obligatory qualifiers. Finally, we are reminded how difficult it may be not to impose criteria and categories onto Latin that only make sense within languages that do not productively employ dominant (or obligatory) qualifiers.

3.5 ‘Nominal’ ACs in Latin

While the qualifier to the (pro)nominal head of ACs in Greek and, as we shall see in the next chapter, Sanskrit, always is a participle, Latin may use (a) an adjective or (b) another substantive instead.

(a) *vosne ego patiar cum mendicis nuptas **me vivo** viris?*

‘I should let you girls be married to beggars **in my lifetime/while I am alive?**’
(Pl. *St.* 132)

*equidem has **te invito** iam ambas rapiam.*

‘I am going to drag them both off right now **against your will.**’
(Pl. *Rud.* 796)

(b) *C. Licinio praetore remiges scribti cives Romani[s] sub portisculum, sub flagrum conscribti venire passim.*

‘When C. Licinius was praetor, conscript Roman citizens continuously came under the rowing-hammer and the whip.’

(Cato frg. 145 (Cugusi))

These constructions are commonly referred to as ‘nominal’ ACs, and are interesting to look at for several reasons. They are not productively used in either Greek or Sanskrit, and thus it needs to be asked whether they were lost in these two languages or whether they represent an innovation in Latin. A closer look at them will reveal that they are likely to be an old phenomenon, and the information they give us weakens hypotheses explaining the rise of ACs through ‘the verbal force of the participle’.⁴³ Independently from the insights relevant for comparative reconstruction that nominal ACs may provide us with, they also offer yet another backdrop against which ‘regular’ Latin (and other) ACs may be viewed, and through which they may be better understood.

As mentioned above, nominal ACs appear in two varieties: adjectival and substantival. As closer scrutiny will reveal, there are several differences between these two categories, which require that each be looked at on its own.

3.5.a Adjectival AAs

In order to understand the difference between ‘regular’ and adjectival AAs, we first need to look at the difference between participles and adjectives. Very generally speaking, both denote qualities or attributes of things rather than things themselves.⁴⁴ Yet participles are a subclass of adjectives that is distinguished by two related features: they are derived from a verbal basis (root or stem), and as a consequence, they denote qualities in reference to time. A good example of a fully developed participle system can be found in

⁴³ See e.g. Müller-Lancé 1994: 368: ‘The genesis [of the AC] is certainly linked to the existence of conjunct participles, which developed more and more of a verbal force, until they could finally take their own subjects that were independent from the matrix clause’ (‘Die Entstehung [der Absolutkonstruktion] hängt sicherlich mit der Existenz von Participia Coniuncta zusammen, die mehr und mehr verbale Kraft entwickelten, bis sie schließlich eigene, von der ÜP unabhängige Subjekte an sich binden konnten’).

⁴⁴ See e.g. Dixon 1977 or 1999 on adjectives in general.

Ancient Greek. Here, there is a participle belonging to every tense stem and voice of the finite verbal system. The meaning of these participles is predictable from their form, and they usually have the same syntactic properties as their finite counterparts (active participles governing direct objects in the accusative, passive participles using the same agent expressions).⁴⁵ In short: Greek participles are regular and paradigmatic. I assume that the 'verbal force' of participles sometimes referred to is what we see exactly in these Greek participles: they may be nominal in their morphology, but like verbs in their semantics and syntax.

In Latin, the situation is different. Only half of the possible 'slots' for participles are filled: there are no present passive or past active participles, and while the gerundive may come close to what one would expect of the semantics of a future passive participle, a regular participle of this kind is also lacking. Also, as we shall see below, the participles that do exist are often not predictable in their meaning, and sometimes also their form. They are nevertheless referred to as participles (rather than, for example, 'verbal adjectives') as all of them have been incorporated into the Latin verbal system, and thus have usages that are regularly participial.

to-formations such as *amatus* can be used as regular perfect passive participles: together with forms of *esse*, they form the paradigmatic passive counterparts of perfect active forms. When used on their own, whether attributively or circumstantially, they can denote 'having been loved' etc. Yet most of these forms can also be employed in a purely adjectival manner: rather than meaning 'having been loved', *amatus* can simply mean 'loved, beloved, dear'.⁴⁶ Like regular adjectives, they thus denote qualities (such as *red*, *tall* etc.) without any reference to time (in this particular case: past time or anteriority). This is also why they receive their own entries in dictionaries: while a regular, paradigmatic participle should not receive its own dictionary entry any more than, say, a perfect active form should, the entries for *affatus*, *affectatus*,

⁴⁵ See n. 8, ch. 2.

⁴⁶ See e.g. *et voltus velamine celat amatos* 'she hides the loved features beneath a veil' (Ov. *Fasti* 6.579).

affectus, *afflictus* etc. throughout the *OLD* refer to the use of these forms as adjectives.

It may not be particularly surprising that *to*-forms function in this way. In Greek, **-to-* never develops into a regular participle suffix,⁴⁷ and even in Sanskrit, where it is extremely frequent, its meaning or function as a participle formant is never completely regularised: used with transitive verbs, it forms a past passive participle, such as *śrutá-* ‘having been listened to, heard’ (cf. its cognate κλυτός), but with intransitive verbs, it effects past active meaning; cf. e.g. *gatá-* ‘having gone’.⁴⁸ Also, in the languages where it occurs, *to-* is not added to a tense stem, but to the verbal root.

To a lesser extent, the Latin present active participle can also seem to have a parallel life as a more or less regular adjective. This participle is formed using the *-nt-* suffix which was employed as the regular formant for the present active participle already in PIE.⁴⁹ Once again, Latin forms such as *metuens* or *neglegens* may be used as regular present active participles, referring to a present or simultaneous action (in this case, ‘fearing’ or ‘neglecting’ something), and from Early Latin on, these participles have been able to govern direct objects.⁵⁰ Yet in Early Latin, only a few verbs form present participles;⁵¹ of these, the majority are intransitive. As Marouzeau (1910: 13–15) outlines, there are no present participles governing accusative objects in Cato; they are rare in Plautus, and only slightly more frequent in Terence. Furthermore, throughout the history of Latin, *nt*-forms can equally be used with adjectival meaning; cf. e.g. *metuens* ‘afraid’ as a general quality rather than something only currently applicable, *neglegens* ‘careless, neglectful’, *sapiens* ‘wise’, *vigilans* ‘vigilant, watchful’, and so on. These adjective-like forms do not govern direct objects, as we would expect of a verb form, but take genitive complements,

⁴⁷ Cf. Smyth 1956: 156–7, K-G 1.2.288–9. ⁴⁸ See *AiGr* II.2.579–81.

⁴⁹ It is used in this exact function in almost all branches of the Indo-European language family (only in Anatolian does this suffix create a passive participle; see Szemerényi 1996: 317–19 and n. 386 on the secondary nature of this) and is reconstructed in this way for PIE.

⁵⁰ *senatusque sententiam uti scientes essetis* ‘and that you may know (lit. ‘be knowing’) the decision of the senate’ (*SC de Bacchanalibus* l. 23).

⁵¹ Bennett 1910: 435.

which is more typical of nominal forms (cf. *a reader of books* as opposed to someone who is *reading books*).⁵²

Participles, as their name indicates, partake in both nominal and verbal qualities. Yet while Greek participles, for example, are strongly verbal in their semantics and syntax and nominal only in their form, almost the opposite holds for some usages of Latin participles: they are verbal in that they are derived from verbal bases, yet in their semantics and syntax, they often behave like adjectives. Their adjectival nature may further be recognised by the way in which they are negated. Greek negates participles as it does finite verb forms (with οὐ or μή). Latin, on the other hand, frequently negates participles with privative *in-*: thus we find *impatiens*, *impudens*, *indocens*, *innocens*, *insolens*, *infectus*, *inasuetus* etc.⁵³ Not only is this the standard way of negating adjectives, thus emphasising the closeness between the two categories, but it also brings about a situation in which there are participial forms that do not have a verbal basis: there is, for example, no verb *inficere* with the meaning ‘to not do’ to go with *infectus* ‘not made, not done’. Similarly, we find compound forms such as *breviloquens* ‘concise’ without a basis **breviloqui*, or forms that are intensified in the same way adjectives are, cf. *peramans* ‘very fond of’.⁵⁴ Latin forms comparatives and superlatives of its participles, cf. *florētissimus* ‘most prospering’⁵⁵ or *amantior* ‘more loving, enamoured of’.⁵⁶ And finally, two of the present participles

⁵² ‘Die Partizipien auf *-ans* und *-ens* von sonst einen anderen Kasus regierenden Verben, wenn sie nicht als Partizipien eine vorübergehende Handlung, sondern als Adjektive eine dauernde Eigenschaft ausdrücken, [regieren den Genetiv]’; see K-G II.1.450–1, with detailed list.

⁵³ Note that there are some small changes in this area within the history of Latin: a search of the corpus of thelatinlibrary.com show that while, for example, Early Latin but also Cicero favour the form *insciens*, from Classical Latin on the form *nesciens*, in line with the verbal paradigm of *nescio*, becomes standard and *insciens* falls out of use.

⁵⁴ There is a verb *peramare*, yet as that appears later than *peramans* (which is used by Cicero, while finite forms are not attested until Statius), it seems likely that the finite forms were created on the basis of the ‘participle’.

⁵⁵ Cf. *cum te expectebant omnes florētissimo | regno, reliqui*: ‘When all were expecting you, when your reign was in full bloom, I left you behind’ (Trag. inc. 186) as quoted by Keydana 1997: 257.

⁵⁶ *non illo melior quisquam nec amantior aequi | vir fuit aut illa metuentior ulla deorum*. ‘There was no better man than he, none more scrupulous of right, nor than she was any woman more reverent of the gods’ (Ov. *Met.* 1.322–3).

most frequently used in Early Latin AAs, *praesens* and *absens*, are not formed as they regularly should be (cf. the participle of the simplex *esse*, *sons* (which has changed in its meaning from ‘being’ to ‘guilty’) and its agreement in vocalism with Greek ὄν, ὄντος).

All of this, the various ways in which adjectives and participles in Latin overlap, has two consequences. First of all, there are numerous Early Latin AAs in which the distinction between ‘regular’ and ‘nominal’ seems rather meaningless. To give just a few examples: the expression *luna silenti* ‘at new moon, when there is no moon’ is found in Cato three times (*Agr.* 29, 40.1, 50.1).⁵⁷ It reappears with the same meaning, but in the shape of *luna silente* at Columella 2.10.12. Cato uses the ‘adjectival’ form of the third-declension ablative singular, Columella the ‘participial’ one. Thus, strictly speaking, *luna silenti* is a nominal AA, *luna silente* regular.⁵⁸ Yet the difference between these is minuscule, and the state described by both obviously identical.

Next, forms such as *infectus* that are negated like adjectives do thus not have a verbal paradigm that they belong to. If we thus consider them as closer to adjectives than proper participles, we would count AAs such as *infecta pace* ‘peace not having been made’ (*Ter. Eu.* 53) as nominal, but e.g. *facto opere* ‘with the deed having been done’ (*Pl. Epid.* 695) as regular. Once more, the difference between the two is small; and indeed, while K-S II.1.779 count *insciente domino* ‘with the master not knowing, without the master’s knowledge’ (*Cato Agr.* 5.4) as nominal, Bennett (1914: 370) counts the passage among his regular AAs.

Similarly, if we expect participles to be regular parts of a verbal paradigm, we run into difficulties with the form *praesens*. Its opposite *absens* ‘absent’ belongs to the verb *abesse* ‘to be absent’. Yet *praesens* ‘present’ belongs to a verb, *praeesse*, whose principal meaning is ‘to be in front of, in charge of’ (the meaning ‘to be present’ does appear, but only marginally).⁵⁹ Thus, strictly speaking, *praesens* is not a regular participle of *praeesse*. This in

⁵⁷ The critical edition (Mazzarino 1982) does not list any manuscript variants.

⁵⁸ Cf. Rubenbauer and Hofmann 1995: 44. ⁵⁹ See OLD s.v. *praesum*.

turn means that *me* (etc.) *praesente*, a very frequent AA in early comedy, should be seen as nominal, while its apparent parallel *me* (etc.) *absente* is to be seen as a regular AA.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the manuscripts sometimes read *me absenti* rather than *me absente* (as e.g. at Ter. *Ph.* 372 or Pl. *Am.* 826): one and the same situation is described by two different expressions, one of which should properly be labelled ‘nominal’, the other ‘regular’. The same applies to the variation between *libente/lubente* and *libenti/lubenti* (the latter can be found at Cic. *Att.* 1.14.3: *quae (res nostrae) tam libenti senatu laudarentur* ‘that my achievements are of sufficient consequence to make the senate so willing to hear them praised’).⁶¹

Finally, not only are many of the participles used in AAs rather adjectival, some of the adjectives used are also rather close to participles. *vivus* ‘alive’ is used four times in Plautus and Terence,⁶² while its participial equivalent *vivens* is not found until Ovid (e.g. *me vivente* at *Met.* 12.228). *invitus* ‘unwilling’ (used thirteen times in AAs in Plautus and Terence⁶³) in effect signifies the same as *nolens*; and indeed, we find *me* (etc.) *nolente* from Seneca the Elder on (*omnes enim dixerunt patre nolente illam perisse* ‘for all said that she died **against her father’s wishes**’, Sen. *Con.* 10.3.12). *salvus*, which occurs repeatedly in Early Latin AAs, is also closely linked to a verb, *salveo*.⁶⁴

It is true that there are a number of clearly adjectival and clearly participial AAs (cf. e.g. *dis inimicis omnibus* ‘with all gods opposed’ (Pl. *Mos.* 563) or *hostibus victis* ‘with the enemy defeated’ (Pl. *Per.* 753–6) respectively). Yet the close similarities between the various cases discussed above suggest that a classification of ‘regular’ vs. ‘nominal’ is often difficult and, more importantly, not very meaningful. This situation, to my mind,

⁶⁰ Probably following a similar line of thought, Bennett 1914: 370 counts *me lubente* ‘with me willing’ at Pl. *Am.* 848 as nominal. As he does not comment on his lists, it can only be assumed he did not deem this a regular participle because the paradigm of *libet* is greatly defective.

⁶¹ Cicero’s achievements had been praised by Crassus, not the senate; this thus is not a prepositionless ablative of agent.

⁶² Pl. *Bac.* 419, *Cas.* 423, *St.* 132; Ter. *Hau.* 103.

⁶³ Pl. *Aul.* 744, 756, 757, *Capt.* 739, *Poen.* 1207, *Rud.* 712, 783, 796; Ter. *Ad.* 158, 198, *An.* 603, 891, *Hau.* 795.

⁶⁴ E.g. *civibus salvis* ‘with the citizens safe’ (Pl. *Per.* 753).

explains how adjectival ACs became possible in Latin: when there is such a significant overlap between the two categories (adjective and participle), it would almost seem odd for one of them to be entirely excluded from use in an AC. Once ‘borderline’ forms from either category were included in the construction, this could then be extended to other, clearly adjectival forms.

3.5.b Comparative matters

Regular adjectival ACs are attested only in Latin, not in Greek or Sanskrit. Especially in Greek, there is a noticeable syntactic gap between adjectives and participles. Yet there are indications that this is the result of inner-Greek developments. In Greek, participles are regularly negated by means of οὐ/οὐκ/οὐχ, i.e. in the same way as finite verb forms.⁶⁵ Nominal negation is by means of privative alpha: it is combined either with nouns to give us *bahuvrīhi* compounds such as ἄδικος ‘unjust’, based on δίκη ‘justice’, or combined with verbal adjectives in -το (ἄοριστος ‘unbounded, without boundary’, from ὀρίζω ‘divide, separate from’), the formation which in other languages developed into past participles (such as Latin *factus* ‘made’, Sanskrit *hitá-* ‘put, placed’), but never became properly involved in the verbal paradigm in Greek. Yet when we look at forms such as ἄέκων ‘unwilling’, we can see this wasn’t always so. ἄέκων is the negated equivalent of ἐκών ‘willing’, which in turn is the present active participle of a root commonly reconstructed as PIE **vek-*⁶⁶ and otherwise lost in Greek. Even though it is a participle, it is negated with privative alpha (< PIE **h-*). It seems that ἄέκων represents an earlier stage in the negation of participles. Maybe this instance of the more ‘nominal’ negation survived this long because it was not associated with a productive verbal paradigm. (ἄέκων remains in use later on (contracted to ἄκων in Attic), but post-Homerically, there are numerous instances of a regular ‘verbal’ negation as οὐχ ἐκών.⁶⁷)

⁶⁵ K-G II.2.198–203.

⁶⁶ Present in e.g. the Sanskrit verbal root $\sqrt{\text{vas}}$ ‘to wish, want’; see Frisk (1960–72) s.v. ἐκών and LIV s.v. **vek-*.

⁶⁷ A textual search of the TLG shows that the earliest of these is ὅσπερ οὐχ ἐκὼν ἐπλεῖ ‘Only Odysseus, the one who sailed against his will, proved himself . . .’, A. A. 841.

Given the combination of the adjectival participles of Latin and the traces of at least a similar situation in Greek, we may speculate whether something close to the Latin situation would also have been found in PIE and perhaps also in the early stages of other IE languages such as Greek. We cannot say whether adjectival ACs existed in PIE; yet we can say that the nature of the PIE participle system made this at least possible; and if adjectival ACs did exist in PIE, they would subsequently have been lost in Greek and Sanskrit when the participle systems of these two languages changed and became more strongly verbal.⁶⁸

The adjectival nature of participles in Latin and, possibly, early IE in general, also sheds light on a different matter: if early participles were adjectival, and if it is correct that we can reconstruct some origins of ACs to PIE, then it seems clear that no ‘verbal force’ was necessary for ACs to become absolute.⁶⁹ Rather, the syntactic oddity of the AC, the obligatory qualifier, would have been brought about by the use of head + qualifier constructions in semantic roles in which the head on its own could not have stood. The presence of the qualifier thus becomes necessary, and it achieves predicate-like status.⁷⁰ This takes us exactly to the kind of AC we find in Early Latin. In the earliest Greek and Sanskrit sources, participles have already acquired much more ‘verbal’ properties. Especially in Greek, this has a fundamental effect on the nature and content of ACs, which thus may convey the same kind and amount of content as a finite subordinate clause.

⁶⁸ Yet ἄεκων, a form that is not a regular (or at least paradigmatic) participle, is interesting in that, at least on a synchronic level, it provides us with a nominal AC outside of Latin, ἄεκοντος ἐμεῖο/ἐμεῦ ἄεκοντος ‘with me unwilling, against my will’ (*Il.* 1.301 and 19.273, respectively). As early as Homer, we find a verbal equivalent to this expression (ἐμεῖο μὲν οὐκ ἔθελούσης ‘although I do not want [that]’, *Il.* 14.289). Yet in the Attic orators and later Plutarch, expressions involving the verb βούλομαι and ἐθέλω ‘to want, wish’ become regular. (This view is based on a search of the *TLG* for the terms ἄεκοντος, ἄκοντος, βουλομένου and ἐθέλοντος.)

⁶⁹ Cf. Section 1.2.c.ii; see also Delbrück 1888: 386.

⁷⁰ An expression of time must refer to time somehow. A verbal clause does this by including (or, under certain conditions, implying) a verb/verbal predicate at its head, without which it cannot function. Regular nominal expressions of time work by having a noun with temporal semantics at their head. The head nouns of ACs do not have such semantics, and thus require the presence of a verbal form – the participial qualifier – to put the head noun into time, in the same way a verbal predicate does.

Nevertheless, this was a secondary development within the history of ACs, not one that led to their genesis.

3.5.c Substantival AAs

The situation is different with substantival AAs. From Early Latin on, there are three groups of nouns involved. Plautus and Terence employ various agent nouns⁷¹ in this construction (*impulsor* ‘instigator’, *interpres* ‘mediator’, *adiutrix* ‘helper’, *emptor* ‘buyer’ etc.; according to the collection in Bennett (1914: 371–2), there are eleven instances in total). In Plautus, there is an expression referring to age (*me puero* ‘when I was a boy’, frg. 24), and in inscriptions and in Cato, we find designations of office (*COS* → *consulibus* ‘when x and y were consuls’; see *C. Licinio praetore* above for an example from Cato). Overall, these are rarer than the adjectival type. In Classical Latin, the construction remains restricted to the same kinds of nouns, with the small limitation that instead of *aliquo rege*, *aliquo regnante* now is the standard expression (as e.g. at Cic. *Brut.* 39).⁷²

The expressions involving someone’s age or a designation of office are unambiguously absolute:

quei ager poplicus populi Romanei in terram Italiam P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos. fuit

‘which public field of the Roman people was on Italian soil **when P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius were consuls**’ (*Lex Agraria*, CIL I².585)

nam me puero venter erat solarium.

‘For **when I was a boy**, my stomach was a sundial.’

(Pl. frg. 24, quoted at Gel. 3.3.5)

Both *P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos.* and *me puero* refer to periods of time even though their head nouns cannot. There is no way of constructing these ablative expressions in any other way, and they must be seen as absolute.

The classification of the agent noun type, on the other hand, is less straightforward. Compare the following example:

⁷¹ In the wider sense of this word, including items such as *testis* ‘witness’ and the like.

⁷² Cf. Menge 2000: 720–1.

me suasore atque impulsore id factum audacter dicito

‘Boldly state that this was done **with me as advisor and instigator**.’

(Pl. Mos. 916)

Here, the speaker (Tranio, the scheming slave in this play) had been involved in the action (the supposed buying of a house for a very good price).⁷³ Thus, *me suasore atque impulsore* could be interpreted both as a comitative and as an instrumental ablative, meaning *together with* or *through me as advisor and instigator*. In either of these cases, the expression in question refers to a person (*me*), not a circumstance. The qualifier *praesente* is thus not obligatory, and the expression not absolute.

Theoretically, we should expect either of these constructions (use of the ablative to refer to a person either in comitative or instrumental function) to be introduced by a preposition: regularly, an expression denoting anyone *together with whom* something occurs is introduced by *cum* ‘with’.⁷⁴ The standard way of depicting a person not as an agent, as someone *by whom* something is done,⁷⁵ but rather as someone *through whom* something happens, is the use of *per* + accusative.⁷⁶ Yet there are exceptions to either of these usages: in military expressions involving *copiis*, *milite*, *manu* etc. as people *with whom* an action occurs, *cum* can be used, or omitted to effect portrayal of these as instruments;⁷⁷ cf. *postquam utrimque exitum est maxuma copia* ‘after both sides had come out in full force’ (Pl. Am. 217)⁷⁸ for an example from Early Latin. On the other hand, constructions such as *armatis hominibus expulsi sunt* ‘they were expelled by means of/through armed men’ (Cic. Att. 4.3.2) show that instead of using *per* + accusative, persons can be represented as mere things or instruments, and thus be denoted by the ablative without *ab*.⁷⁹

Given the great overlap between absolute and other uses of the ablative (see discussion in Section 3.3), one might want to argue

⁷³ That this did not actually take place does not matter here. The person addressed, Theuopides, thinks the purchase occurred and that Tranio had initiated it.

⁷⁴ K-S II.1.407. ⁷⁵ Which of course is expressed by means of *alab* + ablative.

⁷⁶ K-S II.1.380 n. 1. ⁷⁷ Cf. K-S II.1.407 n. 28.

⁷⁸ As given by Bennett 1914: 299.

⁷⁹ ‘Doch werden auch Personen bisweilen als bloße Sachen, als bloße Werkzeuge aufgefaßt und durch den Ablativ ohne *ab* bezeichnet’, K-S II.1.380 n. 1, with numerous other examples.

that the example above (and others like it) represent extensions of regular ablative usages – whether as animate instruments, or as accompaniers somehow regarded/depicted as instruments. Nevertheless, the absence of any preposition disfavours these interpretations, and thus, from a synchronic point of view, it seems best to classify these expressions as absolute.⁸⁰

Yet however we interpret the situation synchronically, the above discussion shows that, diachronically, these expressions most likely originated from uses of the instrumental case that in Latin merged with ablative and locative, and thus with the case that could be employed in absolute usage. This instrumental origin is made more likely when we compare similar expressions from Sanskrit, where the instrumental case never underwent any syncretism. Compare the following:

<i>hatā</i>	<i>vr̥trām</i>	<i>sudānavah</i>	<i>īndreṇa</i>	<i>sāhasā</i>
kill _{2nd.Sg.Impv}	Vr̥tra _{Acc.Sg}	well-gifted _{Voc.Pl}	Indra _{Instr.Sg}	strong _{Instr.Sg}

yujā
companion_{Instr.Sg}
‘kill Vr̥tra, you rich ones, **with Indra as your strong companion**’
(RV 1.23.9)

<i>bhuktaiḥ</i>	<i>phalaiḥ</i>	<i>etaiḥ</i>	<i>jarā</i>	<i>na</i>	<i>te</i>
eaten _{Instr.Pl}	fruit _{Instr.Pl}	they _{Instr.Pl}	old age _{Nom.Sg}	not	you _{Gen/Dat.Sg}

bhaviṣyati
be_{3rd.Sg.Fut}
‘**through these fruits, once they have been eaten** (or in ‘better’
English: if you eat these fruits), old age will not come (lit. ‘be’) to you’
(Kath. 29)

Both of the examples above are taken from discussions of ‘semi-absolute’ (Speijer 1886: 290–1) or ‘absolute’ instrumentals

⁸⁰ Keydana 1997: 238 does not see these as absolute but states that ‘Furthermore I would like to exclude [from absolute status, A.R.] constructions with a nominal predicate such as *me auctore, me impulsore*. Those represent nominal expressions that denote the participation of a person in an action. *Me suasore atque impulsore id factum audacter dicito* (Pl. Mos. 916) thus literally means ‘Do say that this was done with me as advisor and instigator!’ (‘Weiterhin möchte ich Konstruktionen mit nominalem Prädikat wie *me auctore, me impulsore* ausschließen. Es handelt sich um nominal zentrierte Fügungen, die die Teilnahme einer Person an einer Handlung bezeichnen. *Me suasore atque impulsore id factum audacter dicito* (Pl. Mos. 916) heißt also wörtlich: ‘Sage ruhig, es sei mit mir als Ratgeber und Anstifter gemacht worden!’).

(Wenzel 1879: 27–8, Sen 1927: 120–2, Aalto 1979). Yet all of the instrumental expressions can be understood quite literally as comitative instrumentals or as instrumentals in the stricter sense, neither of which require the use of a preposition. In idiomatic English, particularly the second example is best rendered as a subordinate clause, and thus as a background circumstance (‘if you eat these fruits’). Yet that does not change the status of *bhuktaiḥ phalaiḥ etaiḥ* in the original Sanskrit sentence: ‘(you will not grow old) *through* these fruits, once they have been eaten (by you)’. In Sanskrit, this use of the instrumental does not go beyond what we see above: all instrumental expressions cited in the relevant discussions refer to what their heads refer to. No expressions whose head nouns refer to things or people need to be seen as referring to circumstances or events. Thus, none need to be classified as ‘absolute’.⁸¹

Yet as we saw above, things are different in Latin. This is most likely due to the Latin syncretism of the instrumental with the ablative and locative, and thus with the case that permitted absolute usage (more on the locative as the likely original absolute case in Section 3.7 below). Once instrumental and locative had become formally identical, there would not have been a reason for the originally instrumental expressions not to extend in such a way as to become absolute themselves. This, furthermore, would not have required any great developments: what creates ambiguity in the question of whether *me suasore atque impulsore id factum audacter dicito* (Pl. *Mos.* 916) is absolute or not is the verb of its matrix clause: *facere* denotes an action – an action in which the speaker could participate, which could come about *through* his actions. This was already noticed by Flinck-Linkomies, who remarked that many early AAs, substantival ones as well as the *me praesente* type, involved “‘agendi” aut “‘faciendi” verba’ in their matrix clauses (1929: 59). As he outlines (1929: 57–64, see also discussion in Section 5.6.b), the development towards absolute expressions would have occurred by two different paths. On the one hand, the same kind of expression ((pro)noun plus noun) would begin to be used with matrix verbs in which any physical

⁸¹ See also Section 5.3.b on the supposed Sanskrit ‘instrumental absolute’.

involvement was not logically possible. This appears to be what we find in the types of substantival AA that involve designations of age or office rather than agent nouns. Compare the following:

quei ager poplicus populi Romanei in terram Italian P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos. fuit

‘which public field of the Roman people was on Italian soil **when P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius were consuls**’ (*Lex Agraria*, *CIL* 1².585)

Here, the consuls cannot in any way be understood as having been involved in the ‘action’ of the matrix verb. Thus, *P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos.* can only be seen as a background circumstance, and the expression thus as absolute.

A second path for truly absolute expressions to arise lies in a change not of the matrix clause verb, but the ablative expression itself. Such a change need not be very big at all, and in Early Latin, as far as we can observe, went from *me praesente* to the parallel *me absente*. While *me praesente* may denote someone *together with* or *through whom* an action occurs, this is logically impossible in the case of *me absente*. Thus, *me absente* cannot denote a person, but must denote a background circumstance, and as such, it is absolute.

3.5.d *sens

It is sometimes asked whether Latin, if it had a present active participle of *esse*,⁸² would use it in nominal AAs, or also whether the existence of nominal AAs is the effect of the lack of this participle.⁸³ From the above, it should now be clear that nominal AAs work in exactly the same way as the ‘regular’, participial type. An expression makes sense only when both its head and the head’s qualifier are present. This makes the qualifier obligatory, and thus puts it on a par with the (equally obligatory) predicate in a verbal clause. As we have seen, it is the obligatory quality of the

⁸² The form we do find, *sons*, is used to mean ‘guilty’ (‘he who (really) was it, he who is the real author of the thing in question’). In *absens* and *praesens*, the root vowel has been adapted to fit the vocalism of other regular present active participles. This is why I am referring to asterisked *sens in this section.

⁸³ These questions are based on the fact that Greek does use its equivalent participle in this way; cf. e.g. μή μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ τείχους ‘because the wall was not strong (enough)’ at Th. 3.102.

qualifier, rather than any verbal properties it might have, that gives it ‘predicate’ status. Thus, even if Latin did have a present active participle of the copula, its use would not have been necessary in the AA.⁸⁴

3.6 ACs in Italic

The most detailed discussion of this topic to date is Keydana (1997: 281–4). He lists examples from Oscan (one), Paelignian (one certain, one uncertain), Volscian (one) and Umbrian (four, of which three are identical).⁸⁵ A further, less detailed discussion can be found in Bauer (2000: 272–3).

As Bauer points out, Oscan and Umbrian differ from Latin in having a distinct locative case at least in the singular, whereas the PIE ablative and instrumental have syncretised. In the plural, on the other hand, all three cases are rendered by means of the same form. ACs in the singular appear in the ablative-instrumental, which at first sight suggests Italic is proof that there is no inherited locative absolute. Yet as influence from Latin can certainly not be excluded, and as the locative plural is formally identical to the ablative-instrumental, the Italic material cannot give us decisive evidence concerning a possible original absolute case.

Certain lexical/formulaic similarities to the Latin material seem interesting: *populo praesente* (such as at Pl. *Bac.* 336) is paralleled by Oscan *toutad praesentid* ‘with the people present’.⁸⁶ A

⁸⁴ Cf. also K-S II.1.779, who arrive at the same conclusion from a different direction.

⁸⁵ These are Oscan: Tab. Bant. 21; Paelignian: Vetter (1953) 214, 213 3–5; Volscian: Tab. Vel. 3; Umbrian: Tab. Ig. Ia₁, VIa₁ and IIa₁₇, and III₄.

⁸⁶ aut . suaepis . censtomen . nei . cebnust . dolud . mallud / in . eizeic . uincter . esuf . comenei . lamatir . pr . meddixud . **toutad . praesentid** . perum . dolum / mallom . in . amiricatud . allo . famelo . in . ei . siuom . paei . eizeis . fust . pae ancensto . fust / toutico . estud ‘But if someone has not come to the registration out of ill will and is caught in this, he himself shall be hit by the magistrate of the praetor in the assembly **with the people present**, without ill will; and without recompense, his remaining household goods and possessions generally, which were his and were not registered, shall belong to the people’ (‘Wenn aber jemand aus böser Absicht nicht zur Registrierung gekommen ist und er dabei überführt wird, soll er selbst in der Versammlung durch den Magistrat des Praetors geschlagen werden, **wenn das Volk anwesend ist**, ohne böse Absicht; und ohne Entschädigung soll der übrige Haushalt und das Vermögen insgesamt, das sein gewesen ist, [und] das nicht registriert gewesen ist, dem Volk gehören’, Keydana 1997: 281–2).

semantic, albeit not formal parallel of the *me sciente* type appears in Volscian *toticu couehriu sepu* ‘with the people’s assembly knowing [of it]’. We could here be dealing with a parallel development, yet given the influence that Latin had on the literary forms of both Volscian (which is written using the Latin script) and Oscan (which is at least sometimes written in this fashion), these expressions are probably calques on their Latin equivalents.

Umbrian contains a plural AA that appears three times, *aves anzeriates* ‘when the birds have been watched’.⁸⁷ This is lexically interesting as it parallels locative expressions in Sanskrit that are commonly discussed in relation to ACs and often considered absolute. These also describe elements of religious rituals that are employed as markers of time.⁸⁸

In summary, we have some potentially interesting material attested in non-Latin Italic. Yet as so frequently, it is difficult to judge whether one should peg larger theories (in this case, the question of the original AC case) onto a relatively small corpus of material which could have been influenced by Latin and which cannot even always be interpreted with certainty.

3.7 Conclusions

As we have seen, there are many ways in which the Latin AA cannot be said to be ‘absolute’ from its syntactic environment in any interpretation of the term. Semantically, there is considerable overlap with other usages of the ablative. As far as its internal syntax is concerned, the feature that differentiates the AA from those other ablative usages – the obligatory adjectival qualifier – is also present in other constructions. The instances of the very similar dominant qualifier can be found in even greater numbers. As far

⁸⁷ As at Tab. 1g. 1a₁, *este : persklum : aves : anzeriates : enetu : / pernaies : pusnaes* : ‘this sacrifice shall be entered **when the birds have been watched**, those in the front [and] those in the back’ (‘In dieses Opfer soll man eintreten, **wenn die Vögel beobachtet sind**, die vorne [und] die hinten’, Keydana 1997: 284).

⁸⁸ Cf. for example *suté ít tvám nīmiślah indra sóme stóme bráhmaṇi śasyámāne ukthé* (pressed_{Loc.Sg} Ptel you_{Nom.Sg} attached_{Nom.Sg} worship_{Loc.Sg} prayer_{Loc.Sg} being-sung_{Loc.Sg} hymn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘You are attached to pressed-out Soma, Indra, at worship, at prayer, and when the hymn is chanted’ (RV 6.23.1). This example will be discussed in Section 4.4.a.

as the syntactic position within its matrix clause is concerned, it functions just like any other adverbial expression of time, such as *vere* ‘in spring’, *initio* ‘in the beginning’, *Saturnalibus* ‘during the Saturnalia’ etc.⁸⁹

This is not to say that Latin, or even Early Latin, does not have an AC – the AA is very much linked to its grammatical surroundings, but it can be defined as a distinct construction. Yet one of the purposes of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the AA is interesting as much in the ways in which it is identical to other parts of the language as in the ways in which it differs from them.

Several issues are interesting especially for the purposes of PIE comparison. Unlike the Greek GA, the Early Latin AA is not strongly ‘verbal’ at all. There are AAs that contain participles with only very weakly verbal semantics, and there are AAs that do not contain any verbal elements at all. Both of these show that ‘the verbal force of the participle’⁹⁰ was not instrumental in the genesis of ACs. That increasingly verbal and paradigmatic participles (as we find them in Greek) are likely to have contributed to the development and proliferation of ACs once they had come to be is a different matter.

Among the various texts in the corpus of Early Latin, we find different kinds of ACs: while there are mostly ACs expressing natural time (*luna silenti, piro florente, vindemia facta* etc.) in Cato, the majority of AAs in early comedy take the shape of *me/te praesente/absente/vivo* etc. Both denote situations or events and thus have a temporal dimension. Yet whereas the examples from Cato seem slightly closer to locative semantics (‘do something *at new moon, after the harvest*’), the main AA type in Plautus and Terence displays certain comitative-instrumental nuances (‘do something *with me present*’ etc.). The same applies to substantival AAs: while the agent noun type (*me suasore* etc.) seems comitative-instrumental, the other two types (referring to a person’s age or their office) appear more locative (*P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos.*

⁸⁹ See K-S II.1.355–6 for numerous other examples.

⁹⁰ Again, see e.g. Müller-Lancé 1994: 368.

(see above) cannot be interpreted as a comitative ‘with them as consuls’, but only as a temporal ‘when they were consuls’).

One might thus want to speculate whether it is possible to reconstruct some internal chronology of the development of the AA. Both the substantival and regular AAs of comitative-instrumental value (*me auctore*, *me praesente*) tend to appear in environments in which they do not necessarily have to be seen as absolute: as Flinck-Linkomies (1929: 59) points out, especially the *me praesente* (as opposed to *absente*) type is usually found with verbs that denote an action in which the ‘*me*’ etc. could be involved. If we see the *piro florente* type, which is clearly absolute wherever it appears, as locatival in origin, then we may assume that an originally purely locatival AC was expanded when the locative and instrumental cases syncretised. We saw how small the necessary steps are to make the originally instrumental expressions properly absolute: one may leave the instrumental phrase completely unchanged, but combine it with different kinds of verbs (namely verbs denoting actions or states in which the person mentioned in the former comitative-instrumental can clearly not be involved), or one may change an expression such as *me praesente* to its semantically opposite, but otherwise completely parallel *me absente*.

It seems very likely that several sources (i.e. cases) contributed to the make-up of the Latin AA. Although the AA, particularly in early comedy, is predominantly instrumental, we thus do not need to postulate an instrumental first origin for it. These various layers will be very interesting when we try to assign the various reconstructable steps in the development of ACs to PIE and the daughter languages respectively.

Related to this, but perhaps slightly more relevant to Latin itself rather than to PIE, are the various other Latin constructions that contain dominant qualifiers. In Section 3.4.c, I briefly pointed to the distinction between an obligatory and a ‘dominant’ qualifier: an obligatory qualifier is found in expressions with temporal dimension whose head noun does not have such dimensions itself. This distinction will be very important in our search for the first origins of ACs: given that ACs contain obligatory qualifiers, we have to look for their sources among constructions including equally obligatory rather than dominant qualifiers (see Sections 5.3 and

5.5 for a detailed discussion of this question). Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that this theoretical distinction is very hard to notice in practice. The question of whether a native speaker would have perceived a difference between the dominant qualifier in e.g. *virtus . . . constat ex hominibus tuendis* ‘virtue . . . centres in protecting people (lit.: *people which are to be protected)’ (Cic. *Off.* 1.157, cf. Section 3.4.b) and the obligatory one in expressions such as *ab urbe condita* ‘from the foundation of the city’ or *hostibus victis* ‘with the enemy defeated’ (e.g. at Pl. *Per.* 753) is difficult to answer. Yet given the strong surface similarities between these constructions, it seems quite possible that the apparent lack of semantic restrictions on expressions with dominant qualifiers may have served as yet another source for the weakening of possible original semantic restrictions on the AA. In the end, both constructions are equally varied.

To sum up, while the GA provides an interesting object of study just because it is so well developed and has thus allowed us to clearly define our concept of what an AC is, a study of the (early) AA is important just because, in several respects, the construction is *not* as well developed as its Greek counterpart. This has allowed us to look at a number of AC features that may reflect a state of affairs closer to PIE and thus help us understand the development of the ACs we find attested from PIE on.

THE SANSKRIT LOCATIVE ABSOLUTE AND ITS SYNTACTIC SURROUNDINGS

4.1 Introduction

Sanskrit contains a construction parallel to the ACs of Greek and Latin.

yát adyá sūrye udyatí prīyakṣatrāḥ ṛtām dadhá
 when today sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg} dear-ruler_{Voc.Pl} right_{Acc.Sg} set_{2nd.Pl.Perf}
 ‘when you, beloved rulers, appoint the rite **at sunrise** today’ (RV 8.27.19)

This so-called locative absolute (LA) is interesting even for those concerned solely with the Western Classical languages. In the oldest Sanskrit texts, the LA exists but is both infrequent and rather limited in its scope (for the most part, those oldest LAs are expressions of natural time). While the construction never becomes as frequent as its Western counterparts, we can watch it increase in productivity until it becomes as semantically versatile as the Greek GA or the AA of Classical Latin. This allows important inferences onto the history of GA and AA, both of which are much better developed by the time of their respective first attestations.

The current chapter will demonstrate how the understanding of the LA in the Western world has been influenced by our views of GA and especially AA since the first Europeans came in contact with the Sanskrit language. Looking in detail at the LA within its grammatical environment, i.e. Sanskrit case syntax, it will point out which kinds of expressions have erroneously been considered absolute. It will then discuss those expressions which truly are absolute, and put them into a comparative context.

While intended to be interesting also for Sanskritists, this chapter is written so as to be intelligible for readers unfamiliar with Sanskrit. To provide at least some minimal background, it

therefore begins with a very general sketch of the Sanskrit language, its literature and its development. It provides word-by-word annotations of all Sanskrit examples. The rules of sandhi (a system by which the form of words changes when they stand in a sentence) are not applied, thus keeping individual words recognisable.

4.2 Sanskrit literature: a brief sketch

Sanskrit was the highbrow literary language of India for more than two millennia.¹ The name *saṃskṛta*, now standardly transliterated into English as *Sanskrit*,² means ‘polished, composed, perfected’ and is meant to contrast this language with the contemporary spoken idioms, referred to as Prakrit (Skt. *prakṛta* ‘natural, unrefined’). The oldest Sanskrit texts are the so-called Vedas (Skt. *veda* ‘knowledge’), and the form of the language that they are written in is commonly referred to as Vedic (or sometimes as ‘Vedic Sanskrit’). The Vedas (and/or texts reacting to them) form the basis of Indian religious practices and beliefs that precede Hinduism and retain importance even today. The oldest among them is the *Rigveda* (literally meaning ‘praise or verse (*ṛg*) knowledge (*veda*)’).³ Split up into ten books, it consists of just over 1000 hymns to various deities. Most of the *Rigveda* is assumed to date back to the late second and early first millennium BC.⁴ The relation between Vedic and ‘regular’ or Classical Sanskrit is similar to the relation between Homeric and fifth-century Greek: compared to Classical Sanskrit, Vedic is richer in both forms (e.g. case endings) and grammatical categories (e.g. in contrasting a subjunctive, which later is lost, and an optative). Various Vedic vocabulary items fall out of use or reappear later with different meaning.

¹ Sanskrit was regularly used in literary writing until the eleventh century AD, and, much like Latin in the West, continued to be used in learned and religious discourse for some time after that (see Burrow 1973 for an accessible overview of Sanskrit language and literature, and Pollock 2001 for an overview of more recent Sanskrit activity in India).

² Up to the nineteenth century, we also find Sanskrita, Sanscrit, Sunscrit, Sungskrit, Samskrt and others.

³ Some editions: Müller 1849–75, Aufrecht 1877, van Nooten and Holland 1994.

⁴ Cf. Mylius 2003: 18, Bechert and Simson 1979: 50; discussion in Gonda 1975: 20–5.

The other Vedic texts (*Sāmaveda*, *Yajurveda* and *Atharvaveda*)⁵ are mostly younger than and subsidiary to the *Rigveda*. In most general terms, they provide ancillary information and texts for the performance of the Vedic ritual.⁶ In addition to the Vedas in the stricter sense (the so-called *saṃhitās*, i.e. ‘collections’ of the texts), there is a host of more or less closely related companion texts that comment on, explain and greatly expand on each Veda (the so-called *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*).⁷ Finally, there is the so-called *Sūtra* literature, technical prose texts treating the various disciplines of Vedic study (sacrificial technique, astronomy, metrical and grammatical/linguistic study; together, these are referred to as *Vedāṅga*, literally the ‘limbs of the Veda’).

One of these treatises, the oldest surviving exponent of grammatical study, came to be of fundamental importance to Sanskrit writing: the rules found in the Sanskrit grammar of Pāṇini⁸ form the basis of what thereafter became to be considered ‘correct’ written language. They thus define what we think of as ‘Classical’ Sanskrit (or ‘Sanskrit’ as opposed to ‘Vedic’).⁹ It is difficult to date Pāṇini, with estimates ranging from the sixth to fourth centuries BC.¹⁰

The field of literature in ‘Classical’ Sanskrit is vast and contains a wide variety of genres – from plays and poetry of writers such as Kālidāsa¹¹ via novels and large collections of tales¹² to technical literature and commentaries. In some elements, the language of the two Sanskrit epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, diverges from the Pāṇinian standard and is thus specially referred to as ‘Epic Sanskrit’.¹³ Both texts are the result of an oral tradition, and different versions survive from different regions. It is difficult to

⁵ See Bechert and Simson 1979: 53 for a list of editions.

⁶ See e.g. Mylius 2003: 35–46 for a more detailed description.

⁷ See Bechert and Simson 1979: 54 for a list of editions.

⁸ The name is stressed on the first syllable.

⁹ Some editions: Böhtlingk 1887, Katre 1987, Cardona 1988.

¹⁰ See Cardona 1976: 260–8, who concludes that ‘the evidence available hardly allows one to date Pāṇini later than the early to mid fourth century B.C.’ (1976: 268).

¹¹ For an overview of Kālidāsa’s life and works see e.g. the introduction in Vasudeva’s 2006 edition of Kālidāsa’s *Recognition of Śakuntalā*.

¹² For brief introductions to these, see Olivelle 2006 on the *Pañcatantra*, Törzsök 2007 on the *Hitopadeśa*, and Mallinson 2009 or Sattar 1997 on the *Kathāsaritsāgara*.

¹³ See Oberlies 2003.

estimate the age of the versions that we have.¹⁴ The *Bhagavad Gītā*, the famous dialogue outlining the various possible ways of living properly and devoutly, is part of the *Mahābhārata*.

It is not clear when Sanskrit stopped being a regularly spoken language. While it survived as a means of erudite and religious conversation beyond the decline of Sanskrit literature in the eleventh century AD,¹⁵ Sanskrit as a literary language was fixed by Pāṇini's works. Thus, while there are some developments in the last 1500 or so years of Sanskrit in literary use, many parts of the language do not change.¹⁶ This applies specifically to the two areas of the language that this present chapter is concerned with (use of the locative case, and some participle usages). Thus, and this is what is important here, it is possible to make certain linguistic generalisations (e.g. concerning case usage) that apply to texts of vastly different ages.

4.3 Some elements of Sanskrit grammar

4.3.a Nominal expressions and case syntax

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a comprehensive overview of the linguistic structures of Sanskrit.¹⁷ Instead, this section aims at providing the background needed to understand and evaluate the Sanskrit examples throughout this and the next chapter. It thus focuses on nominal and case syntax.

¹⁴ As Brockington outlines, 'There is . . . general agreement that the oldest parts [of the *Mahābhārata*, A.R.] preserved are not likely to be appreciably older than about 400 BC' (1998: 26). As for the *Rāmāyaṇa*, 'Probably [it] had reached its present state . . . by the third century [AD] but its oldest parts may well be as early as any part of the *Mahābhārata*' (1998: 27).

¹⁵ Again, see Pollock 2001.

¹⁶ Much of the variation lies in the increasing popularity of nominal forms, including that of extremely long compounds formed *ad hoc*. This applies especially in the very elaborate and highly ornate style of court poetry (so-called *kāvya*, see e.g. Macdonnell 1900: 318–54); see Section 4.2 immediately below. There also is influence from the substrate languages spoken by the authors.

¹⁷ For an overview see e.g. Burrow 1973: *The Sanskrit Language*. The most detailed grammar of Sanskrit in all its forms is Jacob Wackernagel's *Altindische Grammatik (AiGr)*. Accounts of Sanskrit syntax in general may be found in Speijer 1886 and Delbrück 1888 and 1897. Meenakshi 1983 and Oberlies 2003: 289–381 focus on epic syntax.

Sanskrit belongs to the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. It thus is most closely related to Iranian languages such as Avestan, the language that the followers of Zarathustra recorded their writings in, and Old Persian, attested in the inscriptions of the Achaemenid dynasty since Darius I's reign (late sixth century BC). It furthermore displays numerous inherited parallels to Latin and especially Greek: it is a heavily inflected language, with similar or (genetically) identical conjugations and declensions and grammatical categories. Sanskrit nouns include, for example, *a-*, *i-*, *u-* and consonant stems. There is a class of Sanskrit verbs that forms their present tense stem with *-nu(-mi, etc.)*. Nominal forms are marked for three genders and three numbers (but eight cases: ablative, instrumental and locative remain distinct, with only formal syncretism in parts of the paradigm). Verbs have three voices (active, middle, passive) and four moods (indicative, subjunctive, which is lost by Classical Sanskrit, the optative, which comes to function as a broad 'potential' mood, and imperative) as well as three past tenses (imperfect, perfect and aorist; the first two become semantically identical by Classical Sanskrit, and the aorist rare). Sanskrit has a very productive participle system, with active, middle and passive participles for all tense stems, and an exceedingly frequent participle formed from the verbal root.

Two other processes of nominal formation are extremely productive in Sanskrit: on the one hand, the language possesses a large number of derivative suffixes¹⁸ and other derivative processes that create nouns and adjectives from verbal roots or other nouns (take e.g. the root $\sqrt{kr}$ 'to do', from which we get e.g. *kara* 'doer; hand', *karin* 'elephant' ('the one characterised by his hand, i.e. his trunk'), *karma* 'action, deed', *kāraṇa* 'cause, reason', *karṭṛ* 'agent, author', *kṛti* 'literary work', *kriyā* 'action; sacrifice', *kārya* 'matter, occupation', as well as a number of forms such as *kara*, *karaṇa*, *kāra*, *kārin*, *kāraka*, all meaning 'making, doing'). On the other hand, the formation of nominal compounds enjoys extreme popularity. We find largely the same compound types as in other

¹⁸ See *AiGr* II.2.1–931.

IE languages.¹⁹ Yet Sanskrit employs compounds far more frequently, which is due in large part to the fact that it forms them *ad hoc*: the meaning of a compound does not need to be more than the sum of the meaning of its members. The son of a king may easily be referred to as *rāja-putra* ‘king-son’, a group of friends as *sakhī-gaṇa* ‘(girl)friend-group’, and a woman surrounded by such a group as *sakhī-gaṇa-samāvṛtā* (lit.) ‘girlfriend-group-surrounded’. Particularly in technical prose,²⁰ but also in poetic language, compounds are used where the Western reader might expect either regular nominal or also verbal phrases. The section on ‘verbal nouns expressing cause’ in Tubb and Boose’s 2007 ‘Scholastic Sanskrit’ lists e.g. *kārya-darśanāt* (effect_{Stem-Form}-seeing_{Abl.Sg}) ‘because of seeing the effect’ and *kārya-dr̥ṣṭatvāt* (effect_{Stem-Form}-seen-ness_{Abl.Sg}) ‘because of the seen-ness of the effect’, which both are ultimately equivalent to English ‘because the effect has been seen, because we have seen the effect’ (2007: 208). In Kālidāsa’s *Recognition of Śakuntalā* (Prologue 1.13–4), we find passages such as

subhaga-salīla-avagāhāḥ (pleasant-playing-bathing_{Nom.Pl})
pātāla-saṃsarga-surabhi-vana-vātāḥ (pātāla(-blossom)-mixture-fragrant-forest-wind_{Nom.Pl})
pracchāya-sulabha-nidrāḥ (shade-easy-to-get-sleep_{Nom.Pl})
divasāḥ (days_{Nom.Pl}) *parināma-ramaṇīyāḥ* (passing-pleasant_{Nom.Pl})

‘(For now) are the days: when plunging into water is a joy, with woodland breezes fragrant by contact with *pātala* blossoms, where sleep comes with ease in deep shade, delightful in their twilight.’

(Translation: Vasudeva 2006)²¹

As was mentioned above, Sanskrit and particularly Greek, but also Latin, share largely the same grammatical categories of both nouns and verbs. A noteworthy difference lies in the fact that the cases which are regularly reconstructed for Proto-Indo-European did not syncretise in Sanskrit, which thus has several

¹⁹ See *AiGr* II.1.140–2 for an overview, and 142–239 for detailed discussion.

²⁰ See Tubb and Boose 2007 on the language of Sanskrit commentaries. They also discuss the formation and use of abstract nouns at great length.

²¹ All compounds in this passage are bahuvrīhis, i.e. adjectives agreeing with the noun *divasāḥ* ‘days’. What we see here is dwarfed by later *kāvya*, where compounds can have ten and (many) more members.

productive semantic/peripheral cases.²² From the *Rigveda* on, we see the Sanskrit instrumental case used to express any kind of instrument or method with or by which, as well as people or things together with which: we aspire to hear propitious things *kārṇebhiḥ* (ear_{Instr.Pl}) ‘with [our] ears’ (e.g. at *RV* 1.89.8), the gods are asked to approach *pathībhiḥ devayānaih* (path_{Instr.Pl} god-gone_{Instr.Pl}) ‘by means of god-travelled paths’ (e.g. *RV* 4.37.1). The god Agni (i.e. ‘fire’) may come *devébhiḥ* (god_{Instr.Pl}) ‘with the gods’ (e.g. at *RV* 1.1.5; in post-Vedic Sanskrit, this use normally requires the postposition *saha* ‘with’).²³ The instrumental can also denote spaces, times through which and circumstances under which something is done:²⁴ at *RV* 1.161.14, different gods are described as travelling *divā* (heaven_{Instr.Sg}) ‘through heaven’, *bhūmyā* (earth_{Instr.Sg}) ‘on earth’ and *antārikṣeṇa* (in-between_{Instr.Sg}) ‘through the space in between’, respectively. Nouns denoting ‘time throughout which’ always stand in the plural; take e.g. *rātrībhiḥ* . . . *āhabhiḥ* (night_{Instr.Pl} day_{Instr.Pl}) ‘for nights and days’ (e.g. at *RV* 10.10.9) or *śarādbhiḥ* (year_{Instr.Pl}) ‘for years’ (e.g. at *RV* 1.86.6). The situational/circumstantial use of the instrumental can be seen e.g. at *RV* 9.97.36, where the magic liquid *soma* is told to enter into Indra *brhatā ráveṇa* (great_{Instr.Sg} noise_{Instr.Sg}) ‘with great noise’, or later at *Manusmṛti*²⁵ 4.3 where action is described that must take place *akleśeṇa śarirasya* (non-exertion_{Instr.Sg} body_{Gen.Sg}) ‘with non-exertion (i.e. without exertion) of the body’. Rarely in Vedic, but regularly in Classical Sanskrit, the instrumental also denotes the agent of a passive verb: *uṣāḥ ribhyate vasiṣṭhaiḥ* (dawn_{Nom.Sg} praise_{3rd.Sg.Pres.Pass} Vasiṣṭha_{Instr.Pl}) ‘dawn is praised by the Vasiṣṭhas’ (*RV* 7.76.7).

The ablative case denotes any kind of source or origin, whether personal, spatial or abstract: wealth comes *tvát* (you_{Abl.Sg})

²² Unless otherwise specified, the examples in the following section were taken either from my own collections or from the sections on case syntax in Speijer 1886, Delbrück 1888, Whitney 1924 and Haudry 1977.

²³ See Whitney 1924: 84 (§ 279) or Speijer 1886: 42–3.

²⁴ See Speijer 1886: 47: ‘[The instrumental] is always used, when it is wanted to express the circumstances, instruments, means, ways, properties accompanying the action and qualifying it. In other terms, the instrumental has the duty of telling the *how* of the action or state, expressed by the verb or verbal noun it depends on.’

²⁵ A text outlining preferred socio-legal conventions from around the second century BC to the third century AD. See Flood 1996: 56.

‘from you’ (addressing Agni, *RV* 4.11.3), one can walk away *yávasāt* (pasture_{Abl.Sg}) ‘from the pasture’ (*RV* 7.18.10) or *svāt sakhyāt* (own_{Abl.Sg} friendship_{Abl.Sg}) ‘(away) from one’s own friendship’ (*RV* 10.124.2), worlds may tremble *śúṣmāt* (breath_{Abl.Sg}) ‘from/through (Indra’s) breath’ (e.g. at *RV* 2.12.1), anger arises *kāmāt* (desire_{Abl.Sg}) ‘from desire’ (*BG* 2.62). In its temporal use, the ablative is usually accompanied by postpositions or similar words, and usually has the meaning ‘after’ rather than ‘from’ (such as *kṣanāt* ‘after a moment, within a moment’).

The locative, finally, also denotes its basic idea of ‘location where’ in the widest sense possible: compare spatial *divi* (heaven_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in heaven’ or *nareṣu* (man_{Loc.Pl}) ‘among men’, temporal *uṣasi* (dawn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at dawn’ or *adhvare* (ritual_{Loc.Sg}) ‘during the sacrificial ritual’, and abstract *māde* ‘in madness’ (in the *Rigveda* especially as *māde sōmasya* (excitement/inspiration_{Loc.Sg} soma_{Gen.Sg}) ‘in the intoxication from soma’, e.g. at *RV* 1.46.12; see n. 30 below on soma) or *āpadi* (fall_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in distress, in (case of) an accident’. As Whitney (1924: 101) puts it, ‘[t]he locative is properly the in-case, the case expressing situation or location’. In other words, it overlaps with the uses of English *in* + noun or pronoun: compare examples of physical space (e.g. English *in the street*), temporal (*in the morning*) or abstract/figurative (*in my opinion, in anger*). The Sanskrit locative also encompasses the functions of related spatial or temporal prepositions in English, such as ‘on’, ‘at’, ‘near’, ‘among’ or ‘during’.²⁶

In its spatial use, we find the full spectrum of locative semantics, including the meanings of *in*, *on*, *under* (e.g. at *RV* 7.60.8), but also *towards*, *into* or *onto* (the so-called ‘pregnant’ use of this case). As Delbrück (1888: 115–16) demonstrates, e.g. *pārvate* (mountain_{Loc.Sg}) may mean both ‘on the mountain’ (e.g. at *RV* 1.32.2) and ‘in the mountain’ (e.g. at *RV* 1.51.4), and *sindhau*

²⁶ The meaning and functions of the locative case do not change significantly in the history of Vedic or Sanskrit, and the passages cited in this chapter thus stem from works of various genres and periods. The main difference is the greater overlap between cases. As Oberlies 2003: 304 points out, ‘[a] characteristic feature of Epic syntax is the wide latitude of meanings in which the cases are employed, “independently” and in constructions with particular verbs’. Although this overlap led to an increased use of postpositions particularly after genitives and accusatives (2003: 366–76), there is no actual merger or loss of cases yet.

(river_{Loc.Sg}) may be any of ‘in’, ‘on’ or ‘by’ the river. When used with plural nouns of things or people, the locative denotes ‘among’, as e.g. in *devéṣu* (god_{Loc.Pl}) ‘among the gods’ at e.g. *RV* 5.68.2.

Parallel to the spatial, there are the temporal usages, among them expressions such as *uṣasi* (dawn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at dawn’, *pradoṣe* (evening_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in the evening’, *saṃvatsare* (year_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in/within a year’ or *agre* (beginning_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in/at the beginning’/*pariṇāme* (end_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in/at the end’. Yet these temporal usages are not limited to nouns that denote time proper (such as *morning*, *dawn*, *beginning*). They extend also to what Whitney (1924: 101) refers to as ‘situations’. As was already indicated above, anything that has a temporal dimension – be it an event such as a war, a fight or any organised proceeding, be it an emotion, a look or movement, any spoken word, conversation or declamation – can be represented as an *occasion on* or a *situation in which* when it appears in the locative case. An evil man is said to have fallen *vājrasya pātane* (lightning_{Gen.Sg} fall_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in/at the stroke of lightning’ (*RV* 6.20.5), and the faithful frequently ask a god that they may be *śármaṇi* (protection_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in (his) protection’ (e.g. at *RV* 1.4.6) or *sumataú* (good-will_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in (his) good-will’ (*RV* 3.59.3).²⁷ In the *Rigveda*, a great number of these ‘situations’ come from the spheres of sacrifice or battle, both of which are events that are clearly delineated in both temporal and spatial dimensions: *adhvaré yajñéṣu* (ritual_{Loc.Pl} sacrifice_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the ritual, at the sacrifices (we praise the god)’ (*RV* 1.15.7), *stóme, bráhmaṇi* (worship_{Loc.Sg} prayer_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at/during worship, at/during prayer’ (*RV* 6.23.1), *háveṣu* (shout_{Loc.Pl}) ‘during the shouts/the shouting’ (*RV* 10.103.11),²⁸ *pr̥tsutaú nṛ-ṣáhye* (attack_{Loc.Sg} man-conquering_{Loc.Sg}) ‘(help us) in this attack, (help us) in the man-conquering/when men are conquered’ (*RV* 10.38.1).

There are numerous similar examples from outside the sacrificial sphere, particularly in works whose subject matter differs from the *Rigveda*; compare *udaye . . . āpadi* (up-going_{Loc.Sg} . . . fall_{Loc.Sg}) ‘during (his) rise . . . during (his) downfall’ (*Kā. Ku.* 8.44),

²⁷ Whitney 1924: 102 calls this category of terms the ‘locative of sphere or condition or circumstance’ and regards it as the source of the LA.

²⁸ Grassmann 1876–7 *ad loc.* takes *háveṣu* as referring to the calling of the gods at the sacrifice. Griffith 1896 *ad loc.* refers them to the shouts ‘at the onset of battle’.

or *cumbaneṣu*... *adaya-upagūhane* (kiss_{Loc.Pl} unkind_{Stem-embrace_{Loc.Pl}}) ‘during (their) kisses... in his merciless-embrace’ (Kā. Ku. 8.8). Among the countless examples involving compounds (which may be found by reading just a few chapters of a Sanskrit text) there are e.g. *gotra-skhaliteṣu* (name_{Stem-stumbling_{Loc.Pl}}) ‘in name-errings’ (Kā. Ku. 4.8; Smith (2005) translates ‘when you got my name wrong’) or *vihāra-śayyā-āsana-bhojaneṣu* (play_{Stem}-rest_{Stem}-seating_{Stem}-eating_{Loc.Pl}) ‘while playing, resting, while seated or eating’ (BG 11.42). Note that examples involving ‘event’ nouns may be conceived of as spatial as much as temporal, since those who are present at an event are present both when and where it takes place.

The locative can also be used in the place of other cases whenever their semantic fields overlap.²⁹ A superlative, for example, may stand equally well with a genitive or a locative. The genitive construction would literally be translated as ‘most x of’, whereas the locative would have the connotation of ‘most x among’, but in effect, both signify the same. Thus the *Rigveda* contains both *devēṣu* (*prathamāḥ*) (god_{Loc.Pl} (first)) ‘first among the gods’ (e.g. at RV 1.102.9) and (*prathamāḥ*) *devānām* ((first) god_{Gen.Pl}) ‘first of the gods’ (e.g. at RV 10.27.23). The goal of a motion may be expressed by an accusative (Delbrück 1888: 166) or a ‘pregnant’ locative (Delbrück 1888: 121, see also above); cf. the English duality of putting something *onto* or *on* a table. At RV 3.60.4, the gods are asked to come *suté* (pressed_{Loc.Sg}) ‘to the pressed’ (short for *suté sóme* ‘to the pressed/extracted soma’, a substance central to Vedic ritual).³⁰ The motivation for an action can be expressed in instrumental, ablative and locative: one can act *āsāsā* ‘with/in hope’ (instrumental, RV 8.78.10) or *bhīṣā* ‘with/in fear’ (instrumental, ŚB 1.2.3.1), *bhayāt* ‘from fear’ (ablative, Hit. 85.10) or *māde* ‘in intoxication’ (locative, RV 2.15.1). Depending on the exact nuance to be stressed, accompanying circumstances may be expressed both in the locative and the instrumental: Arjuna is asked by Krishna why he changes his behaviour *viṣame* (danger_{Loc.Sg})

²⁹ Whitney 1924: 101: ‘[t]he locative is properly the in-case, the case expressing situation or location; but its sphere of use has been somewhat extended, so as to touch and overlap the boundaries of other cases, for which it seems to be a substitute’.

³⁰ See e.g. Rodrigues 2006: 33 for a description of soma.

‘in (time of) danger’ (*BG* 2.2), but the sun rises *jyótiṣā* ‘with splendour’ (*RV* 4.13.1). Finally, in its use as the so-called locative of goal,³¹ there is overlap with the dative of purpose: at *RV* 1.10.6, Indra is approached *sakhitvé... rāyé... suvīrye* (friendship_{Loc.Sg} wealth_{Loc.Sg} strength_{Loc.Sg}) ‘for friendship, for wealth, and for strength’. These are only a few examples among many.

The account above demonstrates how the peripheral cases in Sanskrit are able to imprint their semantics on whatever noun may conceivably take them, resulting in spatial, temporal and abstract expressions. While there are still some limitations on this in Vedic, even those diminish over time, as nominal expression increases in popularity. This productivity, and thus the use of plain nominal expressions where other languages might employ verbal clauses, furthermore extends to the core cases. When used together with verbs of motion, the accusative object denotes the end-point, the goal of that motion. As Delbrück (1888: 166) outlines, people, places, events, actions and states (e.g. *amṛtatva* ‘immortality’) are all found in this usage. Thus, e.g. ‘going towards immortality’ would simply mean ‘to become immortal’. The use of such states or abstract expressions is equally found in the dative: from Vedic on, and increasingly in the later language, Sanskrit uses action nouns in the dative to indicate a process to which an action is relevant, a process for the purpose of which this action is done. Vedic examples of this dative of purpose include *sugopāḥ asi ná dābhāya* (good-herdsman_{Nom.Sg} be_{2nd.Sg.Pres} not cheating_{Dat.Sg}) ‘you are a good herdsman, not one for cheating/which one ought not to cheat’ (*RV* 5.44.2) or also *tiṣṭhā naḥ ūtāye* (stand_{2nd.Sg.Impv.} we_{Gen./Dat.Sg} help_{Dat.Sg}) ‘stand up for our help/to help us’ (*RV* 1.30.6).

4.3.b The Sanskrit locative absolute

As we have just seen, Sanskrit has extensive means of nominal expression. The great semantic productivity of its cases, the numerous ways of forming deverbal nouns and adjectives, the comprehensive participle system and an almost extreme use of

³¹ See Haudry 1977: 134–5.

compounds all mean that nominal expressions represent a simple and thus popular way of expressing most concepts.

This is important for our discussion because ACs are nominal expressions. Only when we consider the Sanskrit LA in the context of the remainder of nominal expression in Sanskrit can we understand how it functions. This may seem obvious, yet in past research, the LA appears to have been considered not against the backdrop of the syntactic system it is a part of, but in comparison with ACs in Latin and Greek. This has distorted our view of the actual situation in Sanskrit. In brief, while e.g. the various semantic/peripheral case usages outlined above are recognised as such, the same kinds of usages are then just as readily referred to as ‘absolute’ as soon as a participle is involved in the construction. This view – that the LA basically is an ordinary locative expression that however consists of more than one noun – is formulated e.g. by Speijer,³² yet appears to have been implicitly held by the majority of scholars since.

The existence of a Sanskrit LA has been known since the beginnings of Western contact with Sanskrit,³³ yet Western authors do not define what makes an LA absolute or attempt to delineate it from similar locative usages. As we shall see in Section 4.8 below, there is a historical reason for this. The oldest Western grammars of Sanskrit were all written by missionaries, who had

³² ‘The locative which denotes the circumstances under which things come to pass . . . encompasses also the locative of time as well as the locative absolute . . . The latter occurs if the *circumstance under which* is signified by two nouns, one of which is the predicate of the other. As the said noun-predicate generally is expressed by a participle, it is to the chapter on participles we refer for a full account of the absolute locative.’ He then quite rightly comments on expressions such as *suptesu* (sleep_{Loc.PI}) ‘in sleepings, when one is asleep’ that ‘[t]hey cannot be styled absolute locatives, but serve just the same purpose as those’ (Speijer 1886: 109). Thus, even though he recognises the close link between the two types of expression (locatives referring to a *situation in which*, consisting of either one or two words), he does not then question whether maybe neither of these should be considered absolute. Cf. also Delbrück 1888: 115, who lists sacrifice (‘Opfer’) and also fighting (‘Kampf’) among the words regularly appearing in the locative to denote a *space in which*.

³³ See Section 4.8 for some discussion of these earliest Western Sanskrit grammars and their authors: Roth ~1660–2 (in Camps and Muller 1988), Hanxleden 1732 (a yet unpublished MS at the Convento di San Silvestro, Montecompatri, Italy; many thanks to Toon van Hal for discovering this manuscript, and allowing me early access to the pictures he took of it; see van Haal 2010 for details of this discovery), Paulinus a Sancto Bartholomaeo 1790 and 1804 and Carey 1806.

learned Latin and presumably Greek before going to India and learning Sanskrit. There are numerous expressions in Sanskrit that look similar to both actual LAs and ACs in Latin and Greek, and, very importantly, these expressions (which will be discussed immediately below in Section 4.4) would have to be translated (into German, English etc.) in exactly the same way as actual ACs. While these missionaries all displayed philological talent, they did not write their grammars for the use of philologists, but of other missionaries. In other words, these grammars served applied, not theoretical purposes.³⁴ Yet for the purposes of this present theoretical and philological inquiry, we should take a step back and have a closer look at the grammatical environment of any possibly absolute expressions in Sanskrit, and situate them in this environment before comparing them to anything outside the language. The most relevant aspect here is the use of the locative case in Sanskrit. Simply understanding its scope will allow us to identify many expressions as clearly non-absolute. As was pointed out in n. 26 above, the productivity of the locative increases slightly over time as cases become interchangeable,³⁵ but otherwise remains the same. This makes it possible for us to consider examples from several time periods and linguistic genres side by side.

4.4 Supposedly absolute locatives in the *Rigveda*

4.4.a Time

Works covering Sanskrit case usage³⁶ recognise the wide scope of the locative in this language. Yet as mentioned above, one can observe a strong tendency of calling a locative ‘absolute’ as soon as it is accompanied by a participle. An interesting example of this is the expression *prayatī adhvaré* (forthgoing_{Loc.Sg} ritual_{Loc.Sg}) ‘during the ongoing ritual, during the ritual as it progresses’, which may be found e.g. at *RV* 10.21.6:

³⁴ See n. 92 below for a detailed outline of those purposes.

³⁵ See Oberlies 2003: 304, but also throughout his section on the uses of the locative (2003: 348–58).

³⁶ See Whitney 1924, Speijer 1886, Delbrück 1888 or Haudry 1977.

tvām yajñēṣu īlaté ágne prayatí adhvaré
 you_{Acc.Sg} sacrifice_{Loc.Pl} praise_{3rd.Pl.Pres} Agni_{Voc.Sg} ongoing_{Loc.Sg} ritual_{Loc.Sg}
 ‘you they praise at the sacrifices, o Agni, at the ritual while it progresses’

prayatí is the present active participle of the verbal root $\sqrt{i}$ ‘to go’, prefixed with *pra* ‘ahead, forward’, standing in the locative singular masculine. It agrees with the locative singular of the word *adhvará* ‘sacrifice, (sacrificial) ritual’. *adhvaré* on its own, found about fifty times throughout the *Rigveda*,³⁷ means ‘at/during’ or ‘to’ the ritual, with the ‘pregnant’ use of the locative (e.g. at *RV* 1.142.13).³⁸ The expression *prayatí adhvaré* occurs in the *Rigveda* seven times, and usually stands parallel to other (clearly non-absolute) temporal expressions, as it also does here: the locative plural *yajñēṣu* (sacrifice_{Loc.Sg}) simply means ‘at/during the sacrifices’.³⁹

There is no clear-cut difference between the meaning of *adhvaré* and *prayatí adhvaré*: after all, things can only be said to happen ‘at’ or ‘during’ a ritual *while* that ritual is being performed. Adding *prayatí* to *adhvaré* stresses the proceeding of the ritual as part of which certain actions (such as calling to the god Agni) are performed. Translating *prayatí adhvaré* into English, it certainly is better to choose something like ‘during the course of the ritual, while the ritual proceeds’, rather than ‘during the sacrificial ritual, while it is ongoing’ or ‘during the ongoing ritual’. Yet that is a matter mostly of English style, and does not mean that the Sanskrit construction ought to be seen as absolute: after all, *adhvaré* can easily stand on its own. Nevertheless, *prayatí adhvaré* is the most frequently quoted example of an LA in Western philological literature.⁴⁰

The situation is similar in various other expressions throughout the *Rigveda* and later Sanskrit texts. At *RV* 6.23.1, for example, Indra is said to be linked to the soma *stóme bráhmaṇi śasyámāne*

³⁷ See Lubotsky 1997 s.v. *adhvaré*.

³⁸ ‘Dich rufen Sie zum Gottesdienst’, Geldner 1923 *ad loc.*; cf. Delbrück 1888: 121 on this locative usage.

³⁹ At *RV* 1.16.3 it stands parallel to *prātár* ‘early, in the morning’, at *RV* 8.3.5 to *samiké* ‘during the fight’, and at 8.7.6 to *nāktam* ‘at night’ and *dívā* ‘by day’.

⁴⁰ See Delbrück 1888: 387, Lehmann 1974, Frauzel 1998 and Ziegler 2002.

ukthé (worship_{Loc.Sg} prayer_{Loc.Sg} being-sung_{Loc.Sg} hymn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at worship, at prayer, and at the chanted hymn’.⁴¹ The fact that English might express the latter as ‘during the chanting of the hymn’ or ‘while the hymn is chanted’ again does not make *śasyāmāne ukthé* absolute. A hymn (*ukthá*) has the same kind of temporal dimension as *stóma* (worship) and *bráhman* (prayer): its performance, particularly as part of a religious ritual, is a ‘situation’ or an ‘event’. The participle *śasyāmāne* ‘being chanted’ emphasises the temporal aspects of the hymn’s semantics, but it can easily be omitted without rendering this expression non-functional or ungrammatical. This situational locative that includes a participle stands parallel to two other situational locatives which happen to consist of just one noun each.

Past passive participles are also employed in such constructions: *RV* 5.17.1 asks that a man may approach Agni for protection *kṛté svadhvaré* (made_{Loc.Sg} good-sacrifice_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the made good-sacrifice’, i.e. once the sacrificial rite had been prepared. *RV* 10.130.6 talks about the point at which the sacrificial rite has come into being: *yajñé jāté purāṇé* (sacrifice_{Loc.Sg} born_{Loc.Sg} old_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the having-been-born ancient sacrificial ritual, at the ancient ritual when it was born, when the ancient ritual had been born’.⁴² These expressions are very interesting: The ‘situational’ locative naturally denotes ‘at’ or ‘during’ something. As we saw in e.g. *prayatí adhvaré*, these semantics may further be supported by a present participle. A past participle, on the other hand, may fundamentally change the basic expression. Two putative examples shall serve to illustrate this situation: in an expression such as *‘at the having-been-begun event, when the event has been begun’, an omission of the participle ‘begun’ to give *‘at the event’ does

⁴¹ Compare also *ukthá-ukthe śasyāmāne* (hymn-hymn_{Loc.Sg} sung_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at every sung hymn’ (*RV* 10.45.10) or also *ukthéṣu śasyāmāneṣu* (hymn_{Loc.Pl} sung_{Loc.Pl}) ‘at hymns when they are sung’ (*RV* 10.72.1). (Geldner 1923 *ad loc.* translates the latter passage as ‘(announcing) in sung hymns’ (‘in vorgetragenen Liedern ankündigen’), thus seeing the expression as a complement of the verb rather than a temporal adverbial qualifying the entire clause, and providing us with yet another non-absolute interpretation of this expression.)

⁴² Geldner 1923 *ad loc.* understands *purāṇé* as meaning ‘in der Vorzeit’ (‘in earliest times’), thus reading the entire expression as ‘when the sacrifice had been created in earliest times’ (‘als das Opfer in der Vorzeit erschaffen war’).

not fundamentally change the expression: both concern the same period of time. Yet in a putative *‘at the having-been-finished event’, which effectively refers to the time *after* that event, omission of a participle results in a reference to a different time period, namely to that *at* or *during the event*. According to our criterion for ‘absolute-ness’ as formulated so far, neither of the expressions just discussed are absolute: omission of the participles does not lead to expressions that are ungrammatical (in both cases we still simply get *‘at the event’). Yet in the second case (‘at the finished event’), omission does effectively lead to a different expression, referring to the time *during the event* as opposed to *after the event*. The question we need to ask now is whether we see this difference as so fundamental as to consider the participle in question obligatory. Maybe the most accurate answer to this is that it *is* obligatory, yet for different reasons than in true ACs. *‘At the finished event’ is not an AC if we follow the criterion of the obligatory qualifier applied so far: omitting the participle, we are still left with a working and meaningful temporal expression. Yet for all other intents and purposes, it is so similar to an AC as to be indistinguishable from a practical point of view, the point of view of one speaking the language. What makes these expressions especially interesting is that they offer a gradual way into ‘absolute-ness’: simply replacing one participle by another in otherwise identical expressions can create (basically) absolute expressions. *‘At the begun event’ is not absolute; *‘at the finished event’ in a sense is.

To look at some actual examples of this type: in *vacasi avasite tasmin* (speech_{Loc.Sg} finished_{Loc.Sg} this_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at this finished speech, when this speech was finished’ (Kā. Ku. 2.53), we are looking at one of these ‘basically absolute’ constructions. Perhaps even more intriguing is *asamāpte pratikarmani* (unfinished_{Loc.Sg} adorning_{Loc.Sg}) ‘(you left) at the unfinished adorning (of my foot), before you had finished the adorning, while the adornment was (yet) unfinished’ (Kā. Ku. 4.19.2). This expression refers to the pedicure *while* it is still going on. Thus ‘during the unfinished adorning’ and a shortened *‘during the adorning’ are fundamentally parallel, and the expression not absolute in any sense. Nevertheless, referring to an ongoing action by referring to the end-point

that has not yet been reached seems rather ingenious.⁴³ And so, ‘at the finished action’ may be absolute, ‘at the not-finished action’ may be non-absolute, yet whatever we think about each, the most noteworthy features here are the strong parallels, which make the continuum between all these expressions much more noticeable than any supposed break between absolute and non-absolute.

It may be interesting to note that in the *Rigveda* such locative expressions display only participles which refer to the time *during/after the beginning of* the event in question (*when the sacrifice had been prepared, the ritual had been invented* etc.), rather than participles that effectively refer to a point that is outside of the action in question. This may be an indication that these expressions started out with regular references to ‘time when’/‘situation in which’, and developed later on in the ways we just saw – ways which may lead to absolute-ness.

4.4.b *Time, space and probably both*

As we saw above, event nouns – nouns denoting any kind of action or occurrence – standing in the locative are used in Sanskrit very freely to form temporal expressions. Unlike ‘pure’ temporal expressions, such as ‘at sunrise’ or ‘on Monday’, temporal expressions involving event nouns also have a spatial dimension: events happen in time, but necessarily also in space. To be present at a ritual or a dinner or a conversation means being *where* and *when* it is taking place. Again, when a participle is added to the basic noun, the expression as a whole does not thus become absolute. *dhāne hité*, a recurring expression in the *Rigveda*, may serve to demonstrate how many textual and linguistic issues are potentially relevant to our discussion of whether a given phrase is absolute or not.

The word *dhāna* means both ‘contest’ and ‘prize (in a contest)’. Its etymology is contested.⁴⁴ Either it is derived from the verbal root $\sqrt{dhan}$ ‘to run’, thus making the meaning of ‘contest, race’

⁴³ A parallel expression can be found in *asamāpte kratau tasmin* (unfinished_{Loc.Sg} rite_{Loc.Sg} this_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at this unfinished rite; at this rite, while it is not yet finished’ (*Rām.* 1.28.5).

⁴⁴ See *EWAia* s.v. *dhāna* for details and further literature.

primary. Alternatively, it may belong to the root $\sqrt{dhā}$ ‘to put, place’ and thus first means ‘that which is put down’, being later narrowed semantically to refer to the prize put down for the winner of a contest. Popular etymology may have linked *dhána* to either root. The expression *dhána hitá* (with *hitá* being the past passive participle of $\sqrt{dhā}$), literally a ‘put (down) *dhána*’ could indicate that at least the composers of the *Rigveda* saw *dhána* as derived from $\sqrt{dhā}$, hence coining this *figura etymologica*.

In the *Rigveda*, *dhána hitá* can refer to two things: the material prize that has been set/decided on, or the contest that has started.⁴⁵ The locative *dháne hité* is found in the *Rigveda* nine times.⁴⁶ Where we see it as referring to a race that has started, we have the same situation as in all the locative examples discussed above: a race has a temporal dimension, and thus is an *event* or a *situation*. Hence *dháne hité* simply means ‘in the contest that has begun, once the contest has begun’. Compare RV 9.53.2, where the speaker announces that he will sing praise *rathasamgé dháne hité* (chariot-together-going_{Loc.Sg} contest_{Loc.Sg} put_{Loc.Sg}) ‘during the meeting of chariots, during the fight once it has begun’. As in the examples from the ritual sphere discussed above (such as *prayatí adhvaré*), there is a parallel use of situational locatives with and without accompanying participles.

Yet even where we interpret *dhána hitá* as the prize that has been set, i.e. as a material object whose semantics do not have a temporal dimension, there is no need for viewing *dháne hité* as an LA. Compare RV 1.116.15: here, a racehorse by the name of Viśpalā is said to run *dháne hité*. While Griffith (1896) apparently interprets this as an LA and translates ‘(you gave her an iron leg so that she might move) what time the conflict opened’, Grassmann (1876–7) sees *dháne hité* as a simple pregnant spatial locative and translates ‘Ihr setztet ihr sogleich ein ehern Bein an, zum Kampfp reis hinzueilen’ (‘you straight away fitted her an iron leg [for her] to run to the prize’). Geldner chooses yet another interpretation

⁴⁵ Grassmann 1873 s.v. *dhána* states, ‘*hitám dhánam*, ‘the set battle prize, the battle prize is set... often means “the *fight* is opened/begun”’ (‘der ausgesetzte Kampfp reis, der Kampfp reis ist ausgesetzt... [heißt] oft so viel als: der *Kampf* ist eröffnet’ [italics original, A.R.].

⁴⁶ RV 1.40.2b (= 6.61.5b), 1.116.15, 1.132.5, 6.45.11, 6.45.13, 8.3.9, 9.53.2, 10.63.14.

and here sees *dhāne hité* as having the meaning of ‘for’:⁴⁷ ‘setztet ihr der Viśpalā sofort ein eisernes Bein ein, daß sie um den gesetzten Kampfpreis laufen konnte’ (‘you immediately fitted Viśpalā an iron leg so that she could run for the set contest prize’). One might also consider translating this locatival expression by means of the English ‘at’ in the sense of ‘near’: the prize had been set, and at/near/around it, the race was taking place.⁴⁸

I do not intend to argue for any one of these interpretations here. The aim of discussing this and previous examples in such detail has been to show how many different interpretations are possible for Rigvedic passages and to demonstrate that the assumption of an LA often is not necessary. (One also should note that a finite verbal translation of the participial phrases discussed above (such as ‘while the ritual proceeds’ for *prayatí adhvaré*) often is the best English equivalent of the Sanskrit original, and translations of this kind do not necessarily indicate that the translator saw an LA in a given passage.)

4.4.c Space

While some of the examples above had a spatial dimension, all of them were linked by their shared temporal dimension. This following section concentrates on expressions which are clearly not temporal. Yet as we shall see, many of these locatives are simply spatial.

At *RV* 4.6.4, the ‘sacrificer’ or priest is said to stand *stīrṇé barhīṣi samidhāné agnau* (strewn_{Loc.Sg} grass_{Loc.Sg} kindled_{Loc.Sg} fire_{Loc.Sg}) ‘on the strewn (sacrificial) grass, at/by the kindled fire’. At *RV* 6.40.3, the speaker utters the wish that fast horses may draw the god Indra *sámiddhe agnau suté sóme* (kindled_{Loc.Sg} fire_{Loc.Sg} pressed_{Loc.Sg} soma_{Loc.Sg}) ‘to the kindled fire, to the pressed Soma’. Such pregnant locatives are found after a number of verbs that

⁴⁷ Cf. Haudry 1977: 134–5 on the overlap of dative and locative of goal, and Speijer 1886: 111–12 on the so-called *nimittasaptamī*, the usage of the locative usually translated as ‘in the matter of’, ‘on account of which’.

⁴⁸ Geldner’s translation as ‘rennen um’ could mean ‘to run around’ as well as ‘to run for’. I do, however, not think that this ambiguity is intentional, or that the spatial sense is intended here.

express movement.⁴⁹ When the main verb is $\sqrt{hu}$ ‘to call, to invoke’ both the ‘normal’ and pregnant spatial interpretations seem equally possible: *tvā suté havāmahe* (you_{Acc.Sg} press_{Loc.Sg} call_{Ist.Pl.Pres}), as for example at *RV* 8.64.6, can mean both ‘we call you (standing) at the pressed (soma)’ and ‘we call you to the pressed (soma)’. Which interpretation is the correct one depends on the further context, yet neither of them requires us to see the locative expression as absolute.

At *RV* 10.103.11, we find a locative expression that could be understood to mean both ‘at’ and ‘among’: *asmākam índraḥ sāmṛteṣu dhvajēṣu* (we_{Gen.Pl} Indra_{Nom.Sg} gathered_{Loc.Pl} flag_{Loc.Pl}) ‘[may] Indra [be] at/among *our* gathered flags, (may *our* arrows be the ones that win)’.⁵⁰ Another locative that may well be interpreted as spatial is *RV* 10.88.2, which tells us that ‘the world was swallowed and concealed in darkness; light became apparent *jāté agnau* (born_{Loc.Sg} fire/Agni_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in fire or in Agni [the god of fire, fire personified, A.R.], when it/he was born’.

In effect, these latter two examples actually do have a noticeable temporal dimension to them: the flags are gathered for a specific *event*, and it is the *action* of kindling the fire that creates light. Yet this still does not mean that these expressions are absolute. Rather, it simply reflects the fact that both of these expressions, as all others above, include participles. Participles are verb forms and thus have temporal content. That e.g. *jāté agnau* may best be translated into English as ‘when fire was born’ rather than ‘in fire, when it was born’ is relevant only to us as speakers of English, not to the language from which these expressions are taken. Again, an expression may well be non-absolute, and still be best translated into English in the same way as an AC would be.

Sometimes, the impression of absolute-ness is created by the fact that the probably most idiomatic translation is rather far removed from the translation that reflects the simply spatial dimension of

⁴⁹ Compare e.g. *RV* 3.51.11 or 3.60.4 for further examples.

⁵⁰ The explicit presence of twice-repeated *asmākam* ‘of us’ at the beginning of each half-verse here serves to emphasise whose side the speaker wants to be victorious. The omission of the copula in the first half (*may Indra be* etc.) is normal throughout Sanskrit.

a locative. This is the case e.g. at Kā. *Ku.* 8.71, where a dress hanging from a tree in the moonlight can only be recognised for what it is *marute calati* (wind_{Loc.Sg} moving_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in the moving wind’, or in English: ‘when the wind blows’. While it is possible that this expression was intended by Kālidāsa to be absolute, i.e. to be understood without any spatial connotations and thus in a way which does not make sense when the participle is omitted, once again it seems more important to stress how close the two expressions are in Sanskrit, rather than to attempt a clear-cut distinction that would only be truly relevant from an English point of view. The same holds for Kā. *Ku.* 4.31:

<i>anaghā</i>	<i>api</i>	<i>hi</i>	<i>saṁśraya-drume</i>	<i>gaja-bhagne</i>
innocent _{Nom.Sg}	even	indeed	linked-tree _{Loc.Sg}	elephant-broken _{Loc.Sg}
<i>patanāya</i>	<i>vallarī</i>			
falling _{Dat.Sg}	creeper _{Nom.Sg}			

‘The creeper has to fall, though innocent, **when the tree that was its support is broken by an elephant** (lit. ‘in the elephant-broken link(ing)-tree’).’

(Transl. Smith 2005)

Given that a creeper, i.e. a vine, lives *in* the tree, this could quite simply be translated as ‘in the tree that was its support, when it was broken by an elephant, the creeper had to fall’. The literal translation may be awkward in compound-unfriendly English, but works elegantly in Sanskrit.

Typically, linguistic discussions of ACs quote just the absolute expression in question rather than also providing its matrix clause. Strictly speaking, this is not good practice, as only the context of the matrix clause allows us to see whether an expression is absolute or whether its case is governed/effected by some other element in the clause.⁵¹ Sometimes, furthermore, even the grammatical context is not actually enough to let us determine whether an expression is absolute or not. Rather, knowledge of the matter talked about is required. Several such cases can be found in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. In this dialogue between divine Krishna and the warrior

⁵¹ See also Section 2.3.c for a discussion of repeated phrases of which only some are absolute.

hero Arjuna, the former explains the doctrines on which much of modern Hinduism is based.⁵² One of the fundamental tenets of the *Gītā* is that the body is mortal while the soul is not. The soul finds a home in the body, but just as a man would cast off worn-out clothes and take on new ones, so the soul will seek a new body after the old one has died.⁵³ This is the light in which we need to read passages such as *BG* 2.20: *na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre* (not kill_{3rd.Sg.Pres.Pass} being-killed_{Loc.Sg} body_{Loc.Sg}) ‘Nor is it [the soul] killed in the body (when) that is being killed.’⁵⁴ Note that we find a present participle in this passage (and in both others as well): presumably, the soul is gone from the body once it is dead. Yet while it is *being killed*, the soul is still in it.

4.4.d Excursus: a particularly tricky case

Before finally looking at Sanskrit ACs, let us consider one last Rigvedic passage which usually is seen as clearly containing an absolute locative. This locative, I shall argue, also is simply spatial.

<i>vísve</i>	<i>devāḥ</i>	<i>akṛpanta</i>	<i>samīcyōḥ</i>	<i>niṣpātantyōḥ</i>
all _{Nom.Pl}	god _{Nom.Pl}	complain _{3rd.Pl.Impf}	combined _{Loc.Du}	flying-apart _{Loc.Du}

‘When the united pair flew apart all the gods complained.’ (*RV* 10.24.5)

The *Rigveda* contains numerous words, expressions and passages whose meaning is clear neither to us nor even to ancient

⁵² On recent reception and interpretation of the *Bhagavad Gītā* in India, see e.g. Minor 1986.

⁵³ *vāsāṃsi jīrṇāni yathā vihāya navāni grhṇāti naraḥ aparāni | tathā śarīrāni vihāya jīrṇāni anyāni samyāti navāni dehī* ‘Just as a man casts off his worn-out clothes and puts on other new ones, so the embodied soul casts off its worn-out bodies and takes on new ones’ (*BG* 2.22).

⁵⁴ The same holds for *BG* 8.20 and 13.28: *yaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu naśyatsu na vinaśyati* (who_{Nom.Sg} all_{Loc.Pl} being_{Loc.Pl} being-destroyed_{Loc.Pl} not destroy_{3rd.Sg.Pass}) ‘(there is an unmanifest state of being) which in all beings does not die when they die’ (*BG* 8.20), *samam sarveṣu bhūteṣu tiṣṭhantam paramēśvaram vinaśyatsu avinaśyantam yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati* (same_{Acc.Sg} all_{Loc.Pl} being_{Loc.Pl} standing_{Acc.Sg} highest-lord_{Acc.Sg} un-perishing_{Acc.Sg} who_{Nom.Sg} see_{3rd.Sg.Pres} he_{Nom.Sg} see_{3rd.Sg.Pres}) ‘He who sees the highest lord, existing alike in all beings, not perishing (in them) when they perish, truly sees’ (*BG* 13.28).

commentators.⁵⁵ The interpretation of *RV* 10.24.5 and the surrounding stanzas differs from translator to translator, and while some appear to see *samīcyóh niṣpátantyoḥ* as absolute, others do not. Let us take a step back and look at the various open questions and the information needed to answer them. This may serve as a cursory introduction to the factors that impede understanding of the *Rigveda* on both the linguistic and the cultural levels.

First of all, it is not immediately obvious who *RV* 10.24 is directed to: although it is transmitted as one hymn, modern translators/editors agree that it is to be split up into two halves. The first half (three stanzas) is explicitly addressed to the god Indra. The second half is addressed to two gods (*devā*_{Voc.Du}, 10.24.6) that are described as strong (*śakrā*) and possessing magical power (*māyāvinā*, both 10.24.4). Modern translators such as Geldner follow the interpretation of Sāyana, an influential fourteenth-century commentator on the *Rigveda* who identifies these two as the *Aśvin*, a pair of Vedic gods whose horse-drawn chariot leads the sun (their father) through the sky. The verse preceding the one quoted here mentions Vimada, a young man whom the *Aśvin* are said to have helped find a wife. That, combined with the fact that exactly *two* gods are addressed, is the reason for seeing the *Aśvin* as the addressees here.

The next important question pertains to what the *samīcī* ‘the two united ones’ are. *Samīcī* (or here the locative form *samīcyóh*) is a feminine dual, hence we are looking for a term of those grammatical properties. Sāyana⁵⁶ interprets the ‘united pair’ as the two *arāṇī* (feminine dual), the two sticks used to kindle fire.⁵⁷ At *RV* 10.184, the *Aśvin* are linked with the *arāṇī*, yet there, in a hymn asking for a successful pregnancy, those sticks are not used to start a fire, but mentioned in the context of the creation of

⁵⁵ See e.g. Bechert and Simson 1979: 51, who argue that ‘while the belief in the magic effect of each individual syllable has preserved the text itself, the exact understanding of the words appears to have suffered early on’ (‘Während aber der Glaube an die magische Wirksamkeit jeder einzelnen Silbe den Text selbst konserviert hat, scheint das genaue Wortverständnis früh gelitten zu haben’).

⁵⁶ As summed up in Geldner 1923 *ad loc.*

⁵⁷ As mentioned e.g. at *RV* 7.1.1, which describes how fire is ignited with (literally there ‘from’) these kindling sticks.

life (which supposedly⁵⁸ is to be seen as parallel to the creation of fire). Geldner speculates that the context at 10.24 might be an otherwise unknown part ('ein verhüllter Zug') of the Vimada legend, in which Vimada may have used the kindling sticks 'in the meaning alluded to at 10.184.3, and on that occasion they flew apart'.⁵⁹

Sāyana's interpretation has the advantage of linking three elements from these lines (the Aśvins, the mention of Vimada, the interpretation of the *samīcyóḥ* as the *aráñī*) in a way that is at least possible. Yet as we can see, there is a lot of guesswork here, both ancient and modern. This interpretation is complicated by the fact that in all of the ten other instances that *samīcī*_{Fem. Du} 'the united two' are mentioned in the *RV*,⁶⁰ the term refers either to the *ródasī*_{Fem. Du} 'the two worlds' (i.e. heaven and earth, or rather deified Heaven and Earth) or *naktoṣāsā*_{Fem. Du} 'night and dawn/day', who in turn are very closely linked to Heaven and Earth. And so both Grassmann and Ludwig, the authors of the two translations of the *Rigveda* into German before Geldner, as well as Griffith in his 1896 English translation interpret *samīcī* (or again, the locative *samīcyóḥ*) as referring to the *ródasī*, the two worlds. According to the *Rigveda*, Heaven and Earth were made by the creator god Tvaṣṭṛ, who firmly joined them together (*RV* 4.56.3). The god Indra is said to have split the two and is now supporting the sky (cf. e.g. *RV* 2.15.2), thus holding Heaven and Earth apart (like an axle holds two wheels apart, *RV* 10.89.4).

Coming back to where we started, what does the above mean for our question of whether *samīcyóḥ niṣpátantyoḥ* is absolute or not? For one, if we can indeed see the *samīcī* as the *ródasī* here, a simple spatial interpretation is possible: the *ródasī* are the space in which the gods live, and it thus is *in* the two worlds, as they were flying

⁵⁸ See Geldner 1923 *ad loc.* for links to other passages that imply this link.

⁵⁹ 'For the production of offspring, Vimada may then have made use of the golden kindling sticks in the sense that is alluded to at 10.184.3, and on that occasion they flew away' ('Zur Erzielung von Nachkommenschaft mag dann Vimada die goldenen Reibhölzer in dem 10.184.3 angedeuteten Sinn in Anspruch genommen haben, und bei dieser Gelegenheit flogen sie davon') (Geldner 1923 *ad loc.*, note on stanzas 4–5).

⁶⁰ Referring to 'morning/day and night': 1.96.5, 2.3.6, probably also 3.55.12; referring to 'the two worlds': 1.69.1, 2.27.15, 3.1.7, 3.30.11, 3.55.20, 8.6.17, 10.24.4, 10.88.16.

apart, that all the gods complained. Yet even if we do not think that this spatial interpretation is likely, there are two further options. One, we can follow Geldner. He identifies the ‘united pair’ with the kindling sticks, sees the locative expression as the object of $\sqrt{krap}$ ‘to wail, bewail, miss’, and thus translates ‘all the gods longed for the pair that was flying away’.⁶¹ This is not as straightforward as it may sound given that the verb $\sqrt{krap}$ usually governs objects in the accusative.⁶² Sanskrit verbs often govern objects in whatever case makes sense semantically, and we do find verbs meaning ‘to rejoice in, be happy about’ taking locative complements.⁶³ Yet while it thus is *possible* that we here have a rare case of $\sqrt{krap}$ governing a locative, it is difficult to say with any certainty whether this *actually* is the correct interpretation. Alternatively, we have the option of saying that *samīcyōḥ niṣpātantyōḥ* is not governed by $\sqrt{krap}$, and that the notion of the gods being inside the worlds is irrelevant here (or that the ‘united pair’ refers to the kindling sticks when they putatively flew apart), and that therefore we are dealing with an AC. One possible problem with this approach: going through all the possible instances of the LA in the *Rigveda*, the only unambiguously absolute expressions involve expressions of natural time, or more specifically: the rise of the sun (see the example at the beginning of this chapter, and those in the next section). We would thus be dealing with a noticeable exception here – an AC not part of an otherwise very homogeneous group. Yet of course such statistics do not offer any certainty that this specific construction, from one of the younger books of the *Rigveda*, is not indeed an early instance of a regular, semantically not limited LA. (And, similar to the situation in Homer, there once again are two levels of interpretation: how this expression was perceived at the time when this text was composed, and how it was perceived in the

⁶¹ ‘Alle Götter hatten nach dem wegfliegenden Paar Sehnsucht.’

⁶² Cf. e.g. Grassmann 1873 s.v.

⁶³ Delbrück 1888: 118. There are a number of instances where the logical opposite of an idea is expressed by parallel grammatical means as that idea itself (such as the postposition *vinā* ‘without’ standing with the comitative-instrumental, which, strictly speaking, makes sense only in the case of *saha* ‘with’). And so here, too, we may have an instance of something like *‘complaining in’ formed in analogy with a more regular ‘rejoicing in’.

many centuries of Vedic reception, especially by the time when the LA was a productive, semantically unrestricted construction.)

There are several points to discussing this one obscure passage in such great detail. In Sanskrit even more than in other languages, and in the *Rigveda* even more than in later texts,⁶⁴ we need to

⁶⁴ This applies also to other supposed LAs such as *RV* 10.61.6, a hymn which Grassmann 1876–7 *ad loc.* considers as a late addition to the (already presumed late) corpus of Book 10, and on which he comments that ‘[t]he entire hymn is full of bombast and intentional obscurity, and filled with images coming from brutes sensuality. Its interpretation, as far as it is possible at all, is quite uncertain in many places.’ (‘Das ganze Lied ist voller Schulst und absichtlichen Dunkels, und mit Bildern ausgefüllt, die aus der rohesten Sinnlichkeit entstammen. Die Auslegung, wofern sie überhaupt möglich ist, bleibt vielfach sehr unsicher’.) Ludwig 1876–88: 523 comments ‘This *nābhā nedīṣṭham sūktam* belongs to the most difficult, one is almost tempted to say most hopeless, parts of the *Rigveda*. The *sūktam* consists of several parts that do not have anything to do with one another and in which a lost understanding of what actually is has been replaced by a mystical interpretation.’ (‘Dieses Nābhā nedīṣṭham sūktam gehört zu den schwierigsten, fast möchte man sagen hoffnungslosesten partien des Rgveda. Das sūktam zerfällt in mehrere teile, die miteinander nichts zu schaffen, und in welchen das verloren gegangene verständnis des tatsächlichen einer mystischen auffassung platz gemacht hat.’) The Sanskrit is *madhyā yāt kṛtvam ābhavat abhīke kāmam kṛvānē pitāri yuvatyām | manānāk rētaḥ jahatuḥ viyāntā sānau nṣiktam sukrāsya yōnau* (amidstAdv. whatNom.Sg having-to-be-doneNom.Sg Was3rd.Sg movement-towardsLoc.Sg loveAcc.Sg makingLoc.Sg fatherLoc.Sg young-womanLoc.Sg anger-dispellingNom.Sg ejaculationAcc.Sg left-behind3rd.Du apart-goingNom.Du mountain-peakLoc.Sg poured-downAcc.Sg well-madeGen.Sg lap/womb/resting-placeLoc.Sg). The preceding and following stanzas indicate that these two lines talk about a sexual encounter between either the sky or some other paternal/creating deity and the earth. Ludwig 1876–88: 641–2 translates ‘when the action during their encounter was in progress, **when the father carried out his desire with his daughter**, down to men they let fall the seed, that had been poured out onto the high back, as they parted’ (‘als mitten im verlauf war beim zusammentreffen der vorgang, **als seine lust der vater an der tochter vollführte**, bisz zum menschen hernider lieszen fallen den samen die beiden sich trennend, den auf dem hohen rücken ausgegossenzen, auf der guttat stätte hinab’; locatival expressions in bold). Griffith 1896 *ad loc.* translates ‘When the deed was done in mid-heaven **in the proximity of the father working his will, and the daughter coming together**, they let the seed fall slightly.’ Grassmann 1876–7 *ad loc.* renders the locatives as ‘[i]n the meantime, what needed to be done before, **when the father cooled his love with his young daughter**, [that was done]’ (‘Was inzwischen zu thun war, **als der vater seine lust an der jungen tochter kühlte**, [das geschah]’). Geldner 1923 *ad loc.* translates ‘In mid-work at the (sexual) encounter, **at which the father was involved with the young woman**, there both, when they parted, left behind a little (?) seed, which had been spilled on the ground, at the place of the good deed’ (‘Als man mitten bei der arbeit war bei der (Liebesbegegnung), **da der vater bei der jungfrau der liebe pflegte**, da ließen beide im Auseinandergehen ein wenig (?) Samen zurück, der auf dem Boden (der Erde) vergossen war, auf dem platz des guten Werks.’ So we find the locatival expression twice translated as an LA (Ludwig, Grassmann), once as a clear spatial locative (Griffith), and once in a rather ambiguous manner (Geldner). Two things are important here: 10.61.6 may indeed be an example of a Rigvedic LA, yet a purely spatial interpretation is also possible. More importantly, however, we have

be careful with what we call ‘absolute’. Even if we do see certain constructions as absolute, the closeness between absolute and non-absolute expressions is more striking and noticeable by far. This in turn is relevant for the question of how ACs may have developed: once the seed had been sown and the first ACs had come into being (and again I shall argue, immediately below, that this seed exists in expressions of natural time), the ways in which ACs could expand would be numerous.

4.5 Actual Rigvedic LAs: expressions of natural time

As we have seen, there is a large number of constructions in Sanskrit that could be absolute, but are not necessarily so, and many that look absolute, but are not. There is, however, also a class of expressions that are clearly absolute, and that can be found from the *Rigveda* on. These share a semantic feature: they refer to what I suggest to call ‘natural’ time. There are various events or situations to which we can temporally relate other occurrences; cf. ‘before breakfast’, ‘during the meeting’, ‘after England had won the World Cup’. Yet there also are events that occur naturally and in a regular pattern, and are thus excellent for keeping time by: sunrise, sunset, the alternation of day and night, the phases of the moon, the change of the seasons, the rhythm of the passing years.⁶⁵ While all are expressions of time, these latter are expressions of what I have been calling ‘natural’ time.

At least in the *Rigveda* and with only few exceptions⁶⁶ also in the *Brāhmaṇas*,⁶⁷ prose commentaries on each of the Vedas outlining the proper procedure of the ritual, unambiguous LAs are limited to this type of expression of natural time. The majority of them are concerned with sunrise. Compare the following example:

once again seen that many factors (obscure words, or here: obscure/unclear word uses, obscure statements whose translations/interpretations are problematic, presumed contexts) need to be considered before we can securely describe a locative expression as absolute.

⁶⁵ For the latter cf. e.g. the Homeric περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν ‘as the years went round’ (*Il.* 2.551).

⁶⁶ See e.g. *ŚB* 7.5.2.44 in Section 4.7 below.

⁶⁷ I am here relying on the collection provided by Oertel 1926.

yát adyá *sūrye* *udyatī* prīyakṣatrāḥ ṛtām dadhá
 when today sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg} dear-ruler_{Voc.Pl} right_{Acc.Sg} give_{2nd.Pl.Perf}
 ‘when you, beloved rulers, appoint the rite **at sunrise** (lit. ‘at the rising sun’)
 today’ (RV 8.27.19, transl. after Griffith 1896)

sūrye udyatī (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the rising sun, at sunrise’ is clearly absolute: a spatial or even abstract interpretation of this locative expression does not make sense, but rather, it has to be seen as temporal. As it is not possible for the noun ‘sun’ to stand on its own and function as a temporal expression, the participial attribute ‘rising, going up’ cannot be omitted, thus counting as ‘obligatory’. Yet although this construction is absolute, it remains close to regular temporal expressions: the present participle gives it the meaning of ‘while/during’ regularly denoted by the locative case.

This is the only case of such an LA in the *Rigveda*: all other LAs consist of a word for ‘sun’ combined with the past participle: *sūr(y)e údite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}), literally ‘at the risen sun’.⁶⁸ Here, the normal locative meaning of ‘at’ or ‘during’ an event is absent: although literally ‘at the having-risen sun’, this expression in effect refers to the time *after* sunrise.⁶⁹ ‘After’ is not a notion included in the semantics of the ordinary temporal locative. Thus once again the simple *formal* extension to include not just present but also past participles creates a noticeable *semantic* extension of the AC. In the *Brāhmaṇas*, we find another formal extension of this expression: the participle is negated, resulting in *anudite sūrye*, literally ‘at the unrisen sun’, i.e. ‘when the sun has not (yet) risen’. This expression appears forty-eight times in Oertel’s corpus of Brāhmaṇic prose (e.g. at TB 2.1.2.12). Effectively, *‘at the unrisen sun’ refers to the time *before* sunrise. Once again, a

⁶⁸ The other instances of this expression are RV 3.15.2, 5.54.10, 7.63.5, 7.65.1, 7.66.4, 7.66.7, 7.66.12, 8.1.29, 8.13.13, 8.27.21.

⁶⁹ From their context, we cannot say whether *sūrye udyatī* and *sūr(y)e údite* actually do refer to different points of time, or whether the one *sūrye udyatī* means the same as the eleven instances of *sūr(y)e údite*. Yet without any external evidence either way, it seems preferable to see the two different expressions as different in meaning. Furthermore, that *sūr(y)e údite* refers to a time later than *sūrye udyatī* is indicated by the order in which they appear in 8.27, with *sūrye udyatī* coming first in stanza 19 and *sūre údite* following in stanza 21 (many thanks to Stephanie Jamison for pointing this out to me).

simple formal extension effects that a new semantic slot can now be filled with this construction: through the inclusion of not just present, but also past participles, and then through their negation, the same construction can now be employed to talk not just about sunrise, but also the time before and after it. The importance of sunrise (and the period preceding it) for different parts of the Vedic ritual⁷⁰ explains why the variant forms of this expression occur so frequently.

What we find in Vedic provides us with an interesting parallel for the situation in Early Latin: in Plautus and Terence, the expressions *me* (or *te*, *ero* etc.) *praesente* and *me* (etc.) *absente* are both frequent. Yet while *me praesente* still contains the semantics of the comitative instrumental, the case that probably underlies this kind of AA, use of the formally parallel *me absente* creates a new meaning that in effect is far removed from its underlying semantics. *me praesente* can denote a regular, physical comitative: someone does something *together with me*. *me absente*, on the other hand, can only be seen as what one might call a ‘situational’ comitative: someone does something together with the factor/situation of my absence. (Equally, in (an)udite *sūrye*, something happens at/during the *situation* ‘the sun has (not) risen’.) Thus once again, a (pro)noun without temporal semantics is effectively employed to denote a situation, an event, i.e. something that does have a temporal dimension. This in turn necessitates the presence of the (participial) qualifier. When *me absente* has begun being used in this ‘situational value’, *me praesente* can be used in the same way (see Section 3.5 for examples and details).

In later writings, many unquestionable LAs still refer to ‘natural’ time. It is particularly interesting to see what Kālidāsa makes of these constructions. Generally speaking, the language of his plays and poems is rather artful and elaborate. It abounds in long compounds and nominal syntax, including some intricate LAs. Compare Kā. Ku. 8.84.2, where a character is said to act *jyotiṣām avanatāsu pañktiṣu* (light_{Gen.Pl} down-bowed_{Loc.Pl} five_{Loc.Pl}) *‘at the bowed-down five-lines of (heavenly) lights’, ‘when the lines

⁷⁰ See Gonda 1980: 241–2, and *ibid.* Chapter 12 on time in Vedic religion in general.

of stars had set'. The past participle makes this locative expression effectively speak about the time *after* an event rather than during it, and rather than referring to something simple such as 'at dawn', he refers to a very specific occurrence, namely the setting of a distinct constellation. This still is just an (absolute) expression of natural time; nevertheless, it is far removed from *sūrye udyatí* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) 'at sunrise'.

4.6 LAs in context

Now that we have seen what actual early LAs look like, we need to consider them in their grammatical context. Like supposedly absolute expressions such as *prayatí ádhvare* (RV 10.21.6, see discussion in Section 4.4.a above), LAs particularly in the *Rigveda* often stand in parallel with ordinary temporal expressions. At RV 8.27.19–20, for example, the absolute *sūrye udyatí* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) 'at the rising sun, at sunrise' is followed by a string of temporal locatives: *nimrúci* 'at sunset', *prabúdhi* 'at awakening' (i.e. 'when it is time to wake up, in the morning'), *madhyāṃdine diváh* (middle_{Loc.Sg} day_{Gen.Sg}) 'in the middle of the day' and *abhipitvé* (dusk_{Loc.Sg}) 'at dusk'.

Also, there are a number of expressions of natural time in which the omission of a participle (usually a past participle!) would not make the remainder of the construction ungrammatical, but would change its meaning. Parallel to simple time expressions such as *uśasi* (dawn_{Loc.Sg}) 'at dawn', we find *uchántyām uśasi* (gleaming_{Loc.Sg} dawn_{Loc.Sg}) 'at dawn, when it lit up, at the crack of dawn' (RV 1.184.1), which appears to focus specifically on one part of dawn rather than the entire period between the first reddening of the sky and the actual appearance of the sun. Across Vedic prose,⁷¹ we find the expression *uśasi āgatāyām* (dawn_{Loc.Sg} having-come_{Loc.Sg}) *'at having-come dawn', 'when dawn has come' (AB 4.9.2). Other expressions also focus on one particular point in a temporal event, usually its beginning: *sāye bhūte* (evening_{Loc.Sg} having-become_{Loc.Sg}) *'in the evening, when it has started', 'when

⁷¹ As listed by Oertel 1926 *passim*.

evening has come’ (*ŚB* 7.3.2.18), *rātryām bhūtāyām* (night_{Loc.Sg} having-become_{Loc.Sg}) *‘at night, when it has come’, ‘when night has fallen’ (*KB* 7.10), *kāle āgate* (right-time_{Loc.Sg} come_{Loc.Sg}) *‘at the right time, when it has come’, ‘when the right time has come’ (*TB* 3.3.9.12). Note that, by focusing on the beginning of a time period, these expressions do not extend beyond the regular semantic range of a temporal locative: they still refer to a point *during* said period, not before or after it. An interesting lexicalisation of these expressions can be found in the considerable number of passages in which *udite*, *anudite* or *bhūte* are used elliptically to stand for *sūrye udite* etc.⁷²

And once again we can see authors such as Kālidāsa expanding the artistic possibilities of an expression. Compare Brāhmaṇic *sāye bhūte* ‘when evening has come’ or any of the other examples just given with *tri-bhāga-śeṣāsu niśāsu* (three-part-remaining_{Loc.Pl} night_{Loc.Pl}) ‘whenever only the third part of the night remained’ (lit. ‘during nights which were third-part-remaining’ Kā. *Ku.* 5.57, talking about a series of identical nights).⁷³ An even more unusual expression can be found at Kā. *Ku.* 7.6:

<i>maitre</i>	<i>muhūrte</i>	<i>śaśalakṣaṇena</i>	<i>yogam</i>	<i>gatāsu</i>
favourable _{Loc.Sg}	moment _{Loc.Sg}	hare-sign _{Instr.Sg}	link _{Acc.Sg}	gone _{Loc.Pl}
<i>uttaraphalgunīṣu</i>				
further-Phalgunī _{Loc.Pl}				

Phalgunī is the day of the new moon during the month of Phalgunā, and thus denotes a point/period in time. Literally, this passage translates to something like ‘at/during the later-Phalgunīs, when they went to a link (i.e. became joined) with the hare-sign (i.e. the moon)’. Smith (2005) translates ‘at the auspicious time when the twelfth lunar house was in conjunction to the hare-marked moon’. In spite of its elaborate nature, this is nothing other

⁷² See Oertel 1926 *passim*.

⁷³ Yet similar ‘extensions’ are also already found in the epics, although they appear there more rarely: in addition to ten instances of *rātryām vyatītāyām* (night_{Loc.Sg} having-gone-past_{Loc.Sg}) *vel sim.* ‘when the night was over’, we find *eka-yāma-avaśiṣṭāyām rātryām* (one-watch-remained_{Loc.Sg} night_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when only one watch remained of the night’, lit. ‘at one-nightwatch-remaining night’ at *Rām.* 2.6.5.

than an expression of natural time, which furthermore stands in parallel to another, much simpler temporal locative, *maitre muhūrte* (friendly_{Loc.Sg} moment_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at a favourable moment’.

Already in late Vedic times, we can see the scope of the LA extended not just in the ways illustrated above. We also find unambiguously absolute constructions that do not denote ‘natural time’:

<i>prajāpateḥ</i>	<i>visrastāt</i>	<i>āpaḥ</i>	<i>āyan</i>	<i>tāsu</i>
Prajāpati _{Abl.Sg}	disjointed _{Abl.Sg}	water _{Nom.Pl}	go _{3rd.Pl.Impf}	they _{Loc.Pl}
<i>itāsu</i>	<i>aviśat</i>			
having-gone _{Loc.Pl}	sit _{3rd.Sg.Impf}			
‘From Prajāpati when he had become disjointed the waters went (away).’				
When they had gone (away), he settled down (= collapsed/dissolved).’				
(ŚB 7.5.2.44)				

Note that *tāsu itāsu* unquestionably is an LA, but that it follows upon an expression that formally is completely parallel but stands in a regular, not an absolute case. An interesting phenomenon may furthermore be observed in Brāhmaṇic prose: here, the majority of locative expressions involving participles of the verb ‘to come’⁷⁴ employ a head noun that refers to time, giving us e.g. *uṣasi āgatāyām* (dawn_{Loc.Sg} having-come_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when dawn has arrived’ or lit. ‘at dawn, when it has arrived’ or *kāle/ṛtau āgate* (right moment/time_{Loc.Sg.Masc} having-come_{Loc.Sg.Masc}) ‘when the right moment has come’. Yet in addition to these we also find a few expressions which may actually be absolute, such as *some rājani āgate* (Soma_{Loc.Sg} king_{Loc.Sg} having-arrived_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when King Soma had arrived (the guest-offering is spread)’ (*AB* 1.15.6) or *teṣu āgateṣu* (they_{Loc.Pl} having-come_{Loc.Pl}) ‘when they had come (he was afraid)’ (*JB* 1.245). If these are indeed absolute,⁷⁵ they could be seen as another example of a step-by-step spread of ACs on the basis of formally identical expressions.

⁷⁴ Oertel 1926: 168–72.

⁷⁵ The locative at *AB* 1.15.6 could simply be dative (cf. Haudry 1977: 134–5 on dative–locative overlap), and that at *JB* 1.245 could be the object of the verb (that which one is afraid of may stand in the ablative or genitive, more rarely on the locative, instrumental or accusative; see e.g. Monier-Williams 1888 s.v. $\sqrt{bhī}$ ‘to fear’ and the noun *bhī* ‘fear’).

For a later example in which an apparent LA stands in parallel with a non-absolute expression, see *BG* 1.39:

<i>kula-kṣaye</i> family-destruction _{Loc.Sg}	<i>praṇaśyanti</i> destroy _{3rd.Pl.Pres.Pass}	<i>kula-dharmāḥ</i> family-law _{Nom.Pl}	<i>sanātanaḥ</i> eternal _{Nom.Pl}
<i>dharme</i> law _{Loc.Sg}	<i>naṣṭe</i> destroyed _{Loc.Sg}	<i>kulam</i> family _{Acc.Sg}	<i>kṛtsnam</i> whole _{Acc.Sg}
<i>abhibhavati</i> over-be _{3rd.Sg.Pres}	<i>uta</i> also	<i>adharmāḥ</i> non-law _{Nom.Sg}	

‘In the destruction of family the ancient family laws vanish. **When the law has been destroyed**, lawlessness overpowers the entire family also.’

dharme naṣṭe (law_{Loc.Sg} destroyed_{Loc.Sg}) probably has to be seen as an LA: after all, *dharma* ‘law, religious duty, custom’ does not denote an event or situation, i.e. does not have a temporal dimension. One may also find it difficult to see the law as a ‘space in which’ something could be destroyed. Thus the one syntactic interpretation of *dharme naṣṭe* that we are left with is as an absolute ‘once/when the law has been destroyed’. Yet even if we do not see *dharme* as spatial in any way and thus as absolute, we must note the formal, semantic and positional parallel *kula-kṣaye* (family-destruction_{Loc.Sg}), another ‘situational’ locative introducing a metrical line. *dharme naṣṭe* may be absolute, but it seems that the similarities between absolute and non-absolute nominal expressions were noted more than the differences. In short, as we have seen in a variety of ways, even actual LAs are linked to their syntactic surroundings more than they are somehow separate from them.

4.7 The Sanskrit perspective

Now that we have looked both at the LA and its environment, and seen not just a number of forms in which non-absolute expressions appear, but also how similar they may be to actually absolute expressions, let us take into account the native grammatical perspective. The oldest grammatical study of Sanskrit that we have available is the grammar of Pāṇini, which is estimated to have been written by the mid fourth century BC.⁷⁶ It is heir to what is assumed

⁷⁶ See n. 10 above.

to be a long grammatical tradition and, similar to Homer's version of the tales surrounding the Trojan war and its aftermath, was considered so far superior to its predecessors that it is the only one of its kind which was passed down to posterity.

Western views on the LA may be distorted through prior knowledge of (and comparison with) languages such as Latin and Greek. The view of a speaker of Sanskrit in ancient India would not have been affected by such influences. It is not certain to what extent Sanskrit would still have been regularly spoken at the time when Pāṇini's grammar was written: on the one hand, it seems very likely that active competence of Sanskrit was common at least among the educated. Otherwise, Pāṇini would presumably not have written his grammar *in* Sanskrit. On the other hand, the simple fact that it was felt to be necessary to write grammars, i.e. to record the rules of a language lest knowledge of them be lost, indicates that this knowledge was not entirely commonplace any more. The fact that almost all subsequent written Sanskrit simply follows the rules laid out by Pāṇini,⁷⁷ basically freezing written Sanskrit for a millennium and a half, also indicates that his grammar was the writers' main source of information on 'correct' Sanskrit. (By the time of Kālidāsa, particularly simpler characters and women typically speak Prakrit.⁷⁸)

Before we look at Pāṇini's writing,⁷⁹ a short note on his style is necessary. As Böhtlingk (1887: xxiv) remarks, 'The greatest possible conciseness and avoidance of any repetition were his goal, and this was achieved without any doubt.'⁸⁰ As we shall see immediately below, this 'conciseness' means that Pāṇini's language is almost entirely technical, leading to a long line of (Indian, and later Western) commentators interpreting (or almost translating) Pāṇini's aphoristic work. Pāṇini's grammar is called the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or 'Eight Chapters'. As the name suggests, it consists of eight units, which are further split up into nearly 4,000

⁷⁷ For an overview of the non-Pāṇinian elements of Epic Sanskrit, see Oberlies 2003: xxvii–lvi.

⁷⁸ E.g. the actress or the buffoon in *The Recognition of Śakuntalā*.

⁷⁹ Some editions: Böhtlingk 1887, Katre 1987 or Cardona 1988.

⁸⁰ 'Erstrebt wird die möglichste Kürze und Vermeidung aller Wiederholungen, und dieses wird ohne allen Zweifel erreicht.'

so-called *sūtras* ('threads' or 'rules'). A popular source for examples to illustrate each *sūtra* is the seventh-century *Kāśikā*. In this section, the annotations of the seventeenth-century commentary *Siddhānta Kaumudī* are consulted for further comparison.

The *sūtra* that is accepted by Western philologists as 'explaining the locative absolute'⁸¹ is 2.3.37:

yasya	ca	bhāvena	bhāva-lakṣaṇam
which _{Gen.Sg}	and	being _{Instr.Sg}	being-sign _{Nom.Sg}

Böhtlingk (1887) translates this as 'That, too, stands in the locative through the being of which another being is further characterised.'⁸² Literally translated, the line says 'and [that, too, stands in the locative/seventh case] through the being of which [there is] a sign/indication of being'. This *sūtra* follows upon the one which introduces the adverbial locative, 2.3.36:⁸³

saptamī	adhikaraṇe	ca
seventh	adhikaraṇa _{Loc.Sg}	and
'the seventh case [is used in this] and ⁸⁴ in/for the <i>adhikaraṇa</i> '		

The term *adhikaraṇa* literally means 'a doing (*karaṇa*) beyond, in addition, to a great extent (*adhi*)'. It is used to refer to a variety of apparently unrelated things. In his shorter Sanskrit dictionary,⁸⁵ Böhtlingk lists bowls/receptacles of any kind, a part, chapter, element of something. When *adhikaraṇa* is used as a grammatical term, he describes it as standing for the 'Lokativbegriff', i.e. 'that which the locative denotes'. We must assume that Böhtlingk gave this latter meaning specifically to explain this passage (and any expanding on it). Looking at the two *sūtras* together (they are linked with *ca* 'and') makes their meaning

⁸¹ 'Erklärung des Locativus Absolutus': Böhtlingk 1887: 60.

⁸² 'Auch dasjenige steht im Locativ, durch dessen Sein ein anderes Sein näher gekennzeichnet wird.'

⁸³ Other *sūtras* discussing the locative are concerned with its temporal use in the meaning 'since' (in which it overlaps with the ablative: 2.3.7), and locatives governed by verbs (2.3.9: e.g. 'be lord/master over something') or adjectives (2.3.43: e.g. 'good for').

⁸⁴ 'And' because the preceding *sūtra* talks about the cases in which we can find the adjective *dūra* 'far, distant' (which includes the locative).

⁸⁵ Böhtlingk 1879–89. In his full *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* (Böhtlingk 1855–75) furthermore includes the general meanings of 'relationship' and 'material'.

clearer: 2.3.36 presumably refers to the core meaning of the locative, indicating a space or spot where. Among the examples that later commentators supply are expressions such as *dūre/antike grāmasya* (distance_{Loc.Sg}/proximity_{Loc.Sg} village_{Gen.Sg}) ‘at a distance, far from/in the vicinity of, close to the village’. Accordingly 2.3.37 would refer to the less core usages, i.e. not the physical space in which an action takes place, but other kinds of background information, such as concurrent events, temporal or mental spaces (as discussed at length in Section 4.4). Although an LA would thus fall within the category covered by 2.3.37, that *sūtra* cannot be said to *refer* to an LA. To claim that this is the case would be like seeing a direct reference to turquoise in a simple mention of the concept of ‘colour’.

Other grammars echo Pāṇini’s wording, but slightly change the focus of the *sūtra*, or rather: make it more specific. In the *Siddhānta Kaumudī* the pure ‘being’ is replaced by a ‘doing’:

<i>yasya</i>	<i>kriyayā</i>	<i>kriya-antaram</i>	<i>lakṣyate</i>
which _{Gen.Sg}	doing _{Instr.Sg}	doing-other _{Nom.Sg}	perceive _{3rd.Sg.Pres.Pass}
<i>tataḥ</i>	<i>saptamī</i>	<i>syāt</i>	
then	seventh _{Nom.Sg}	be _{3rd.Sg.Pres.Opt}	
‘[when] through the doing of something another doing/action (or: the doing of something else) is perceived, then [this] should be [in] the locative’			

In spite of this change – which perhaps can be seen as emphasising that background events usually involve actions rather than states? – this description covers much more than just the LA. Again, it includes any ‘situational’ use of the locative. But there is the *Kāśikā* (seventh century AD), which states:

<i>saptamī</i>	<i>iti</i>	<i>varṭate</i>	<i>bhāvaḥ</i>	<i>kriyā</i>	
seventh _{Nom.Sg}	thus	be/mean _{3rd.Sg.Pres}	being _{Nom.Sg}	doing _{Nom.Sg}	
‘The seventh case is used in this way: Being [and] doing.					
<i>yasya</i>	<i>ca</i>	<i>bhāvena</i>	<i>yasya</i>	<i>ca</i>	<i>kriyayā</i>
which _{Gen.Sg}	and	being _{Instr.Sg}	which _{Gen.Sg}	and	doing _{Inst.Sg}
<i>kriya-antaram</i>	<i>lakṣyate</i>				
doing-other _{Nom.Sg}	perceive _{3rd.Sg.Pres.Pass}				
[When] through the doing or being of something another doing is					

tataḥ bhāvavataḥ saptamī vibhaktiḥ bhavati
 then being-having_{Gen.Sg} seventh_{Nom.Sg} case_{Nom.Sg} be_{3rd.Sg.Pres}
 then the seventh case (*saptamī vibhaktiḥ*) is [the sign] of it having that being.’
 (Translation mine.)

It thus explicitly mentions background states (‘being’) and action (‘doing’) as appearing in this construction. It then provides the following examples:

goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ dugdhāsu āgataḥ
 cow_{Loc.Pl} being-milked_{Loc.Pl} gone_{Nom.Sg} having-been-milked_{Loc.Pl} come_{Nom.Sg}
 ‘When the cows were being milked, he went (away). When they had been milked, he came back.’

agniṣu hūyamāneṣu gataḥ huteṣu āgataḥ
 fire_{Loc.Pl} being-praised_{Loc.Pl} gone_{Nom.Sg} praised_{Loc.Pl} having-come_{Nom.Sg}
 ‘When the fires were being praised, he went. When they had been sacrificed/honoured through sacrifice, he came back.’

These examples are interesting. Given the ‘pregnant’ function of the locative to denote the goal of a motion, the very first example (*goṣu duhyamānāsu*) may be interpreted as ‘he went to the cows that were being milked/as they were being milked’. Yet in the second half of this sentence (*goṣu dugdhāsu*) this is not possible: a point *from* which a motion starts needs to stand in the ablative.⁸⁶ Alternatively, both locative expressions may have to be seen as absolute. The same applies to the second sentence: one of the two locative expressions can be interpreted as pregnant, thus denoting the end-point of the ‘going’ described. The other, which describes a movement away from the sacrificial fire,⁸⁷ must be understood as absolute. Alternatively, both are to be seen as absolute.

Without further context or background to the actions described, we cannot know which interpretation is correct, i.e. how these examples would have been intended or perceived in the seventh century AD. Fortunately, this does not affect the point this section

⁸⁶ As at *ŚB* 7.5.2.44 above.

⁸⁷ An interesting example to use, as it is one of the more frequent topics of situational locatives in the *Rigveda*.

is attempting to make. Going back to Pāṇini himself, we noted above that *sūtra* 2.3.37 stands as a complement to 2.3.36: whereas the latter covers the core locative function of denoting a place where, the former refers to all those ‘where’ usages that do not denote physical space, i.e. the ones we have been calling ‘situational’ locatives. As no other *sūtra* in Pāṇini refers to these kinds of locatives,⁸⁸ 2.3.37 must necessarily include all of them and not just the LA. It is true that the LA is the ‘extreme’ example of ‘situational’ locatives: here, a temporal *space where*, a *situation in which* is denoted by a noun that has no such ‘situational’ or temporal semantics. In the spirit of keeping one’s grammatical treatise concise, it makes sense to give examples that demonstrate just how far e.g. a case usage extends. If a grammar provides solely a more ‘core’ example (such as a regular temporal *uṣasi* ‘at dawn’, or a situational *vacasi* ‘during the conversation’), a user of that grammar may think that the case usage under discussion does not go beyond this. Hence the author of the *Kāśikā* chooses an ‘extreme’ example, i.e. an LA, in combination with either another LA, or an example of a non-absolute situational locative. The author of the *Siddhānta Kaumudī*, in turn, explains the Pāṇinian *sūtra* in more general terms that cover all ‘situational’ locatives, and states explicitly that both *bhāvaḥ* ‘being’ (perhaps in the sense of ‘state, static situation’) as well as *kriyā* ‘doing’, i.e. actions, are included here. Pāṇini, at any rate, did apparently not feel that the LA deserved separate mention.⁸⁹ It is clear that the LA was included in what is covered by 2.3.37, though, given that the following *sūtra* refers

⁸⁸ At least I could not identify anything in the other *sūtras* referring to or mentioning the locative (1.1.19, 2.1.40, 2.2.35, 2.3.7, 2.3.9, 2.3.43, 2.4.84, 3.1.92, 3.2.97, 3.4.49, 5.3.10, 5.3.27, 5.4.56, 5.4.82, 6.2.2, 6.2.32, 6.2.65, 6.2.152, 6.3.9).

⁸⁹ A very interesting comment on this is made by Filliozat 1988: 88, who correctly remarks, ‘one recognises in this the use that is called the locative absolute. Yet the grammarians only see here the use of a substantive that is qualified by a participle, with the latter being perceived more as a nominal form . . . rather than as a verbal form. They do not see this use as an independent syntagma separated from the main clause. (‘On reconnaît dans cet emploi ce qu’on appelle le locatif absolu. Les grammairiens ne voient cependant ici que l’emploi d’un substantif qualifié par un participe, ce dernier étant conçu plus comme un nom . . . que comme une forme verbale. Ils ne conçoivent pas cet emploi comme celui d’un syntagme autonome séparé de la proposition principale.’)

specifically to the genitive absolute.⁹⁰ Yet given that no mention is made of situational locatives in general anywhere else in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, it simply is wrong to say that 2.3.37 ‘refers to the LA’: if that were the case, situational locatives, which are a relatively regular occurrence, would not be included in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* at all. Instead, 2.3.37 needs to be seen as referring to all non-core adverbial locatives, i.e. all those that are not as strictly spatial as ‘in the distance/vicinity’ etc. would be. We thus ought to see the work of Pāṇini and also of his successors as an indication that the close link between the LA and formally very similar but, in modern terms, non-absolute nominal constructions was keenly felt.

4.8 The origins of the Western perspective

As we have seen, the most noteworthy feature of the Sanskrit LA in comparison to the Latin AA and especially the Greek GA is its extreme similarity to non-absolute expressions. Due to this similarity, Pāṇini does not devote a separate *sūtra* to this construction, but includes it among what I have been calling ‘situational’ locatives (expressions such as *adhvaré* ‘at, during the ritual’). As was mentioned in Section 4.3, this similarity also has led Western scholars, familiar with Latin and Greek and their ACs, to call ‘absolute’ various constructions which, as we saw when we looked at their Sanskrit surroundings, are not.

The first four extant Western grammars of Sanskrit were written by missionaries – Heinrich Roth and Johann Hanxleden were Jesuits, Paulinus a Discalced Carmelite and William Carey a Baptist.⁹¹ These men wrote partly for scholarly, but mostly for practical reasons: future missionaries of their orders or denominations were to learn Sanskrit not only in order to be able to read the works that shaped the minds of those they were sent to convert, but also to make it easier for them to learn the languages spoken

⁹⁰ A construction that only develops within the history of Sanskrit rather than being inherited; see de Saussure 1881 for the seminal descriptive treaty of this construction, and Ruppel 2012 for an attempt at explaining its origins.

⁹¹ See Roth ~1660–2 in Camps and Muller 1988, Hanxleden 1732, Paulinus 1790 and 1804 and Carey 1806.

in India at that time, and thus to communicate with their potential convertees.⁹² They thus wrote for people whose primary goals were identical to those of anyone wanting to learn Sanskrit, then or today, in order to be able to read texts written in it. Normally, this also is the first step towards the kind of knowledge of a language that allows us to ‘use’ this language in linguistic comparison. Yet in the question of the LA, this is not the case.⁹³

The Western fascination with the LA can be traced back all the way to the first Western grammar of Sanskrit, written in the 1660s by the Jesuit missionary Pater Heinrich Roth.⁹⁴ Writing in Latin, Roth seems to have chosen his Sanskrit examples so as to be as close as possible to their Latin translations. When, in his section on syntax, he discusses case usage, he lists the cases first by their Sanskrit designations (*prathamā* ‘first’, *dvitīyā* ‘second’ etc.). His Latin nomenclature starts out as we would expect (*nominativus*, *accusativus*, etc.). Given that his presumable point of comparison – Latin – is a language that does not have a separate locative case, it is not surprising that he does not call the *saptamī*, the ‘seventh’ case, *locativus*.⁹⁵ (The next Western grammars call this case the ‘*ablativus tertius*’⁹⁶ and the ‘*ablativus quietis et numeri*’⁹⁷ respectively.⁹⁸) Yet it is surprising that he chooses to translate *saptamī* as ‘*ablativus absolutus*’ – even though the actual locative absolute then is only one of seventeen usages⁹⁹ of this

⁹² As Paulinus 1804: 9 outlines in his foreword, a dedication of his grammar to Stephanus Borgia, the head of the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, ‘Hac igitur mea lucubratione Indicis Fidei praeconibus campus aperitur, non solum ad ediscendam linguam Sanscritam, reliquorum Indiae idiomatum matrem, per quam aditus patet ad sacros Indorum veteres codices perlegendos: sed etiam expedita via datur ad varias Indiae dialectos inter se conferendas et examinandas, ad impuras in iis dictiones ope primaevi sermonis castigandas, ad abstrusas variorum nominum radices penitus indagandas et, quod rei caput est, ad ipsas Indicis dialectos accurate, et feliciter perdiscendas.’

⁹³ See Section 1.1.

⁹⁴ *Grammatica linguae Sanscrtanae Brachmanum Indiae Orientalis* ~1660–2, in Camps and Muller 1988.

⁹⁵ He calls the instrumental the *trītiyā seu agentis instrumental[is] nobis ablativus passivi*.

⁹⁶ Hanxleden 1732: 39v. The instrumental, the third case in Sanskrit, is the *ablativus primus*, and the ablative, the fifth case in Sanskrit, the *ablativus secundus*.

⁹⁷ Paulinus 1804: 139. I am so far unable to explain this choice of name.

⁹⁸ Carey 1806, the first to write a Sanskrit grammar in English, simply uses the Sanskrit terms *first*, *second*, *third* etc. to refer to the cases.

⁹⁹ As he notes, *varii sunt sensus huius casus*.

case that he enumerates.¹⁰⁰ Throughout Sanskrit literature, the LA never becomes the majority use of the locative case. If it had, the rationale behind Roth's naming would be understandable.¹⁰¹ Yet as it did not, we can only speculate about Roth's motivations and ask whether he might have chosen the name 'ablativus absolutus' simply because he was, understandably, struck by the fact that a construction as notable as the Greek and Latin ACs had a counterpart in Sanskrit.

The entries on the uses of the locative in the grammars of Hanxleden (1732: 21R) and Paulinus (1804: 139) simply follow the same order as Pāṇini (*sūtras* 2.3.36–39). They each entitle their equivalent of 2.3.37, situational locatives including the LA, 'ablativus absolutus'. Yet Paulinus' treatment of this 'ablativus absolutus, seu temporis' is very interesting. He calls this the 'ablativus absolutus, seu temporis' and translates his first example, *udayati bhasvati djato radja putra* (in standard transcription *udayati bhāsvati jāto rājaputraḥ*; rising_{Loc.Sg} sun_{Loc.Sg} having-been-born_{Nom.Sg} king-son_{Nom.Sg}) as 'ortu solis, oriente sole natus regis filius', and his second, *vrszati deve tschora ayata* (standard transcription *vṛṣati deve cora āyātaḥ*; raining_{Loc.Sg} god_{Loc.Sg} thief_{Nom.Sg} having-come_{Nom.Sg}) as 'hyeme, tempore pluviae ad delubrum, idolum fur venit'.¹⁰² He thus provides no regular temporal locatives but only actual LAs, and more specifically LAs denoting natural time. And much more importantly, he translates them partly by means of Latin AAs, and partly by regular Latin ablatives of time. However he may have understood or defined the meaning of 'abso-lutus', his entry depicts the situation in Sanskrit as it is: there is a LA, there is a locative of time, and the two are extremely close.

After these first Sanskrit grammars, it is not until the late nineteenth century that the topic of Sanskrit syntax is taken up again

¹⁰⁰ His example of an *ablativus absolute positus in septimo casu effectus* is *varṣati daive caurāyātaḥ* [sic] *pluente deo venit fur*.

¹⁰¹ After all, this is how e.g. the πτωσις δοτική/*casus dativus* received its name.

¹⁰² The first example is identical to that used by Hanxleden, the second identical in meaning, although not completely in form, to that used by Roth ~1660–2 (in Camps and Muller 1988): 43r. (*vṛṣati* is the form as it would appear in Vedic, *varṣati* as it would appear in later Sanskrit). Note also that this is not *varṣati deve* 'with the god raining', but that the locative *deve* here appears in its 'pregnant' use to denote the end-point of a motion: 'the thief came *to* the (image of a) god, *to* the idol'.

in any detail.¹⁰³ In 1886 Speijer's *Sanskrit Syntax* appears, and in 1888 Delbrück's *Altindische Syntax*. These two present us with the treatment of LAs that one would also find today and that I have been discussing (and in part arguing against) in this chapter.

4.9 Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how, when viewed against their own grammatical surroundings, many Sanskrit constructions that have been discussed under the label 'absolute' by Western philologists are not absolute at all. It has also attempted to show that actually absolute expressions, which originally were limited to expressions of natural time and apparently spread from there to become semantically as flexible as their Western counterparts, are extremely close to a number of non-absolute locative usages and are frequently used in syntactic parallel with these (see e.g. RV 8.27.19).¹⁰⁴ Briefly put: Sanskrit does have an LA (a fact

¹⁰³ Colebrook announces that 'The Second Volume [of his grammar, A.R.] will contain: . . . Maxims of Syntax' (1805: xxii), yet unfortunately this second volume was never published. Wilkins 1808 and Forster 1810 have sections on case syntax that mostly follow Pāṇini's method of presentation but seem haphazard in their choice of case usages mentioned. Bopp explains the absence of a section on syntax from his 1827 grammar by saying that he intends to treat this subject more properly after other more pressing Indological needs have been served ('Die Herausgabe der Syntax werde ich bis zur Vollendung eines begonnenen Glossars verschieben, weil letzteres mir, zur Förderung des Sanskritstudiums, ein dringenderes Bedürfnis erscheint, besonders da Wilson's nützliches, wenn gleich für Anfänger in mancher Beziehung unzuweckmäßiges Wörterbuch in Europa selten geworden ist', 1827: XI–XII). He then does not treat syntax in any of the later editions of his Sanskrit grammar (1832, 1834, 1845, 1863). Benfey excludes syntax from his grammar but stresses the importance of a systematic treatment of Sanskrit syntax that incorporates Indian views while coming up to the principles of modern (Western) philology ('Die Syntax habe ich für jetzt ganz ausgeschlossen, da sie, wenn auch vollständig im Sinn der indischen Grammatiker dargestellt, doch nur höchst ungenügend ausfallen würde. Diese muß vielmehr aus der Sanskrit-Literatur selbst – natürlich mit gebührender Berücksichtigung der einheimischen Lehrer – geschöpft und ganz im Sinn moderner Sprachwissenschaft entwickelt werden', 1852–4: vii). Oppert 1859, Müller 1866 and Edgren 1885 do not discuss syntax. Whitney's section on case syntax (1924: 81–91) is rather concise, but otherwise very similar to the equivalent section in Speijer 1886.

¹⁰⁴ Here, *sūrye udyati* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) 'at the rising sun, at sunrise' is followed by a string of temporal locatives: *nimrūci* 'at sunset', *prabūdhi* 'at awakening' (i.e. supposedly 'when it is time to wake up, in the morning'), *madhyāndine divāḥ* (middle_{Loc.Sg} day_{Gen.Sg}) 'in the middle of the day', *abhipitvė* 'at dusk'; see Section 4.6.

that is relevant for comparative philologists), but this LA is often virtually indistinguishable from non-absolute expressions (which is important for anyone who ‘just’ wants to understand Sanskrit).

In Sanskrit, just as in Latin and Greek, we have nominal phrases that may be defined as temporal expressions with a non-temporal head (*sūrye udyatī* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the rising sun, at sunrise’, *RV* 8.27.19, or *sūr(y)e údite* ‘at the risen sun, when the sun has risen’, *RV* 3.15.2 and elsewhere).¹⁰⁵ These expressions exist from the earliest texts onwards, and are at first limited to simple expressions of ‘natural’ time. Their range is then extended, first by very small changes such as the use of a past rather than a present participle, or a negated rather than a positive participle, which has the result that they can be used to refer not just to times at which (e.g. *sūrye udyatī* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg})), but also *after* (*sūr(y)e údite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-gone_{Loc.Sg}), lit. ‘at the having-risen sun’) and later also *before* which (*sūrye anudite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} un-up-gone_{Loc.Sg}) lit. ‘at the unrisen sun’). In the prose of the *Brāhmaṇas*, we find small extensions from regular expressions of time (such as *kāle āgate* (right-moment_{Loc.Sg} having-come_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the right moment, when it has arrived, when the right moment has arrived’) to formally very close LAs such as *rājñi āgate* (king_{Loc.Sg} having-come_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when the king has arrived’. In a way, this is similar to the small incremental changes Flinck-Linkomies (1929) noticed in regard to the Early Latin AAs *me praesente* and *me absente* (Sections 1.2.c.v and 3.5). Other expressions of natural time appear in which the participle effects a reference not to the head noun in general, but one specific point of it (such as *rātryām bhūtāyām* (night_{Loc.Sg} having-become_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when night has fallen, at night-fall’). These develop to include very elaborate and artful expressions such as Epic *eka-yāma-avaśiṣṭāyām rātryām* (one-watch-having-remained_{Loc.Sg} night_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when only one watch remained of the night’, lit. ‘at one-watch-remaining night’ at *Rām.* 2.6.5 or Kālidāsa’s *śaśalakṣaṇena yogam gatāsu uttaraphalgunīṣu* (hare-sign_{Instr.Sg} link_{Acc.Sg} gone_{Loc.Pl} further-Phalguni_{Loc.Pl}) ‘during the latter Phalgunīs, when they were joined with the hare-marked one’ (*Kā. Ku.* 7.6, cf. Section 4.6). These constructions are not absolute;

¹⁰⁵ See n. 68 above.

yet it seems likely that this kind of extension of regular nominal expressions of time stands in some relation to the extension of such regular nominal expressions of time that led to LAs. The final step towards a productive AC can be found in the general disappearance of semantic limitations of LAs to expressions of ‘natural’ time, and so we find expressions such as *upāvr̥tte munau tasmin* (turned-back_{Loc.Sg} seer_{Loc.Sg} this_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when the seer had turned back (Rāma said to Lakṣmaṇa)’ (*Rām.* 2.49.7), *tatra ānīyamāne vipre tasmin mahātmani* (there_{Adv} being-led_{Loc.Sg} wise_{Loc.Sg} this_{Loc.Sg} great-soul_{Loc.Sg}) ‘when this wise great-souled one was being led there, (the god suddenly brought rain)’ (*Rām.* 1.9.28, with more than just one noun as the head) or *tapyamāne tapaḥ deve devāḥ* (undergoing-austerities_{Loc.Sg} austerity_{Acc.Sg} god_{Loc.Sg}) ‘while the god [Shiva] was practising austerities, (the (other) gods approached the grandfather)’ (*Rām.* 1.36.1, with a direct object governed by the absolute participle). This, I think, is the information that is relevant and helpful for comparative purposes.

Yet within Sanskrit, in the case of the large majority of expressions that have been called or perceived as absolute by Western scholars, we need to ask ourselves what the question ‘Is this expression absolute?’ actually means. In the case of expressions whose head nouns are purely spatial, such as *marute calati* lit. ‘in the moving wind’ (*Kā. Ku.* 8.71) or the various instances of *dhāne hité* ‘at the set (fighting-)prize; in the opened fight’ (Section 4.4.c), the question ‘Is this absolute?’ can only mean ‘Did the author intend this to be understood as a purely temporal expression without reference to space or place?’ This question, I argue, is usually impossible to answer. Perhaps less importantly, I furthermore argue that such a purely temporal understanding seems rather unlikely in an expression that does, after all, involve a noun referring to physical space. In the case of expressions whose head noun does have temporal semantics, such as *prayatī adhvaré* (forthgoing_{Loc.Sg} ritual_{Loc.Sg}, e.g. at *RV* 1.16.3), I do not think that the question ‘Is this absolute?’ can be asked meaningfully. Whether we translate such an expression as ‘while the sacrifice proceeds’ or as ‘during the ongoing sacrifice’ does not say anything about how the writer of that phrase would have ‘intended’ this adverbial phrase to be understood, but rather about the differences between Sanskrit

and modern English idiom. That LAs were perceived as a distinct phenomenon by Sanskrit grammarians no later than the seventh century AD can be seen in the examples from the *Kāśikā* in Section 4.7. Yet that does not tell us whether examples such as *prayatī adhvaré* or *hanyamāne śarīre* (being-killed_{Loc.Sg} body_{Loc.Sg}) ‘(the soul does not die) in the body when it dies’ (*BG* 2.20) would have been perceived as anything other than regular locative expressions by native speakers of Sanskrit. We also cannot say whether early locative expressions such as *samīcyóh niṣpátantyoh* (see Section 4.4.d) would later have been perceived as absolute (which in this case would mean: as a temporal locative, not one denoting any spatial dimension).

In Sanskrit, LAs represent the end of a series of closely similar, non-absolute locative expressions. This state of affairs explains why early Indian grammarians such as Pāṇini apparently treated LAs together with their non-absolute relatives. It also leads to a situation where the concept ‘absolute’ becomes almost irrelevant when looking at Sanskrit itself. The term *is* useful from a comparative perspective, but comparative philologists studying the Sanskrit LA must nevertheless pay as much attention to what makes these ACs absolute as to what links them with their environment.

Thus we have seen how, while the Greek GA is a rather well-defined syntactic phenomenon, ACs in Latin and Sanskrit are much less distinct than our translations make them out to be. Let us now take the information gathered in respect to each single language and combine it for an attempt at reconstructing both the PIE origins of ACs and the paths by which the situation in the proto-language may then have developed into the daughter languages.

PROTO-INDO-EUROPEAN ROOTS OF ACS

5.1 Introduction

When linguistic phenomena (be it certain classes of phonemes, noun or verb endings, lexemes or grammatical categories) appear in parallel in related languages, it is far more likely that they share a root – one entity or category in the common ancestor language – than that they developed several times independently. Upon encountering such parallel phenomena, historical philologists take into account the regular developments they know occurred between the reconstructed ancestor language and the attested languages in question, and attempt to lead the given entities back to one proto-entity. Sometimes this is successful: combining various kinds of comparative information, we know that Indo-European words for father such as Sanskrit *pitar-*, Greek *πάτηρ*, Latin *pater*, Old Irish *athair*, English *father* etc. can be led back to one word in PIE, commonly reconstructed as **ph₂ter-*.¹ Sometimes it is not possible, and we must realise that e.g. word pairs like Greek *θεός* and Latin *deus* do not go back to the same source, but that their relationship is more complicated.

Absolute constructions exist in a number of related languages. They display formal as well as functional parallels. Thus it makes sense to try and lead them back to a ‘proto-AC’ in their ancestor language, PIE. Yet, as outlined in [Chapter 1](#), a straightforward reconstruction is impossible here, as the cases the different ACs appear in cannot be led back to one case in PIE. So, to what extent can we reconstruct PIE roots for ACs? In this chapter, I shall combine the information gathered in [Chapters 2–4](#) in order to answer this question.

¹ Cf. Wodtko *et al.* 2008: 554–62 on the reconstruction of **ph₂ter-*, and Clackson 2007 on the so-called ‘comparative method’ of Indo-European reconstruction in general.

As was demonstrated in [Chapter 1](#), past discussions of ACs often were not based on an actual definition of what was meant by ‘absolute’. In Section 5.2 of this chapter, I shall briefly summarise older definitions of ‘absolute’ and what I perceive to be their main flaws. I shall then sum up my findings concerning obligatory qualifiers, the feature which, as I hope to have shown, is the only one that can be used to distinguish absolute from non-absolute constructions across the languages in which they are attested. In the past, ACs were usually studied in isolation. Focusing on their delineating feature, the obligatory qualifier, Section 5.3 of this chapter will compare ACs to other constructions that display this phenomenon. This, as we shall see, will show in more detail how this ‘obligatoriness’ comes to be, and will help us understand what makes ACs absolute.

Having thus arrived at a better understanding of *how* absolute-ness came to be, the remaining sections of this chapter will look at *when* the relevant developments likely took place. Section 5.4 looks at participle and case syntax in some of the old IE languages in an attempt at establishing how participles and cases, two factors crucial to the workings of ACs, were used in PIE. This helps us understand which stages in the development of attested ACS likely took place already within PIE (Section 5.5), and which developments occurred in the single daughter languages. This last question is addressed in Section 5.6, which puts together all the pieces of the puzzle and explicitly outlines each likely developmental step.

5.2 Recapitulation: what makes ACs absolute?

5.2.a *What does not make them absolute*

In Section 1.2.c, I discussed various views on the question of what makes ACs absolute. The main suggested criteria were the apposition of the nominal phrase to the whole matrix clause rather than its subordination to a single element within that clause, supposed widening of the case meaning to ‘untypical roles’, and also the suggested equivalence of these nominal constructions to full verbal clauses.

Apposition to an entire clause can be found in a number of adverbial expressions. In a sentence such as ‘she was reading her newspaper on the sofa’, ‘on the sofa’ qualifies the whole sentence. This applies similarly in the case of temporal expressions: in ‘on Fridays, we would go to the museum’, ‘on Fridays’ again stands in apposition to the rest of the clause. To my mind, ablative/genitive of time and AA/GA stand in the same relation to the rest of their matrix clause in sentences such as *prata primo vere stercorato luna silenti* ‘manure meadows at the opening of spring, at new moon’ (Cato Agr. 50.1) or τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι . . . ἀνεχώρησαν ‘the following winter, the Spartans returned’ and ψυχρὴ γὰρ τ’ ἥως πέλεται Βορέας πεσόντος ‘for dawn is cold once Boreas has arrived’ (Hes. Op. 547). Identifying a systematic difference between ACs and (particularly temporal) adverbials as far as their degree of sentence apposition is concerned seems difficult at best.

It is also difficult to find support for the argument that cases used absolutely somehow differ semantically from other case usages. Especially in Vedic, the few actual LAs we find are almost indistinguishable from related non-absolute expressions:

<i>suté</i> pressed _{Loc.Sg}	<i>ít</i> ptcl	<i>tvám</i> you _{Nom/Voc.Sg}	<i>nímiślah</i> attached _{Nom.Sg}	<i>Indra</i> Indra _{Voc.Sg}	<i>sóme</i> soma _{Loc.Sg}
<i>stóme</i> worship _{Loc.Sg}	<i>bráhmani</i> prayer _{Loc.Sg}	<i>śasyámāne</i> being-sung _{Loc.Sg}	<i>ukthé</i> hymn _{Loc.Sg}	‘You, Indra, are attached to pressed-out Soma, at worship, at prayer, and when the hymn is chanted.’ (RV 6.23.1)	
<i>tvám</i> you _{Nom/Voc.Sg}	<i>naḥ</i> us _{Dat./Gen.Sg}	<i>asyāḥ</i> this _{Gen.Sg}	<i>uśasaḥ</i> dawn _{Gen.Sg}	<i>vyūṣtau</i> flash/break _{Loc.Sg}	
<i>tvám</i> you _{Nom/Voc.Sg}	<i>sūre</i> sun _{Loc.Sg}	<i>údite</i> gone-up _{Loc.Sg}	<i>bodhi</i> be _{2nd.Sg.Impv}	<i>gopāḥ</i> ‘cow-herd’ _{Nom.Sg}	‘you be our protector at the flashing of this dawn, you after sunrise’ (RV 3.15.2)

All of the above locatives denote points in time. Yet while *stóme*, *bráhmani*, *uśasaḥ* *vyūṣtau* and, as I hope to have shown in Section 4.4, also *śasyámāne* *ukthé* are all non-absolute, *sūre* *údite* has to be seen as absolute no matter what criterion for absoluteness we employ. Nevertheless, its locative stands in a semantically standard role: to denote a ‘time when’. The situation in Greek is similar.

While the Homeric GA is clearly absolute, it is mostly temporal in its semantics (see Section 2.2). In order to distinguish a ‘regular’ temporal genitive from a GA, we have to take recourse to lexical factors: νυκτός ‘at night’ and ἀποικομένοιο ἀνακτος ‘in the absence of the master, while the master is gone’² both denote spaces in time, yet while the former consists of a noun actually denoting time, the latter has a noun without temporal dimensions as its head. The genitive assigns both of them the same role in the sentence.³ In Latin, too, ACs frequently reflect the semantics of the three cases the Latin absolute case is composed of: the locative (*P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos.*), the comitative-instrumental (*me praesente*) or also the original ablative (expressions such as *his rebus confectis* ‘with these matters completed’ can be interpreted both as locative (‘at the point when . . .’) or ablative (‘from, after the point when . . .’)).

Finally, as I hope to have shown in the preceding chapters, it is not possible to characterise ACs by their supposed equivalence to finite subordinate clauses. On their most basic level, ACs denote points or spaces in time. These can otherwise be denoted by regular nominal adverbials (in the morning, on Fridays etc.), but also by finite subordinate clauses. ACs are nominal expressions. One may argue that some of them – especially those which go beyond the formal minimum of noun and qualifier – encode in nominal form that which English or related modern languages would perhaps more idiomatically express in finite verbal form.⁴ Yet not only does this say more about the relation between (in this case) English and Greek than about Greek itself, there also are numerous clear ACs whose closest equivalent even in English is a

² δὴ τότε κείτ’ ἀπόθεστος ἀποικομένοιο ἀνακτος | ἐν πολλῇ κόπρῳ ‘but now **with his master gone**, he lay there, cast away, on piles of dung’ (*Od.* 17.296–7).

³ Some GAs of course also reflect the semantics of the ablative that syncretised with the genitive in Greek: τὸ δ’ ὑπὲρπτατο χάλκεον ἔγχος, | καρφαλέον δὲ οἱ ὀσπὶς ἐπιτρέξαντος αὖσεν | ἔγχος ‘under it low he hunched and the brazen spear flew past with a grating screech **as/because the shaft grazed it/from the shaft grazing it**’ (*Il.* 13.408–10); see also Section 2.2.d on this.

⁴ Cf. ‘ABS stehen offenbar in direktem Zusammenhang mit Sätzen, denn sie enthalten in mehr oder minder großem Umfang dieselben Konstituenten wie diese’, Keydana 1997: 9. For an example, cf. e.g. ἐπιτρέψαντος Εὐρυσθέως, ὅτ’ ἐστράτευε, Μυκῆνας τε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον Ἀτρεΐ ‘when Eurystheus, when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenae and the government to Atreus’ (*Th.* 1.9). See Section 1.2.c.ii for the context of this GA.

nominal phrase (*sūrye udyatí* (*sun*_{Loc.Sg} *up-going*_{Loc.Sg}) (*RV* 8.27.19) or ἡελίου ἀνιόντος (*Il.* 8.538) ‘at sunrise’, *me absente* ‘in my absence’ etc.).

5.2.b What does make them absolute: the obligatory qualifier

As I hope to have demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the one criterion shared by all ACs across the languages discussed in this study is the obligatory qualifier. ACs are expressions of time whose head nouns do not refer to time. The presence of the qualifier thus is crucial for a word such as ‘me’, ‘you’ or ‘the sun’ to be usable as an expression of *time when*.

τί νυ βείομαι αἰνὰ παθοῦσα
σεῦ ἀποτεθνηῶτος;

‘Why shall I live in my terrible suffering, **now you are dead/even though you are dead?**’
(*Il.* 22.431–2)

fecisti funus med absente prandio

‘You buried the lunch **in my absence**’
(*Pl. Men.* 492)

udite sūrye prātar juhōti
*up-gone*_{Loc.Sg} *sun*_{Loc.Sg} *early*_{Adv.} *sacrifice*_{3rd.Sg.Pres}
‘He offers in the morning **when the sun has risen**’ (*TB* 2.1.2.7)

Yet before we can claim that the obligatory qualifier is the defining characteristic that not just unites ACs, but also delineates them from their grammatical environment, we need to look at the other uses of this type of qualifier.

5.3 Obligatory and apparently obligatory qualifiers: a cross-linguistic look

As was shown in previous chapters, semantically dominant and also obligatory qualifiers exist outside of ACs, mostly in the AUC (see Sections 2.7 and 3.4.a), but also in various different case usages (see e.g. the discussion of the ablative of attendant circumstance in Section 3.3). This section will combine evidence from

the various languages in which the AUC is attested in order to help us towards a better understanding of this construction, and will attempt to lay a basis for a reconstruction of the AUC's origins in PIE (Section 5.3.a). It will also discuss some case usages which involve dominant (not obligatory!) qualifiers. Partly, it will show why they should not be labelled 'absolute' (as has happened with the 'dative absolute' in Greek and the 'instrumental absolute' in Sanskrit), and partly also to contrast them with actual ACs in an attempt to help us understand ACs better (Section 5.3.b).

5.3.a *The AUC*

The earliest discussion of the AUC that I am aware of names the construction not by means of an example, as we do now, but by the descriptive 'participium perfectum passivum pro substantivo verbalis positum'.⁵ The literature on this topic is not very extensive.⁶ A typical description of the AUC can be found in Menge (2000: 717–18): 'The participle in the so-called dominant participle construction (or *ab urbe condita* construction) formally is (just like the participle in an ablative absolute) attributive: it agrees with its head in case, gender and number: *Illum interfectum aegre tuli*. Unlike the participle in the ablative absolute, the dominant participle can be omitted without causing any serious syntactic problems (*Illum aegre tuli*), yet the semantics would at any rate be strongly affected. Thus arises an important difference between it and the purely attributive or the conjunct participle.'⁷ Yet, as we shall see

⁵ Lübbert 1871. Indeed, the majority of Latin AUCs employ a perfect passive participle; K-S II.1.769.

⁶ Particularly in relation to old IE languages, it seems mostly limited to descriptive accounts in grammars. Actual discussions can be found in Heick 1936 and Jones 1939 (see their bibliographies for references to older works), Laughton 1964: 84–99, Bolkestein 1980 and König/van der Auwera 1990.

⁷ 'Das Partizip in der sog. dominanten Partizipialkonstruktion (oder ab-urbe-condita-Konstruktion) ist formal (wie das Partizip im Ablativus absolutus) ein Attribut: es richtet sich in Kasus, Genus und Numerus nach seinem Bezugswort: *illum interfectum aegre tuli*. Im Unterschied zum Partizip eines Ablativus absolutus kann das dominante Partizip zwar fehlen, ohne dass seine ernsthafte syntaktische Störung hervorgerufen würde (*illum aegre tuli*), aber zumindest wäre die Semantik in fast allen Fällen stark beeinträchtigt, so dass hier ein entscheidender Unterschied zum rein attributiven Partizip und zum PC zu sehen ist.'

below, this account is incorrect: only some AUCs actually fit the description in Menge, whereas others (among them the example that the construction is named after) are exactly like ACs in their structure.

Among old IE languages, I am aware of instances of the AUC in Latin (see Section 3.4.a), Greek (see Section 2.7), Avestan and Gothic (see immediately below).⁸ Occurrence in Sanskrit especially of the prepositional kind would be surprising, given how little pre-/postpositions are used there. Several modern languages display AUCs (see below for a brief discussion). As was shown in Sections 2.7 and 3.4.a, AUCs appear both with and without prepositions. Some of the prepositional expressions are formally minimal: compare Latin *ab urbe condita*, Greek ἄμα δ' ἡελίῳ καταδύντι 'at sunset (lit.: together with the setting sun)' (*Il.* 1.592–3) or Gothic *at urrinnandin sunnin* (during rising_{Dat.Sg} sun_{Dat.Sg}) 'at sunrise' (translating the GA ἀνατείλαντος τοῦ ἡλίου e.g. at Mark 16:2). Yet formally extended examples are also found, such as Avestan *aštəməm aētaēšqm šiiəoθənanqm vərəzimməm anuzuuarštāt paiti pauraūāt* (eighth_{Nom.Sg} this_{Gen.Pl} act_{Gen.Pl} done_{Nom.Sg} not-made-up-for_{Abl.Sg} (along) with earlier_{Abl.Sg}) '(if/when) the eighth of these acts (is) committed **with the preceding one not yet made up for**' (*Videvdad* 4.20),⁹ or particularly in Greek historiographic prose: δι' ἃ καὶ τότε ὑπὸ τε τῆς Δεceleίας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλωμάτων μεγάλων προσπιπτόντων ὀδύναντοί ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν 'For all these reasons, and **because at that time Deceleia was doing them much injury and the general expenses which were accruing were very great**, they became crippled in the matter of money' (*Th.* 7.28). Some of the Latin gerundive constructions discussed in Section 3.4.b also fall into this category; cf. e.g. *virtus . . . constat ex hominibus tuendis* 'virtue . . . centres in **protecting people** (lit.: *people which are

⁸ I say 'I am aware of' as a thorough textual search especially for AUCs that do not employ prepositions is beyond the scope of this current study. For the questions discussed here, it also is not crucial to know exactly how widespread AUCs are.

⁹ The Avestan material is discussed by Bartholomae 1892: 178–80, Reichelt 1909: 331–2 and Kellens 1984: 331–2 [sic]. Bartholomae 1904 s.v. *paiti* II.6.4 lists all other instances of *paiti* used in this construction.

to be protected)’ (Cic. *Off.* 1.157). The non-prepositional kind¹⁰ appears in almost all cases: *angebant virum Sicilia Sardiniaque amissae* ‘the loss of Sicily and Sardinia (lit.: Sicily and Sardinia lost) pained to this man’ (Livy 21.1.5),¹¹ Σαρπηδόντι δ’ ἄχος γένετο Γλαύκου ἀπίοντος ‘in (lit. ‘to’) Sarpedon arose pain **over Glaucus’ leaving**’ (Il. 12.392), σοὶ μὲν νοστήσαντι, διοτρεφές, ὥς ἐχάρημεν ‘how glad are we **at your return**, o you nourished by Zeus’ (Od. 10.419). In all of these, the semantics of the adjectival qualifiers are so important to the meaning of the expression as a whole that idiomatic English would not express them as mere qualifiers, but turn them into the heads of the expression. This can be by means of a differently structured nominal expression (e.g. ‘the loss of Sicily and Sardinia’) or as a verbal clause (e.g. ‘that Sicily and Sardinia had been lost’).

In Section 3.4, I argued two things: one, that it is very difficult to define what makes a qualifier dominant; but two, that there is a subcategory to semantic dominance which can be clearly defined and which appears in those AUCs that are expressions of time. While the omission of a dominant qualifier from a noun phrase effects a nonsensical sentence, omission of the obligatory qualifier makes the actual noun phrase ungrammatical in itself: omitting *amissae* from *angebant virum Sicilia Sardiniaque amissae* ‘the loss of Sicily and Sardinia (lit.: Sicily and Sardinia lost) pained this man’ (Livy 21.1.5) results in an odd statement as whole countries (or islands) are rarely a source of emotion.¹² Yet the phrase *Sicilia Sardiniaque* in itself, while changed, is grammatically fully acceptable in its role as subject. It is just its collocation with the main verb *angebant* that makes the sentence nonsensical, or at least rather unexpected. On the other hand, omitting *exorientem* in *ante solem exorientem* ‘before sunrise’ (Pl. *Bac.* 424) makes the nominal phrase **ante solem* ungrammatical in itself: *ante solem*

¹⁰ I offer Latin and Greek examples exclusively as I could not find any examples from other languages in the relevant secondary literature, and the textual searches thus required are beyond the scope of this present study.

¹¹ Cf. X. *An.* 7.7.12 for a Greek parallel: ἐλύπει αὐτὸν ἡ χώρα πορθομένη ‘the **plundering of the country**/the fact that the country had been plundered saddened him’.

¹² Unless, of course, a name of a country etc. is used metonymically for some event in that country; see n. 91, ch. 2.

exorientem is an expression of time, and the noun *sol* itself does not have a temporal dimension to its semantics. Hence it cannot be used in this way to denote a point or period in time.¹³ The same applies to all other examples of temporal AUCs, such as μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας ‘after the foundation of Syracuse’ (Th. 6.33), or Gothic *at urinnandin sunnin* ‘at sunrise’ (Mark 16:2).¹⁴

As we just saw, a set of formally identical expressions can be split up into two subsets for semantic reasons (or rather, reasons at the point where semantics and syntax interact). All AUCs contain a semantically important (or ‘dominant’) qualifier, yet some contain one that is obligatory. What makes it obligatory is its use in a temporal expression whose head cannot express or refer to time. This is interesting as it helps us understand why the qualifier in an AC is obligatory: while many ACs, especially in prose texts, are not temporal expressions as simple as ‘at sunrise’, ‘in midwinter’ etc., they always have a temporal element of meaning to them: ἀπποιοχόμενιο ἄνακτος refers to a period of time just as much as *Cicerone consule* does. Even the Latin AAs that can best be described as denoting attendant circumstances (the *me absente* type)¹⁵ refer to a period of time, namely that during which the speaker is absent.

While not directly relevant to our discussion of ACs, those AUCs with merely dominant qualifiers also are interesting to look at. AUCs of this kind exist in more languages than are usually discussed in this context. Some modern languages contain temporal AUCs, yet as their head nouns all have temporal semantics, their qualifiers are not obligatory: German, for example, has slightly fossilised expressions such as ‘nach getaner Arbeit’ (lit. ‘after done work’). In South Slavic languages, AUCs are more productive. Compare Croatian *nakon obavljeno* *rada*

¹³ Admittedly, prepositions such as *ante* can also be used in non-temporal expressions. Yet it seems that *ante solem exorientem* ‘before sunrise’ and *ante solem* ‘in front of the sun’ are two expressions so different in their meaning that we should look at them as distinct, in spite of their formal similarity. In this sense we can say that temporal *ante* cannot be collocated with non-temporal nouns.

¹⁴ Note that, as Marchant 1893 (on Th. 7.28) points out, the construction in which the participle is obligatory is mostly used with prepositions of temporal meaning: ἀπὸ, μετὰ with accusative, and ἐπὶ with the dative. Both he and Smith 1886 refer to this construction as one ‘in which the participle has the force of a verbal substantive’.

¹⁵ See e.g. Chapter 1.2.b.v.

(after finished_{Gen.Sg} work_{Gen.Sg}) ‘after finished work’, i.e. ‘when the work was done’, Serbian *posle svršenog osmog razreda* (after finished_{Gen.Sg} eighth_{Gen.Sg} grade_{Gen.Sg}), or Slovenian *po opravljeni diplomi* (after finished_{Loc.Sg} diploma_{Loc.Sg}) ‘after the finished diploma’ i.e. ‘after he had finished his undergraduate degree’.¹⁶ In English, AUCs are mostly seen as limited to highly poetic expressions that presumably imitate classical languages – compare Milton’s ‘since created man’ or Dryden’s ‘royal feast for Persia won’.¹⁷ Yet it often goes unnoticed that English (and not just it) does employ dominant attributes on a regular basis. Take sentences such as

*There are no atheists on a **sinking** ship.*

*It’s great being outside on a **nice** day.* (Compare German *bei schönem Wetter* ‘in good weather’, i.e. ‘when the weather is nice’.)

*No one can sleep in a **hot** room.*

What ‘on a sinking ship’ effectively says is that, *when a ship is sinking*, there are no atheists on it. When the attributes in such sentences as the above are omitted, the nominal phrases themselves remain intelligible,¹⁸ yet the sentences as a whole (e.g. *‘on a ship, there are no atheists’) are missing the point. If we compare this to a statement such as ‘There are no atheists in foxholes’ we can see that the dominance of ‘sinking’ is due entirely to the connotations of the term ‘ship’: unlike ‘foxhole’, the concept ‘ship’ does not evoke any negative associations. Hence there is no intelligible link

¹⁶ Many thanks to Wayles Browne, who mentioned the existence of these to me. He arrived at the examples cited here by means of Google searches for the words ‘after finished’ in Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian. The searches found instances from a number of textual genres, including news articles, Wikipedia entries and a biographic text from the early 1900s. All the examples found involved nouns that had a temporal component to their semantics (work, inspections, undergraduate degrees etc.).

¹⁷ Examples taken from Jones 1939: 6 n. 2. A ‘feast for Persia’ is a possible expression: the reader simply is left to infer what event in relation to Persia it was that merited a royal feast. Yet it is true that a ‘feast for Persia won’ refers to a ‘feast for the victory over Persia, a feast for the fact that Persia had been conquered’. In other words: the participle may not be obligatory, but a ‘translation’ of the expression into ‘proper’ English does require the same kind of rephrasing as for obligatory participles. ‘*Since created man*’, on the other hand, includes an obligatory qualifier: the expression as a whole is temporal, but does not have a temporal head.

¹⁸ With the exception of ‘on a day’, which on its own of course is not idiomatic; yet that is due to factors irrelevant here.

between it and the presence or absence of atheists, and hence a further attribute is necessary to establish this link. The examples given above differ from regular AUCs in that the qualifiers either are not participles, but adjectives, or, as in the case of ‘sinking’, they are participles used adjectivally. Other than that, we are here dealing with a productive usage of dominant qualifiers.

This leads us to an interesting question: how do we define whether a qualifier is dominant, or rather, where do we see the cut-off point between ‘dominant’ and ‘regular’ usage? If a noun is accompanied by an adjective, that adjective is there for a reason. Sometimes it is more important to the understanding of the sentence as a whole (e.g. *I like big dogs*, which may be meant to imply that the speaker likes dogs only if they are big), sometimes less so (e.g. *we all live in a yellow submarine*). Sometimes it is semantically so important that e.g. English would not express it as a qualifier, but would put it into that role which is also syntactically more important (to give e.g. *the loss of Sicily and Sardinia* rather than *Sicily and Sardinia lost*). Yet reference to English or related modern languages – which this study has so far used in its description of AUCs – is once again shown to be insufficient as something by which we can define the constructions in other languages: as we just saw, English *does* use dominant qualifiers itself, but it uses them differently from e.g. Greek or Latin.

One could argue that ‘there are no atheists on a sinking ship’ can be rephrased as ‘if/when a ship is sinking, there are no atheists on it’ (where the dominant ‘sinking’ is represented by the verbal phrase ‘is sinking’, the syntactic head of the clause), while *‘when a submarine is yellow, we live on it’ does not make sense. Similar intra- (rather than inter-)language replacement tests could be applied to regular ACs where, as we have seen, the dominant qualifier can usually be replaced by an action noun or, once more, by the main verb in a subordinate clause. Yet while this process is entirely feasible in Vedic (see Ziegler 2002 on the variation between *uchántyām uśási* (gleaming_{Loc.Sg} dawn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at gleaming/appearing dawn’ and *vástoḥ uśasaḥ* (gleaming_{Gen.Sg} dawn_{Gen.Sg}) ‘at the gleaming/appearance of dawn’) and while Cicero might indeed have said e.g.

amissio Siciliae Sardiniaeque,¹⁹ the use of such verbal abstracts in Latin on the whole is rather rare.²⁰ Thus Pinkster (1988: 199) and, following him, Ziegler (2002: 84) are incorrect in claiming that ‘in such cases, a transformation into a construction consisting of a verbal abstract noun and an adnominal genitive is possible’.²¹

This takes us back to the more general discussion of some constructions ‘underlying’ others. It seems generally assumed that the element which is semantically most important for an expression should also appear as its syntactic head. For example, the years should be counted *from the founding of the city* and not *from the (founded) city*. Given the apparent ‘mismatch’ between actual/syntactic and ‘semantic’ head in AC or AUC, the thought continues, there must be some different, ‘well-matched’ structure underlying an AUC. For instance, we might postulate with Heick (1936: 10) that we have a Latin AUC in those cases ‘where the participle has replaced a verbal noun or noun clause, and expresses the leading thought of the sentence’.²² As was outlined in [Chapter 1](#), similar views are found concerning the question whether nominal or verbal forms of expression are more basic. Thus, Riemann and Ernout (1927: 523–5, also in reference to Latin) consider not just nominal clauses (‘that X is the fact’), but also temporal and

¹⁹ See the *OLD* s.v. *amissio*. It is found in Livy only once, namely at 11.2. An alternative noun *amissus* is only found once, at Nep. *Alcib.* 6.2.

²⁰ Pinkster 1988: 199 and, following him, Ziegler 2002: 84 state that a Latin AUC can be replaced by a construction consisting of a verbal abstract noun and a dependent genitive. Pinkster offers *caedes Caesaris* as a potential replacement of (or equivalent to) *imperator occisus* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.8). While that is correct, it does not mean that expressions of the former type are somehow more fundamental than the latter in Latin: many verbs lack abstract nouns linked with them; yet nearly all have participles, which are what is required for the AUC. One should thus ask whether, language-specifically, a construction that can be formed in relation to more or less all verbs/actions should not be considered more fundamental than one that can only be used in a limited number of cases, even if this construction is semantically odd in the sense that its syntactic head is not its semantically most important element.

²¹ ‘Auch hier ist in solchen Fällen eine Umformung in eine Konstruktion aus Verbalabstraktum und adnominalem Genitiv möglich.’

²² On the other hand, Heick argues that Latin is too primitive to have verbal nouns. In the wonderful moralistic style that was still acceptable then, he writes that ‘The language remained simple, childlike, i.e., like that of a child who is not yet able to express himself in abstract terms, and makes use of concrete words where an adult person would employ abstracts’ (Heick 1936: 65). Thus I wonder what language level he is thinking of when he says that the participle ‘replaces’ an abstract noun.

adverbial clauses as structures equivalent to or underlying AUCs. Yet do such alternative formulations really represent something more fundamental? In some areas of syntax, Transformational Grammar may have a point: it is possible to see how e.g. direct questions would be derived from statements, or indirect questions from direct ones. Yet in the case of the nominal expressions we are looking at here, how can we say that one phrasing is underlying another and that e.g. a verbal expression is more fundamental than a nominal one? One might argue on the basis of relative frequency – yet even in a language as predominantly verbal as English, I cannot see any convincing principles that might tell us whether e.g. ‘in his lifetime’ or ‘while he was alive’ is more ‘fundamental’ or basic. Similarly for ‘on a sinking ship’ and its rephrasing as ‘when/if a ship is sinking’: in the latter, the crucial element (the idea of the ship *sinking*) appears as the verb and thus as the head of the clause. Thus, the most important element semantically also has the most prominent syntactic position. But, again, is this rephrasing really more fundamental in any way? Similarly with the ‘mismatch’ between semantic and syntactic heads: in a language such as Latin, where (verbal) abstract nouns are comparatively rare, what basis do we have for arguing that AUCs somehow have such an abstract noun underlying them? Finally, even if we subscribe to such transformational notions, we need to keep separate the question of how specific instances of the constructions in question are formed synchronically, and how they first came to be, i.e. their diachronic development.

To sum up, AUCs can be split up into two categories. Those that contain obligatory qualifiers help us understand better how ACs work: compared with the remainder of AUCs, they show us that it is their nature as temporal expressions (whose heads neither refer to nor are marked for time) that makes their qualifiers obligatory, and when we look at ACs across languages, we can see that this exact description, temporal expressions with non-temporal heads, also fits all ACs across the languages in which they are attested. This gives us a very good starting-point from which to embark on our question of the original source(s) of ACs. The type of AUC whose qualifier is merely dominant, on the other hand, makes us revisit the issue of structures supposedly ‘underlying’ others, and

makes us question once more the link between ‘mismatched’ and regular or ‘well-matched’ constructions.

Finally, the question remains: how did it become permissible to employ the AUCs of the temporal type, in which qualifiers are obligatory? Also, did it arise in PIE or the single daughter languages? The same question applies to ACs, hence I shall come back to it in Section 5.5, where I shall discuss AC and AUC together.

5.3.b Various case usages

There are a number of individual case usages in Greek, Latin and Sanskrit that involve the use of a qualifier of great semantic importance: Greek ‘dative absolutes’, Sanskrit ‘instrumental absolutes’, as well as cases used to express manner, quality or quantity.

Greek datives of respect limit the validity of a statement. In the English sentence ‘That was horrible for me’, the horribleness mentioned extends only to the speaker. In ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι ‘and **to him as he pondered**, this seemed better’ at *Il.* 14.23–4, the appearance of something being preferable extends not generally to *him*, but *to him as* (or *because*) *he was thinking about it*. Now consider the following sentence, given by Rosén (1988: 94–5) as an example of a dative absolute.

Ἔστι . . . ὁδὸς ἐς Ἡλίου πόλιν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω ἀνιόντι παραπλησίη τὸ μήκος τῇ ἐξ Ἀθηνέων ὁδῷ . . . ἐς Πῖσαν.

‘The path/journey from the sea to Heliopolis, **to one travelling upstream**, is about as long as that from . . . Athens to . . . Pisa.’ (Hdt. 2.7)

Here, the dative participle ἀνιόντι plays an even more important role: there is no such thing as a ὁδὸς ἐς Ἡλίου πόλιν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης unless there is someone who takes this journey. Hence this sentence is best rendered into English as ‘*If* someone travels upstream, the journey takes him that long.’ Also, given that substantivised participles referring not to someone specific but to a general group do not have an article²³ and there is nothing else (such as τινι) agreeing with the participle, ἀνιόντι also cannot be

²³ K-G II.1.608.

omitted because otherwise the whole dative expression, crucial for the statement of this sentence, would be gone. Yet even though the presence of the dative ἀνιόντι is thus required (or ‘obligatory’) for very specific reasons, these reasons are quite different from those which cause qualifiers in ACs or temporal AUCs to be obligatory. In any dative of respect where a head (noun or pronoun) is present, the qualifier is not obligatory, and the head can function on its own. Some (such as Mugler 1936 or Rosén 1988) see constructions such as Hdt. 2.7 as absolute. I see them simply as datives of respect.²⁴

In relation to Sanskrit, we sometimes find an instrumental absolute mentioned (cf. Aalto 1979 and Sen 1927: 120–2); Speijer (1886: 290–1) speaks of a semi-absolute instrumental. Compare the following example, taken from Speijer’s discussion of this phenomenon:

<i>te</i>	<i>somam</i>	<i>rājānam</i>	<i>akurvan</i> ,		
they _{Nom.Pl}	soma _{Acc.Sg}	king _{Acc.Sg}	make _{3rd.Pl.Impf}		
<i>te</i>	<i>somena</i>	<i>rājñā</i>	<i>sarvāḥ</i>	<i>diśaḥ</i>	<i>ajayan</i>
they _{Nom.Sg}	soma _{Instr.Sg}	king _{Instr.Sg}	all _{Acc.Pl}	direction _{Acc.Pl}	conquer _{3rd.Pl.Impf}
‘They made Soma king. With/through Soma as their king , they					
conquered all the quarters/the whole world.’					
					(KB 7.10)

To understand how this construction works, it is best to look at it in comparison with the Latin AA of the *me praesente* type. Each expression helps us understand the other, and together they illustrate again what ‘absolute’ is. When we look at a sentence such as *illo praesente mecum agito, si quid voles* ‘Deal with me **in his presence**, if you want anything’ (Pl. *Mos.* 1121) it seems likely that the AA here reflects an original comitative-instrumental: you do this *together with him who is present*. As already Flinck-Linkomies (1929 *passim*) pointed out, the Latin AA²⁵ develops towards ‘true’ absoluteness through gradual lexical changes. Starting out from *me praesente* used in combination with verbs that signify an action

²⁴ See K-G II.1.420–1 (§ 423 18a) and especially also 424–5 (§ 423 18f) on expressions consisting of dative and participle.

²⁵ Or as I would argue, the Latin AA of this particular kind, which I have been calling the *me praesente* type.

in which the speaker of the *me* may then be involved,²⁶ we go to the formally parallel *me absente*, where the speaker obviously cannot be involved in the action of the matrix clause. Through this development, the role expressed by the ablative phrase shifts from denoting an actual concomitant (a thing, a person, here *me*) to an *accompanying circumstance*, an *event* or a *situation*, i.e. something with a temporal dimension, as in *fecisti funus med absente prandio* ‘You buried the lunch **in my absence**’ (Pl. *Men.* 492). Here, the action cannot logically have been performed *together with* the speaker, because the speaker was absent. Hence, *me absente* can only be interpreted as a circumstance, an event. An event has a temporal dimension. *me* does not. Hence the qualifier *absente* becomes obligatory. This situation is found in most of the examples of *me absente* attested in Early Latin (as in the one we have seen immediately above). Whereas the *luna silenti* type of AC is immediately absolute as soon as the temporal expression does not employ a temporal head, the *me praesente* type has the possibility for various stages of ambiguity. When we look at the Sanskrit example above and those given immediately below, all of which have been listed in discussions of absolute or semi-absolute instrumentals, we need to ask whether the instrumental phrases denote physical accompaniers, or accompanying *situations*, or whether they are to be seen as instrumentals expressing something or someone by means of which/whom something happens.²⁷

Lakṣmaṇena sahāyena vanam gacchasva putraka
 Lakṣmaṇa_{Instr.Sg} companion_{Instr.Sg} forest_{Acc.Sg} go_{2nd.Sg.Impv} son_{Voc.Sg}
 ‘go into the forest **with Lakṣmaṇa as your companion**, my son’
 (*Rām.* 2.37.18)

Here, we have a clear example of a physical accompanier: two people are meant to perform one action together. The qualifier *sahāyena* may thus be semantically important, but is by no means

²⁶ This is not the case in the example from Plautus just given. My point here is simply that there is a possibility for the expression to denote a physical concomitant ‘you do this together with me, who I am present’.

²⁷ In Classical and Epic Sanskrit, the comitative use of the instrumental case usually is marked in some way (most often by means of the postposition *saha* ‘with’). Yet this use without such markers, while infrequent, is fully grammatical. See Whitney 1924: 84 (§ 279) or Speijer 1886: 42–3.

obligatory. In the example quoted above (*somena rājñā*), the situation is less clear: if we can understand personified Soma as a deity that is to have fought together with the men, the attributive *rājñā* can easily be omitted. If *somena rājñā* is to be understood not as an actual accompanier, but rather an accompanying circumstance (best paraphrased in English as ‘when Soma was their king’), then we cannot omit *rājñā* that easily: just as the head of a temporal expression such as *sūrye údite* ‘at the risen sun, just after sunrise’ cannot make sense on its own because it does not have any temporal dimension, so *soma* on its own cannot really express an accompanying circumstance. Once again, a circumstance has a temporal dimension. *Soma* does not. Yet the third possibility, namely the interpretation as an instrumental of means, gives us a straightforward ‘through soma as their king, they conquered . . .’, in which *rājñā* ‘as their king’ can once again easily be omitted. We cannot say which of the three is intended here (if, indeed, one can at all argue that only one of these semantic nuances is present/intended), and without an otherwise established AC in the instrumental, it would be an unnecessary complication of matters to see this specific example as absolute. Similar instances of the instrumental of means can be found in the following examples:

<i>sa</i>	<i>ca</i>	<i>uddhṛtena</i>	<i>bāṇena</i>	<i>sahasā</i>	<i>svargam</i>
he _{Nom.Sg}	and	drawn-out _{Instr.Sg}	arrow _{Instr.Sg}	immediately	heaven _{Acc.Sg}

āsthitaḥ
 ascended_{Nom.Sg}
 ‘when the arrow had been drawn out, immediately he ascended to heaven’
 (Rām. 2.58.16)

<i>sakhi,</i>	<i>bhuktaiḥ</i>	<i>phalaiḥ</i>	<i>etaiḥ</i>	<i>jarā</i>	<i>na te</i>
friend _{Voc.Sg}	eaten _{Instr.Sg}	fruit _{Instr.Sg}	these _{Instr.Pl}	old age _{Nom.Sg}	not you _{Gen./Dat.Sg}

bhaviṣyati
 be_{3rd.Sg.Fut}
 ‘friend, if you eat these fruits, old age will not come (lit. ‘be’) to you’
 (Kath. 29)

In neither of these examples are we dealing with an instrumental absolute. Instead, both feature instrumentals of cause:²⁸ thus the

²⁸ See Delbrück 1888: 127 or Speijer 1886: 47–52, esp. § 72: ‘the instrumental in one of its basic uses, expressing the ‘how’ of an action – the means or way by which the action is carried out’.

literal translation of *Kath.* 29 is ‘through these fruits, when they are eaten, old age will not come to you’. *Rām.* 2.58.16 is saying ‘through the arrow, as soon as that had been drawn out, he ascended to heaven’. In other words: it is because of the arrow – here: the arrow that has been removed from his body – that he can go to heaven. English would probably not phrase either of these sentences in this way, but would emphasise the fact that the fruits have to be *eaten*, and the arrow to be *drawn out* for the action of the matrix verb to be possible. Yet again, while these qualifiers can thus be labelled ‘dominant’ they are not syntactically obligatory, and thus the expressions as a whole not absolute.

We find more passages listed as (semi-)absolute instrumentals, but none of these provide clear examples of what we find e.g. in Latin: a phrase that unambiguously denotes an event, but does not have a noun with temporal dimensions at its head. Thus, comparing one type of the Latin AA and these Sanskrit instrumental expressions has made it clearer to us what makes *me prae-/absente* expressions absolute, and has demonstrated why the same cannot be said about the formally identical expressions in Sanskrit.

In addition to these two kinds of expression that have sometimes been called ‘absolute’, there are a number of other case usages in which adjectival or participial qualifiers are dominant, or in a sense even obligatory. For syntactic reasons different from those that we find in ACs, qualifiers in the Latin genitive and ablative of quality (e.g. *homo iracundus perditioni animi* ‘an irascible man, with a quick temper’, Pl. *Men.* 269,²⁹ *quadrupes aspectu truci* ‘a quadruped of terrible appearance’, Pac. 2)³⁰ cannot be omitted without rendering the remainder of the noun phrase unable to fulfil its function: e.g. ‘mind’ and ‘appearance’ are not qualities by reference to which someone can be described; it is assumed that every man has an *animus* and an *aspectus*, so for these to have any descriptive power, they need to be accompanied by a

²⁹ Many thanks to Dave Mankin for pointing out that the genitive of quality never stands without an attribute. See also Bennett 1914: 64–8 for a list of Early Latin examples.

³⁰ *quis illaec est mulier timido pectore peregre adveniens?* ‘Who is that woman coming from abroad with a fearful breast?’ (Pl. *Epid.* 533) is seen as an ablative of quality by Bennett 1914: 321. To my mind, this example shows how close the ablative of quality (adnominal) and the ablative of attendant circumstance (adverbial/adsentential) are semantically.

word that denotes an actual quality. The situation is similar in the Sanskrit instrumental of quality. In *ekena pādena* *vyāvartante* (one_{Instr.Sg} foot_{Instr.Sg} turn-apart_{3rd.Sg.Pres}) ‘(the seasons) differ **in one foot**’ (TS 5.3.1), one could argue for lesser dominance of the *ekena* (one_{Instr.Sg}) given that without it the expression would still read ‘differ in a foot’, the difference between ‘one’ and ‘a’ not being very important. Still I think that the *ekena* is important in showing that the difference is *exactly* one foot. If the number was anything other than one, its omission would have much greater consequences.

5.3.c Conclusions

The obligatory qualifier is present in constructions other than ACs. Hence we have to add further criteria in order to define ACs without including any of these other constructions. In Latin and Greek, ACs and temporal AUCs complement one another: we speak of e.g. an AA when the construction stands in a prepositionless ablative (such as *urbe deleta*), and of an AUC if the ablative stands with a preposition (such as *ab urbe condita*) or in another case altogether. Moreover, there are usages of the Latin ablative such as the *ablative of attendant circumstance* (see Section 3.3) that can be difficult to distinguish from AAs, and even further case usages in which adjectival qualifiers seem more or less obligatory (see the brief discussion of ablative and genitive of quality above). The point here is not to treat all of these constructions as the same or as genetically linked. They are not, perhaps with the exception of ACs and temporal AUCs.³¹ Nevertheless we need to acknowledge that the phenomenon which characterises ACs is not nearly as unique as it may appear at first sight.

In Greek, the situation is clearer than in Latin – ACs are more clearly defined – as there are almost no case usages that overlap with the GA (the temporal genitive coming very close, but being lexically rather limited in attested Greek). Nevertheless, there are a number of ambiguous expressions in which it is very difficult for us today to tell how people at the time would have understood

³¹ See Section 5.3.a of this chapter.

them. Would Homeric audiences have perceived an adnominal link in either of the following examples? (Underlined are the possible heads of the genitive expressions.)

ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται
οἰχομένοιο σέθεν δολιχὴν ὁδὸν ἀργαλήην τε.

‘[and he can tell you] – if you so wish (τοι) – all that’s occurred within
your palace, good and bad, **while you’ve been gone** your long and
painful way’ (Od. 4.392–3)

μεμνησθαι πατρὸς καὶ μητέρος ἐν μεγάροισιν
ὥς νῦν, ἣ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐμεῦ ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντος

‘watch over my father and mother in the palace, just as now, or perhaps a
little more, **when I am far from home**’ (Od. 18.267–8)

We have no grammatical criteria to answer this question, but need to rely on our literary/stylistic intuitions to decide whether we are to see such constructions as adnominal, or as adverbial and thus absolute. At Od. 18.267–8, for example, there clearly is a link in real life. Yet the question is whether this is the point here, and we/Homeric audiences are *meant to* perceive a link between ‘the father and mother of me who I am far away’. However native speakers may have interpreted individual ambiguous instances of this kind, the boundaries between absolute and such potentially adnominal constructions cannot have been very clear. This question is different from the ones relevant in relation to Latin. Yet the mere fact of the absence of an identifiable criterion for whether such expressions are absolute or not again shows that ACs are more closely tied in with the remainder of Greek syntactical constructions than we often realise.

In Sanskrit, we again find a fully absolute construction, but one that, at least in its early attestations, is semantically limited (to expressions of natural time) and that is surrounded by numerous formally and semantically so very similar constructions that one should wonder whether the ‘absoluteness’ of the LA is not far less relevant than its links to its grammatical context and the continuity between all the different kinds of expression that consist of noun and agreeing (verbal) adjective.

In brief, there *is* a delineating feature suitable for identifying ACs and for delineating them from other constructions across the

languages in which they occur. Yet this feature is also present in other constructions. This is relevant in two ways. On the one hand it demonstrates that, unlike what one might infer from depictions in grammars etc., the main characteristic of ACs is not unique. And on the other, these other constructions provide us with all the more background against which to compare ACs, and test whether we do understand what sets them apart from their environment.

5.4 The elements of the AC

Two syntactic factors play a role in ACs: how they employ participles, and how they employ case. As it is the aim of this chapter to reconstruct the state of ACs in PIE, it is necessary to first inquire into the state of these two elements in PIE.

5.4.a *Participles*

In several accounts of the development of ACs,³² the ‘verbal force’ of participles is appealed to: it is this force which is meant to cause nominal phrases consisting of (pro)noun and participle to be perceived as similar to verbal clauses. Once that was the case, the theories continue, these expressions could go beyond the original semantic scope of the case they stand in, and (for those who see governed case as the source of absolute case usage) could free themselves from this original government. As I have argued (Section 1.2.c.ii), the theories seeing ACs as originally developed from governed case usage are difficult to motivate linguistically, and yet even those who see adverbial case usage as the main AC source refer to the ‘verbal force’ of participles to account for the development from adverbial expressions such as νυκτός to ACs such as ἀποικοιμένοις ἀνακτός.

If ACs are to develop in PIE or early IE because of a ‘verbal force’ of their participles, we have to be certain that this force actually existed. Given that participles are verbal adjectives, formed with nominal suffixes, they could also have mostly adjectival properties without any reference to time/tense. It is also possible for

³² See Section 1.2.c.ii.

them to have more nominal properties when they are first formed, and to develop verbal properties later, if and when they align themselves with the finite forms of the verbal base they are built on.

While participles are used both like adjectives (i.e. denoting qualities such as ‘beloved’ without any reference to time) and with more verbal properties (e.g. marked for aspect or (relative) time, or governing objects) across all languages this study is focusing on, participles in Greek are more often close to the verbal end of the spectrum while those in Latin are more often at the adjectival end. In Classical Greek, participles are fully integrated into the verbal paradigm. There is a regularly formed participle for every tense stem and voice a finite Greek verb may be marked for. Participles can have verbal syntax. (An active participle, for example, could take a direct object in the accusative from Homer on.³³ Post-Homerically, the agent of a passive participle could be expressed in the same way as the agent of a finite passive verb.³⁴) At the other end of the spectrum is the Latin participle system that is rather rudimentary, lacking a present passive, a past active and a future passive participle.³⁵

The question now is: what is closer to PIE and early IE, and thus more representative of the environment in which ACs developed? A comprehensive look at participle usage across early IE languages is beyond the scope of this study. What follows is a summary of the indications that two deverbal formations, those created by the addition of *-nt-* and *-to-*, were likely to have been more adjectival than verbal in their early existence. Material from the oldest IE languages (Hittite, Vedic/Sanskrit, Avestan, Greek and Latin) was taken into account.

Deverbal *-nt-* formations in IE are extremely regular. Across IE languages, there is a participle formed by means of adding the *-nt-* suffix to the present stem of a verb; in all languages except for Hittite³⁶ this participle is present active. Yet *-nt-* is used also

³³ τοὺς ὃ γ’ ἐπιτορύνων ἔπειτα πτερόεντα προσηύδα ‘spurring them on, to them he spoke the winged words’ (Il. 13.94).

³⁴ See n. 8, ch. 2. ³⁵ A past passive participle is, of course, active for deponent verbs.

³⁶ In Hittite, deverbal *-nt-* forms denote neither present tense, nor always active voice. Rather, *-nt-* creates a *past* participle that is active when formed from intransitive verbs, and passive when formed from transitive verbs (cf. e.g. *kunant-* ‘killed’ (from

to form non-deverbal adjectives in several languages,³⁷ such as Hittite *arsanant-* ‘envious’ (cf. *arsan-iya-* ‘envy’), Latin *frequens*, *recens*, *ingens* or Sanskrit *ruśant-* ‘white, bright’, *mahānt-* and *bṛhant-* ‘big, great’ (Avestan *bər^ozant* ‘high, tall’, *mazānt* ‘great’), and forms from pronominal or adverbial stems, such as Sanskrit *īyant-* ‘so big’, *kīyant-* ‘how big’ or Latin *totiens*, *quotiens*. Nouns such as Sanskrit *dant-/*Greek ὀδών/Latin *dens* ‘tooth’ or Greek γέρον/Sanskrit *jarant-* ‘old man’ seem to be nominalised participles (of **ed-* ‘to eat’ and **ġerh₂-* ‘to make old’, respectively). Greek furthermore contains a number of (partly deverbal) formations in -οντ- or -οντ-, mainly used in names.

Latin also displays a number of deverbal *nt*-formations (such as *sapiens* ‘wise’, *cupiens* ‘desirous, eager, anxious’) that are entirely adjectival in meaning and use. In addition to the presence of non-participial *nt*-formations, Early Latin, as is pointed out by Bennett,³⁸ also displays an absence of *nt*-participles from various verbal stems. Looking through his long list of examples, one does notice that the large majority of *nt*-participles are either from intransitive verbs (*abire*, *currere*, *tacere*, *exoriri*, *mori* etc.) or from verbs used intransitively. These are more likely to be used adjectivally.³⁹

In Greek, the use of *-nt-* to form participles is extremely regular in all aspects – formally, semantically, syntactically. Yet even here we find an interesting semantic and syntactic exception. The forms ἔκων and negated ἀέκων/ἄκων are more or less adjectival

kuen- ‘kill’), but *akkant-* ‘having died’ (from *ak-* ‘die’); the same situation is found with **to*-participles in Sanskrit). Forms such as *asant-* ‘being’ (rather than ‘having been’) and *iyant-* ‘sheep’ (originally ‘walking (one)’; cf. Old Norse *gangandi fé* ‘walking cattle’ = ‘sheep’) indicate that an originally present meaning underlies the Hittite state, too (Kronasser 1956: 210). The active/passive distinction for intransitive/transitive might represent an original semantically freer function of this suffix; alternatively, it might represent another instance of Hittite going its own way within the IE language family.

³⁷ See Kronasser 1956: 127–8 for the Hittite material, *AiGr* II.2.160–8 on the Sanskrit, Hoffmann and Forssman 1996: 147 on the Avestan, Risch 1974: 26–8 on the Greek and e.g. K-G 1.991 on the Latin material. I am not including compounded *nt*-stems (such as formations in **-uent-*) here.

³⁸ ‘In general it is to be noted that in Early Latin the present participle is not used with the freedom with which it is employed later. It is confined likewise to a very limited number of verbs, of which *advenio* is by far the most important’ (Bennett 1910: 435).

³⁹ As is the case in *complexus cum Alcumena cubat amans, animo obsequens* ‘he is lying with Alcumena in his arms, in love and enjoying himself’ (Pl. *Amph.* 290).

in their properties. The verbal stem from which they derive (PIE **uek̑*, cf. Skt. *vaś* ‘to wish, want’)⁴⁰ has otherwise been lost in Greek, and the forms are used as equivalents to the English ‘willing/unwilling’ rather than a more verbal ‘(not) wanting (sth./to do sth.)’. In Homeric GAs, nothing modifies the absolute instances of ἐκών/ἄεκων.⁴¹ In ἐμεῖο μὲν οὐκ ἐθελούσης (*Il.* 24.289), on the other hand, the negation we find is οὐκ, which Greek uses to negate participles and finite verb forms (contrast this with the privative ἄ- in ἄεκων; οὐχ ἐκών is found from Aeschylus⁴² onwards),⁴³ and we also find a μὲν that is taken up by an ἀλλά in the following line (ἐπεὶ ἄρ σέ γε θυμὸς | ὀτρύνει ἐπὶ νῆας ἐμεῖο μὲν οὐκ ἐθελούσης. | ἀλλ’ εὖχαιο σύ γ’ ἔπειτα κελαινεφέϊ Κρονίωνι), expressing a contrast between the GA and the finite verb εὖχαιο: ‘I do not want you to go. But you (given you want to go) at least pray to cloud-black Zeus.’

In their non-absolute uses in Homer, ἐκών and ἄεκων are also used more or less adjectivally. Given that these two forms do not have a verbal root or finite verbal forms associated with them, one should speculate whether they display the original semantic nature of these deverbal formations. If this is the case, then the remainder of attested participles would only have become properly verbal over time. Most probably this happened under the influence of the relevant finite verbal paradigms. If it is correct that ἐκών and ἄεκων/ἄκων did not develop any regular verbal properties because they were not recognised as participles, then those participles that *are* linked to existing finite verbal paradigms may once have been equally adjectival in their properties. Thus Greek participles may once have been like their Latin counterparts in both their semantics and their syntax. Admittedly, this is basing a big theory on just one example. Nevertheless, the remaining system of Greek *nt*-participles is very regular, and it would be difficult to explain ἐκών etc. as innovations. Hence these exceptions must represent something old, and thus possibly a mirror of something once more widespread.

⁴⁰ Cf. Frisk (1960–72) s.v. ἐκών, and *LIV* s.v. **uek̑*.

⁴¹ ἄεκοντος ἐμεῖο *Il.* 1.301, ἐμεῦ ἄεκοντος *Il.* 19.273, σευ ἄεκοντος *Od.* 9.405.

⁴² ὅσπερ οὐχ ἐκών ἔπλει ‘(Only Odysseus,) the one who sailed against his will, (proved himself . . .)’, *A. A.* 841. See also n. 67, ch. 3.

⁴³ K-G 1.2.323–3.

Finally, we should note the interesting use of ἐκών/ἄέκων in the Homeric GA. Given that they, not having a verbal paradigm they belong to, are not regular participles, ἄέκοντος ἐμεῖο (e.g. at *Il.* 1.301) strictly speaking is a nominal AC in Greek. At any rate, it provides us with a direct semantic parallel to the frequent Early Latin *me invito*. Together, they provide an indication that this state of affairs (an absolute construction not involving a strongly verbal participle, but a form that is more or less adjectival) may be much closer to the PIE state of affairs than what we find in standard Greek ACs.

In the case of **-to-*, there is more variation among formations than for **-nt-*. As Bennett notes, the semantic variations are ‘an Indo-European inheritance. In Indo-European, the verbal *-tos* was not restricted to either voice, but was used freely now with active, not with passive, force.’⁴⁴ Sommer illustrates that **x-to-* originally signified that the verbal action had in some way affected the head noun.⁴⁵ Wackernagel notes that Sanskrit formations in *-ta-* are counted as participles in ‘more recent portrayals of Sanskrit grammar’, but that they are fundamentally different from participles in that they were added to the verbal root rather than a stem marked for tense, and that they were used equally for active and medial verbs, with the effect that they would inherently express neither tense nor voice.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Bennett 1910: 436.

⁴⁵ ‘Das Verbaladjektiv auf *-to-*, auch in verschiedenen anderen Einzelsprachen (Arisch, Germanisch etc.) zum P. p. ausgebildet, hatte anfangs eine weitere Gebrauchssphäre; es drückte aus, daß der Vorgang des Verbalbegriffs dem Bezugswort als Eigenschaft anhaftete: *volneratus* ist “mit den Merkmalen der Verwundung behaftet”. Damit war die Möglichkeit einer Verwendung zum P. p. gegeben, zugleich erklären sich aber auch andere Funktionen, vor allem die gelegentlich aktivische: ... *homo potus* “der die Merkmale des Trinkens an sich hat, ein Trunkener.” Sommer 1914: 599–600. See also *AiGr* II.2.576: ‘Die Verbaladjektiva auf *-ta-* haben als Grundbedeutung “dem der Verbalbegriff als Eigenschaft, als Merkmal anhaftet”.’

⁴⁶ ‘Durch die in §432 genannten Funktionen steht *-ta-* den Partizipien nahe; es pflegt daher in den neueren Darstellungen der ai. Grammatik den Partizipien zugerechnet zu werden. Von Haus aus unterscheidet es sich aber von den Partizipien schon durch seine Bildung völlig, indem *-ta-* ursprünglich an die Wurzel oder den allgemeinen Verbalstamm, nicht an einen Tempusstamm tritt und gleichmäßig für aktive und mediale Verba verwendet wird, so daß die Beziehungen zur Zeitstufe und Diathesis formal nicht zum Ausdruck kommen.’ He continues, ‘Grundsprachlich war aber *-to-*, wie das Griechische zeigt, auch sonst in Funktion und Konstruktion von den Partizipien deutlich geschieden, freilich schon im ältesten Indischen durch eine wohlverständliche Weiterentwicklung des Gebrauchs den Partizipien angenähert’ (*AiGr* II.2.579).

*-to- is not found in Anatolian.⁴⁷ Greek does not use it for participles, but for what is commonly referred to as ‘the verbal adjective’, whose meaning can be identical to that of the *-to-participle in other languages (e.g. ποιητός ‘done’), or expresses possibility (e.g. ὁρατός ‘visible’).⁴⁸ In Latin, we find a great number of denominal adjectives in -tus that denote ‘endowed/equipped with something’ (cf. Latin *barbatus*, *togatus*, *cordatus*, *turritus*, *cornutus* etc.).⁴⁹ This usage is paralleled in Sanskrit, especially in negated forms (cf. e.g. *a-sūr-ta-* ‘not having sun, without sun’).⁵⁰ In Avestan, *-to- is used not only to form a past participle, but also a small number of nouns and adjectives; furthermore, negated -to-participles can mirror the meaning of -to-formations in Greek (as in *ahqṣta-* ‘uncountable’).⁵¹

In both Sanskrit and Latin, the suffix is used to form a past participle in a formally regular fashion. Yet in both languages, it is not regularly added to a tense stem, but simply to the verbal root: cf. Skt. *hita-* ‘put’, Latin *factus* ‘done, made’.⁵² On the semantic level, Sanskrit here is interesting, as the -ta-participle is passive if formed of a transitive verb, and active if formed of an intransitive verb (compare e.g. *kṛta-* ‘(having been) done, made’ from $\sqrt{kṛ}$ ‘to do, make’ as opposed to *gata-* ‘having gone’ from $\sqrt{gam}$ ‘to go’). All of this shows that *-to- never settled in the participle system as well as -nt- did. Forms such as *quietus*, while commonly listed as the fourth principal part of *quiesco*, basically mean ‘at rest, inactive, quiet’, expressing neither tense nor voice, and even commonly used participles can be used adjectivally, i.e. without reference to tense/time.⁵³

⁴⁷ Kronasser 1956: 210.

⁴⁸ Most of these forms can have either meaning. -to- is usually added to a stem identical to that of the aorist passive without the -σ-, but forms from present and future stems are also found (e.g. φερ-τός or μενε-τός); cf. Smyth 1956: 156–7, K-G 1.2.288–9.

⁴⁹ K-S 1.1000–1. ⁵⁰ *AiGr* II.2.588.

⁵¹ Hoffmann and Forssman 1996: 213, Jackson 1892: 219.

⁵² As Brugmann 1895: 92 points out, -to- formations were originally distinct from the corresponding finite perfect (e.g. *datus* vs. *dedi*, *tonsus* vs. *totondi*, *esus* vs. *edi* etc.), and only later (‘nachdem dieser Einleibungsprozeß im wesentlichen zum Abschluß gekommen war’) do we find formal relations between the two forms established (e.g. *hausus* (instead of earlier *haustus*) to go with the active perfect *hausi*).

⁵³ As in e.g. *voltus velamine celat amatos* ‘he hides the beloved face with a veil’ (Ov. *Fast.* 6.579).

Greek, as mentioned above, negates participles in the same way as it does finite verbs. In Sanskrit, on the other hand, *a-* and prevo-calic *an-* negate adjectives, participles, infinitives and absolutes, while *na* negates finite verbs.⁵⁴ In Latin, too, where finite verbs are negated by means of particles such as *non*, *haud* or *ne*, participles, as all other adjectives, are negated with *in-* (e.g. *impudens*, *innocens*, *indoctus*, *intonsus* etc.; cf. also the nominalised *infans*). Thus, in this particular aspect Latin and Sanskrit treat their participles like other adjectives. As ἄέκων indicates, this may once also have been the case in Greek.

A further indication of once stronger links between deverbal and non-deverbal adjectives comes from the area of syntax. While e.g. participles in Hittite cannot govern objects at all,⁵⁵ Greek participles do this on a regular basis from the *Iliad* on.⁵⁶ In Latin, the situation is mixed. As stated above, the present active participle in Early Latin is found almost only of intransitive verbs. Of those participles of transitive verbs that we do find, such as *amans*, *cupiens*, *metuens*, *gerens* etc., most have retained nominal syntax and take genitive attributes.⁵⁷ Over time, verb-like behaviour increases, yet as K-S (who list examples from Early through Silver Latin) point out,⁵⁸ we also find a continuing double use: participles of transitive verbs are constructed with genitives when they are used as adjectives to express a lasting characteristic, rather than as ‘proper’ participles that express a passing state or action.⁵⁹

If we can see the above as evidence that a number of adjective-like features of participles are old, rather than innovated, we may speculate that the PIE system of participles included the following features: first of all, not all verbs would have had all

⁵⁴ *AiGr* II.1.77.

⁵⁵ This is a natural consequence of the fact that the *-ant*-suffix, when used of transitive verbs, is passive in meaning; see Friedrich 1960: 144.

⁵⁶ See n. 8, ch. 2. ⁵⁷ See Bennett 1914: 82–7.

⁵⁸ K-S II.1.450–1; cf. e.g. *tui cupiens* (Pl. *Mil.* 1049). They note that this is not written in stone and that there are exceptions.

⁵⁹ The double character of Latin participles (one more verbal, one more nominal) is also reflected in the fact that Latin dictionaries such as the *OLD* have separate entries for e.g. *amare*, *amans* and *amatus*. The entries *amans* and *amatus* refer to the adjectival rather than the paradigmatic, i.e. participial use of these forms.

participles formed from them. If e.g. *-nt*-formations originally had more adjective-like features, this makes sense: in a language that does not have deverbal adjectives with verbal syntax yet, *-nt*-derivations may only have been formed from verbs in whose case the result was something equally adjectival, such as e.g. English ‘loving’ in ‘he’s very loving’, but not when the result would basically demand verbal syntax, such as in ‘preparing’ *vel sim.*⁶⁰ One can see how such a starting-point could over time have led to the use of existing *-nt*-forms in non-adjectival ways, and thus to the creation of new *-nt*-forms which could only be used as ‘true’ verbal participles. The more forms there are that can be used in non-adjectival ways, the more frequent the non-adjectival use may become even of forms that can be used in an adjectival way. Linked with that we would then find the various developments which make the single participles more verb-like: negation akin to that of finite verbs, more participles with direct objects, fewer with genitive attributes, more in use as conjunct participles etc. How far these various processes can go can be seen in Greek. The question is how far they went within PIE. It seems unlikely that they would have gone further than the state in which we find them in Latin.⁶¹ How much less far they went we cannot say. Still, it seems safe to suspect that both purely adjectival forms and forms in adjectival usage would have been relatively frequent. And thus, ‘participle phrases’ would probably have consisted of just the participle and its head, and would not have been likely to convey any clause-like character. Also, to come back to the question we posed at the outset, it is unlikely that their ‘verbal force’, if it did exist, would have been strong enough to effect any weakening of the ties between a noun and that which governs it. The view held by e.g. Delbrück

⁶⁰ Compare this to e.g. English agent nouns. These are usually applied only to someone who/something that does something regularly and characteristically: a driver, a runner, a bottle-opener. It thus would be ungrammatical to call someone a bottle-opener only because they have just opened a bottle. Also, in unmarked English an agent noun of a verb that is not a typical repeated action of anyone or anything would sound odd (e.g. a ‘dier’, a ‘decayer’ or an ‘ager’) and hence we might not use it.

⁶¹ This at least seems more likely than to postulate that Latin participles had gained some of those facilities, then lost them (and subsequently regained them, at least partly under the influence from Greek.)

(1888: 386) and many others who attribute the ‘loosening’ of ACs to the verbal force of the participle (which causes noun and participle to be perceived as ‘a kind of temporal or modal subordinate clause’)⁶² is thus problematic for PIE. It works for attested Greek, yet not only do the parallels between ACs across languages make it greatly preferable to reconstruct the genesis of ACs for PIE, it would also be very difficult to explain how Latin ACs – which neither are very ‘verbal’ in themselves nor come from a verbal system of participles – came to be.

5.4.b Case

On the basis of the cases and patterns of case syncretism we find attested in IE languages,⁶³ we reconstruct seven syntactic cases for PIE, and one extrasyntactic case, the vocative. As these survive without functional syncretism into Vedic,⁶⁴ that system of case usage may provide a good guide for inferring how cases may have been used in PIE. Some of the case systems we find in Balto-Slavic, an IE branch with languages in which there has been very little case syncretism to date, are also interesting here.

The seven syntactic cases we reconstruct for PIE can be grouped into two categories. On the one hand, there are the *grammatical* or *core* cases (nominative, genitive, dative, accusative). These do not assign semantic roles, but mostly specify the degree to which something belongs to its head. The actual semantic role of the noun (e.g. possessor, agent, patient) appearing in one of these cases is determined by the sentence context, i.e. the lexical semantics of the noun in question and that which it depends on or is governed by. The nominative, for example, simply marks a noun as the subject of the clause: in the sentence ‘he was bitten by the dog’, the subject is the patient of an action rather than its agent. In the sentence

⁶² ‘Die Grundlage einer sog. absoluten Participial-Construction bildet ein gewöhnlicher Localis oder Genitiv, dem ein Partic. zugefügt ist. Indem diese beiden Wörter innerlich als eine Art von temporalem oder modalem Nebensatz empfunden werden, löst sich der Casus von seinem regierenden Theile los, und es können solche Constructionen auch da gebraucht werden, wo der Casus allein nicht stehen könnte.’

⁶³ For a comprehensive treatment of case, see e.g. Blake 2001.

⁶⁴ And for the most part into Sanskrit, the exception being the dative, which cedes most of its functions to the genitive.

‘he bit the dog back’, the subject is the agent. The adnominal genitive simply expresses that a noun is connected with or belongs to some other noun. How semantically empty this case is can be seen from e.g. its subjective vs. its objective use in languages such as Latin: in *amor parentum*, the parents can be either the source of the love (‘the love of one’s parents’: subjective genitive) or its intended goal (‘the love for one’s parents’: objective genitive). An accusative expresses the extent of an action: with transitive verbs, the result is a direct object; with verbs of motion, the goal of that motion. In a number of languages, including Greek, the accusative can be used to mark the extent of various intransitive verbs and even adjectives (the ‘Greek accusative’ or ‘accusative of respect’, cf. e.g. the Homeric πρόδος ὠκύς ‘fast in respect to his feet’).

On the other hand, there are the so-called *peripheral* cases (ablative, instrumental, locative). These always assign the same basic semantic role: source, instrument and location respectively. The exact nature of that role still depends on the semantics of the noun in question: putting a word that denotes place into the ablative, the result will denote the source or spatial origin of a physical motion (e.g. *tuom Stalagmum servom, qui aufugit domo* ‘your slave Stalagmus, who fled from home’, Pl. *Capt.* 875). If, on the other hand, we put an abstract noun into the ablative, this will denote an ‘inner’ origin, i.e. a cause or motivation (e.g. *abscesserant metu hostes* ‘the enemy had departed in/out of/from fear’, Livy 21.26.2).⁶⁵ In languages with little post-PIE case syncretism, the peripheral cases are very productive: as was demonstrated in Section 4.3.a, the locative in Sanskrit can be employed of basically any word that can possibly be seen as a place or point in time, space, or imagination; comparable variety can be observed in the Sanskrit ablative and instrumental. A modern example of this kind of productivity can be found in the Lithuanian instrumental: anything that can be represented as an instrument or concomitant of any kind can stand in this case (cf. e.g. *eĩti kaliù* ‘go along a path’ (lit. by means of a path, cf. *ibam via sacra*, Hor. *Sat.* 1.9.1), *tvilkti karščiù* ‘to sweat

⁶⁵ I am aware of the discussion of whether the ablative of cause should be seen as an original PIE ablative or instrumental (see e.g. Bennett 1914: 312); I believe that at least some instances are original ablatives, and that the one given here is among them.

through/because of heat', *jis bùvo mókitoju* 'he was a teacher' (lit. he was/existed through being a teacher'), a common Balto-Slavic usage).⁶⁶

Grammatical and peripheral cases thus *principally* work in the same way. Yet they differ significantly in the degree to which they assign a particular role or function to a noun. In all of them, the exact function of the nominal expression in question is determined by the semantics of the noun that stands in the case in question. The roles which grammatical cases assign have little intrinsic meaning, those which semantic cases assign, a lot.

Such a system in which cases are functionally clear (i.e. displaying a more or less one-to-one relation between formal and functional case) and relatively numerous is likely to do without pre-/postpositional support and to make frequent and varied use of this rather productive means of expression (see below for both).

Wherever there is *one* general idea or concept denoted by each case, the combination of the case marker(s) and the semantics of the noun in question is enough to disambiguate the exact function of a nominal phrase. This can be witnessed e.g. in the so-called Latin 'locative': while 'place where' is normally denoted by *in* with the regular ablative, some names and words for actual places still display the inherited locative ending **-i*, such as *Romae*, *domi* or *Carthagini*, and can be used to express the concept of 'place where' without the support of a preposition.

We commonly reconstruct for PIE such a system where each formally distinct case represents *one* general idea or function.⁶⁷ That is not to say that PIE would not have had any of the words later used as pre- or postpositions. Again, the state of the proto-language *in this respect* is probably still closely reflected in Vedic: the various forms that are elsewhere used as both preverbs and

⁶⁶ Examples taken from Senn 1966: 425–30. Compare also Vaillant 1948: 180–1 for e.g. instrumentals of cause, time or way by which in Old Church Slavonic.

⁶⁷ The exception being the instrumental case: its functions as instrumental and comitative overlap, but are distinct. This has the result that e.g. in Sanskrit, one of these two functions (the comitative) requires postpositional support even though this case itself remains distinct. (In Vedic, there are instances of comitative instrumentals without a postposition, but these get increasingly rarer with time.)

prepositions are found in Vedic, but are used mostly with verbs.⁶⁸ From early IE sources such as the *Rigveda* or the Homeric epics we can see that preverbs would once not have been univerted with the verb, but would have had their own accent and thus been independent. From such a starting point, they could have been linked either with verbs, or with nouns, or with both. The latter is what we find e.g. in Greek, where all of e.g. ἐκβαίνω τῆς πόλεως, ἐκβαίνω ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, βαίνω ἐκ τῆς πόλεως are possible.⁶⁹ It thus seems likely that the later preverbs and prepositions would have been loose adverbials in PIE, and thus that nominal expressions, whether in adverbial or governed functions, would not usually have featured a preposition. This absence of prepositions remains a noticeable feature of ACs.

Productive case usage would likely have led to frequent and varied employment of nominal expressions. Thus, while e.g. English would typically phrase subordinate information by using verbal means (I did this *because I was afraid, when I was tired, in order to make money* etc.), older IE languages, and Vedic/Sanskrit in particular, may prefer nominal expressions: *sutásya pītáye á gahi* (pressed_{Gen.Sg} drinking_{Dat.Sg} hither come_{2nd.Sg.Impv}) ‘come **for (the purpose of) the drinking** of pressed [Soma]’, i.e. ‘come to drink Soma’ (RV 5.51.1), *máde áhim índraḥ jaghāna* (fury_{Loc.Sg} dragon_{Acc.Sg} Indra_{Nom.Sg} kill_{3rd.Sg.Perf}) ‘**in (his) fury**, Indra slew the dragon’, i.e. ‘because he was angry/furious’ (RV 2.15.1), *bhayāt idam āha* (fear_{Abl.Sg} this_{Acc.Sg} say_{3rd.Sg.Perf}) ‘**from fear**/because he was afraid, he said this’ (*Hit.* 96).⁷⁰

Various verbal nouns derive from fossilised case usages: instrumental expressions of abstract nouns seem to have been employed

⁶⁸ See Delbrück 1888: 432: ‘Was die Verbindung [der Praepositionen] mit Casus angeht, so lässt sich aus dem Sanskrit besonders gut nachweisen, dass der Casus ursprünglich zu der mit der Praeposition innerlich verbundenen Verbalforn trat, und dass erst allmählich sich ein engeres Verhältniss zwischen Casus und Praep. entwickelte. Der Ausdruck, dass die Praeposition den Casus regiere, ist für die Periode der Sprache, die uns hier beschäftigt, höchstens bei á ‘bis’ und purá (purás) ‘vor’ in ihrer Verwendung mit dem Abl. angebracht.’

⁶⁹ See K-G II.1.531–2.

⁷⁰ Quoted by Speijer 1886: 76; see *ibid.*: 42–113 for more examples of various such case usages. In the *Rigveda*, emotions are more frequently given in the locative (see *máde* above).

so frequently in Sanskrit to denote a cause and thus some prior condition that the instrumental of deverbal abstracts in **-tu-* became grammaticalised as the *absolute*: *-tvā* added to any verbal root, usually in zero grade, results in a form most closely rendered into English as ‘having x-ed’. Various other abstracts lie at the basis of infinitives. In Vedic, these are particularly varied, with original dative and accusative (and less frequently genitive/ablative and locative) forms coming to be used in this way.⁷¹ By Classical Sanskrit, only one accusative form survives, which incidentally is formed in the same way (by means of the same suffix and in the same case) as the Latin Supine I, another example of a fossilised verbal noun. Dativial infinitives are original datives of purpose.⁷² In Latin and Greek, too, certain case forms of abstract nouns later fossilised as infinitives.⁷³ Such an environment – where semantic case usage is productive and expression by nominal means frequent – seems to be ideal for ACs to develop in. I shall discuss the possible details of such a development in Section 5.5.c.

Most case usages attested across IE languages can be explained by reference to the basic function or ‘meaning’ that the cases in question express. Yet one case usage that is attested in several languages (Sanskrit and Avestan, both of which belong to the Indo-Iranian branch of IE, and Greek) and might be reconstructed for PIE is difficult to explain on the basis of the function of the case involved: the temporal genitive. In Greek, it is used with a number of nouns referring to points or periods in time, for instance νυκτός ‘at night’, ἡοῦς ‘at dawn’, ὁπώρας ‘in summer’, or weather conditions such as νηνεμίας ‘when there is no wind’.⁷⁴ Yet Vedic has only the genitives *aktoḥ* and *kṣāpah/kṣapāḥ* ‘at night’, *vástoḥ* and *uṣásah* ‘in the morning’.⁷⁵ In Avestan we find an equally limited *khshapô* ‘at night’ and *ayān* ‘during the day’; according to Hübschmann (1875: 279), there are only four examples of these in attested Avestan texts, one of them after a multiplicative.

⁷¹ Macdonell 1910: 407–12. ⁷² Macdonell 1910: 408.

⁷³ The Latin infinitive in *-re* originally goes back to the loc. sg. of an abstract noun, the passive infinitive in *-(r)i* originated as a dative (see Meiser 1998: 225). See Rix 1992: 237–9 on the various infinitives in Greek.

⁷⁴ K-G II.1.385–7 and Smyth 1956: 336–7. ⁷⁵ See Delbrück 1888: 164.

The rise of this usage has been explained in different ways: Hübschmann (1875: 279–80) paraphrases Siecke’s explanation (*non vidi*) that this genitive is originally adnominal: ‘he came at night’ would have been expressed as ‘he came as one of the night’ (‘er kam als der der Nacht, als der nächtliche’), thus employing a genitive rather than an adjectival attribute to characterise the head noun. Schwyzer and Debrunner (*GrGr* II.112–13) may have had something similar in mind when they categorise the temporal genitive as ‘partitive’. Delbrück (1888: 164) speculates that the temporal genitive may have developed from the use of temporal nouns after numerals or multiplicative adverbs (such as *trīḥ aktóḥ* (thrice_{Indecl} night_{Gen.Sg}) ‘thrice during the night’, i.e. ‘at three times/moments of the night’⁷⁶). Indeed, this usage is something we find in all three languages that have a temporal genitive. Yet neither of these explanations seems quite sufficient: if the temporal genitive derived from such regular expressions, why is it so limited (both lexically and in its overall numbers) in the languages in which it appears, particularly Sanskrit and Avestan? It seems some of the supposed genitives of time are a comparatist figment: in respect to Vedic, Bartholomae (1889) argues convincingly that there is no temporal genitive, but that the supposed instances of such an adverbial case usage can all be explained in different ways.⁷⁷ Some genitives may have been seen as temporal just because such an interpretation would make for a more idiomatic translation into e.g. English: when we look at early Greek evidence, we equally find a surprisingly large number of apparent temporal genitives that could also be seen as adnominal.⁷⁸ The

⁷⁶ See e.g. Grassmann 1873 s.v. *tris* for more examples.

⁷⁷ He explains some as (formally identical) plural accusatives, some as genitives that are dependent on numerals (such as *trīḥ aktóḥ* above), others as dependent on nouns (he thus reads the recurring *doṣā vástoḥ* (evening_{Instr.Sg} daybreak_{Gen.Sg}, e.g. at *RV* I.104.1) not as ‘in the evening and in the morning’ (lit. ‘in darkness and lighting-up’), but as ‘in/during the darkness of daybreak’, making the genitive *vástoḥ* simply dependent on *doṣā*). In examples where he does not offer a firm conclusion, he shows that there are a number of possible interpretations.

⁷⁸ Compare obvious examples such as *πεφύλαξο δὲ θυμῷ* | *[τετράδ’ ἀλεύασθαι φθινοντός θ’ ἱσταμένου τε]* | *ἄλγεα* ‘but take care to avoid troubles which eat out the heart [on the fourth of **the beginning and ending of the month**]’ (Hes. *Op.* 797–9, 798 often being seen as spurious) to less clear cases such as *ἄλλ’ ὅτε δὴ ἔτος ἦλθε περιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν* | *τῷ οἱ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι* | *εἰς ἰθάκην* ‘but when that year

Avestan numbers, finally, are minuscule. If the construction is thus far less well attested as it may seem at first sight, it is possible we do not need to reconstruct it for PIE. Further research may help shed more light on all this. For the purposes of this current study, we are simply faced with the fact that Greek has a temporal usage of the genitive that is much more pronounced than in any other ancient IE language.

We have now seen that PIE, even though its participles probably did not have the strongly verbal properties of participles in later IE languages, especially Greek, is nevertheless likely to have had an environment conducive to nominal expression. In a language with little or no formal case syncretism, the need for pre- or postpositions is minimal. In other words: PIE had excellent conditions for the first seeds of ACs, which after all are prepositionless, nominal adverbial expressions.

5.5 Proto-Indo-European

In this section, I shall finally attempt to answer the historical/comparative questions that this study is concerned with: from which roots, how, and when did ACs develop? I shall work on the premise that an ‘absolute’ construction is a nominal phrase of temporal dimensions whose head noun does not have such dimensions, or for short: a temporal expression with a non-temporal head. I shall put together what the preceding chapters attempted to establish concerning the relevant grammatical factors in PIE (mainly case and participle usage). I shall look at the kinds of ACs we find across early IE languages, and shall suggest a starting-point from which they could arise. Subsequently, I shall look at

of/among the years rolling on spun out by the gods when he should reach his home’ (*Od.* 1.16–18), ἄλλ’ ὅτε δὴ μῆνές τε καὶ ἡμέραι ἐξετελεύντο | ἄψ περιτελλομένου ἔτεος καὶ ἐπὶ λυθον ὥραι ‘but when the months and days **of the year that rolled round again** were being brought to a close and as the seasons came again’ (*Od.* 14.294). Finally, some passages seem to make more sense if a genitive they contain is interpreted as absolute; cf. ἄλλ’ ὅτε δὴ ῥ’ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔην, περὶ δ’ ἔτραπον ὥραι | μηνῶν φθινόντων, περὶ δ’ ἡμῶν πόλλ’ ἐτελέσθη, | ἡ δ’ ἔτεκ’ ἐννέα κούρας ‘and when a year had passed and the seasons turned **with the waning of the moons/months** (rather than: the seasons of the waning months), and many days were completed, she gave birth to nine daughters’ (*Hes. Th.* 58–60).

how the construction developed into the single IE languages, and how it was augmented by expressions from different sources.

As we saw above (Section 5.4.a), there are indications that participles in PIE were rather unlike the regular and paradigmatic participles of Greek, on which the idea of a ‘loosening’ from syntactical bounds (cf. e.g. Delbrück 1888: 386, see Section 1.2.b.ii) as the basis of ACs was founded. Yet when we understand what ACs are, the question of the ‘verbal’ or ‘verb-like’ status of participles actually becomes irrelevant: that ACs have a temporal dimension is due to the fact that the nominal qualifier of the head is obligatory, and thus acts like a sentence predicate, which also is obligatory. Once a qualifier had thus gained predicate status, it did not make any difference how inherently ‘verbal’ it was. This, to my mind, means that there could not have been any noteworthy difference between ‘nominal’ and regular ACs. (More on this below in Section 5.6.b on the development into Latin.)

As we also saw (Section 5.4.b), case usage in PIE is likely to have been varied and productive. Grammatical and peripheral cases would have been very similar in their productivity: just as a genitive likely was able to mark adnominal relationships of any kind whatsoever, so an instrumental could have displayed any noun as an instrument or concomitant in the widest sense of the word. One of the likely consequences of this would have been a relatively high frequency of nominal expression. Given the nearly one-to-one relation between formal and functional case that we can reconstruct for PIE especially on the basis of Vedic (see Sections 4.3.a and 5.4.b), it is likely that nominal expressions governed by prepositions were rare in PIE.

5.5.a ACs in PIE

In Chapters 2–4, we saw the various shapes and semantic nuances of AC that are found across the oldest IE languages in which these constructions are clearly attested. What all of these had in common was that they referred to time even though their head nouns did not. In spite of the semantic variation in ACs between languages, there was one type that existed in all three: expressions of *natural* time, i.e. points in or units of time that mark the regular passing

of the seasons, of the years, of the interchange between night and day. This type includes such expressions as:

ἄλλ' ἐν πρότοισιν ὄω
κείσεται οὐττηθείς, πολέες δ' ἄμφ' αὐτὸν ἑταῖροι
ἡελίου ἀνιόντος ἐς αὖριον

‘in the front ranks he will lie wounded, I think, many of his comrades
around him **when the sun rises** tomorrow/**at the rising of tomorrow’s
sun**’ (Il. 8.536–8)

prata primo vere stercorato luna silenti

‘manure meadows at the opening of spring, **at new moon**’
(Cato Agr. 50.1)

yát adyá *sūrye* *udyati* *prīyakṣatrāḥ* ṛtām dadhá
when today sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg} dear-ruler_{Voc.Pl} right_{Acc.Sg} set_{2nd.Pl.Perf}
‘when you, beloved rulers, appoint the rite **at sunrise** today’ (RV 8.27.19)

Given that this very particular type of AC is present in three IE languages, let us assume that absolute expressions of natural time did exist in PIE. As expressions of ‘time at which’ seem most naturally given in the locative, let us assume for now that these very specific and semantically very limited ACs stood in the locative case. Let us then try to take a step back and determine how such expressions most likely developed. Once we have looked at this, let us take a step forward and see whether the ACs we find attested in the single IE languages can be led back to an absolute seed of this kind.

In Sanskrit, regular expressions of time are productively formed in the same way as ACs (namely: in the locative, and without any prepositions). Here we can see that, at least on the surface, such ACs of natural time are only minimally different from other, non-absolute expressions of natural time. Indeed, several instances of *sūrye* *udite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} risen_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the risen sun, at sunrise’ appear parallel to a non-absolute expression of natural time, *madhyāmdine divaḥ* (mid-day_{Loc.Sg} day_{Gen.Sg}) ‘at the middle of the day’.⁷⁹ Furthermore, there are expressions of natural time whose

⁷⁹ RV 8.1.29, identically at 8.13.13, with small variations at 8.27.21. *madhyāmdine* is also used in parallel with *ūdītā sūryasya* (rise_{Loc.Sg} sun_{Gen.Sg}) ‘at the rise of the sun’. See Ziegler 2002 on these expressions and a comparison of them with ACs.

nominal head does have a temporal dimension, and yet the qualifying participle still provides semantically very important information. Compare expressions such as Sanskrit *uṣasi āgatāyām* (dawn_{Loc.Sg} having-come_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the arrival of dawn, at the crack of dawn’ (AB 4.9.2) or *rātryām bhūtāyām* (night_{Loc.Sg} having-become_{Loc.Sg}) ‘as night has fallen (lit. ‘in the night, when it has become’)’ (KB 7.10), or also Greek θέρευς ἔτι μέσσου ἐόντος ‘while it is yet midsummer (lit. ‘in the summer, while it is still (in the) middle’)’ (Hes. *Op.* 664) or even περιπλομένου δ’ ἐνιαυτοῦ (τέξεαι ἀγλαὰ τέκνα) ‘and when a year has run its course (you will give birth to glorious children)’ (*Od.* 11.248–9).⁸⁰ This last example is particularly interesting as we here have an expression with a noun of natural time at its head, yet no notion of ‘during’ is present: the matrix action takes place *after* that year. Omitting the qualifiers in any of the other expressions (ἔτι μέσσου ἐόντος etc.) still leaves us with an expression of time, but one which misses the precise point of the original. It seems likely that such expressions – featuring a temporal head but a qualifier that was nevertheless obligatory or at least semantically rather important – functioned as an intermediate step between simple temporal expressions (such as νυκτός ‘at night’) and regular ACs (such as ἡελίου ἀνιόντος ‘at sunrise’). As we shall see in Section 5.5.b, the same type of intermediate expression can be found in AUCs.

We may go even further and wonder whether there existed more nouns such as **meh₁-ns*,⁸¹ which lies at the bottom of nouns for both moon (no temporal dimension, e.g. Sanskrit *mās*, Goth. *mena*) and month (clear temporal dimension, e.g. Sanskrit *mās* again, Greek μῆν/μείς, Latin *mensis*). Hence, an expression comparable to the Homeric τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μηνός, τοῦ δ’ ἵσταμένοιο (*Od.* 14.161) may once have been ambiguous: one can think of both the moon and a month as waxing or waning. If this example features the word for moon, the participial qualifier is as obligatory as in a word for ‘sun’ *vel sim*. If it features a word

⁸⁰ See Monro 1891: 212–13 who also points to links to weather expressions such as νηνεμίης and Βορέαο πειπόντος (Hes. *Op.* 547).

⁸¹ As reconstructed e.g. by EWAia II.352, s.v. *mās*.

for ‘month’, the situation is different: here, the qualifiers are very important for the specific meaning of the expression, but not syntactically obligatory: ‘during/in a/that month’ is a regular expression of time. Such semantic fluctuation may once have played a role in the PIE stages of AC development. Yet unless we find more such examples, this is not well-founded reconstruction, but speculation.

Thus I propose the following: the development towards ACs started from nouns referring to time – day, night, year, month, dusk, dawn etc. – standing in a case through which they expressed the notion of ‘at [that time]’. Examples of this stage attested in the daughter languages include *uṣasi* ‘at dawn’ or *νυκτός* ‘at night’. Such expressions, as any other noun, could be qualified by adjectives or participles, and sometimes such qualifiers would then make the expression as a whole refer specifically to one part of the time period denoted by the noun in question. This stage would have been similar to attested expressions such as *uchántyām uṣási* (gleaming_{Loc.Sg} dawn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at dawn, when it lit up, at the crack of dawn’ (*RV* 1.184.1), *rātryām bhūtāyām* (night_{Loc.Sg} having-become_{Loc.Sg}) ‘as night had fallen (lit. ‘in the night, when it had become’)’ (*KB* 7.10) or also *θέρευς ἔτι μέσσου ἑόντος* ‘while it is yet midsummer (lit. ‘in the summer, while it is still (in the) middle’)’ (*Hes. Op.* 664). This, in turn, was followed by a small change that may indeed have at first existed only in one specific expression: ‘dawn’ is a word that intrinsically refers to time. The end-point of dawn is marked by the appearance of the sun. Although the semantics of the word ‘sun’ in itself do not have a temporal dimension, the sun is closely linked to natural time and how we measure it. And so it seems possible that the first AC came to be when the word ‘sun’ was used in an expression referring to time: from *‘at dawn appearing, at the crack of dawn’, the step to ‘at the sun appearing/rising, at sunrise’ is very small. Yet as soon as we have reached this point, we have a fully absolute expression, and from it, ACs could expand very easily. No further syntactic changes were necessary, and below we shall see a number of specific ways by which this spread of the construction could have taken place.

It is indeed possible that the first AC did not actually involve the sun, but a different word that marked the passage of time without itself referring to time (a seasonal wind or rain, a bird or plant whose arrival or appearance marked the beginning of spring, the first snow etc.).⁸² Given the importance of religion and thus, probably, religious ritual, words for such rituals may also have been the basis for ACs, with the first AC having involved an object important in such religious ceremonies. In short: any object or thing used for measuring time, but not actually being a point or period in time, may have formed the basis for the first ACs. The reason why the sun was used to exemplify the step from non-absolute to absolute here is because both the basic expression (involving dawn) and the AC that, as I think, developed from it (involving the sun) are actually attested in several languages.

The theory just outlined has the advantage that it identifies a very small step in which one expression has been modelled on another, formally identical expression. It thus is parallel to well-established theories of syntactic reanalysis (such as those concerning the Greek and Latin *accusative and infinitive* constructions).⁸³ The theory is based on attested expressions, absolute and not. The end point of this development is the only unambiguously absolute construction that we find in the earliest layer of Sanskrit, the *Rigveda*.

The first variations that occurred within ACs perhaps took place still within the realm of expressions of natural time. While we find *śūrye udyatī* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the rising sun, at sunrise’ once in the *Rigveda* (8.27.19), both the *Rigveda* and Brāhmaṇic prose⁸⁴ show mostly *āditye/sūr(y)e udite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-gone_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the having-risen sun, just after sunrise’. Both expressions, strictly speaking, refer to a ‘point at which’, yet ‘at the rising sun: at sunrise’ refers to a point slightly better defined than ‘at the having risen sun: just after sunrise’. The LA using the Sanskrit *ta*-participle thus, in effect, refers not to a point, but

⁸² Not all of these apply to all climates, of course, and as we still do not know who the speakers of PIE were and where they lived, we cannot tell which of these phenomena they would have experienced.

⁸³ See K-S II.1.688–9 or also Coleman 1985.

⁸⁴ See Oertel 1926.

a period of time. It is from *sūrye udite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-gone_{Loc.Sg}) that we then find the perhaps next step to *sūrye anudite* (sun_{Loc.Sg} non-up-gone_{Loc.Sg}). Similar to the development from *me praesente* to the formally parallel *me absente*, *sūrye anudite* ‘at the unrisen sun’, i.e. ‘before the sun rises’, is an exact formal parallel to *sūrye udite*. Yet semantically it is yet another step away from the simple locative *sūrye udyatí* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at the rising sun’.

The most noticeable development towards greater variation in ACs is the simple extension from denoting expressions of natural time (*sunrise* etc.) to just denoting any expression of time (*the absence of the master* etc.). It seems unlikely to me that this would have happened within PIE: throughout Vedic, there are very few clear LAs that do not denote natural time. The unquestionable LAs in the *Rigveda* refer exclusively to sunrise (or rather: the periods right around and after it), which I take as an indication that other kinds of ACs, if they did exist in the proto-language, were rare. Yet if the state we find in Sanskrit is any indication, it is likely that there were numerous expressions that, while not strictly speaking absolute as their heads did have a temporal dimension to their semantics, would have been formally almost identical to ACs (cf. e.g. *śasyāmāne ukthé* (being-sung_{Loc.Sg} hymn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘during the chanted hymn, when the hymn is chanted’ (RV 6.23.1, see Section 4.4.a) or also *dhāne hité* (contest/prize_{Loc.Sg} put_{Loc.Sg}) e.g. at RV 9.53.2; see Section 4.4.b for a discussion of this phrase and its possible meanings).

As [Chapter 4](#) demonstrated in detail and as was summed up just now, there are many semantic paths by which ACs can become more common and more varied. Yet there also are what one could call syntactic paths: once ACs did exist, it seems very possible that other hitherto governed nominal expressions were understood/reanalysed as absolute. Once Greek, for example, had a GA,⁸⁵ both adnominal genitive expressions and those dependent on verbs could be reinterpreted as ACs (cf. Σαρπήδοντι δ’ ἄχος γένετο Γλαύκου ἀπιόντος ‘in (lit. ‘to’) Sarpedon arose pain over the leaving of Glaucus’, *Il.* 12.392, or perhaps even in the case of

⁸⁵ On how this point may have been reached, see Section 5.6.c below.

genitives governed by verbs, such as τοῦ δ' ἰθὺς μεμαῶτος ἄκόντισε Τυδέος υἱός 'at him as he charged ahead, the son of Tydeus cast his javelin', *Il.* 8.118), thus freeing the construction from any possibly semantic constraints.⁸⁶

Other 'reinforcements' for ACs could have come about as a result of case syncretism: it seems very likely that Latin AAs of the *me/te/etc. praesente/absente* type so prevalent in Early Latin are of instrumental (or specifically: comitative) origin. While the instrumental expressions in Sanskrit (where the locative and instrumental did not syncretise) discussed in Sections 3.5.b and 3.5.c never went beyond expressing means/instruments or physical companions, the Latin *me auctore* and *me praesente* types did: especially in the case of *me absente* it is clear that an accompanying *situation* (i.e. something with a temporal dimension) is being referred to, rather than any physical accompaniment (see Section 3.5.c). Although one cannot prove this, it is possible that these original instrumentals acquired the possibility of being used in an absolute way (i.e. to denote a temporal event when their head nouns did not) through their syncretism with the locative, which already was able to form ACs. This explanation is made likely by the fact that we do not have absolute instrumentals attested anywhere across IE, and this approach makes postulating the existence of an original instrumental absolute for Latin unnecessary. As I demonstrated above (e.g. Section 3.5.c) using examples from Latin, there are various levels of ambiguity between a physical comitative instrumental and an instrumental expressing an accompanying situation. If the prior existence of ACs in the form of absolute expressions of natural time allowed the development of instrumental expressions to do the same, and thus also develop an obligatory qualifier, comitative instrumentals would have been one of the constructions that joined what now appears as the Latin AA, with the effect of making it semantically more varied and also, possibly, more frequent. Both of the sources just outlined are likely to have affected ACs post-PIE: the examples listed above became possible only after case syncretism that we know happened in the single IE languages.

⁸⁶ See Section 2.2.a for more potential sources of constructions reinterpreted as absolute.

5.5.b AUCs and ‘nominal’ ACs

As ‘nominal’ ACs are not regularly attested outside Latin,⁸⁷ we can only speculate whether they would actually have been present in PIE. Given that the boundaries between participles and adjectives, and adjectives and nouns⁸⁸ would have been far less clear-cut in PIE than in the later languages, it clearly is possible that PIE would have employed all three in its ACs. In this case, the reason for the absence of adjectival ACs in Greek and Vedic would lie in the fact that the participle systems of these languages, and thus also their ACs, had already developed in such a way that adjectival ACs would not have remained productive: participles and regular adjectives would already have been too dissimilar by that point, and only the more productive kind, that involving participles, continued developing.

And while substantival ACs thus seem possible in PIE overall, a perhaps more important factor in this discussion lies in the *lexical* limitations on ACs in PIE: at least if we accept the theory outlined above and assume that ACs in the proto-language were limited to expressions of natural time, possible ACs involving two substantives are especially hard to think of. Whether something of this kind existed⁸⁹ is a question best left to scholars of PIE poetics.

It seems unlikely that AUCs would have existed in PIE: the only AUCs featuring obligatory qualifiers (i.e. those that refer to time) all involve prepositions (*ab urbe condita*, μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας (Th. 6.33) etc.) and given the lack of case syncretism in PIE it seems unlikely that this would have been a phenomenon prevalent there. AUCs seem a natural development from ACs: they function principally in the same way, yet just as IE case usage in general develops towards increased use of prepositions, so this may also have happened with ACs. As we have seen, the

⁸⁷ And as the use of ἀέκων is nominal only in a very strict interpretation of the term, namely if we count as important the fact that no participle negated with privative alpha has a verbal basis, finite verbs not being negated in this manner.

⁸⁸ See K-G II.1.266–79 on such overlap in Greek and K-S II.1.222–33 on Latin. In Sanskrit, the overlap is so pervasive that Whitney 1924: 99 states that there are indeed ‘words which are distinctly adjectives’.

⁸⁹ Perhaps involving words for celestial phenomena that would also have been personified as deities?

difference between ACs and temporal AUCs is minimal. Thus it seems possible that, after an AC had developed in PIE and spread into the daughter languages, temporal AUCs developed in parallel in those languages.

In temporal AUCs, too, we have examples of constructions in which there is a temporal head, but also a participial qualifier that is semantically significant:

ἄμα δ' ἡοῖ φαινομένηφι
φρασσόμεθ' ἥ κε νεώμεθ' ἔφ' ἡμέτερ' ἥ κε μένωμεν

‘when dawn appears, we shall decide whether we sail home or hold out here’
(*Il.* 9.618–19)⁹⁰

ἄμα δ' ἡοῖ would be a syntactically correct and meaningful expression. Yet φαινομένηφι adds some extra information that cannot be omitted without altering the overall meaning: not dawn in general is referred to here, which continues for a period of time, but its onset, the ‘crack of dawn’, probably the first appearance of light (or colour) in the sky.⁹¹ Compare this to

ὥς τότε μὲν πρόπταν ἡμαρ ἐς ἥελιον καταδύντα
δαίνυντ[ο]

‘and all day long until the sun went down (lit.: up to the setting sun) they feasted’
(*Il.* 1.601–2)⁹²

Although this AUC contains a noun related to the lexical field of natural time, that noun does not actually have a temporal dimension. ἐς ἥελιον does not make sense as a temporal expression, and thus, καταδύντα needs to be seen as obligatory. Note that we thus have a pair of nouns used for measuring time (dawn and sun), only one of which (dawn) actually refers to time, attested not just in ACs, but also in AUCs.⁹³

⁹⁰ ἄμα δ' ἡοῖ φαινομένηφι appears in Homer a total of twelve times; see n. 86, ch. 2.

⁹¹ Compare this expression to the Sanskrit temporal locative *uchāntīām uśāsi* (gleaming_{Loc.Sg} dawn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at dawn, when it lights up, at the crack of dawn’ (*RV* 1.184.1).

⁹² πρόπταν ἡμαρ ἐς ἥελιον καταδύντα is found several times throughout Homer.

⁹³ As far as the other constructions mentioned under the name of AUC, i.e. the non-temporal kind in e.g. *Sicilia Sardiniaque amissae* (Livy 21.1.5) are concerned, we here also have the possibility that their rise was made possible by the prior existence of temporal AUCs. Yet it may also be that these simply represent a natural development

In sum, it seems possible for us to reconstruct single steps by which ACs as we find them attested arose. My reconstruction of these steps has been based on the different kinds of ACs that we can find either across Greek, Latin and Sanskrit, or in just some of these languages. It has also allowed us to define what ‘absolute’ is, which expressions are absolute, and which are not. This in turn has made it possible to clear up much of the confusion concerning ACs that can be found in older literature on the topic.

5.6 From PIE into the daughter languages

Having identified what we may be able to reconstruct for PIE, let us see whether this reconstruction allows us to explain the state of affairs that we actually find attested in the single languages looked at in this study. In Latin and Sanskrit, the development seems quite natural. Only Greek seems slightly more difficult to reconstruct.

5.6.a Sanskrit

The number of cases we can reconstruct for PIE survives unaltered into Sanskrit. The cases remain semantically productive, and the use of pre- (or post-)positions rare. The sole truly absolute constructions we find early on are locatives denoting natural time. If the theory outlined in Section 5.5 above is correct, the Vedic state of ACs is very close to that in PIE. In Epic and Classical Sanskrit, we find that the semantic limitation on Vedic LAs to expressing just natural time is gone.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, given that the locative case remains productive, the number and kind of expressions that are very similar to ACs but not strictly speaking absolute remain.⁹⁵

from expressions of noun plus adjectival qualifier in which the qualifier was of lesser semantic importance.

⁹⁴ See examples of LAs not denoting natural time e.g. in Section 4.9.

⁹⁵ Cf. e.g. (*tasyām*) *rātryām vyatītāyām* ((that)_{Loc.Sg} night_{Loc.Sg} past-gone_{Loc.Sg}) ‘in that night, when it had passed; when that night had passed’ (*Rām.* 1.57.9 and nine more times throughout this text), where there is a noun with temporal dimensions at the head of the expression, but the participle is nevertheless of crucial importance for the meaning of the expression, or *sthāpyamāneṣu sarveṣu sumahān anayaḥ bhavet* (being-placed_{Loc.Pl} all_{Loc.Pl} very-great_{Nom.Sg} evil_{Nom.Sg} is_{3rd.Sg.Subj}) ‘it would be a great misfortune if they

From Epic Sanskrit onwards, there is a genitive absolute (GA).⁹⁶ It seems likely that this is a result of the post-Vedic syncretism between genitive and dative. The GA is ‘properly’ absolute in that it denotes a situation, and thus has a temporal dimension even though its head noun (usually denoting a person) does not. Maybe the construction arose because of the case syncretism between the genitive and dative in (post-Vedic) Sanskrit: if an original *dativus iudicantis* expression appears in a genitive, the semantic link between such a (former) dative and a suitable matrix clause verb⁹⁷ is removed. From that point, such genitive constructions are then used even with verbs where a *dativus iudicantis* would not make sense. To a certain extent, the Latin AA of instrumental origin (the *me praesente* type) may have developed in a similar way.

5.6.b Latin

In Early Latin, we find traces of an original locative absolute in the type of AA that is most frequent in e.g. Cato and that denotes expressions of natural time (*luna silenti, piro florente* etc.). The *me praesente* type, which is most frequent in comedy, probably derived from an original instrumental expression. As Flinck-Linkomies (1929; see Section 1.2.c.v) describes, this type of construction most likely developed through lexical/collocational changes (*me praesente* → *me absente*; *verba facti aut agenda* as matrix verbs → any verb as matrix verb).⁹⁸ This development was made possible through the syncretism of the PIE instrumental, locative and ablative cases that results in the Latin ablative: expressions that once stood in a (comitative) instrumental now appear in a case which can be used absolutely, i.e. to refer to

are all [so] placed’ (*Rām.* 2.8.14), where we are dealing with a spatial locative (‘there is great misfortune in them when/if they are placed’).

⁹⁶ See de Saussure 1881 and Ruppel 2012.

⁹⁷ Such as ‘to him thinking . . . this seemed right/was important/happened’.

⁹⁸ From an actually physical concomitant ‘he did this together with me present’ (i.e. he and I did this together) to collocations where no shared action is described, but the action has to be understood as co-occurring with the presence of the other person (cf. *noli, mea mater, me praesente cum patre conicere* ‘don’t, dear mother, argue with my father in my presence’, Afranius 310).

temporal events rather than just to what the head noun of the construction in question refers to. Only small changes (those outlined by Flinck-Linkomies) are necessary to form ACs from the basis of non-absolute instrumentals referring to people with which or through which an action takes place. In Early Latin, the *me praesente* type is still mostly found with verbs denoting actions (in which someone else could take part), but the step from *me praesente* to the formally parallel *me absente* has already been made. Thus made more frequent and more variable in its semantics, and finding a well-developed parallel in the Greek GA, the AA gradually develops into the lexically productive construction that we know from literary Classical Latin.

Latin participles are frequently used in the same way as adjectives – without any clear reference to tense or even voice, and not governing any complements in the way finite verbs may. Hence there is no fundamental difference between an AA that contains an adjectival participle and one that contains a regular adjective. It seems possible that this so-called ‘nominal’ AA in Latin continues a phenomenon from PIE, where the difference between deverbal and regular adjectives may have been equally small. Just as the ‘regular’ and adjectival AAs seem to be partly of locative, partly of instrumental origins and semantics, so do substantival AAs appear to come from two sources: those that involve nouns referring to age or office (*me puero*, *P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos*; see Section 3.5.c) are purely locative, referring just to a ‘time at which’. Those that involve agent nouns (*me suasore atque impulsore* etc.) have instrumental/comitative semantics.

As I just said, there are good indications that the locative type of AA is inherited and that the instrumental kind only became possible through case syncretism within Latin. As we also saw (see especially Section 3.5), the distinction between ‘regular’ and adjectival AAs is difficult to uphold, and it is very difficult to say whether the latter were a Latin innovation or inherited from PIE. Independently of this, it seems one can reconstruct the genesis of substantival AAs as caused by the Latin syncretism of ablative, locative and instrumental: given the right environment, expressions such as both *me praesente* and *me suasore* can denote regular, physical concomitants (‘you did this together with me there/as

instigator'). If, similarly to what we saw in Sanskrit (see Section 5.3.b on 'instrumental absolutes'), such non-absolute expressions had once stood in the instrumental case and then come to stand in the newly syncretised ablative, the case of the Latin AC, it seems plausible that not just the *me praesente* type but also the substantival *me suasore* type joined the AA in this way. Once substantival ACs had thus become possible in general, the locative type (*piro florente*) may then have been extended to include substantival expressions such as *P. Muucio L. Calpurnio cos.* Note that this type remains lexically limited throughout Latin,⁹⁹ and furthermore limited to what one might call expressions of natural time – be it the ages a human life cycles through, or the regular cycle of people in certain offices that probably is the closest man-made ways of measuring time can get to the natural repetitive rhythm of the seasons and years.

5.6.c Greek

If PIE really did have an absolute locative, how can we explain the case of the Greek GA? Although we can mostly just speculate about the answer to this question, it is possible to make at least a few observations.

Greek employs two different temporal case expressions, the genitive and dative of time. Their meaning and function display considerable overlap. The temporal usage of the dative is the result of the syncretism of the PIE locative with the Greek dative. The origin of the temporal genitive is unclear, yet its existence from earliest attested Greek is a fact. Some (such as Menge 1999: 138–9) try to see a semantic difference between these two usages: the dative is meant to denote a time at which, and the genitive a time within which. Yet just by looking at the Homeric expressions for 'during the day' and 'at night' respectively (ἡμέρᾳ in the temporal dative as opposed to νυκτός in the temporal genitive) we can see that the difference between the two usages, whatever it may be, is not semantic in nature. If anything, a day would be portrayed as a

⁹⁹ See Menge 2000: 720–1.

period *within* which things happen, whereas night, a uniform time of sleep, would be a much less differentiated time ‘at’ which.

Theoretically, both temporal usages could at some point acquire the possibility of forming ACs. An LA in PIE would have developed into a dative absolute in Greek. Yet as we saw in Section 5.3.b above, this does not happen. Hence we need to ask which factors may have favoured the genitive. On the one hand, we have to note that the merger of the PIE temporal locative with the Greek dative is not completely straightforward: if for example *νύκτωρ* and *δεῦρο* can be seen as evidence of original locatives in *-r*, it is easy to understand why such morphologically different forms would not have been perceived as datives. Inscriptional evidence such as *πολέμῳ καὶ εἰράνῳ* ‘in war and peace’ (from Elis, c. 200 BC)¹⁰⁰ indicates that the temporal genitive may also have been used for expressions in which the literary language employs a temporal dative (cf. *ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ εἰρήνῃ* e.g. at X. *Lac.* 11.1.2 or at Plt. *Lg.* 942b1). In whatever way this may have taken place, it seems possible that a number of (once locative) temporal expressions may have switched over to the temporal genitive. If the temporal genitive was more frequent than the temporal dative at one time, it would thus have been a natural starting point for the development of an AC.¹⁰¹

Alternatively, one could also argue that the reason why a DA never developed is not to do with the relevant frequency of genitive vs. dative of time, but simply because of datival semantics. The original dative, the non-comitative instrumental and also the temporal (i.e. locative) datives can all stand without any prepositional support.¹⁰² A temporal dative can be recognised by the fact that the noun in it denotes time (cf. the *ἡματι* so frequent in Homer and Hesiod). In all other cases, the context determines how we interpret a given dative.

When we see a GA in Greek, we interpret it as a GA because there is no other way of interpreting it: if there is no potential head

¹⁰⁰ See *GrGr* II.112–13.

¹⁰¹ On theories postulating a partial locative–genitive syncretism, see Holland 1986.

¹⁰² As we just saw, the temporal dative can also be marked by a preposition, namely in the case of single substantives (such as *ἐν νυκτί*) and when the meaning of ‘during’ is intended; cf. Menge 1999: 139.

noun nearby, or a verb with which the genitive can be construed, it has to be seen as a peripheral adverbial, and thus as temporal, i.e. a GA. In the dative, the situation is different: given the wide application of and basically the lack of lexical restrictions on the so-called ethic dative or dative of respect, almost any noun or noun phrase can be understood as such a dative. Both K-G II.1.424–5¹⁰³ and Smyth (1956: 343)¹⁰⁴ point out how loosely a dative can be used to qualify or limit the statement of the matrix verb in some way.

When we add a participle to an ethic dative such as μεμνήσθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν ‘for my sake (or ‘pray’), remember not to raise a clamour’ (Plt. Ap. 27b) to give e.g. μεμνήσθέ μοι λέγοντι μὴ θορυβεῖν, then the dative phrase could never be interpreted as denoting just a temporal background fact, i.e. as ‘be calm *while I am speaking*’. One would automatically understand this as ‘for the sake of me speaking, stay calm’. In other words: the neutral ‘time at which’ once represented by the locative absolute cannot be expressed by the Greek dative. A genitive expression (such as *μεμνήσθέ μου (or ἐμοῦ) λέγοντος μὴ θορυβεῖν) on the other hand cannot be related to any verb in the sentence, thus has to be adverbial and thus temporal. If there was an attempt within the language to keep a neutrally temporal AC alive, this would explain such a shift from one case used for temporal nominals to the other.

In addition to the question of case, the most noticeable change in the GA occurred because of the developments in the Greek participle system. As participles became more paradigmatic and thus more like finite verb forms in their syntactic capabilities, absolute phrases could denote temporal spaces quite dissimilar to the basic temporal expressions (such as ‘at dawn’) from which they ultimately derive. Instead, they became able to hold as much lexical

¹⁰³ ‘[Es wird] der mit einem Partizip verbundene Dativ gebraucht, um eine in irgend einem Zustand sich befindende Person (seltener Sache) zu bezeichnen, der die Handlung des Satzes gilt. Besonders häufig werden so Zeitbestimmungen des Satzes ausgedrückt. Dieser Gebrauch ist vorzugsweise der alt- und neuionischen Sprache eigen, aber auch der attischen nicht fremd.’

¹⁰⁴ As Smyth says of the ethic dative, which is ‘used to denote the interest of the speaker, or to secure the interest of the person spoken to, in an action or statement’: ‘Sometimes the idea cannot be given in translation.’ This is the case simply because the Greek dative can serve to present two situations as ‘linked’ also where this is beyond the scope of the dative in other languages.

content as finite subordinate clauses, and thus were used not just in a way parallel to temporal clauses but, given the semantic breadth of conjunct/circumstantial participles, were used also to express conditional, concessive or causal nuances. Once all of this had happened, Greek GAs were quite far removed from their origins. By focusing on these most well developed of ACs, scholars have allowed themselves to be misled concerning the roots and nature of ACs for centuries.¹⁰⁵

5.7 Absolute or not: an excursus

Most of this chapter has been about straightforward recognisable ACs; and while these are the central part of this study, it seems important to briefly look back on the ambiguities and uncertainties involved in some – potentially absolute – expressions. When looking at sentences in which a genitive may be either adnominal or absolute, there is no clear-cut method for deciding on one or the other interpretation. Distance between the genitive expression and its possible head plays a role, as does word order: given that any listener would parse a sentence as they hear it, a genitive expression that appears before any possible head noun seems more likely to be perceived as absolute, at least initially, than one whose potential head has already been given. But even if a genitive appears several words before its head, a link between the two may then be perceived as soon as that head appears. At *Il.* 14.173–4,

τοῦ καὶ κινυμένοιο Διὸς κατὰ χαλκοβατὲς δῶ
ἔμπης ἔς γαῖάν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἵκετ' ἄϋτμή

‘of this shaken/when this was shaken in the bronze-floored halls of Zeus
the scent would drift from heaven down to earth’

we cannot say for certain whether a GA was perceived in τοῦ κινυμένοιο, by either Homeric or later Greek audiences, or whether it was seen as dependent on the much later ἄϋτμή.

Semantic factors are also rarely straightforward: in order to see whether a link may have to be acknowledged between a genitive

¹⁰⁵ On the Greek accusative absolute, a construction that first appears in the fifth century and remains lexically very limited, see Ruppel 2002.

and another noun, we may want to go through the works of the author in question, or, where applicable, the literature of that genre or time in general, and see whether pairings of/links between the words in question are commonly found. Yet even if we find such commonplace links as, for example, between a word for house and a genitive to denote the owner of that house, or parents and a genitive denoting the child of those parents, this does not give us any guarantees that, in the passage below, any adnominal link would have to be perceived between ἐμεῦ ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντος and either πατρός καὶ μητέρος or μεγάροισιν.

μεμνησθαι πατρός καὶ μητέρος ἐν μεγάροισιν
ὥς νῦν, ἢ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐμεῦ ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντος

‘watch over my father and mother in the palace, just as now, or perhaps a little more, when I am far from home’ (Od. 18.267–8)

The attestation of such links elsewhere is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for seeing a link in any specific instance. Personal intuition based on familiarity with an author is a further, extremely helpful tool, yet not only does it, too, provide no certainty, it may in this specific case also have been misled for some time: as I said above, it perhaps is due to the way in which we are introduced to the constructions in language classes, where ACs are usually represented as rather clear-cut phenomena, that many scholars see ACs where there are none. This is a problem particularly in Sanskrit (where the confusion, however, arises not from syntactic but semantic factors; see Section 4.4), but also, I think, in Latin and Greek. Given that many students of e.g. Latin have learned that AAs are ‘a combination of noun and participle in the ablative’, it is understandable that many would see an AA in an expression such as *victa serpente superbus* (Ovid *Met.* 1.454) where a more literal interpretation is just as possible, and where a translation in the way in which many are taught to translate ACs (as a finite subordinate clause, here ‘[Apollo was] proud because the snake had been defeated/because he had defeated the snake’) makes for more idiomatic English than a literal rendering as an instrumental ‘proud through the killed snake’ or an ablatival ‘proud from the killed snake’. Furthermore, any translator who does not want to destroy the effect created by the word order of passages

such as *Il.* 14.173–4 above would likely translate τοῦ κινυμένοιο in the same way as one would a GA (‘when this was shaken’) even if they did feel that there was an adnominal link between it and ἀϋτμή; the same applies to Sanskrit expressions such as *prayatí adhvaré* (forthgoing_{Loc.Sg} ritual_{Loc.Sg}) ‘while the ritual is progressing’ rather than ‘during the progressing ritual’.

Finally, in the case of locative expressions such as those discussed in Sections 4.4.c and 4.9 (*marute calati* lit. ‘in the moving wind’ (Ka. *Ku.* 8.71) or the various instances of *dháne hité* ‘at the set (fighting-)prize, in the opened fight’), where ‘absolute’ could only mean ‘intended by the author not to have any spatial but solely temporal connotations’, short of interviewing the author and hoping that his feel for the language will help our theoretical inquiry we have no way of establishing absolute- or non-absoluteness.

In short, while extensive study and reading enables us, who are not native speakers of any ancient language, not only to understand much of ancient literature but also to see how a native speaker’s brain might have parsed a sentence, a number of possible ACs do not allow us to do the latter. More specifically, unless we have explicit statements by grammarians, we can also not say whether an expression that may have been perceived e.g. as an adnominal genitive by Homeric audiences or a spatial or temporal locative by early Vedic audiences would have been perceived/understood as an actual AC by later (e.g. fifth-century) audiences. For purposes of understanding texts and/or translating them, this usually is irrelevant; but for those interested in syntax, this question will continue to pose a puzzle.

5.8 Conclusions

Last year, I taught an intensive Latin course. When the time came to look at the AA, I found myself introducing my students to this construction in exactly the manner in which I had first learnt about it as an eleven-year-old. This was the manner in which more or less all school grammars describe ACs, the manner that I outlined at the beginning of this study: I explained how we had to translate them into their modern-language equivalents.

As there was some time left at the end of the class, I also added an abbreviated explanation of how I assume ACs came to be. Yet as knowledge of such a development is actually not very helpful for students about to read, say, the *Crito* or the *First Catilinarian*, there is in effect no real place for such diachronic information in most grammars, let alone textbooks. Given that the number of students learning to read Latin is far bigger than the number of those ‘using’ the language for comparative research, it would be counterproductive to suggest a different approach to teaching the construction, let alone attempt to give it a more apt name. ‘Absolute constructions’ will never be replaced by ‘temporal expressions with non-temporal heads’.¹⁰⁶ Even further to the credit of the traditional approach we have to concede that what it suggests may even have been linguistically correct from a synchronic point of view. In, say, literary Attic of the fifth century BC or Latin prose of the first century BC, where ACs *could* have the same informational content as finite subordinate clauses but were used more rarely, there probably was a process by which finite clauses could be converted into ACs. In other words, what we teach students of Latin or Greek may be exactly the process the mind of a native speaker would have applied: turn the main verb into a participle and put both it and its head noun into an ablative or genitive, respectively.

Whenever there is an overlap between constructions in a source and a target language (the latter usually being our native language), learning how to translate something, i.e. learning what the idiomatic equivalent in our native language is, is useful also towards understanding how what we are translating actually works in the source language. Yet whenever there is a mismatch, as is the case in ACs and also AUCs, the common approach that is useful for translation and thus for understanding a text is a hindrance to

¹⁰⁶ Nutting (1930: 203) offers the following quote from a bookseller who ‘garnishes his advertisements with whimsical comments’ and ‘appends the following to the mention of a work on Latin grammar’: ‘It is remarkable how Latin changes from generation to generation. Brought up on Allen and Greenough, I found in college that Gildersleeve and Lodge taught a very different language. Now I am wondering if the rules for cases that I learned with Eleanor two years ago will still hold next week, when Charles starts in. There seems to be only one rock of ages that survives: the Ablative Absolute. Thank Jupiter for that!’

understanding how the construction actually works in the source language. As we saw especially in [Chapter 1](#), even those scholars who look exclusively at the diachronic aspect of ACs are often still surprisingly caught up in what they must have learned in school: how to *translate* an ablative or genitive absolute. [Chapter 4](#) on Sanskrit showed us how the frequent synchronic identification of locative expressions as absolute may be influenced not just by the categories and boundaries that we draw in our own native languages, but also by those that we have seen in Latin and Greek, when what we should do is look at the relevant material in comparison to its direct syntactic surroundings, i.e. remain within the language in question.

To illustrate how our preconceptions may mislead us, let us review what we found in relation to the Sanskrit LA. The construction has so far been treated without regard to its natural context, the wide range of locative expressions in Sanskrit. Expressions are called absolute even though, within that context, they are clearly not. This goes unnoticed as a sound definition of what ‘absolute’ means has often been missing. In this process, much interesting information displayed by the constructions looked at goes unnoticed. Take *RV* 10.24.5 as an example:

<i>vísve</i>	<i>devāḥ</i>	<i>akṛpanta</i>	<i>samīcyóḥ</i>	<i>niṣpátantyoh</i>
all _{Nom.Pl}	god _{Nom.Pl}	complain _{3rd.Pl.Impf}	combined _{Loc.Du}	flying-apart _{Loc.Du}

‘When the united pair flew apart all the gods complained.’

This construction is usually seen as a clear example of an LA. As [Section 4.4.d](#) demonstrated, in all likelihood it is not. (*niṣpátantyoh* in the above example is semantically dominant – it is because the two worlds are flying apart that the gods in them are complaining. Nevertheless, given that we can see *samīcyóḥ* as a regular spatial locative, *niṣpátantyoh* is not syntactically obligatory.) Yet this example not only shows us that we need to look at the wider background (both textual and mythological) of any Rigvedic passage before we can call a specific expression ‘absolute’, it also demonstrates that, within a language with a productive, non-syncretised locative case as we find it in Vedic and presumably also PIE, constructions which under other syntactic circumstances would be absolute, are not.

Combining our thoughts on constructions such as the above with our findings on the kinds of ACs that exist throughout old IE languages, we can say on the one hand that PIE very likely did have ACs, but that these were semantically very limited – namely, to expressions of natural time. On the other hand, we can also see how small the apparent difference between proper ACs and formally very similar but nonetheless non-absolute expressions was, and how easily ACs could thus expand once the first seed was sown.

The idea of ACs as finite-clause equivalents has also misled past research. Given that these nominal phrases are equivalent to verbal phrases, the thought goes, that verbal element must come from somewhere. One element in ACs, i.e. participles, is integrated into the verbal paradigm, hence these must be the origin of the verbal element in ACs, and also somehow play a role in their genesis. This train of thought is problematic: in a way, ACs are indeed equivalent to finite subordinate clauses: one way of rephrasing them is as such clauses, and especially in Classical Greek and Latin prose, they often have the same amount of informational content that might more typically be denoted by a ‘proper’ verbal clause than a nominal phrase. Yet it is a different equivalence that actually matters, and it is only when we try to systematically identify the characteristic that delineates absolute from non-absolute constructions that we then also see how the verbal semantics of ACs come to be: ACs, being expressions of time whose heads do not refer to time themselves, are characterised by the obligatory nature of their qualifier. Whereas qualifiers of a nominal head can typically be omitted without any consequences to the syntax of an expression, the verbal predicate belonging to a subject (i.e. the main verb of a clause) cannot. But the adjectival qualifiers in ACs share this syntactically important criterion with the heads of verbal clauses, which makes them appear as important as the head of their constructions, and makes the constructions as a whole appear similar to verbal clauses. In other words, the equivalence of ACs with finite clauses is due to the obligatory nature of the nominal qualifier, not to its (supposed) ‘verbal’ nature. This view is corroborated by Latin, where ACs that do not involve participles but adjectives or nouns as qualifiers function in the same way as those that do have a participle as the qualifier to the nominal head.

I hope that the above recapitulation of the argument which I have developed over the course of this study has shown why clear definitions and a close eye on any potentially relevant contexts are crucial to a sound understanding of ACs and their origins. Close analyses of the material from each individual language, only later followed by a comparison between materials from these languages, has allowed us to recognise various layers and steps within AC development. A small development – which can be exemplified by the step from ἄμα δ' ἡοῖ φαivομένηφι ‘together with dawn, when it appears’ (temporal head, e.g. at *Il.* 9.618) to ἄμα δ' ἡελίῳ καταδύvτι ‘together with the sun, when it sets’ (non-temporal head, e.g. at *Il.* 1.592), or from *uchántyām uṣási* (lighting_{Loc.Sg} dawn_{Loc.Sg}) ‘at dawn, when it flashes/appears’ (*RV* 1.184.1) to *sūrye udyatí* (sun_{Loc.Sg} up-going_{Loc.Sg}) lit. ‘at the rising sun’, ‘at sunrise’ (*RV* 8.27.19) – sets off a long list of much bigger and far-reaching developments which led to the ACs that we find in the various old IE languages.

Every linguistic element needs to be studied within its contexts. In our present case, several of these contexts have presented us with interesting areas for future research. The biggest field that comes to mind is the dominant qualifier. A cross-linguistic study – examining distribution, potential factors why it should be employed or avoided, and if possible more detailed criteria for defining and delineating this phenomenon – will shed more light on this element that in some ways bridges the gap between regular and obligatory usage of nominal qualifiers. As far as ACs themselves are concerned, several stylistic questions may prove very interesting to look at: can we identify reasons why specific authors chose an AC in one instant and a different form of subordination in another? Can we identify more than just the vague ‘influence of the GA on the Classical Latin AA’ sometimes posited?

It may also prove very interesting to take another look at one-word ACs, particularly in the shape of *Witterungsimpersonalia* such as *varṣati* (raining_{Loc.Sg})/ῥοντος. If Frauzel (1998) is correct and these are inherited (which would also fit in well with the theory propounded in this study), then why are there so few of them e.g. in Early Greek (none in the corpus examined by this study)? What is their relation to other one-word ACs (e.g. Latin military terms

such as *pugnato* ‘after it had been fought’)? How, exactly, can they be combined with the theory of ACs as presented here?

Finally, it seems obvious that much work is left to do in Sanskrit, particularly in the later stages of the language. Given that, as concerns their ACs, older stages of Sanskrit are at a level that we can only assume for pre-historical Greek – they contain ACs, but these are not semantically free and productive yet – a more comprehensive search of late Vedic as well as Classical texts may allow us to actually witness a development parallel to what we can only reconstruct for Latin and Greek: the steps from lexically limited to productive AC usage. Furthermore, to my knowledge, no one has gone through Vedic texts looking for nominal ACs. If this is correct, this might be an interesting, albeit time-consuming task. If Vedic did contain such ACs, it would be far more probable that PIE did, too. As things stand at the moment, we can only say that there are no grammatical reasons speaking against it.

To sum up, then, even after two hundred years of attested research, the study of ACs remains rewarding and fruitful. If we learn from the mistakes of the past, we look at ACs first in the contexts of their own language, then in the contexts of and contrasts with other languages. We do not allow ourselves to be confused either by the term ‘absolute’ or by views of ACs as filtered through modern-language perspectives. We strive to see what ‘absolute’ is – what all ACs have in common – without generalising about ACs where we should recognise the differences among them. And most importantly, we realise that all that glitters is not absolute.

APPENDIX I

LITERATURE ON ACS

The following articles, monographs or grammars are either dedicated entirely to ACS or a particular AC, or at least contain a noteworthy section on these constructions.

Substantial/noteworthy sections in grammars/reference works

K-G II.2.77–98, 110–1; K-S II.1.766–92; *GrGr* II.397–404; *LGr* II.137–44; Draeger (1881) *Historische Syntax der lateinischen Sprache* II.2.788–811; Speijer (1886) *Sanskrit Syntax* 109, 284–91; Delbrück (1888) *Altindische Syntax* 387–90; (1897) *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen* II.393–7 (= Grundriß IV.2); Brugmann (1903) *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen* II.609–10; Bennett (1910) *Syntax of Early Latin*, Part I: *The Verb* 433, 440 (collected Early Latin material), (1914) *Syntax of Early Latin*, Part II: *The Noun* 367–72; Wackernagel (1926) *Vorlesungen über Syntax* I.292–4; Chantraine (1953) *Grammaire homérique* II.323–4; Cooper (1998) *Attic Greek Prose Syntax* I.156–64, 280, 841–4; (2002) *Early Greek Poetic and Herodotean Syntax* 2015–19, 2574–8.

Monographs

Wenzel (1828) *De genetivis et dativis linguae Graecae, quos absolutos vocant*; Boksch (1863) *De genetivi absoluti apud Homerum usu (non vidi)*; Classen (1867) *Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch* 160–89 and *passim*; Rumpf (1868) *Utrum verborum deponentium participia perfecti temporis in ablativis absolutis sint vitanda an admittenda*; Lübbert (1871) *Commentationes syntacticae*; Lücke (1876) *Absolute Participia im Gotischen und ihr Verhältnis zum griechischen Original*; Bombe (1877) *De ablativi absoluti apud antiquissimos Romanorum scriptores usu*; Callaway (1889) *The Absolute Participle in Anglo-Saxon*; De Saussure (1881) *De l'emploi du génitif absolu en sanscrit*; Weißenmajer (1891) *Zur Geschichte des absoluten Partizips im Lateinischen*; Lell (1892) *Der Accusativus Absolutus im Griechischen bis Aristoteles*; Ross (1893) *The Absolute Participle in Middle and Modern English*; Lerch (1912) *Prädikative Participia für Verbalsubstantiva im Französischen*; Horn (1918) *Beiträge zur Geschichte der absoluten Konstruktionen im Lateinischen*; Oertel (1926) *The Syntax of Cases in the Narrative and Descriptive Prose of*

the *Brāhmaṇas*; Flinck-Linkomies (1929) 'De ablativo absoluto quaestiones', *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae* B.20.1; Jones (1939) *The ab urbe condita Construction in Greek*; Schaubert (1954) *Vorkommen, gebietsmäßige Verbreitung und Herkunft altenglischer absoluter Partizipialkonstruktionen in Nominativ und Akkusativ*; Biese (1959) 'Der spätlateinische Akkusativus Absolutus und Verwandtes', *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae* B.22.2; Stump (1985) *The Semantic Variability of Absolute Constructions*; Helttula (1987) *Studies on the Latin Accusative Absolute*; Krisch (1988) *Zur semantischen Interpretation von absoluten Konstruktionen in altindogermanischen Sprachen*; Vasilaros (1993) *Der Gebrauch des Genitivus Absolutus bei Apollonios Rhodios im Verhältnis zu Homer*; Müller-Lancé (1994) *Absolute Konstruktionen vom Altlatein zum Neufranzösischen*; Keydana (1997) *Absolute Konstruktionen in altindogermanischen Sprachen*; Bauer (2000) *Archaic Syntax in Indo-European*; Ruppel (2002) 'The origins and early development of the Greek "Accusative Absolute"'; Maiocco (2005) *Absolute Participial Constructions: A Contrastive Approach to the Syntax of Greek and Latin*.

Articles

Articles listed without a source stem from monographs rather than periodicals. See bibliography for full information. Spieker (1885) 'On the so-called genitive absolute and its use especially in the Attic orators', *AJPh* 6: 310–43; Bartholomae (1892) 'Absoluter Lokativ mit Partizip Präsens im Avesta', *IF* 1: 178–80; Steele (1902) 'The ablative absolute in Livy', *AJPh* 23: 295–312 and 413–27, (1904) 'The ablative absolute in the epistles of Cicero, Seneca, Pliny and Fronto', *AJPh* 25.3: 315–27; Wölfflin (1904) 'Der Gebrauch des Ablativus absolutus', *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie* 13: 271–407; Methner (1914–15) 'Die Entstehung des Ablativus qualitatis und sein Verhältnis zum Ablativus modi und zum Ablativus absolutus', *Glotta* 6: 33–61; Kieckers (1921) 'Zum accusativus absolutus im Gotischen', *IF* 39: 125–6; Bacherler (1922) 'Zum sogenannten Nominativus Absolutus bei Curtius', *Wiener Studien* 43: 100–2; Knapp (1923) 'Is the ablative absolute necessary?', *The Classical Weekly* 17: 9–10; Kunst (1923) 'Vom Wesen und Ursprung des absoluten Genetivs', *Glotta* 12: 29–51; Flinck-Linkomies (1924) 'Absolute Konstruktionen in den neueren Sprachen', *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 25: 214–21; Lease (1928) 'The ablative absolute limited by conjunctions', *AJPh* 49.4: 348–53; Nutting (1930) 'The ablative absolute and the stenographic ablative', *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 10.8: 203–17; Lease (1931) 'The ablative absolute limited by conjunctions' (2), *AJPh* 52.2: 175; Mugler (1936) 'Remarques sur l'origine et le développement du datif absolu chez Homère', *Revue des études grecques* 49: 38–57; Tarelli (1938) 'Génitif absolu et datif absolu', *Revue des études grecques* 51: 267–74; Schwyzer (1942) 'Zum sogenannten Genitivus Absolutus statt Participium Coniunctum im Griechischen', *Emerita* 10: 98–104; Wifstrand (1956) 'Dativus absolutus im Griechischen', *Classica et Mediaevalia*

17: 163–71; Thesleff (1958) ‘On the origin of the Genitive Absolute’, *Arctos* 2: 187–207; Piirainen (1969) ‘Die absoluten Kasuskonstruktionen des Deutschen in diachroner Sicht’, *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 70: 448–70; Thesleff (1969) ‘Genitive absolute and Platonic style’, *Arctos* NS 6: 121–31; Grady (1972) ‘The English absolute construction’, *Linguistics* 90: 5–10; Berent (1973) ‘Absolute constructions as “subordinate clauses”’, Carrière (1973) ‘L’*accusatif absolu* avec *ὡς*: nuances at origine’, *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes* 47, 2: 212–24; Press (1973) ‘The syntax of absolute constructions in Slavonic and Baltic, with reference to Finno-Ugrian’, *Slavonic and East European Review* 51: 11–21; Serbat (1979) ‘L’*ablatif absolu*’, *Revue des études latines* 57: 340–54; Bolkestein (1980) ‘The “*ab urbe condita*”-construction in Latin: a strange type of raising?’, (1987) ‘The bad behaviour of trivalent verbs in the *ablativus absolutus*’, *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica* 20: 93–103; Costello (1980) ‘The absolute construction in Gothic’, *Word* 31.1: 91–104, (1992) ‘The absolute construction in Indo-European: a syntagmatic reconstruction’, *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 10.3–4: 235–52; Dohnalová (1983) ‘The Greek genitive absolute and the Latin ablative absolute in the chosen works of the Greek–Latin translation literature’, Holland (1986) ‘Nominal sentences and the origins of absolute constructions in Indo-European’, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 99.2: 163–93; Rosén (1988) ‘Der griechische “*dativus absolutus*” und indogermanische “unpersönliche” Partizipialkonstruktionen’, *KZ* 101: 92–103; Coleman (1989) ‘The rise and fall of absolute constructions: a Latin case history’, Hoff (1989) ‘Les *ablatifs absolus* irréguliers: un nouvel examen du problème’, Ramat (1989) ‘On Latin absolute constructions’, König, van der Auwera (1990) ‘Adverbial participles, gerunds and absolute constructions’, Whaley (1990) ‘The effect of non-surface grammatical relations on the genitive absolute in Koine Greek’, Bauer (1994) ‘The development of Latin absolute constructions: from stative to transitive structures’, *General Linguistics* 33: 64–83; Frauzel (1998) ‘Impersonal absolutes in Indo-Iranian, Greek, Latin, Baltic and the Origin of the Indo-European absolute construction’, *Journal of Indo-European Studies Monograph* 27: 105–25; Sluiter (2000) ‘Seven grammarians on the ablative absolute’, *Historiographia Linguistica* 27.2/3: 381–416; Ziegler (2002) ‘Zur Entstehung des *locativus absolutus* im Altindischen’, Lavency (2005) ‘L’*ablatif absolu* aujourd’hui, hier et avant-hier’, *Latomus* 64.3: 585–9; Ruppel (2012) ‘The origins of the genitive absolute in Sanskrit’.

APPENDIX 2

ACS, POTENTIAL ACS AND CONSTRUCTIONS SIMILAR TO ACS

NB: While ACs can only be unambiguously identified as such in the context of their matrix clause, this list will provide only the participle phrases in question. Whenever there is potential for grammatical dependence in some way, this has been noted. Many of the Vedic examples have been listed not because they are absolute, but because they are so similar to actual LAs that they not only have been called absolute in the past, but also provide the environment against which we need to study actual LAs.

Chapter 2

GAs in Homer

The most ambiguous but to my mind non-absolute expressions are also included in this list. They are marked with an asterisk, and the noun or verb on which the genitival expression is potentially dependent is underlined.

Iliad

ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο (*Il.* 1.88), ἀέκοντος ἐμεῖο (*Il.* 1.301), περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν (*Il.* 2.551), ἀνδρῶν εἰλομένων (*Il.* 5.203), ἐπειγομένων ἀνέμων (*Il.* 5.501), ὀδυσσαμένοιο τεοῖο (*Il.* 8.37 = *Il.* 8.468), εἷξαντος ἐμεῖο (*Il.* 8.164–5), *πόλιν λαῶν ἀπεόντων (*Il.* 8.522), ἡελίου ἀνιόντος (*Il.* 8.538), *χωομένου Ἀχιλλῆος κλισίῃθεν (*Il.* 9.107), ἐμεῦ ἀπομηνίσαντος (*Il.* 9.426), τοῦτου γ' ἐσπομένοιο (*Il.* 10.246), Ἑκτορος ὀτρύναντος (*Il.* 10.356), σπασθέντος (*Il.* 11.458), πολέμοιο μετακλινθέντος (*Il.* 11.509), *σεῖο μεθῆσω τειρομένοιο (*Il.* 11.841: syntactic hapax (μεθήμι plus genitive) or a GA?), ἐπιθρέξαντος ἔγχρεος (*Il.* 13.409–10), πολέμοιο συνεσταότος καὶ αὐτῆς (*Il.* 14.96), νηῶν ἄλλα δ' ἔλκομένων (*Il.* 14.100), κεδασθείσης ὑσμίνης (*Il.* 15.238 = *Il.* 16.306), σημάντορος οὐ παρεόντος (*Il.* 15.325), δηῖων ἀπὸ νόσφιν ἑόντων (*Il.* 15.548), ἐρευγομένης ἁλὸς (*Il.* 17.265), πολλῶν ἐλκόντων (*Il.* 17.393), ἑταίρου κικλήσκοντος (*Il.* 17.532), ἔτι ζῶντος ἐμεῖο (*Il.* 18.10), ἐμεῦ ἀπομηνίσαντος (*Il.* 19.62), μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος (*Il.* 19.75), ἑταίρου τεθνηῶτος (*Il.* 19.210), *κούρην ἐμεῦ ἀέκοντος (*Il.* 19.272–3), κούρων ἐλκόντων (*Il.* 20.405), ἀρξάντων ἑτέρων (*Il.* 21.437), σεῖο καταφθιμένοιο (*Il.* 22.288), *πόλιν ἄκρην τοῦδε πεσόντος (*Il.* 22.383), Ἑκτορος οὐκέτ' ἑόντος (*Il.* 22.384), σεῦ ἀποτεθνηῶτος (*Il.* 22.432), πόλεος πεδίοιο θέοντος (*Il.* 23.521), κείνου τεθνηῶτος (*Il.* 24.244), ἐμεῖο μὲν οὐκ ἐθελούσης (*Il.* 24.289).

Odyssey

*ἔτος περιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν (*Od.* 1.16), *Διὸς γε διδόντος ὀρέσθαι (*Od.* 1.390), ἡθάκης ἔτι ναιεταούσης (*Od.* 1.404), *ἐν μεγάροισι . . . οἰχομένοιο σέθεν (*Od.* 4.392–3), ἐμεῖο μετ’ Αἰθιόπεςσιν ἐόντος (*Od.* 5.287), *ῶραι μηνῶν φθινόντων (*Od.* 10.470 = *Od.* 19.153 = *Od.* 24.143; generally regarded as spurious in all three passages), *μῆνές τε καὶ ἡμέραι ἅψ περιτελλομένου ἔτεος (*Od.* 11.295–6 = *Od.* 14.293–4), τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μηνός, τοῦ δ’ ἵσταμένοιο (*Od.* 14.161), *μῆνές τε καὶ ἡμέραι ἅψ περιτελλομένου ἔτεος (*Od.* 14.293–4), Βορέας πεσόντος (*Od.* 14.475), *δόμον . . . κακῶς πάσχοντος ἐμεῖο (*Od.* 16.274–5), τούτου γε ζώνοντος (*Od.* 16.373), ζώνοντός γ’ ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο (*Od.* 16.439), ἀποχομένοιο ἀνακτος (*Od.* 17.296), *πατρός καὶ μητέρος ἐμεῦ ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντος (*Od.* 18.267–8), ἕαρος νέον ἵσταμένοιο (*Od.* 19.519), σέθεν ἐνθάδ’ ἐόντος (*Od.* 20.232), μήλων σφαζομένων οἰοίό τε πινομένοιο/καὶ σίτου (*Od.* 20.312–13), θεῶς ὅπα φωνησάσης (*Od.* 24.535).

GAs in Hesiod

Πηλιάδων Ἀτλαγενέων ἐπιτελλομένων . . . δυσομενάων (*Op.* 383–4), αὖτις δὲ περιπλομένου ἐνιαυτοῦ (*Op.* 386), χαρασσομένου σιδήρου (*Op.* 387), μετοπωρινὸν ὁμβρήσαντος Ζηνὸς ἐρισθενέος (*Op.* 415), θέρεως ἔτι μέσσου ἐόντος (*Op.* 502), ἐπὶ γαῖαν πνεύσαντος Βορέας (*Op.* 506), Βορέας πεσόντος (*Op.* 547), πυκνὰ Θρηκίου Βορέω νέφεα κλονέοντος (*Op.* 553), ἕαρος νέον ἵσταμένοιο (*Op.* 569), ἐς τέλος ἐλθόντος θέρεος (*Op.* 664), ἡοῦς γεινομένης (*Op.* 821), μηνῶν φθινόντων (*Th.* 59), περιπλομένων δ’ ἐνιαυτῶν (*Th.* 184), ἐπιπλομένου δ’ ἐνιαυτοῦ (*Th.* 493), ἵππων ἱεμένων (*Sc.* 65), ἐπιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν (*Sc.* 87), ῥινοῖο σαπείσης (*Sc.* 152), οὔταμένου σάκεος (*Sc.* 363).

Extensive discussions of these passages can be found in Vasilaros (1993) and Keydana (1997: 187–233).

Chapter 3

Extensive collections of AAs can be found in Keydana (1997: 235–80) and Bennett (1914: 367–72; see especially on ‘nominal’ AAs).

Chapter 4

As concerns Rigvedic LAs, the ‘classic’ list that all later works on this topic refer back to is Delbrück (1888: 386–9). Below I have given a list of various interesting locative expressions and have marked with a single asterisk those that Delbrück sees as absolute. A double asterisk indicates expressions that I consider clearly absolute. A list of LAs in Vedic prose can be found in Oertel (1926). The standard work on the Sanskrit GA is de Saussure (1881).

The Rigveda: LAs and interesting participial expressions in the locative

Involving the sun: **sūrye udyatī* (8.27.19);* and **sūr(y)e údite* (3.15.2, 5.54.10, 7.63.5, 7.65.1, 7.66.4, 7.66.7, 7.66.12, 8.1.29, 8.13.13, 8.27.21); **involving dawn:** **uchántyām uśási* (1.184.1), *uchántyām* (elliptical for *uchántyām uśási*; 5.64.7); **involving sacrifice:** **prayatī adhvaré, vel sim.* (*1.16.3, 3.29.16, 5.17.1 5.28.6, 6.10.1, 8.7.6, 8.13.30, 8.35.23, 9.82.3, *10.17.7, 10.21.6, 10.130.6); **involving hymns:** **śśāntīṣu dhīṣú* (1.17.8 – possibly a locative with instrumental nuance?), *śśasyāmāne ukthé* (6.23.1), *ukthá-ukthe śśasyāmāne* (10.45.10), **ukthéṣu śśasyāmāneṣu* (10.72.1); **involving fire:** *sámiddhe agnaú, vel sim.* (1.108.4, 1.124.1, *2.9.3, *2.15.4, 2.16.1, 3.30.2 *3.55.3, 4.6.4 (= 6.52.17), 4.25.1, *4.39.3, 6.40.3); **jāté agnaú* (4.3.11, 10.88.2); **involving soma:** **suté* or *sóme suté:* around 70 times, e.g. at 1.5.2 or 1.9.2; **involving battle:** **dhāne hité* (1.40.2, 1.116.15, 1.132.5, 6.45.11, 6.45.13, 6.61.5, 8.3.9, 9.53.2, 10.63.14); **dhāneṣu hitéṣu* (8.16.5); **denoting physical spaces:** *saṃjagmānāsu kṛṣṭīṣu* (1.74.2), *jūryatsu vāneṣu* (3.23.1), **stīrṇé barhīṣi* (4.6.4), **daurgahé badhyāmāne* (4.42.8), *hitéṣu vāneṣu* (5.1.5), *jāté jánamāne* (8.99.3), *sahásradhāre vītate* (9.73.7), **samīcyoh̄ niṣpátantyoh̄* (10.24.5), *dhṛṣitéṣu khādīṣu* (10.38.1), **kṛté yónau* (10.101.3), **asmin jāyamāna* (10.95.7), *sámṛteṣu dhvajéṣu* (10.103.11); **from stanzas with unclear meaning:** *jāté góṣu* (3.31.10), *kṛṇvāné pitári* (10.61.6), *kṛté camasé* (10.96.9), *vṛddhāsu yāsu* (10.91.12); **locatives with instrumental nuance:** *práyatāsu ṛṣṭīṣu* (1.166.4), *taṣṭéṣu javéṣu* (10.71.8).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviated references

- AiGr* Wackernagel, J., A. Debrunner and L. Renou (1896–) *Altindische Grammatik*. Göttingen.
- AJPh* *American Journal of Philology*
- CIL* 1² Lommatzsch, E. (1918) *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*: pars II, fasc. I, *Inscriptiones Latinae antiquissimae ad C. Caesaris mortem*, 2nd edn. Berlin.
- EWAia* Mayrhofer, M. (1986–2001) *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen*. Heidelberg.
- IF* *Indogermanische Forschungen*.
- GrGr* II Schwyzer, E. and A. Debrunner (1950) *Griechische Grammatik*, Part II. Munich.
- K-G* Kühner, R. and B. Gerth (1898) *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, Part II vol. I. Hanover and Leipzig.
(1904) *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, Part II vol. II. Hanover and Leipzig.
- K-S* Kühner, R. and C. Stegmann (1912) *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*, Part I, 2nd edn. Hanover.
Kühner, R. and C. Stegmann (1976) *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*, Part II vol. I, 5th edn. Hanover.
- KZ* *Kuhns Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*.
- LGr* Leumann, M., J. B. Hofmann and A. Szantyr (1972) *Lateinische Grammatik*, vol. II: *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik*. Munich.
- LfgrE* Snell, B. (ed.) (1955–2010) *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*. Göttingen.
- LIV* Rix, H. (ed.) (2001) *Lexikon der indogermanischen Verben*, 2nd edn. Wiesbaden.
- LSJ* Liddell, H., R. Scott and H. Jones (1996) *A Greek–English Lexicon*, 9th edn. Oxford and New York.
- Menge* Menge, H., A. Thierfelder and J. Wiesner (1999) *Repetitorium der griechischen Syntax*. Darmstadt.
Menge, H., T. Burkard and M. Schauer (2000) *Lehrbuch der lateinischen Syntax und Semantik*. Darmstadt.

- OLD Glare, P. G. W. (ed.) (1982) *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. Oxford and New York.
- TLG *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, online at www.tlg.uci.edu

Works cited

- Aalto, P. (1949) *Untersuchungen über das lateinische Gerundium und Gerundivum*. Helsinki.
- (1979) 'On the absolute instrumental in Sanskrit', *Indologica Taurinensia* 7.1: 47–55.
- Adams, J. N. (2005) 'The *Bellum Africum*', in *Aspects of the Language of Latin Prose*, eds. T. Reinhardt, M. Lapidge and J. N. Adams. Oxford: 73–96.
- Allardice, F. (1929) *Syntax of Terence*. Oxford.
- Ambrasas, V. (1997) *Lithuanian Grammar*. Vilnius.
- Ammann, H. (1922) *Untersuchungen zur homerischen Wortfolge und Satzstruktur*, Part I. Freiburg im Breisgau.
- (1924) *Untersuchungen zur homerischen Wortfolge und Satzstruktur*, Part II, *IF* 42: 149–78, 300–23.
- Aufrecht, T. (1877) *Hymnen des Rigveda*, 2nd edn. Bonn.
- Autenrieth, G. (1902) *Wörterbuch zu den Homerischen Gedichten*, 9th edn. Stuttgart.
- Bacherler, M. (1922) 'Zum sogenannten Nominativus Absolutus bei Curtius', *Wiener Studien* 43: 100–2.
- Baehrens, E. (1886) *Fragmenta poetarum Romanorum*. Leipzig.
- Balkenholl, J. (1882) *De participiorum usu Thucydideo*. Göttingen.
- Balser, H. (1878) *De linguae Graecae participio in neutro genere substantive posito*. Leipzig.
- Barron, J. P. and P. E. Easterling (1985) *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, vol. I: *Greek Literature*. Cambridge.
- Bartholomae, C. (1889) 'Der sogenannte genitivus temporis im Veda', *Bezzen-bergers Beiträge* 15: 200–21.
- (1892) 'Absoluter Lokativ mit Partizip Präsens im Avesta', *IF* 1: 178–80.
- (1904) *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*. Strasbourg.
- Bartoněk, A. (2003) *Handbuch des mykenischen Griechisch*. Heidelberg.
- Bauer, B. (1994) 'The development of Latin absolute constructions: from stative to transitive structures', *General Linguistics* 33: 64–83.
- (1995) *The Emergence and Development of SVO Patterning in Latin and French: Diachronic and Psycholinguistic Perspectives*. Oxford and New York.
- (2000) *Archaic Syntax in Indo-European*. New York and Berlin.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bechert, H. and G. von Simson (eds.) (1979) *Einführung in die Indologie*. Darmstadt.
- Behaghel, O. (1903) 'Die Herstellung der syntaktischen Ruhelage des Deutschen', *IF* 14: 438–59.
- Benfey, T. (1852–4) *Handbuch der Sanskritsprache*, 2 vols. Leipzig.
- Bennett, C. E. (1910) *Syntax of Early Latin*, Part I: *The Verb*. Boston.
- (1914) *Syntax of Early Latin*, Part II: *The Noun*. Boston.
- Berent, G. P. (1973) 'Absolute constructions as "subordinate clauses"', in *You Take the High Node and I'll Take the Low Node*, eds. C. Corum, T. C. Smith-Stark and A. Weiser. Chicago: 147–54.
- Biese, Y. M. (1959) 'Der spätlateinische Akkusativus Absolutus und Verwandtes', *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae* B.22.2.
- Birt, T. (1883) *De participiis quae dicuntur perfecti passivi*. Marburg.
- Blake, B. J. (1977) *Case Marking in Australian Languages*. Canberra.
- (2001) *Case*, 2nd edn. Cambridge.
- Böhtlingk, O. (1855–75) *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, 7 vols. St Petersburg.
- (1879–89) *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung*. St Petersburg.
- (1887) *Pāṇini's Grammatik*. Leipzig.
- Boksch, X. (1863) *De genetivi absoluti apud Homerum usu*, Misc. Phil. Libellus, Wrocław: 19–22 (*non vidi*).
- Bolkestein, A. M. (1980) 'The "ab urbe condita"-construction in Latin: a strange type of raising?', in *Linguistics in the Netherlands*, eds. S. Daalder and M. Gerritsen. Amsterdam: 80–91.
- (1987) 'The bad behaviour of trivalent verbs in the ablativus absolutus', *Cuadernos de filología clásica* (L) 20: 93–103.
- Bolkestein, A. M. et al. (eds.) (1981) *Predication and Expression in Functional Grammar*. London and New York.
- Bombe, E. (1877) *De ablativi absoluti apud antiquissimos Romanorum scriptores usu*. Diss. Greifswald.
- Bopp, F. (1827) *Ausführliches Lehrgebäude der Sanskritsprache*. Berlin.
- (1832) *Grammatica critica linguae sanscritae*. Berlin.
- (1834, 1845, 1863) *Kritische Grammatik der Sanskrita-Sprache in kürzerer Fassung*, 1st–3rd edn. Berlin.
- Brown, K. and J. Miller (eds.) (1999) *Concise Encyclopedia of Grammatical Categories*. Amsterdam and New York.
- Brockington, J. (1998) *The Sanskrit Epics*. Leiden and Boston.
- Brugmann, K. (1895) 'Die mit dem Suffix -to- gebildeten Partizipien im Verbal-system des Lateinischen und des Oskisch-Umbrischen: Eine syntaktische Untersuchung', *IF* 5: 89–153.
- (1903) *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*, vol. II. Strasbourg.
- (1910) 'Der sogenannte Akkusativus der Beziehung im Arischen, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Germanischen', *IF* 27: 121–51.
- Buck, C. D. (1904) *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*. Boston.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Buijs, M. (2005) *Clause Combining in Ancient Greek Narrative Discourse* (Mnemosyne Supplementa 260). Leiden.
- Burrow, T. (1973) *The Sanskrit Language*. London.
- Calasso, R. (1998) *Ka*, transl. T. Parks. New York.
- Callaway, M. (1889) *The Absolute Participle in Anglo-Saxon*. Baltimore.
- Campe, P. (1994) *Case, Semantic Roles, and Grammatical Relations: A Comprehensive Bibliography*. Philadelphia.
- Camps, A. and J.-C. Müller (eds.) (1988) *The Sanskrit Grammar and Manuscripts of Father Heinrich Roth, S.J. (1620–1668)*: facsimile edition of Biblioteca Nazionale, Rome, Mss. Or. 171 and 172. Leiden and New York.
- Cardona, G. (1976) *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*. The Hague.
- (1988) *Pāṇini, His Work and Its Traditions*. Delhi.
- (1999) *Recent Research in Pāṇinian Studies*. Delhi.
- Carey, W. (1806) *A Grammar of the Sungskrit Language*. Serampore.
- Carling, G. (2000) *Die Funktionen der lokalen Kasus im Tocharischen*. Berlin and New York.
- Carrière, J. (1973) 'L'accusatif absolu avec ὡς: nuances et origine', *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes* 47.2: 212–24.
- Chantraine, P. (1948) *Grammaire homérique*, vol. 1: *Phonétique et morphologie*. Paris.
- (1953) *Grammaire homérique*, vol. II: *Syntaxe*. Paris.
- Chassignet, M. (1986) *Caton, Les origines: fragments*. Paris.
- Chomsky, N. (1957) *Syntactic Structures*. The Hague.
- (1970) 'Remarks on nominalization', in *Readings in English Transformational Grammar*, eds. R. Jacobs and P. Rosenbaum. Waltham, MA: 184–221.
- Christenson, D. M. (2000) *Plautus Amphitruo*. Cambridge and New York.
- Clackson, J. (2000) Review of Keydana (1997), *Kratylos* 45: 192–4.
- (2007) *Indo-European Linguistics: An Introduction*. Cambridge.
- Clarke, M. (1999) *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer*. Oxford.
- Classen, J. (1867) *Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch*. Frankfurt am Main.
- Colebrooke, H. T. (1805) *A Grammar of the Sanscrit Language*. Kolkata.
- Coleman, R. (1985) 'The Indo-European origins and Latin development of the accusative with infinitive construction', in *Syntaxe et Latin*, ed. C. Touratier. Aix-en-Provence: 307–42.
- (1989) 'The rise and fall of absolute constructions: a Latin case history', in *Subordination and Other Topics in Latin*, ed. G. Calboli. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: 353–74.
- Comrie, B. (1989) *Language Universals and Linguistic Typology: Syntax and Morphology*, 2nd edn. Chicago.
- Cooper, G. L. (1998) *Attic Greek Prose Syntax after K. W. Krüger*. Ann Arbor.
- (2002) *Early Greek Poetic and Herodotean Syntax*. Ann Arbor.
- Costello, J. (1980) 'The absolute construction in Gothic', *Word* 31.1: 91–104.
- (1982) 'The absolute construction in Indo-European: a syntagmatic reconstruction', *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 10.3/4: 235–52.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cugusi, M. (1982) *Orationum reliquiae M. Porci Catonis*. Turin.
- Cutt, T. (1970) *Plautus Amphitruo*. Detroit.
- Degrassi, A. (1972) *Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae*, 2nd edn. Florence.
- Delaunois, M. (1988) *Essai de syntaxe grecque classique*. Brussels and Louvain-la-Neuve.
- Delbrück, B. (1867) *Ablativ Localis Instrumentalis im Altindischen Lateinischen Griechischen und Deutschen*. Berlin.
- (1879) *Die Grundlagen der griechischen Syntax*. Halle.
- (1888) *Altindische Syntax*. Halle.
- (1897) *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen*, vol. II. Strasbourg.
- Dik, H. (1995) *Word Order in Ancient Greek*. Amsterdam.
- Dik, S. (1978) *Functional Grammar*. Amsterdam.
- Dimitropoulos, P. (1999) *Untersuchungen zum finalen Genitiv des substantivierten Infinitivs bei Thukydides*. Helsinki.
- Dingeldein, O. (1884) *De participio Homérico quaestionum specimen*. Gießen.
- Dixon, R. M. W. (1972) *The Dyirbal Language of North Queensland*. London.
- (1977). 'Where have all the adjectives gone?', *Studies in Language* 1: 19–80.
- (1999) 'Adjectives', in *Concise Encyclopedia of Grammatical Categories*, eds. K. Brown and T. Miller. Amsterdam: 1–8.
- Dixon, R. M. W. and A. Y. Aikhenvald (eds.) (2004) *Adjective Classes: A Cross-Linguistic Typology*. Oxford and New York.
- Dohnalová, A. (1983) 'The Greek genitive absolute and the Latin ablative absolute in the chosen works of the Greek–Latin translation literature', in *Concilium Eirene* XVI, vol. II, eds. P. Oliva and A. Frolíková. Prague: 263–67.
- Draeger, A. A. (1881) *Historische Syntax der lateinischen Sprache*, vol. II, 2nd edn. Leipzig.
- Dressler, W. (1970) 'Über die Rekonstruktion der indogermanischen Syntax', *KZ* 85: 5–22.
- Dubois, L. (1988) *Recherches sur le dialecte arcadien*. Louvain-la-Neuve.
- Edgren, A. H. (1885) *A Compendious Sanskrit Grammar*. London.
- Edmonds, J. (1963–7) *Lyra Graeca*, 3 vols. Cambridge, MA.
- Edwards, M. W. (ed.) (1991) *The Iiad: A Commentary*, vol. v: *Books 17–20*. Cambridge.
- Elizarenkova, T. J. (1995) *Language and Style of the Vedic Ṛṣis*. Albany, NY.
- Erbse, H. (1972) *Beiträge zum Verständnis der Odyssee*. Berlin and New York.
- Ernout, A. (1935) *Morphologie historique du latin*. Paris.
- Ernout, A. and F. Thomas (1953) *Syntaxe Latine*. Paris.
- Faarlund, J. T. (1990) *Syntactic Change: Toward a Theory of Historical Syntax*. Berlin and New York.
- Fagles, R. (1990) *The Iliad*. New York.
- (1996) *The Odyssey*. New York.
- Filliozat, P.-S. (1988) *Grammaire sanskrite paninéenne*. Paris.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Flinck-Linkomies, E. (1924) 'Absolute Konstruktionen in den neueren Sprachen', *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 25: 214–21.
- (1929) 'De ablativo absoluto quaestiones', *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae* B.20.1.
- Flood, G. (1996) *An Introduction to Hinduism*. Cambridge.
- Forster, H. P. (1810) *An Essay on the Principles of Sanskrit Grammar*, Part 1. Kolkata.
- Frauzel, J. D. (1998) 'Impersonal Absolutes in Indo-Iranian, Greek, Latin, Baltic and the origin of the Indo-European absolute construction', in *Proceedings of the 7 Annual UCLA Indo-European Conference*, eds. A. della Volpex and E. Polomé. Los Angeles: 105–25.
- Friedrich, J. (1960) *Hethitisches Elementarbuch*, 2nd edn. Heidelberg.
- Frisk, H. (1960–72) *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 3 vols. Heidelberg.
- Fuss, E. and C. Trips (eds.) (2004) *Diachronic Clues to Synchronic Grammar*. Amsterdam.
- Gaedicke, C. (1880) *Der Accusativ im Veda*. Wrocław.
- García Ramón, C. and M. A. Gutiérrez Galindo (eds.) (2001) *Prisciani institutionum grammaticalium librorum I–XVI, indices et concordantiae*, 2nd edn. Hildesheim and New York.
- Geldner, K. F. (1923) *Der Rig-Veda*. Göttingen and Leipzig.
- George, C. H. (2005) *Expressions of Agency in Ancient Greek*. Cambridge and New York.
- Gildersleeve, B. L. (1888) 'On the stylistic effect of the Greek participle', *AJPh* 9: 137–57.
- Gonda, J. (ed.) (1975) *Vedic Literature: Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas*. Wiesbaden.
- (1980) *Vedic Ritual: The Non-Solemn Rites*. Leiden and Cologne.
- (1986) *Prajāpati's Rise to Higher Rank*. Leiden.
- Grady, M. (1972) 'The English absolute construction', *Linguistics* 90: 5–10.
- Grassmann, H. (1873) *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*. Leipzig.
- (1876–7) *Rig-veda, übersetzt und mit kritischen und erläuternden Anmerkungen versehen*, 2 vols. Leipzig.
- Gren-Eklund, G. (1978) *A Study of Nominal Sentences in the Oldest Upaniṣads*. Uppsala and Stockholm.
- Grice, P. (1975) 'Logic and conversation', in *Syntax and Semantics*, vol. III: *Speech Acts*, eds. P. Cole and J. Morgan. New York. (Reprinted in *Studies in the Way of Words*, ed. H. P. Grice. Cambridge, MA: 1989: 22–40.)
- Griffith, R. T. H. (1896) *The Hymns of the Rigveda*, 2nd edn. Varanasi.
- Guiraud, C. (1962) *La phrase nominale en grec d'Homère à Euripide*. Paris.
- Gvozdanovic, J. (ed.) (1997) *Language Change and Functional Explanations*. Berlin and New York.
- Haal, Toon van (2010) 'A la recherche d'une grammaire perdue: Johann Ernst Hanxleden's *Grammatica Grandonica* retrieved', *Historiographica Linguistica* 37: 445–57.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Haiman, J. and S. Thompson (1984) 'Subordination in universal grammar', in *Proceedings of the 10th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*, eds. C. Brugmann and M. Macaulay. Berkeley: 510–23.
- Hajnal, I. (1995) *Studien zum mykenischen Kasusystem*. Berlin and New York.
- Hale, M. (1998) 'Diachronic syntax', *Syntax* 1.1: 1–18.
- Hanxleden, J. E. (1732) *Grammatica Grandonica*. Manuscript, Library of Convento di San Silvestro. Montecompatri. (In: Hanxleden, J. E. (forthcoming) *Grammatica Grandonica*. Digital photographic reproduction pending the publication of a critical edition. Potsdam.)
- Harris, A. C. and L. Campbell (1995) *Historical Syntax in Cross-Linguistic Perspective*. Cambridge.
- Hatfield, J. T. (1884) *The Elements of Sanskrit Grammar*. Lucknow.
- Haudry, J. (1977) *L'emploi des cas en védique*. Lyon.
- Havers, W. (1911) *Indogermanische Kasusyntax*. Strasbourg.
 - (1924) 'Eine syntaktische Sonderstellung der griechischen und lateinischen Neutra', *Glotta* 13: 171–89.
 - (1926) 'Der sogenannte Nominativus Pendens', *IF* 43: 207–57.
 - (1928) 'Zur Syntax des Nominativs', *Glotta* 16: 94–127.
- Heick, O. W. (1936) *The ab urbe condita Construction in Latin*. Lincoln, NB.
- Heikel, I. A. (1884) *De participiorum apud Herodotum usu*. Helsinki.
- Helntula, A. (1987) *Studies on the Latin Accusative Absolute*. Helsinki.
- Hettrich, H. (1988) *Untersuchungen zur Hypotaxe im Vedischen*. Berlin and New York.
 - (1990) 'Rektionaler und autonomer Kasusgebrauch', in *Jakob Wackernagel und die Indogermanistik heute*, eds. H. Eichner and H. Rix. Wiesbaden: 82–98.
 - (2002) *Indogermanische Syntax: Fragen und Perspektiven*. Wiesbaden.
- Heubeck, A., S. West and J. B. Hainsworth (1990) *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, vol. I. Oxford.
- Hirt, H. (1937) *Indogermanische Grammatik*, vol. VIII: *Syntax II*. Heidelberg.
- Hock, H. H. (ed.) (1991) *Studies in Sanskrit Syntax*. Delhi.
- Hoff, F. (1989) 'Les ablatifs absolus irréguliers: un nouvel examen du problème', in *Subordination and Other Topics in Latin*, ed. G. Calboli. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: 401–23.
- Hoffmann, K. and B. Forssman (1996) *Avestische Laut- und Flexionslehre*. Innsbruck.
- Holland, G. B. (1986) 'Nominal sentences and the origins of absolute constructions in Indo-European', *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 99.2: 163–93.
- Holtzmann, A. (1884) *Grammatisches aus dem Mahabharata: ein Anhang zu William Dwight Whitney's Indischer Grammatik*. Leipzig.
- Horn, F. (1918) *Beiträge zur Geschichte der absoluten Konstruktionen im Lateinischen*. Lund and Leipzig.
- Horrocks, G. C. (1981) *Space and Time in Homer*. New York.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- (1997) 'Homer's dialect', in *A New Companion to Homer*, eds. I. Morris and B. Powell. Leiden: 193–218.
- Householder, F. (1959) 'pa-ro and Mycenaean cases', *Glotta* 38: 1–10.
- Hübschmann, H. (1875) *Zur Casuslehre*. Munich.
- Jackson, A. V. W. (1892) *An Avesta Grammar in Comparison with Sanskrit*. Stuttgart.
- Jackson, S. (1995) Review of Vasilaros (1993), *Classical Review* NS 45.2: 238–40.
- Janko, R. (1994) *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. IV: *Books 13–16*. Cambridge.
- Jensen, H. (1959) *Altarmenische Grammatik*. Heidelberg.
- Jocelyn, H. D. (1969) *The Tragedies of Ennius: The Fragments*. London.
- Jones, F. P. (1939) *The ab urbe condita Construction in Greek (Language Supplement 15.1)*. Baltimore.
- Jong, J. R. de (1982) 'Word order within Latin noun phrases', in *Linguistics in the Netherlands*, eds. S. Daalder and M. Gerritsen. Amsterdam: 95–101.
- Kale, M. R. (1922) *A Higher Sanskrit Grammar*, 6th edn. Mumbai.
- Katre, S. (1987) *Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*. Delhi.
- Kellens, J. (1984) *Le verbe avestique*. Wiesbaden.
- Keydana, G. (1997) *Absolute Konstruktionen in altindogermanischen Sprachen*. Göttingen.
- Kieckers, E. (1912) 'Zum accusativus limitationis im Griechischen', *IF* 30: 361–6.
- (1921) 'Zum accusativus absolutus im Gotischen', *IF* 39: 125–6.
- Kielhorn, F. (1870) *A Grammar of the Sanskrit Language*. Mumbai.
- Knapp, C. (1923) 'Is the ablative absolute necessary?', *The Classical Weekly* 17: 9–10.
- König, E. and J. J. van der Auwera (1990) 'Adverbial participles, gerunds and absolute constructions', in *Toward a Typology of European Languages*, eds. J. Bechert, G. Bernini and C. Buridant. Berlin and New York: 337–55.
- Krause, W. and W. Thomas (1960) *Tocharisches Elementarbuch*, vol. 1: *Grammatik*. Heidelberg.
- Krisch, T. (1988) *Zur semantischen Interpretation von absoluten Konstruktionen in altindogermanischen Sprachen* (Scientia 10). Innsbruck.
- Kronasser, H. (1956) *Vergleichende Laut- und Formenlehre des Hethitischen*. Heidelberg.
- Kunst, K. (1923) 'Vom Wesen und Ursprung des absoluten Genetivs', *Glotta* 12: 29–51.
- Kurschat, F. (1876) *Grammatik der litauischen Sprache*. Halle.
- Lass, R. (1997) *Historical Linguistics and Language Change*. Cambridge.
- Lauer, M. (1869) *Grammatik der classischen armenischen Sprache*. Vienna.
- Laughton, E. (1964) *The Participle in Cicero*. Oxford.
- Lavency, M. (2005) 'L'ablatif absolu aujourd'hui, hier et avant-hier', *Latomus* 64.3: 585–9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Lease, E. (1928) 'The ablative absolute limited by conjunctions', *AJPh* 49.4: 348–53.
- (1931) 'The ablative absolute limited by conjunctions (2)', *AJPh* 52.2: 175.
- Lehmann, W. (1972) 'Contemporary linguistics and Indo-European studies', *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association* 87: 976–93.
- (1974) *Proto-Indo-European Syntax*. Austin.
- (1993) *Theoretical Bases of Indo-European Linguistics*. London and New York.
- Lell, F. (1892) *Der Accusativus Absolutus im Griechischen bis Aristoteles*. Würzburg.
- Lerch, E. (1912) *Prädikative Participia für Verbalsubstantiva im Französischen*. Halle.
- Lightfoot, D. (1979) *Principles of Diachronic Syntax*. Cambridge and New York.
- (1999) *The Development of Language: Acquisition, Change, and Evolution*. Malden, MA.
- Lindsay, W. M. (1903) *T. Macci Plauti Comoediae*. Oxford.
- (1907) *Syntax of Plautus*. Oxford.
- Lindsay, W. M. and R. Kauer (1926) *P. Terenti Afri Comoediae*. Oxford.
- Lipka, L. (1981) 'Zur Lexikalisierung im Deutschen und Englischen', in *Wortbildung* (= *Wege der Forschung* 564), eds. L. Lipka and H. Günther. Darmstadt: 119–32.
- (1983) 'A multi-level approach to word-formation: complex lexemes and word semantics,' in *Proceedings of the 13th International Congress of Linguistics*, eds. S. Hattori and K. Inoue. Tokyo: 926–8.
- Lobel, E. and D. Page (1955) *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*. Oxford.
- López Facal, J. (1974) *Los usos adverbiales del acusativo, dativo y genitivo en la lengua de Heródoto*. Madrid.
- Lübbert, E. (1871) *Commentationes syntacticae*, Particula 1: *De structura participii perfecti passivi pro substantivo verbalis positi*. Gießen.
- Lübker, F. (1833) *De participiis Graecis Latinisque commentatio*. Altona.
- Lubotsky, A. (1997) *A Ṛgvedic Word Concordance*. New Haven.
- Lücke, O. (1876) *Absolute Participia im Gotischen und ihr Verhältnis zum griechischen Original*. Diss. Magdeburg.
- Ludwig, A. (1876–88) *Der Rigveda, oder, Die heiligen Hymnen der Brāhmaṇa*. Prague and Leipzig.
- Lunt, H. G. (1974) *Old Church Slavonic Grammar*. The Hague.
- Macdonald, K. S. (1982) *The Vedic Religion*. Kolkata.
- Macdonell, A. A. (1900) *A History of Sanskrit Literature*. New York.
- (1910) *Vedic Grammar*. Strasbourg.
- Mahoney, A. (2004) *Plautus: Amphitryo*. Newburyport, MA.
- Maiocco, M. (2005) *Absolute Participial Constructions: A Contrastive Approach to the Syntax of Greek and Latin*. Pisa.
- Mallinson, J. (2009) *The Ocean of the Rivers of Story*. New York.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Marchant, E. C. (1893) *Thucydides: Book VIII*. London.
- Marouzeau, J. (1910) *L'emploi du participe présent latin à l'époque républicaine*. Paris.
- Masson, O. (1961) *Les inscriptions chypriotes syllabiques*. Paris.
- Matthews, P. (1981) *Syntax*. Cambridge.
- Mazzarino, A. (1982) *M. Porci Catonis De agri cultura*. Leipzig.
- Meenakshi, K. (1983) *Epic Syntax*. New Delhi.
- Meillet, A. and J. Vendryes (1979) *Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques*, 5th edn. Paris.
- Meiser, G. (1998) *Historische Laut- und Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache*. Darmstadt.
- Merkelbach, R. and M. West (1967) *Fragmenta Hesiodica*. Oxford.
- Methner, R. (1914–15) 'Die Entstehung des Ablativus qualitatis und sein Verhältnis zum Ablativus modi und zum Ablativus absolutus', *Glotta* 6: 33–61.
- Minor, R. N. (1986) *Modern Indian Interpreters of the Bhagavadgītā*. Albany.
- Monier-Williams, M. (1857) *A Practical Grammar of the Sanskrit Language*, 2nd edn. Oxford.
- (1888) *A Sanskrit–English Dictionary*. Oxford.
- Monro, D. B. (1891) *A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect*. Oxford.
- Monro, D. B. and T. W. Allen (1920) *Homeri Opera: Ilias*, 3rd edn, 2 vols. Oxford.
- (1922) *Homeri Opera: Odyssea*, 2nd edn, 2 vols. Oxford.
- Morpurgo, A. (1960) 'Il genitivo miceneo e il sincretismo dei casi', *Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei* 15: 33–61.
- (1966) 'An instrumental-ablative in Mycenaean?', in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Colloquium on Mycenaean Studies*, eds. L. R. Palmer and J. Chadwick. Cambridge and New York: 191–202.
- Moulton, J. H. (1911) *Einleitung in die Sprache des neuen Testaments*. Heidelberg.
- Mugler, C. (1936) 'Remarques sur l'origine et le développement du datif absolu chez Homère', *Revue des études grecques* 49: 38–57.
- (1938) *L'évolution des constructions participiales complexes en grec et en latin*. Paris.
- Mullach, F. W. A. (1860) *Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum*, vol. 1. Paris.
- Müller, F. M. (1849–75) *The Hymns of the Rigveda*, 6 vols. London.
- (1866) *A Sanskrit Grammar for Beginners*. London.
- Müller-Lancé, J. (1994) *Absolute Konstruktionen vom Altlatein zum Neufranzösischen*. Tübingen.
- Mylius, K. (2003) *Geschichte der altindischen Literatur*, 2nd edn. Wiesbaden.
- Nagel, L. (1885) *Quaestiones ad participiorum usum Thucydidium pertinentes*. Halle.
- Nestle, E. and E. Nestle, B. Aland and K. Aland (1994) *Novum Testamentum Graece*, 3rd edn. Stuttgart.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Nooten, B. van and G. Holland (1994) *Rig Veda, a Metrically Restored Text*. Cambridge, MA and London.
- Nordlinger, R. (1998) *Constructive Case: Evidence from Australian Languages*. Stanford.
- Nutting, H. (1930) 'The ablative absolute and the stenographic ablative', *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 10.8: 203–17.
- Oberlies, T. (2003) *A Grammar of Epic Sanskrit*. Berlin and New York.
- Oakley, S. (2005) *A Commentary on Livy, Books VI–X*. Oxford and New York.
- Oertel, H. (1912–13) 'Über grammatische Perseverationserscheinungen', *IF* 31: 49–66.
- (1923) 'Zum disjunkten Gebrauch des Nominativs in der Brāhmaṇaprosā', in *Antidoron: Festschrift Jacob Wackernagel*. Göttingen: 45–50.
- (1926) *The Syntax of Cases in the Narrative and Descriptive Prose of the Brāhmaṇas*, vol. I: *The Disjunct Use of Cases*. Heidelberg.
- Oguse, A. (1962) *Recherches sur le participe circonstanciel en grec ancien*. Wetteren.
- Olivelle, P. (1998) *The Early Upaniṣads*. New York.
- (2006) *Five Discourses on Worldly Wisdom*. New York.
- Oniga, R. (1991) *Tito Maccio Plauto, Anfitrione*. Venice.
- Oppert, J. (1859) *Grammaire sanscrite*. Berlin.
- Palmer, L. (1963) *The Interpretation of Mycenaean Greek Texts*. Oxford.
- Panagl, O. (1999) 'Beobachtungen zur mykenischen Syntax', in *Florent Studia Mycenaea II*, eds. S. Deger-Jalkotzy, S. Hiller and O. Panagl. Vienna: 488–94.
- Parry, A. (ed.) (1980) *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*. New York.
- Paul, H. (1920) *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, 5th edn. Halle.
- Paulinus a S. Bartholomeo (1790) *Sidarubham seu grammatica samscrdamica*. Rome.
- (1804) *Vyācarana seu locupletissima samscrdamicae linguae institutio*. Rome.
- Peter, H. (1883) *Historicorum Romanorum fragmenta*. Leipzig.
- Piirainen, I. (1969) 'Die absoluten Kasuskonstruktionen des Deutschen in diachroner Sicht', *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 70: 448–70.
- Pinkster, H. (1988) *Lateinische Syntax und Semantik*. Tübingen.
- (1990) *Latin Syntax and Semantics*. London.
- Pischel, R. (1877) 'Pali-grammatik', *KZ* 23: 434–7.
- Pollock, S. (2001) 'The death of Sanskrit', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42.2: 392–426.
- Press, J. I. (1973) 'The syntax of absolute constructions in Slavonic and Baltic, with reference to Finno-Ugrian', *Slavonic and East European Review* 51: 11–21.
- Radatz, H.-I. (2001) *Die Semantik der Adjektivstellung*. Tübingen.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ramat, P. (1989) 'On Latin absolute constructions', in *Subordination and Other Topics in Latin*, ed. G. Calboli. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: 259–68.
- Reichelt, H. (1909) *Awestisches Elementarbuch*. Heidelberg.
- Reichenbach, H. (1947) *Elements of Symbolic Logic*. New York.
- Rengakos, A. (1996) Review of Vasilaros (1993), *Gnomon* 68: 642–4.
- Renou, L. (1956) *Histoire de la langue sanskrite*. Lyon.
- (1968) *Grammaire sanscrite*, 2nd edn. Paris.
- Riemann, O. and A. Ernout (1927) *Syntaxe latine d'après les principes de la grammaire historique*. Paris.
- Risch, E. (1974) *Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache*, 2nd edn. Berlin and New York.
- Rix, H. (1992) *Historische Grammatik des Griechischen*, 2nd edn. Darmstadt.
- Rodrigues, H. (2006) *Introducing Hinduism*. Oxford and New York.
- Rosén, H. (1988) 'Der griechische "dativus absolutus" und indogermanische "unpersönliche" Partizipialkonstruktionen', *KZ* 101: 92–103.
- Ross, C. H. (1893) *The Absolute Participle in Middle and Modern English*. Baltimore.
- Rubenbauer, H. and J. B. Hofmann (1995) *Lateinische Grammatik*, 12th edn. Bamberg and Munich.
- Ruijgh, C. J. (1971) *Autour de "te épique"*. Amsterdam.
- Rumpf, H. (1868) *Utrum verborum deponentium participia perfecti temporis in ablatis absolutis sint vitanda an admittenda*. Frankfurt.
- Ruppel, A. (2002) 'The origins and early development of the Greek "Accusative Absolute"', unpublished MPhil Dissertation, Faculty of Classics, Cambridge University.
- (2012) 'The development of the genitive absolute in Sanskrit', in *Indic Across the Millennia: from the Rigveda to modern Indo-Aryan*. Proceedings of the Linguistics Sessions of the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto. Available at www.indology.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp.
- Russo, J., M. Fernández-Galiano and A. Heubeck (eds.) (1992) *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, vol. III. Oxford.
- Sattar, A. (1997) *Tales from the Kathāsaritsāgara*. London.
- Saussure, F. de (1881) *De l'emploi du génitif absolu en sanscrit*. Paris. (Reprinted in *Recueil des publications scientifiques* (1984), eds. C. Bally and L. Gautier. Geneva and Paris: 269–338.)
- Scaglione, A. D. (1970) *Ars grammatica*. The Hague.
- Schaubert, E. von (1954) *Vorkommen, gebietsmäßige Verbreitung und Herkunft altenglischer absoluter Partizipialkonstruktionen in Nominativ und Akkusativ*. Paderborn.
- Schleicher, A. (1856–7) *Handbuch der litauischen Sprache*, 2 vols. Prague.
- Schneider, R. and G. Uhlig (1873–1910) *Apollonii Dyscoli quae supersunt* (Grammatici Graeci II.1.3). Leipzig.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Schröder, W. A. (1971) *M. Porcius Cato, das erste Buch der Origines*. Meisenheim am Glan.
- Schwyzler, E. (1923) *Dialectorum Graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora*, 3rd edn. Leipzig.
(1942) 'Zum sogenannten Genitivus absolutus statt Participium coniunctum im Griechischen', *Emerita* 10: 98–104.
- Sedgwick, W. B. (1960) *Plautus, Amphitruo*. Manchester.
- Seiler, H. (1960) *Relativsatz, Attribut und Apposition*. Wiesbaden.
- Sen, S. (1927) 'The syntax of cases in Vedic Prose', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 9: 91–170.
- Senn, A. (1966) *Handbuch der litauischen Sprache*. Heidelberg.
- Serbat, G. (1979) 'L'ablatif absolu', *Revue des études latines* 57: 340–54.
- Shipp, G. P. (1953) *Studies in the Language of Homer*. Cambridge.
- Sieg, E., W. Siegling and W. Schulze (1931) *Tocharische Grammatik*. Göttingen.
- Siegel, M. E. A. (1980) *Capturing the Adjective*. New York.
- Siewierska, A. and J. Jung Song (eds.) (1998) *Case, Typology, and Grammar*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia.
- Sluiter, I. (2000) 'Seven grammarians on the ablative absolute', *Historiographia Linguistica* 27.2/3: 379–414.
- Snell, B. (1953) *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*. Leipzig.
- Smith, C. F. (1886) *Thucydides: Book VII*. Boston.
- Smith, D. (2005), *Kālidāsa, The Birth of Kumāra*. New York.
- Smith, S. D. (2005) Review of Buijs (2005), in *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, 2005.07.70.
- Smyth, H. W. (1956) *Greek Grammar*. Cambridge, MA.
- Snell, B. (1953) *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*. Leipzig.
- Sommer, F. (1914) *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre*. Heidelberg.
- Speijer, J. S. (1886) *Sanskrit Syntax*. Leiden.
(1896) *Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax*. Strasbourg.
- Spieker, E. H. (1885) 'On the so-called genitive absolute and its use especially in the Attic orators', *AJPh* 6: 310–43.
- Staal, F. (1988) *Universals: Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics*. Chicago.
- Steele, R. B. (1902) 'The ablative absolute in Livy', *AJPh* 23: 295–312 and 413–27.
(1904) 'The ablative absolute in the epistles of Cicero, Seneca, Pliny and Fronto', *AJPh* 25.3: 315–27.
- Streitberg, W. (2000) *Die gotische Bibel*, Band 1: *Der gotische Text und seine griechische Vorlage*, 7th edn. Heidelberg.
- Stump, G. T. (1985) *The Semantic Variability of Absolute Constructions*. Dordrecht.
- Sturtevant, A. (1933) 'Gothic syntactical notes', *AJPh* 54.4: 340–52.
- Sturtevant, E. H. (1951) *A Comparative Grammar of the Hittite Language*. New Haven.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Szemerényi, O. (1996) *Introduction to Indo-European Linguistics*. Darmstadt.
- Tammelin, E. J. (1889) *De participiis priscæ latinæ quæstiones syntacticae*. Helsinki.
- Taraporewala, I. (1967) *Sanskrit Syntax*. Delhi.
- Tarelli, C. C. (1938) 'Génitif absolu et datif absolu', *Revue des études grecques* 51: 267–74.
- Thesleff, H. (1958) 'On the origin of the genitive absolute', *Arctos* 2: 187–207.
- (1969) 'Genitive absolute and Platonic style', *Arctos* NS 6: 121–31.
- Törzsök, J. (2007) *Friendly Advice/King Vikrama's Adventures*. New York.
- Tubb, G. and E. Boose (2007) *Scholastic Sanskrit*. New York.
- Uhlir, G. (1883) *Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica* (Grammatici Graeci I.1). Leipzig.
- Vahlen, J. (1903) *Ennianae poesis reliquiae*. Leipzig.
- Vaillant, A. (1948) *Manuel du vieux slave*. Paris.
- Van Valin, R. (2001) *An Introduction to Syntax*. Cambridge and New York.
- (2005) *Exploring the Syntax–Semantics Interface*. Cambridge and New York.
- Vasilaros, G. N. (1993) *Der Gebrauch des Genitivus Absolutus bei Apollonios Rhodios im Verhältnis zu Homer*. Athens.
- Vasudeva, S. (2006) *Kālidāsa's Recognition of Śakuntalā*. New York.
- Ventris, M. and J. Chadwick (1974) *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*, 2nd edn. Cambridge.
- Vermeer, H. J. (1963) *Adjektivische und verbale Farbausdrücke in den indogermanischen Sprachen mit ē-Verben*. Heidelberg.
- Vetter, E. (1953) *Handbuch der italischen Dialekte*. Heidelberg.
- Vilborg, E. (1960) *A Tentative Grammar of Mycenaean Greek*. Göteborg.
- Volkman, R. (1885) *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht*, 2nd edn. Leipzig.
- Waanders, F. M. J. (1997) *Studies in Local Case Relations in Mycenaean Greek*. Amsterdam.
- Wackernagel, J. (1926) *Vorlesungen über Syntax*, vol. I, 2nd edn. Basel.
- (1928) *Vorlesungen über Syntax*, vol. II, 2nd edn. Basel.
- Warren, B. (1984) *Classifying Adjectives*. Göteborg.
- Wecklein, N. (1906) *Euripides Orestes*. Leipzig and Berlin.
- Weihenmajer, E. (1891) *Zur Geschichte des absoluten Partizips im Lateinischen*. Reutlingen.
- Wentzel, E. (1828) *De genitivis et dativis linguae Graecae, quos absolutos vocant*. Diss. Wrocław.
- Wenzel, H. (1879) *Über den Instrumentalis im Rigveda*. Tübingen.
- West, M. (1966) *Hesiod: Theogony*. Oxford.
- (1972) *Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, vol. II. Oxford.
- (1978) *Hesiod: Works and Days*. Oxford.
- (2000) *Homeri Ilias*, vol. II. Munich and Leipzig.
- Whaley, L. (1990) 'The effect of non-surface grammatical relations on the genitive absolute in Koine Greek', in *Grammatical Relations: A*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cross-Theoretical Perspective*, eds. K. Dziwirek, P. Farrell and E. Mejías-Bikandi. Stanford: 459–71.
- Whatmough, J. (1952) Review of Aalto (1949), *Classical Philology* 47: 182–3.
- Whitney, W. D. (1924) *Sanskrit Grammar*, 5th edn. Leipzig.
- Wifstrand, A. (1956) ‘Dativus absolutus im Griechischen’, *Classica et Mediaevalia* 17: 163–71.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von (1916) *Die Ilias und Homer*. Berlin.
- Wilkins, C. (1808) *A Grammar of the Sanskrit Language*. London.
- Wilson, H. H. (1841) *An Introduction to the Grammar of the Sanskrit Language*. London.
- Wodtko, D., B. Irslinger and C. Schneider (2008) *Nomina im Indogermanischen Lexikon*. Heidelberg.
- Wölfflin, E. (1904) ‘Der Gebrauch des Ablativus absolutus’, *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie* 13: 271–407.
- Wooster, C. (2005) *Living with Sheep: Everything You Need to Know to Raise Your Own Flock*. Guilford, CT.
- Yates, W. (1820) *A Grammar of the Sanscrit Language, on a New Plan*. Kolkata.
- Zeegers-Vander Vorst, N. (1991) ‘Quelques cas de double analyse du participe grec’, in *Etudes de syntaxe du grec classique*, ed. M. Biraud. Nice: 155–70.
- Ziegler, S. (2002) ‘Zur Entstehung des locativus absolutus im Altindischen’, in *Indogermanische Syntax: Fragen und Perspektiven*, ed. H. Hettrich. Wiesbaden: 79–86.
- Zimmer, S. (1985) ‘Die Gebrauchsweisen des adnominalen Genetivs im Tocharischen’, in *Grammatische Kategorien*, eds. B. Schlerath and V. Rittner. Wiesbaden: 560–574.

INDEX OF CITED PASSAGES

- Aeschylus: A. 841, 115, 195
Aitareya Brāhmaṇa: 1.15.6, 158; 4.9.2, 156, 209
 Alcaeus: frg. 117b.30–1, 75
- Bhagavad Gītā*: 1.39, 159; 2.20, 148, 171; 8.20, 148; 13.28, 148
- Caesar: *Gal.* 2.12.2, 84; *Gal.* 2.8.3, 85; *Gal.* 2.8.5, 89; *Gal.* 2.22.1, 89; *Gal.* 3.19.6, 104, 105; *Gal.* 4.14.2, 104; *Gal.* 5.2.1, 1, 84
 Callinus: frg. 1 9–11, 74
 Cato: *Agr.* 5.4, 113; *Agr.* 26, 87; *Agr.* 29, 113; *Agr.* 37, 87; *Agr.* 40.1, 113; *Agr.* 50.1, 87, 90, 113, 174, 208; *Agr.* 131, 14, 84, 87; frg. 145 (Cugusi), 85, 109
 Cato the Elder, 87, 88, 113, 217
 Cicero: *Amic.* 25, 100; *Att.* 1.14.3, 114; *Att.* 2.1.6, 98; *Att.* 4.3.2, 118; *Att.* 9.14.2, 99; *Att.* 9.14, 77; *Att.* 10.11.3, 96; *Brut.* 32, 86; *Brut.* 39, 117; *Fam.* 12.7.1, 95; *Fin.* 5.73, 104; *Inv.* 2.34, 89; *Leg.* 2.29, 103, 105; *Leg.* 3.37, 96; *Off.* 1.157, 104, 126, 179; *Off.* 3.86, 106; *Off.* 3.104, 85; *Orat.* 1.35, 101; *Part.* 82, 95; *Phil.* 1.24, 100; *Phil.* 9.7, 98; *Pis.* 17, 104; *Quinct.* 19, 95; *Ver.* 2.2.190, 95
CIL: I².577.1 99; I².585 (*Lex Agraria*), 117, 121
- Ennius: Ach. viii (Vahlen)/Ach. vi (Jocelyn), 87; Epigr. 1 3–4 (Vahlen), 92; Thyestes 36 (Vahlen) = 299 (Jocelyn), 86
- Herodotus: 1.153, 1; 2.7, 185; 3.23, 52
 Hesiod, 68–73; *Op.* 414–17, 71; *Op.* 502–3, 70; *Op.* 547, 70, 174, 209; *Op.* 552–3, 71; *Op.* 568–9, 70; *Op.* 664, 209, 210; *Op.* 744–5, 69; *Op.* 797–9, 205; *Sc.* 64–5, 72; *Sc.* 152–3, 72; *Sc.* 362–3, 72; *Th.* 58–60, 206; *Th.* 705, 69; *Th.* 842–3, 69
- Homer: *Il.* 1.88–9, 9, 37, 47, 73; *Il.* 1.301, 37, 116, 195; *Il.* 1.430, 63; *Il.* 1.592–3, 78, 178, 228; *Il.* 1.601–2, 78, 215; *Il.* 2.182, 53; *Il.* 2.550–1, 55, 153; *Il.* 2.63, 53; *Il.* 2.94–5, 40; *Il.* 4.496–7, 40; *Il.* 6.134–5, 38; *Il.* 8.118, 17, 18, 41, 213; *Il.* 8.521–2, 73; *Il.* 8.538, 47, 176, 208; *Il.* 9.426, 47; *Il.* 9.618, 78, 215, 228; *Il.* 9.682, 78; *Il.* 10.355–6, 51, 57, 73; *Il.* 10.512, 53; *Il.* 11.458, 37; *Il.* 11.508–9, 42; *Il.* 11.685, 78; *Il.* 12.392, 78, 179, 212; *Il.* 13.83–4, 68; *Il.* 13.94, 193; *Il.* 13.408–10, 44, 175; *Il.* 13.571–2, 67; *Il.* 13.660, 78; *Il.* 14.23–4, 185; *Il.* 14.25–6, 58, 60; *Il.* 14.26, 62; *Il.* 14.173–4, 19, 222, 224; *Il.* 14.96–101, 47, 49; *Il.* 14.96–7, 42; *Il.* 14.289, 116; *Il.* 15.328, 47; *Il.* 15.363–4, 67; *Il.* 15.547–8, 36, 48; *Il.* 15.573, 40; *Il.* 16.61–2, 49; *Il.* 16.168–98, 67; *Il.* 16.530–1, 59; *Il.* 17.393, 47; *Il.* 18.61–2, 9, 38; *Il.* 18.442–3, 9, 38, 49; *Il.* 18.604–6, 50, 57; *Il.* 18.606, 56; *Il.* 19.74–5, 13, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 57; *Il.* 19.162, 78; *Il.* 19.210, 47; *Il.* 19.273, 73, 116, 195; *Il.* 20.403–5, 51, 57; *Il.* 20.413–14, 58; *Il.* 22.287–8, 43; *Il.* 22.383–4, 39, 47; *Il.* 22.401–3, 39; *Il.* 22.431–2, 43, 176; *Il.* 23.385, 62; *Il.* 23.520–1, 48, 49; *Il.* 24.288–90, 37; *Il.* 24.243–4, 43; *Il.* 24.289, 47, 195; *Il.* 24.558, 9; *Il.* 24.600, 78; *Il.* 24.713, 78; *Od.* 1.16–18, 55, 206; *Od.* 1.91, 52; *Od.* 1.390, 40, 51, 57, 75; *Od.* 3.138, 78; *Od.* 4.17–19, 50, 57; *Od.* 4.392–3, 59, 191; *Od.* 4.833, 9; *Od.* 4.407, 78; *Od.* 4.646,

INDEX OF CITED PASSAGES

- 37, 58, 63; *Od.* 4.833–4, 38, 49; *Od.* 5.287, 47; *Od.* 6.155–7, 50, 53, 59; *Od.* 6.31, 78; *Od.* 7.222, 78; *Od.* 9.161, 78; *Od.* 9.256–7, 50, 53, 59; *Od.* 9.405, 195; *Od.* 9.458–9, 59; *Od.* 9.550–1, 39; *Od.* 9.556, 78; *Od.* 10.183, 78; *Od.* 10.419, 179; *Od.* 10.476, 78; *Od.* 10.498, 9; *Od.* 11.248–9, 55, 209; *Od.* 11.294–5, 55; *Od.* 12.24, 78; *Od.* 12.29, 78; *Od.* 12.393–5, 55; *Od.* 14.7–8, 55; *Od.* 14.44, 9; *Od.* 14.161, 209; *Od.* 14.293–4, 55, 206; *Od.* 14.449–50, 55; *Od.* 14.526–7, 37, 59; *Od.* 15.396, 78; *Od.* 16.270, 78; *Od.* 16.275, 47; *Od.* 16.372–3, 43; *Od.* 16.438–9, 9, 37, 48; *Od.* 17.231–2, 59; *Od.* 17.296–7, 23, 36, 55, 77, 90, 175; *Od.* 17.435, 78; *Od.* 17.570, 78; *Od.* 17.582, 78; *Od.* 18.267–8, 48, 49, 191, 223; *Od.* 19.424, 78; *Od.* 20.207, 9; *Od.* 20.232, 47; *Od.* 20.311–13, 58; *Od.* 20.312–13, 47; *Od.* 20.317–19, 60; *Od.* 22.17–19, 59, 63; *Od.* 24.534–5, 44, 50, 53, 57
- Horace: *Ep.* 1.10.50, 86
- Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa: 1.245, 158
- Kālidāsa: *Abhi.* Prologue 1.13–14, 132; *Ku.* 2.53, 142; *Ku.* 4.19.2, 142; *Ku.* 4.31, 147; *Ku.* 5.57, 157; *Ku.* 7.6, 157, 169; *Ku.* 8.71, 147, 170, 224; *Ku.* 8.84.2, 155
- Kāśikā: ad Pāṇini 2.3.37, 162
- Kathāsaritsāgara: 29, 119, 188
- Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa: 7.10, 186, 209, 210
- Livy: 21.1.5, 98, 179
- Naevius: *car.* fr. 4 (Baehrens), 95
- Nepos: *Alcib.* 15.4, 106, 107
- New Testament: Mark 16:2, 178, 180
- Ovid: *Fasti.* 6.579, 110; *Met.* 1.322–3, 112; *Met.* 1.454, 223; *Met.* 12.228, 114
- Pāṇini: 2.3.7, 161; 2.3.9, 161; 2.3.36, 161; 2.3.36–39, 167; 2.3.37, 161; 2.3.43, 161
- Pindar: *O.* 3.39, 75; *P.* 5.3, 75
- Plato: *Ap.* 27b, 221; *Ap.* 27c, 38; *Lg.* 942b1, 220; *Tim.* 92a, 31
- Plautus: *Am.* 188–9, 24, 67, 87; *Am.* 217, 118; *Am.* 290, 194; *Am.* 366–9, 94; *Am.* 654–6, 87; *Am.* 826, 114; *Am.* 1093–4, 91; *Aul.* 98–9, 84; *Aul.* 744, 114; *Aul.* 756–7, 114; *Bac.* 336, 122; *Bac.* 338, 106; *Bac.* 367, 99; *Bac.* 419, 85, 114; *Bac.* 424, 77, 98, 179; *Bac.* 625, 103; *Bac.* 1070–1, 87; *Bac.* 1101–2, 93; *Capt.* 739, 114; *Cas.* 423, 114; *Cist.* 144, 99; *Cist.* 163, 86; *Cur.* 31, 91; *Cur.* 302, 100; *Epid.* 533, 189; *Epid.* 695, 113; *frg.* 24, 85, 117; *Men.* 269, 189; *Men.* 469–70, 84; *Men.* 492, 176, 187; *Men.* 1133, 93; *Mos.* 563, 114; *Mos.* 916, 12, 118, 119, 120; *Mos.* 1121, 186; *Per.* 198, 95; *Per.* 753–6, 87, 93, 114, 126; *Poen.* 524–5, 87; *Poen.* 1207, 114; *Ps.* 50, 100; *Ps.* 786, 92; *Rud.* 712, 114; *Rud.* 783, 114; *Rud.* 796, 85, 108, 114; *St.* 132, 108, 114; *St.* 281, 103; *Trin.* 869, 103; *Truc.* 75, 86, 87; *Truc.* 759, 92
- Pliny the Elder: *Nat.* 11.54, 85
- Rāmāyaṇa: 1.28.5, 143; 1.36.1, 170; 1.57.9, 216; 1.9.28, 170; 2.6.5, 157, 169; 2.8.14, 217; 2.37.18, 187; 2.49.7, 170; 2.58.16, 188
- Rigveda: 1.16.3, 140, 170; 1.17.8, 13; 1.23.9, 119; 1.40.2, 144; 1.104.1, 205; 1.116.15, 144; 1.132.5, 144; 1.184.1, 156, 210, 215, 228; 3.15.2, 154, 169, 174; 3.51.11, 146; 3.60.4, 146; 4.6.4, 145; 4.56.3, 150; 5.17.1, 141; 5.54.10, 154; 6.23.1, 123, 140, 174, 212; 6.40.3, 145; 6.45.11, 144; 6.45.13, 144; 6.61.5, 144; 7.63.5, 154; 7.65.1, 154; 7.66.4, .7, .12, 154; 8.1.29, 154, 208; 8.3.5, 140; 8.3.9, 144; 8.7.6, 140; 8.13.13, 31, 154, 208; 8.27.19, 31, 127, 154, 169, 176, 208, 211, 228; 8.27.21, 154, 156, 208; 8.64.6, 146; 9.53.2, 87, 144, 212; 10.21.6, 139, 156; 10.24.5, 148, 226; 10.45.10, 141; 10.61.6, 152; 10.63.14, 144; 10.72.1, 141; 10.88.2, 146; 10.95.7, 7; 10.103.11, 146; 10.130.6, 141; 10.184.3, 150
- Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa: 7.3.2.18, 157; 7.5.2.44, 158

INDEX OF CITED PASSAGES

- SC de Bacchanalibus*: l. 23, 111
 Semonides: frg. 7.110, 75
 Seneca the Elder: *Con.* 10.3.12, 114; *Suas.* 6.24
Siddhānta Kaumudī: ad Pāṇini 2.3.37, 162
 Solon: frg. 10 l.2, 74; frg. 33 l.2, 75
Tabula Bantina 21, 122
Tabula Veliterna 3, 122
Tabulae Iguvinae: 1a₁, 123
 Tacitus: *Ann.* 1.8, 77, 98, 102; *Ann.* 1.19, 99; *Ann.* 1.36, 99
Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa: 2.1.2.7, 176; 2.1.2.12, 154; 3.3.9.12, 157
Taittirīya Saṃhitā: 5.3.1, 190
 Terence: *Ad.* 158, 114; *Ad.* 198, 114; *Ad.* 870–1, 84; *An.* 180, 86; *An.* 603, 114; *An.* 891, 114; *Eu.* 53, 113; *Eu.* 1025, 12; *Hau.* 103, 114; *Hau.* 795, 114; *Hau.* 1041–2, 26; *Hec.* 94, 86; *Hec.* 830, 87; *Ph.* 372, 114
 Theognis: frg. incert. l.1222, 74
 Thucydides: 1.9, 21, 175; 1.124, 38; 2.33, 12; 3.102, 121; 6.33, 36, 77, 180, 214; 7.28, 178
 Tyrtaeus: frg. 11 l.14, 74
Videvda 4.20, 178
 Xenophon: *An.* 1.10, 78; *An.* 1.4, 78; *An.* 7.7, 78, 179; *Hell.* 4.3.13, 78

GENERAL INDEX

- ab urbe condita* construction, 27, 77, 102, 177–85, 216
- ablative absolute
- ambiguities in, 89–97
 - and the ablative of attendant circumstance, 91, 93, 94, 96
 - and the ablative of quality, 93
 - awareness of, 94
 - comitative-instrumental, 88, 117
 - development, 88, 219
 - in Classical Latin, 88
 - locative, 124
 - ‘military’ type of, 87, 89, 93
 - nominal (adjectival), 115
 - nominal (substantival), 121
- absolute, use of the term, 4–6
- absolute constructions
- ambiguities in, 38–41, 89–97, 139–53, 222–4
 - as finite-clause equivalents, 9, 14, 21, 35, 38, 65, 68, 175, 222, 227
 - collections of, 28
 - definition of, 14, 30
 - limitations on, 50, 68, 153, 214
 - prior study of, 4–28
 - translation of, 9–11, 77, 140, 145, 146
 - vs. conjunct participles, 52, 64, 67
- accusative absolute, 16, 222
- ἀέκων/ἄκων/ἐκών, 115, 194
- ambiguity, 38–41, 89–97, 139–53, 222–4
- Carey, William, 165
- Classical Greek, the genitive absolute in, 20, 34, 35, 80
- Classical Latin, the ablative absolute in, 89
- comparative method, 172
- dative absolute, supposed, 185–6
- dawn, 78, 89, 134, 156, 158, 164, 182, 209, 210, 215, 228
- dominant qualifier, 13, 28, 83, 97–108, 125, 176–92, 226, 228
- genitive, temporal, 12, 20, 34, 90, 175, 204, 219
- genitive absolute
- ambiguities in, 38–41, 222–3
 - and conjunct participles, 46
 - clause-like, 37
 - development, 222
 - in Classical Greek, 20, 34, 35, 80
 - in Hesiod, 68–73
 - limitations on, 50, 68
 - semantics, 42–4
 - transitive, 50–7
 - vs. conjunct participles, 57–64
- genitive absolute (Sanskrit), 165
- gerundives, 102–8, 178
- Hanxleden, Johann, 165, 167
- instrumental absolute, supposed, 186–9
- Italic, 122–3
- locative absolute
- ambiguities in, 139–53
 - development, 217
 - native/Indian perspective of, 159–65
 - parallel to non-absolute expressions of time, 140, 144, 156, 158, 159, 168, 208
 - vs. spatio-temporal locative, 145
 - vs. spatial locative, 153
 - vs. temporal locative, 143
 - Western perspective of, 138, 165–8
- locative case, 143
- Sanskrit, 134–7

GENERAL INDEX

- Mycenaean, 33
- natural time, expressions of, 31, 68, 70, 71, 72, 124, 153–6, 158, 169, 207, 208, 211
- obligatory qualifier, 14, 78, 83, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97–108, 116, 121, 125, 142, 176–92, 209, 227
- Pāṇini, 129, 159–65, 167, 171
- Paulinus a Sancto Bartholomeo, 165, 167
- qualifier *see* dominant qualifier, obligatory qualifier
- Roth, Pater Heinrich, 165, 166
- *sens*, 121
- Shield of Heracles*, authenticity of, 72
- sun, 31, 78, 101, 151, 153–6, 169, 174, 178, 208, 210, 211
- translation, 9–11, 77, 97, 105, 139, 146

